# The European Champions Report 2018

footballbenchmark.com

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# What is KPMG Football Benchmark?

Consolidated and verified database of football clubs' financial and operational performance.

Daily updated and historical tracking of football clubs’ social media performance.

Business intelligence tool enabling relevant comparisons with competitors.

An ever-growing platform that includes financial and operational data from over 200 European and South American football clubs and social media information for 500+ clubs and 2,000+ footballers.

footballbenchmark.com

# Foreword

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The 2016/17 season witnessed some historical on-pitch achievements, with the usual suspects and few newbies sitting at the table of the European champions. LaLiga winners Real Madrid CF confirmed their pride as "most winning football club in the world", winning back-to-back UEFA Champions League for the first time in modern times against Juventus FC. The *Bianconeri* did not abdicate their domestic dominance, lifting their sixth consecutive Serie A title, but fell short of the biggest prize for the second time in three years.

As new entries in our report, FC Spartak Moscow, representing the biggest European country by population, and Feyenoord Rotterdam, celebrated a long-awaited triumph in the Russian Premier League and Eredivisie, respectively. However, the headline story of the past football season was undoubtedly the Ligue 1 triumph of AS Monaco FC, who were capable of emerging as champions after 17 years against all the odds; the *Monegasques'* domestic campaign, with the addition of an impressive Champions League ride until the semi-finals, was the umpteenth demonstration of how a well-coached club can overachieve even in the least foreseeable circumstances.

**In the second edition of "The European Champions Report", KPMG's Football Benchmark team highlights and compares the financial performance of the domestic champions of 12 European leagues**, representing both the elite and lesser-known football markets. More specifically, we focus on *AS Monaco FC, Beşiktaş JK, Chelsea FC, FC Bayern München, FC Spartak Moscow, Feyenoord Rotterdam, Juventus FC, Real Madrid CF, SL Benfica*, while disclosing less information regarding other national champions: *Celtic FC, FC Basel 1893 and FC Viitorul Constanța*. For the second consecutive season, KPMG's report does not feature the biggest club by operating revenues, Manchester United FC, that reported GBP 581 million (EUR 676 million[1]), as the club finished in fifth position in the 2016/17 football season.

Football is a growing business, and the trend is confirmed by the fact that **all the clubs but two** (FC Bayern München and FC Basel 1893) **increased their operating revenues year-on-year in local currency**[2]. The Spanish giants are the richest champions flaunting a total revenue of EUR 671 million; however, taking into account the year-on-year growth, AS Monaco FC make the headlines again with an impressive 86%, followed by Scottish side Celtic FC (52%). Most prominently for mid-size clubs, participation in the top flight UEFA competition massively impacts not only the broadcasting segment, but also matchday (due to more fixtures played at home ground) and commercial (from sponsorship bonuses). Unsurprisingly, AS Monaco FC (45%) and Celtic FC (30%) are also the two clubs with the highest "UEFA-dependence" in our report.

Digitalisation is gaining relevance year after year, with football clubs trying to reach out to fans from all over the world in a "think global – act local" strategy, engaging them with tailored content, behind-the-scenes news and rewarding programmes. **The social media follower base's ranking[3] is topped again by *Los Blancos*, being the most followed club on social media with almost three times as**

1 In order to conduct cross-league analysis and comparison, where the local currency is not EUR, for the purposes of this report all local currency figures have been converted using the average exchange rate for the 12 months prior to 30 June 2017.
2 After conversion in EUR, Chelsea FC also show a decrease.
3 Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube combined.

**many followers as second-placed Chelsea FC**. On the other hand, some football players show staggering figures, as their social media reach is sometimes even bigger than that of the club for which they ply their trade: a phenomenon true for Cristiano Ronaldo (Real Madrid CF), James Rodríguez (FC Bayern München), David Luiz (Chelsea FC), Falcao (AS Monaco FC) and Pepe (Beşiktaş JK).

One of the main challenges affecting football clubs in recent years has concerned the sustainability of their business. Despite eye-catching transfer deals and spiralling staff costs, the industry is headed towards a direction where being profitable is not a chimera anymore; indeed, **all the European champions included in this report have scored an after-tax profit at the end of the 2016/17 season**[4]. In this scenario, clubs excelling at player development and trading are likely to have a competitive edge. Juventus FC, Chelsea FC and SL Benfica represent the three best examples in this regard, as the profits on the disposals of Pogba, Oscar, Gonçalo Guedes and Lindelof, respectively, played a fundamental role in scoring a bottom-line profit at the end of the financial year. On the other hand, **Real Madrid CF and FC Basel 1893 are the only clubs that decreased their bottom-line results, by 29% and 10% respectively**. While for the Swiss champions the main reason can be attributable to lower proceeds from player trading activities, for the *Merengues* the *quadruble* of trophies caused a significant rise in staff costs (32%).

We hope that you enjoy this year's report and would like to invite you to visit **footballbenchmark.com**, KPMG's football business intelligence tool in order to find more detailed information for these and many other football clubs.



4 For FC Spartak Moscow such information was not available at the date of publication.

# Highlights

## Total operating revenue ranking and y-o-y change

EUR million




| Club | Total operating revenue (EUR million) | y-o-y change | Matchday (%) | Broadcasting (%) | Commercial and Other (%) | UEFA Dependence (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real Madrid CF | 671 | 8% | 21 | 37 | 42 | 12 |
| FC Bayern München | 588 | -1% | 17 | 25 | 58 | 9 |
| Chelsea FC | 420 | -4% | 18 | 45 | 37 | Did not participate |
| Juventus FC | 412 | 21% | 14 | 57 | 29 | 27 |
| Beşiktaş JK | 145 | 43% | 13 | 48 | 39 | 28 |
| AS Monaco FC | 144 | 86% | 6 | 76 | 18 | 45 |
| SL Benfica | 128 | 2% | 19 | 55 | 26 | 22 |
| Celtic FC | 105 | 52% | 42 | 40 | 18 | 30 |
| Feyenoord Rotterdam | 69 | 13% | 28 | 14 | 58 | 8 |
| FC Basel 1893 | 62 | -4% | 47 | 26 | 27 | 26 |
| FC Spartak Moscow | 60 | 22% | 20 | 5 | 75 | 0.5 |
| FC Viitorul Constanța | 3 | | 7 | 75 | 18 | N/A |

*Source: KPMG Football Benchmark*

# Key Performance Indicators

## AS Monaco FC

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 9,499 |
| Utilisation ratio | 58% |
| Total staff costs | 98.8 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 0.1 |
| | EUR m |

## Beşiktaş JK

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 30,193 |
| Utilisation ratio | 72% |
| Total staff costs | 70.3 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 1.3 |
| | EUR m |

## Celtic FC

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 48,742 |
| Utilisation ratio | 81% |
| Total staff costs | 62.2 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 8.0 |
| | EUR m |

## Chelsea FC

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 41,508 |
| Utilisation ratio | 100% |
| Total staff costs | 255.4 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 17.7 |
| | EUR m |

## FC Basel 1893

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 26,484 |
| Utilisation ratio | 69% |
| Total staff costs | 31.7 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 4.7 |
| | EUR m |

## FC Bayern München

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 75,000 |
| Utilisation ratio | 100% |
| Total staff costs | 264.9 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 39.2 |
| | EUR m |

## FC Spartak Moscow

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 32,760 |
| Utilisation ratio | 73% |
| Total staff costs | N/A |
| Profit/Loss after tax | N/A |
| | EUR m |

## FC Viitorul Constanța

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 2,083 |
| Utilisation ratio | 46% |
| Total staff costs | 3.0 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 0.4 |
| | EUR m |

## Feyenoord Rotterdam

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 47,500 |
| Utilisation ratio | 93% |
| Total staff costs | 36.5 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 6.2 |
| | EUR m |

## Juventus FC

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 39,489 |
| Utilisation ratio | 95% |
| Total staff costs | 261.8 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 42.6 |
| | EUR m |

## Real Madrid CF

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 68,896 |
| Utilisation ratio | 85% |
| Total staff costs | 406.1 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 21.4 |
| | EUR m |

## SL Benfica

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 55,994 |
| Utilisation ratio | 86% |
| Total staff costs | 74.7 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 44.5 |
| | EUR m |

*Source: KPMG Football Benchmark*

**Social media follower base – Big 5 leagues (million, 1st December 2017)**

**Country's UEFA coefficient**




**Social media follower base – Other leagues (million, 1st December 2017)**

**Country's UEFA coefficient**




*Source: KPMG Football Benchmark*

# Ligue 1

AS MONACO FC

## AS Monaco FC: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Matchday | 8.1 | YoY Operating revenues growth ↑ 86% |
| Broadcasting | 109.6 | |
| Commercial & Other | 26.3 | |
| **Total Operating Revenues** | **144.0** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Total Staff costs | 98.8 | Staff costs / Operating revenues 69% |

| | |
|---|---|
| Pre-tax profit/loss | 0.1 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 0.1 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Average attendance | 9,499 | Utilisation rate 58% |
| Stadium capacity | 16,500 | |

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — N/A EUR m
Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 273 EUR m
Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

**Social Media Followers**
Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | **5.00** million |
| Twitter | **2.05** million |
| Instagram | **0.77** million |
| YouTube | **0.06** million |
| **Total** | **7.88** million |

**Most followed player**

Falcao **37.36** million

# AS Monaco FC

Breaking Paris Saint-Germain FC's four-year monopoly and emerging as champions for the eighth occasion in their history—and for the first time in 17 years—**AS Monaco FC's Ligue 1 triumph was one of European football's headline stories in 2016/17**. With the addition of an impressive UEFA Champions League campaign that ended in the semi-finals, last season was one to remember for the *Monegasques*.

Such results were even more notable given the relatively limited resources AS Monaco FC had at their disposal. Indeed, operating revenues of EUR 144 million (an 86% year-on-year increase) represented around one-fourth of Paris Saint-Germain FC's revenues and were also lower than the EUR 198 million enjoyed by Olympique Lyon.

The key driver behind the highest revenue growth in this year's report was due to participation in the Champions League after a year of absence: unsurprisingly, **the EUR 65 million in UEFA distributions represented almost half of the entire operating income of the club**. As a consequence, matchday and broadcasting revenues skyrocketed by 128% and 143%, respectively.

In addition to that, stadium performance was also driven by these positive results, as average attendance rose by 21% and stadium utilisation increased to 58%, a figure that remains far below the level of the European football superpowers.

While staff costs increased by 20% to EUR 98.8 million, the above-mentioned revenue increase clearly outpaced it, meaning that **the staff costs/revenue ratio decreased from 107% to a more sustainable 69%**. In terms of sustainability, the club agreed upon a settlement agreement with UEFA in May 2014 following their failure to comply with Financial Fair Play break-even requirements. Also thanks to a positive bottom-line result this year, **at the end of the season UEFA confirmed that AS Monaco FC had complied with the targets set for 2016/17** and will exit the settlement regime if they also comply in 2017/18.

Another achievement of AS Monaco FC, which represents a significant part of their core business, relates to an impressive culture of nurturing talent. At the end of the 2016/17 season the market value of the squad almost doubled year-on-year, despite the disposal of two of their best players, Anthony Martial and Layvin Kurzawa. This was consistent with the strategy of recent years in which the club built a squad of affordable players to be sold later at a premium[1]. It remains to be seen whether, after a successful season followed by the disposal of talents such as Kylian Mbappé and Bernardo Silva, AS Monaco FC will be able to increase the value of the squad and remain competitive on the pitch.

The first half of the 2017/18 season has been somewhat below par for the Monegasques, with a winless Champions League group stage that resulted in an exit from all UEFA competitions by December, something that will significantly affect this year's financial results. However, should the club secure a top three position in the domestic table, it would guarantee access to next year's Champions League, which would once more reap benefits in terms of finance and exposure from participating in Europe's premier club competition.

1 AS Monaco FC featured fifth in KPMG's "The Player Trading Game 2017", in which we examine the best-performing European clubs regarding player trading activities.

# Süper Lig

## Beşiktaş JK: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Matchday | 19.0 | YoY Operating revenues growth 43% |
| Broadcasting | 69.1 | |
| Commercial & Other | 57.0 | |
| **Total Operating Revenues** | **145.1** | |
| Total Staff costs | 70.3 | Staff costs / Operating revenues 48% |
| Pre-tax profit/loss | 2.0 | |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 1.3 | |
| Average attendance | 30,193 | Utilisation rate 72% |
| Stadium capacity | 42,000 | |

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — 219 EUR m
Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 120 EUR m
Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

**Social Media Followers**
Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | **6.0** million |
| Twitter | **3.5** million |
| Instagram | **1.7** million |
| YouTube | **0.1** million |
| **Total** | **11.4** million |

**Most followed player**
Pepe — **21.6** million

# Beşiktaş JK

Beşiktaş JK secured their second consecutive title—and their 15th overall—at the end of the 2016/17 season, their first full campaign at the club's new Vodafone Arena.

Unlike in the previous year, **the club took part in the UEFA Champions League group stage** and were later eliminated in the quarter finals of the UEFA Europa League, **a major contributor to the 43% year-on-year operating revenue increase, which was up to a record EUR 145.1 million**.

More home matches drove the 28% growth in matchday income, while broadcasting income witnessed the highest rise (61%) thanks to UEFA distributions, which amounted to approximately EUR 40 million. **UEFA revenues represented almost one third of total operating revenues**, underlining the importance of Champions League participation for clubs from smaller media markets. However, thanks to a new, five-year domestic TV deal worth USD 600 million per annum kicking off from the current 2017/18 season, the club will be in the position to better exploit the domestic market. Finally, the club's commercial space also showed a positive trend with a 32% increase, mainly thanks to improved licensing and royalties, more remunerative sponsorships and stadium naming rights.

**The first full season at the new venue was a success, as both average attendance and stadium utilisation rose by 62% and 37%, respectively**. The new Beşiktaş JK stadium is part of a wider sporting infrastructure plan being implemented by the Turkish Football Federation, namely the "30 stadiums in 27 cities" project. Since 2012 Turkey has built nine new venues—the highest number in Europe—something that can significantly improve matchday experience as well as the overall awareness and profile of the entire league. It also better positions Turkey to host major international competitions in the foreseeable future.

Despite a 16% increase in staff costs, **the staff costs/revenues ratio decreased to 48%, the second-lowest among the clubs covered in our report**. On top of that, both pre and after tax profits were positive (EUR 2 million and EUR 1.3 million, respectively), which meant the club met the financial measures set up in the Settlement Agreement agreed upon with UEFA of having a maximum break-even deficit of minus EUR 10 million.

However, at the end of the season UEFA stated that the club only partially fulfilled the overall targets set for 2016/17. As a consequence, the envisaged conditional sporting measures, such as the limit on the number of players that may be included in the UEFA List A and the transfer restrictions, will not be lifted and will continue to apply until 2018/19 as specified in the agreement.

In the current season, Beşiktaş JK lost the Turkish Super Cup but advanced to the Champions League Round of 16, their best European Cup campaign since 1986/87 and a result that will reap even more positive financial results at the end of 2017/18. On the other hand, in case the club will not be able to reach a position in the league table that would guarantee participation in next year's main international competition, this might hamper their progress towards full compliance with UEFA Financial Fair Play.


*Credits: Beşiktaş JK*

# Premier League

## Chelsea FC: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | **76.2** |
| Broadcasting | **188.9** |
| Commercial & Other | **155.1** |
| **Total Operating Revenues** | **420.0** |

YoY Operating revenues growth -4%

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Staff costs | **255.4** |

Staff costs / Operating revenues 61%

| | |
|---|---|
| Pre-tax profit/loss | **18.2** |
| Profit/Loss after tax | **17.7** |

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | **41,508** |
| Stadium capacity | **41,631** |

Utilisation rate 100%

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — 1,599 **EUR m**

Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 508 **EUR m**

Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

### Social Media Followers

Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | **47.9** million |
| Twitter | **13.8** million |
| Instagram | **10.5** million |
| YouTube | **0.7** million |
| **Total** | **72.9** million |

**Most followed player**

David Luiz — **51.8** million

Note: Figures refer to Chelsea FC plc. Consolidated data were not available at the date of publication.

# Chelsea FC

After a disappointing 2015/2016 season, the Blues bounced back in the English Premier League, winning the title with the most points (93) in the competition's history. After finishing 10th the previous year, the club did not have the opportunity to compete in Europe but they also reached the FA Cup final, where they lost against Arsenal FC.

Financially, **Chelsea FC earned operating revenues of GBP 361.3 million** (EUR 420 million[1]), **a 9.8% year-on-year increase in local currency** (4% decrease in EUR). The differential from the club's announcement is mainly attributable to the impact of Brexit, which has been the catalyst for a significant drop in the GBP/EUR exchange rate.

The club's biggest revenue generator was the broadcasting stream. With the new domestic TV deal kicking off in the Premier League, Chelsea FC secured EUR 188.9 million from centrally-distributed revenues, the highest in the league. However, their absence from UEFA competitions significantly limited the possibility to further exploit this source of income.

**Chelsea FC's commercial activities**, totalling some EUR 155.1 million (the third highest among the clubs in our report), featured several new sponsorship agreements, including Carabao (a new training wear partner), Beats, Hublot and William Hill. In this space, the club **will reap significant rewards from the 2017/18 season as a new, EUR 65 million per year kit sponsorship with Nike got underway**, a figure that doubles the previous deal with adidas.

On the other hand, despite Stamford Bridge being continually sold-out, matchday revenues decreased mainly due to the lack of international fixtures. When the plans to relocate to a new, bigger venue are confirmed, the club will have the chance to leverage this stream and significantly increase matchday revenues.

**Chelsea FC were able to achieve a turnaround on the pitch, going from the 10th place to win the title the very next year without increasing employee expenses, which showed a year-on-year decrease of 14%**. In addition, the disposal of Brazilian playmaker Oscar to Chinese side Shanghai SIPG for a reported EUR 60 million was the key reason behind the **bottom line profit of EUR 17.7 million, a major improvement on last year's loss of EUR 94.3 million**.

Chelsea FC's social media following (+13% year-on-year) is 72.9 million (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube combined), making it the fourth most followed football club in the world.

This season, the club's new signings, headlined by Álvaro Morata and Tiémoué Bakayoko, were not able to consolidate the Blues' position at the top of the Premier League; after the first half of the 2017/18 campaign, another title win would be something of a surprise. On the European stage, the club's return to the Champions League presents a major challenge in 2018 as they face FC Barcelona in the Round of 16.

1 In order to conduct cross-league analysis and comparison, where the local currency is not EUR, for the purposes of this report all local currency figures have been converted using the average exchange rate for the 12 months prior to 30 June 2017.

# Bundesliga

## FC Bayern München: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | **97.7** |
| Broadcasting | **146.7** |
| Commercial & Other | **343.5** |
| Total Operating Revenues | **587.9** |

YoY Operating revenues growth: -1%

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Staff costs | **264.9** |

Staff costs / Operating revenues: 45%

| | |
|---|---|
| Pre-tax profit/loss | **66.2** |
| Profit/Loss after tax | **39.2** |

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | **75,000** |
| Stadium capacity | **75,000** |

Utilisation rate: 100%

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — 2,445 **EUR m**

Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 543 **EUR m**

Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

### Social Media Followers

Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | **43.6** million |
| Twitter | **5.6** million |
| Instagram | **11.3** million |
| YouTube | **0.8** million |
| **Total** | **61.4** million |

### Most followed player

James Rodríguez — **81.8** million

# FC Bayern München

FC Bayern München continued to dominate the Bundesliga in 2016/17, winning their fifth consecutive title with a 15-point margin over newly promoted RB Leipzig. However, falling short in the DFB-Pokal (Semi-final) and UEFA Champions League (quarter-finals) was a slight disappointment for the club's fans.

After last season's record business results and growth, **operating revenues** (net of transfer proceeds) **were stable at the end of 2016/17 at EUR 587.9 million**. Despite that, the club were able to significantly increase bottom-line profit by 19%, to EUR 39.2 million.

Unsurprisingly, revenues were driven once more by **commercial income** (EUR 343.5 million, stable from previous year), which **represented 58% of total operating revenues—the highest percentage among the clubs reviewed in this report**. While marketing and sponsorship operations were flat compared to last year (EUR 169.4 million), merchandising witnessed a 10% decrease, to EUR 96.9 million; conversely, FC Bayern München generated higher proceeds from "other revenues", such as the museum and stadium tour, and the club's digital ventures.

Failing to reach the semi-finals of the Champions League for the first time in six years meant that broadcasting revenues stagnated and, despite sell-out crowds at the Allianz Arena, a 4% year-on-year decrease in matchday income, down to EUR 97.7 million, occurred. However, **a tangible boost in broadcasting revenues is expected from the current 2017/18 season, as the much-awaited new Bundesliga domestic broadcasting agreement becomes effective**.

The club's historical ability to operate a sustainable business was underlined again this past year, with a healthy staff costs/operating revenues ratio that remained stable thanks to a negligible 2% rise in employee expenses[1].

The slightly weaker on-pitch performance was reflected in the squad's market value, displaying a 6% decrease year-on-year to EUR 542.7 million. Indeed, last year's transfer windows were relatively quiet for FC Bayern München, the only additions to the first team being German centre-back Mats Hummels and Portuguese talent Renato Sanches.

Looking at social media figures, the Bavarians managed to grow their combined social media followers (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube) by 17%, to 61.4 million. Currently, the most followed player of the club is the newcomer from Real Madrid CF, Colombian playmaker James Rodríguez, with a follower base of 81.8 million that is an impressive 33% higher than the club's own social media audience.

The start to the 2017/18 season was not in keeping with the club's high standards. Italian manager Carlo Ancelotti was replaced at the end of September by Jupp Heynckes, returning for his third spell at the club. Since then, FC Bayern München have managed to assume the leadership in the Bundesliga, but finished second in their Champions League group behind Paris Saint-Germain FC, earning the right to play against Beşiktaş JK in the Round of 16.

1 Total staff costs refer exclusively to parent company FC Bayern München AG. Consolidated data were not available at the date of publication.

**FC Bayern München – Most popular starting XI (Facebook, Twitter and Instagram combined in million)**


Source: KPMG Football Benchmark

# Russian Premier League

## FC Spartak Moscow: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | 12.3 |
| Broadcasting | 2.9 |
| Commercial & Other | 44.9 |
| **Total Operating Revenues** | **60.1** |

YoY Operating revenues growth 22%

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Staff costs | N/A |

Staff costs / Operating revenues N/A

| | |
|---|---|
| Pre-tax profit/loss | N/A |
| Profit/Loss after tax | N/A |

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 32,760 |
| Stadium capacity | 45,000 |

Utilisation rate 73%

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — N/A EUR m

Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 96 EUR m

Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

### Social Media Followers
Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | **0.7** million |
| Twitter | **0.7** million |
| Instagram | **0.3** million |
| YouTube | **0.2** million |
| **Total** | **1.9** million |

**Most followed player**

Luiz Adriano — **0.5** million

# FC Spartak Moscow

FC Spartak Moscow's long-awaited triumph in the Russian Premier League, their first title win since 2001, justified recent investments in a new stadium (inaugurated in the 2014/15 season), academy, museum and training camp. As a result, **operating revenues reached EUR 60.1 million, a significant, 22% year-on-year increase**.

Unlike their European counterparts, the relatively weak domestic broadcasting deal in the Russian Premier League (worth EUR 25.5 million a year and expiring in 2018) did not provide the club with significant resources from this revenue stream.

Indeed, revenues from domestic competition earned the club just EUR 2.6 million, while UEFA prize money amounted to EUR 300,000, as FC Spartak Moscow were eliminated in the third qualifying round of the UEFA Europa League. As a result, the total of EUR 2.9 million represents the second lowest among the clubs featured in this report. However, thanks to their participation in this year's UEFA Champions League group stages, revenues from this stream are likely to benefit from a huge boost.

The new stadium, along with success on the field, produced a twofold result. Firstly, matchday receipts totaled EUR 12.3 million, mainly thanks to a 30% increase from matchday/season tickets; secondly, **attendance at domestic league matches and stadium utilisation both rose by 30%, the second best increase in this report**. The Otkrytie Arena, compliant with modern standards, hosted more than 200 events, including three concerts, with combined attendance totaling more than 600,000 people.

Finally, **the commercial & other revenues segment, at EUR 44.9 million, accounted for the most remunerative stream, contributing 75% of the total**; this notable achievement was the result of improved income from merchandising (+48%) and sponsorships (+42%).

The successful season was also reflected in the market value of the squad—the acquisitions of Russian international Aleksandr Samedov, Brazilian playmaker Fernando and Brazilian striker Luiz Adriano, among others, being the catalyst for a 29% year-on-year increase.

On social media platforms FC Spartak Moscow also reaped the rewards of their first domestic success in 16 years, displaying an impressive 22% growth to 1.9 million, with Instagram showing the most marked rise (74%). With the addition of the local platform VKontakte, the total number of followers increases to 2.7 million.

The 2017/18 season started well, with a victory in the Russian Super Cup against city rivals FC Lokomotiv Moskva and a respectable third place in the Champions League group stage, behind Liverpool FC and Sevilla FC. On the other hand, at the date of publication the club are fighting for a position that would guarantee access to next year's Champions League. Given the importance UEFA revenues have on clubs from smaller TV markets, FC Spartak Moscow will surely fight to maintain their position back to the spotlight.


*Credits: Dreamstime*

# Eredivisie

## Feyenoord Rotterdam: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | 19.5 |
| Broadcasting | 9.3 |
| Commercial & Other | 39.9 |
| **Total Operating Revenues** | **68.7** |

YoY Operating revenues growth: 13%

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Staff costs | 36.5 |

Staff costs / Operating revenues: 53%

| | |
|---|---|
| Pre-tax profit/loss | 6.2 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 6.2 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 47,500 |
| Stadium capacity | 51,177 |

Utilisation rate: 93%

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — N/A EUR m

Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 107 EUR m

Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

### Social Media Followers
Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | 0.62 million |
| Twitter | 0.45 million |
| Instagram | 0.23 million |
| YouTube | 0.05 million |
| **Total** | **1.35 million** |

**Most followed player**

Karim El-Ahmadi — 0.21 million

# Feyenoord Rotterdam

Feyenoord Rotterdam won their first league title in 18 years after a tight 2016/17 Eredivisie season, finally overtaking AFC Ajax by just one point in the final fixture thanks to home idol Dirk Kuyt's hat-trick. On-field success was matched by a **13% year-on-year increase in operating revenues to EUR 68.7 million**.

However, despite these achievements, **the club continue to trail behind the other two domestic superpowers, namely AFC Ajax and PSV Eindhoven**, both of whom are consistently able to generate higher income mainly due to frequent European campaigns.

The key driver behind the growth of operating revenues was UEFA Europa League participation, netting Feyenoord Rotterdam approximately EUR 6 million in prize money. After qualifying for the group stage of the UEFA Champions League for the first time since the 2002/03 season, this figure is expected to grow significantly at the end of this year. **In a smaller TV market such as the Eredivisie**, with a domestic broadcasting deal with Fox running through to 2025, **Dutch clubs need to constantly participate in European competitions in order to keep pace with their international peers**.

The club also managed to increase their other two revenue categories, producing a 21% year-on-year growth in matchday income and 10% rise in commercial revenues. While the former is explained again by receipts from hosting international matches, the latter improved due to merchandising and licensing activities. In the short-term, the new, four-year shirt sponsorship deal with electricity supplier Qurrent, which kicked off in 2017/18, is expected to bring further growth to the commercial stream. Looking at a longer timeframe, plans to develop a new, 63,000-seater stadium should improve the matchday experience and also boost stadium income.

On the operating expenses side, **staff costs carried the burden of the successful campaign, showing 29% year-on-year growth, to EUR 36.5 million**, although not jeopardising the overall financial stability of the Dutch club. Indeed, while the staff costs/revenues ratio increased to a still healthy 53%, the bottom-line result increased by 7%, to EUR 6.2 million.

Behind Feyenoord Rotterdam's success there was also a smart transfer window, highlighted by the signing of Danish striker Nicolai Jørgensen, who became the top scorer in the Eredivisie, with 21 goals. The investments have also paid off when looking at the market value of the squad, which rose dramatically by 64%, to EUR 106.8 million.

The performance of the team has also resulted in greater social media popularity: as of 1 December 2017, Feyenoord had 1.35 million combined followers on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube, which is 29% more than one year ago.

Giovanni van Bronckhorst's Champions League adventure in 2017/18 was cut short after starting with five consecutive defeats, proving how tough it can be for newcomers to perform in top flight football. Furthermore, as things stand at the date of publication, the *Club of the People* face even bigger problems in the Eredivisie, as the club do not feature in the top positions.


*Credits: Feyenoord Rotterdam*

# Serie A

JUVENTUS

## Juventus FC: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Matchday | 58.9 | YoY Operating revenues growth ↑ 21% |
| Broadcasting | 232.8 | |
| Commercial & Other | 119.9 | |
| **Total Operating Revenues** | **411.6** | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Total Staff costs | 261.8 | Staff costs / Operating revenues 64% |

| | |
|---|---|
| Pre-tax profit/loss | 58.4 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 42.6 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Average attendance | 39,489 | Utilisation rate 95% |
| Stadium capacity | 41,500 | |

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — 1,218 EUR m
Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 474 EUR m
Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

### Social Media Followers
Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | **30.5** million |
| Twitter | **6.9** million |
| Instagram | **8.4** million |
| YouTube | **0.6** million |
| **Total** | **46.5** million |

**Most followed player**

Paulo Dybala — **15.9** million

# Juventus FC

Thanks to an impressive European campaign, falling short of winning the UEFA Champions League only in the final against Real Madrid CF, **Juventus FC registered record operating revenues of EUR 411.6 million in 2016/17, representing a 21% year-on-year growth**. Such success is also underlined by the club's share price that more than doubled, to EUR 0.7.

**The Champions League journey was the main driver for a 19% increase in broadcasting revenues**, to EUR 232.8 million, **and for a 34% year-on-year growth in matchday revenues**, to EUR 58.9 million. Furthermore, the *Bianconeri* enjoyed a 17% rise in their commercial stream, mainly thanks to bonuses received from sponsors and improved merchandising and licensing activities. In the commercial space, one of the main limitations moving forward might be the fact that both kit and shirt sponsor contracts expire after the 2020/21 season, meaning the current gap with international rivals may widen.

Juventus FC continued their remarkable domestic dominance, grabbing their sixth consecutive Serie A title and taking home the Coppa Italia for the third season running. Hunger for success is also reflected in the club's transfer activity, as Juventus FC signed, among others, Argentinian striker Gonzalo Higuaín, Brazilian full-back Dani Alves (sold to Paris Saint-Germain last summer), and Bosnian international Miralem Pjanić. Because of this sizeable investment, staff costs rose by 18%, to EUR 261.8 million. However, thanks to the aforementioned 21% rise in operating revenues, the staff costs/revenue ratio remained stable at 64%.

While acquisitions of new star players weighed down Juventus FC's costs, **the once-record sale of Frenchman Paul Pogba to Manchester United FC generated a net profit on his disposal of EUR 72.5 million, the main driver in achieving a record bottom-line profit of EUR 42.6 million at the end of the season—a 10-fold increase on the previous year**.

In the social media space, Juventus FC are the ninth most popular football club in the world in terms of combined social media followers (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube). Now standing at approximately 46 million followers, the club's social media followership grew by 32% from the 2015/16 season. The club's most popular player is Paulo Dybala with 15.9 million social media followers.

Currently, Juventus FC sit in second place in Serie A and finished second in their Champions League group. Summer transfer activity brought in Italian talent Federico Bernardeschi together with experienced internationals Blaise Matuidi and Douglas Costa, while Leonardo Bonucci joined domestic rivals AC Milan. Moving forward, the main question remains: Can the *Old Lady*, after two UEFA Champions League finals lost in three years, become champions on the biggest stage?


*Credits: Juventus FC/LaPresse*

# La Liga

## Real Madrid CF: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | 139.0 |
| Broadcasting | 251.5 |
| Commercial & Other | 280.7 |
| **Total Operating Revenues** | **671.1** |

YoY Operating revenues growth 8%

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Staff costs | 406.1 |

Staff costs / Operating revenues 61%

| | |
|---|---|
| Pre-tax profit/loss | 26.3 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 21.4 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 68,896 |
| Stadium capacity | 81,044 |

Utilisation rate 85%

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — 2,976 EUR m

Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 783 EUR m

Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

### Social Media Followers

Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | **106.1** million |
| Twitter | **45.3** million |
| Instagram | **54.0** million |
| YouTube | **2.6** million |
| **Total** | **208.0** million |

**Most followed player**

Cristiano Ronaldo **304.4** million

# Real Madrid CF

*Los Blancos'* remarkable season was highlighted by something no club has ever achieved in modern times: winning back-to-back UEFA Champions Leagues. On top of that, the club won the *quadruble*, only falling short in the Spanish Cup, where they reached the quarterfinals. Outstanding on-pitch performance also translated into revenue success, resulting in an 8% increase to EUR 671.1 million.

The main source of the revenue increase was the commercial growth of the club (+19% year-on-year), mainly attributable to new sponsorship agreements from a wide range of industries (i.e. gambling, manufacturing, beverage). Bearing this in mind, **the club's commercial stream will most likely witness a further boost over the next season as a new shirt sponsor deal with Fly Emirates**, worth a reported EUR 70 million per campaign, **will kick off**.

On-pitch results are even more impressive if we look at the club's relatively quiet transfer activity, the only major transaction being the return from Juventus FC of Spanish striker Álvaro Morata, who has since been sold to Chelsea FC. However, despite lower investment in the transfer market, success and silverware allowed Zinedine Zidane's team to increase the overall market value of the squad by 12% compared to the previous season (EUR 783 million vs. EUR 700 million).

Winning came at a cost, though, as **Real Madrid CF witnessed a 32% staff costs increase**, which brought the staff cost/revenues ratio up to 61% from last year's 50%. **With total staff costs in excess of EUR 400 million, *Los Blancos* have the highest payroll in world football**. These costs impacted the club's overall profitability, as they registered a bottom-line profit some 29% lower than the previous season's, to EUR 21.4 million.

**Real Madrid CF**'s historical and current triumphs are reflected in their social media performance, as they **are the most popular football club in the world, with an aggregate fan base of more than 208 million followers** across the four main platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube). Their players are similarly popular, with star names like Portugal's Cristiano Ronaldo enjoying more social media followers (in excess of 300 million) than the club for which he plies his trade. Gareth Bale (77 million) and Spain national team's captain Sergio Ramos (58 million), in second and third position respectively, clearly trail behind.

In the current season, Real Madrid CF have had a slow start in both La Liga and the Champions League, but with the UEFA Super Cup and the FIFA Club World Cup already secured, Real Madrid CF will likely need to find more space in their trophy room.

# Primeira Liga

## SL Benfica: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | 24.4 |
| Broadcasting | 70.7 |
| Commercial & Other | 33.1 |
| **Total Operating Revenues** | **128.2** |

YoY Operating revenues growth 2%

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Staff costs | 74.7 |

Staff costs / Operating revenues 58%

| | |
|---|---|
| Pre-tax profit/loss | 45.4 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 44.5 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Average attendance | 55,994 |
| Stadium capacity | 65,000 |

Utilisation rate 86%

**Enterprise Value** 1 Jan. 2017 — 340 EUR m

Source: KPMG Football Club Valuation: The European Elite 2017

**Squad market value** — 203 EUR m

Source: Transfermarkt. Data retrieved at the club's financial year end.

## Social Media Followers
Data retrieved on 1 December 2017

| | |
|---|---|
| Facebook | 3.68 million |
| Twitter | 1.15 million |
| Instagram | 0.75 million |
| YouTube | 0.07 million |
| **Total** | **5.66 million** |

**Most followed player**

Raul Jiménez 5.18 million

# SL Benfica

The domestic dominance of SL Benfica continued in 2016/17 as the club won their fourth consecutive Primeira Liga title while also advancing to the UEFA Champions league Round of 16. Given that SL Benfica also won the *Taça de Portugal*, it is reasonable to assess that on the pitch the season was a success, also underlined by the club's share price increase by 24%, to EUR 1.2.

On the business side, **the Eagles more than doubled last year's after-tax profit to EUR 44.5 million**. Despite stagnating operating revenues of EUR 128.2 million, combined profits over the past four years at SL Benfica have totalled EUR 86 million.

Among SL Benfica's revenue streams, commercial was the only segment displaying a decrease (-8%) from EUR 35.9 million to EUR 33.1 million. As the club's main shirt sponsor deal will expire after the current 2017/18 season, they have the opportunity to build on current income levels.

Broadcasting revenues enabled a substantial offset between lower UEFA income, due to elimination from the Champions League one round earlier than in the 2015/16 season, and the club's new domestic broadcasting deal. As the latter will run through to 2026, European success is a must if the club want to increase this revenue stream.

More positively, stadium performance was notably higher, with matchday revenues registering a 12% growth rate, mainly attributable to proceeds from season tickets and corporate seats. In this regard, the club performed extremely well during the past season, as the stadium utilisation rate grew by 12% to 86% for domestic league matches.

Aligned to the trend across Europe, **SL Benfica's staff costs have increased significantly (+22% year-on-year)** and equally the staff costs/revenues ratio has climbed up to 58%. Despite the costs increase, **the main driver behind SL Benfica's sizeable profit is their business model based on nurturing young players who can be sold at a premium**. Indeed, the club managed to generate the best player trading balance in Europe between 2014/15 and 2015/16 and have followed this strategy in the 2016/17 season, thanks to the profits on the disposals, among others, of Gonçalo Guedes (EUR 26 million net profit) and Victor Lindelof (EUR 23 million net profit).

In the Portuguese social media space, SL Benfica is the second most popular football club after FC Porto in terms of combined social media followers (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube). Now standing at approximately 5.7 million followers, the club's social media presence grew by 15% from the 2015/16 season. The club's most popular player is Mexican forward Raul Jiménez with 5.2 million combined social media followers.

So far in 2017/18, SL Benfica have not been able to match last year's performance. They finished last in their Champions League group with zero points and are currently in third place in the Portuguese Primeira Liga. With the club's business strategy strongly affected by player trading activities, it remains to be seen if SL Benfica's visibility on the international stage can be sustained in the long term.

1 According to KPMG's "The Player Trading Game 2017", in which we examine the best-performing European clubs regarding player trading activities.


*Credits: SL Benfica*

# Other National Champions

## Celtic FC: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | 43.7 |
| Broadcasting | 42.5 |
| Commercial & Other | 19.2 |
| Total Operating Revenues | 105.4 |
| Total Staff costs | 62.2 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 8.0 |
| Average attendance | 48,742 |

YoY Operating revenues growth 52%

Staff costs / Operating revenues 59%

Utilisation rate 81%

## FC Basel 1893: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | 29.6 |
| Broadcasting | 16.0 |
| Commercial & Other | 16.7 |
| Total Operating Revenues | 62.3 |
| Total Staff costs | 31.7 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 4.7 |
| Average attendance | 26,484 |

YoY Operating revenues growth -4%

Staff costs / Operating revenues 51%

Utilisation rate 69%

## FC Viitorul Constanța: Key Performance Indicators
(EUR m, 2016/2017)

| | |
|---|---|
| Matchday | 0.2 |
| Broadcasting | 2.4 |
| Commercial & Other | 0.6 |
| Total Operating Revenues | 3.2 |
| Total Staff costs | 3.0 |
| Profit/Loss after tax | 0.4 |
| Average attendance | 2,083 |

YoY Operating revenues growth N/A

Staff costs / Operating revenues 92%

Utilisation rate 46%

*Credits: Rick Barrett*

**Basis of preparation and limiting conditions**

The foundation of this study is an analysis of the publicly available statutory financial statements ("the Financial Statements") of the professional football clubs selected for the purposes of this report. In respect of each professional football club, all financial figures have been extrapolated from the Financial Statements of the 2016/17 football season.

In case the Financial Statements of the clubs were not available and whenever we considered it necessary, KPMG has consulted with the management of the clubs in order to obtain the necessary information or clarifications to support our analysis.

The Financial Statements utilised for the purpose of KPMG's analysis were acquired either from the relevant public sources in each country or other public sources (for example a club's official website). As far as the team responsible for the production of this report is aware, the Financial Statements for each professional football club have been prepared on the basis of the accounting regulations and principles in their respective country or in compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS"). In performing our analysis we also relied upon information of a non-financial nature obtained from publicly available sources: national governing bodies, trade associations, international federations and social media.

The team responsible for the production of this report has relied on information included in the published Financial Statements of each of the clubs. KPMG professionals have not performed any verification work or audited any of such financial information or any of the non-financial publicly available data obtained from other sources considered authoritative.

Whilst every effort has been made by KPMG to make the analysis between professional football clubs consistent and comparable, in undertaking this research we faced several challenges which are difficult to overcome. Differences of accounting practice in the respective countries, differences in reporting currencies, fluctuation in exchange rates,and differences in year-ends limit to a certain extent the comparability of data and affect the outcome of our analysis.

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For interpretation of financial terms used in this report, please refer to the methodology section of the Data & Analytics tab of KPMG's www.footballbenchmark.com website.