Court File No.

# ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST)

**BETWEEN:** 

# IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

# AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ORIGINAL TRADERS ENERGY LTD. AND 2496750 ONTARIO INC.

# **BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE OTE GROUP**

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# IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

# IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

## APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Farley J.

Heard: March 5, 2004 Judgment: March 22, 2004 Docket: 04-CL-5306

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#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.1 General principles XIX.1.b Qualifying company

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Application of Act

Steel company S Inc. applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") on January 29, 2004 — Union locals moved to rescind initial order and dismiss initial application of S Inc. and its subsidiaries on ground S Inc. was not "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of CCAA because S Inc. was not insolvent — Motion dismissed — Given time and steps involved in reorganization, condition of insolvency perforce required expanded meaning under CCAA — Union affiant stated that S Inc. will run out of funding by November 2004 — Given that November was ten months away from date of filing, S Inc. had liquidity problem — S Inc. realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access to further

outside funding — S Inc. had negative equity of \$647 million — On balance of probabilities, S Inc. was insolvent and therefore was "debtor company" as at date of filing and entitled to apply for CCAA protection.

# **Table of Authorities**

Cases considered by *Farley J*.:

A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re (1993), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) - considered

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*Barsi v. Farcas* (1923), [1924] 1 W.W.R. 707, 2 C.B.R. 299, 18 Sask. L.R. 158, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154, 1923 CarswellSask 227 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to

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Challmie, Re (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78, 1976 CarswellBC 63 (B.C. S.C.) - considered

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*Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.* (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 2954, 16 B.L.R. (3d) 74, 28 C.B.R. (4th) 294 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

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- s. 2 "debtor company" referred to
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*Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11 Generally — referred to

#### Words and phrases considered:

#### debtor company

It seems to me that the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36] test of insolvency . . . which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the [*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3] definition of [s. 2(1)] (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring.

### Farley J.:

1 As argued this motion by Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 United Steel Workers of America (collectively "Union") to rescind the initial order and dismiss the application of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") and various of its subsidiaries (collectively "Sub Applicants") for access to the protection and process of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") was that this access should be denied on the basis that Stelco was not a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.

2 Allow me to observe that there was a great deal of debate in the materials and submissions as to the reason(s) that Stelco found itself in with respect to what Michael Locker (indicating he was "an expert in the area of corporate restructuring and a leading steel industry analyst") swore to at paragraph 12 of his affidavit was the "current crisis":

12. Contending with weak operating results and resulting tight cash flow, management has deliberately chosen not to fund its employee benefits. By contrast, Dofasco and certain other steel companies have consistently funded both their employee benefit obligations as well as debt service. If Stelco's management had chosen to fund pension obligations, presumably with borrowed money, *the current crisis* and related restructuring plans would focus on debt restructuring as opposed to the reduction of employee benefits and related liabilities. [Emphasis added.]

3 For the purpose of determining whether Stelco is insolvent and therefore could be considered to be a debtor company, it matters not what the cause or who caused the financial difficulty that Stelco is in as admitted by Locker on behalf of the Union. The management of a corporation could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the corporation could be in the grip of ruthless, hard hearted and hard nosed outside financiers; the corporation could be the innocent victim of uncaring policy of a level of government; the employees (unionized or non-unionized) could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the relationship of labour and management could be absolutely poisonous; the corporation could be the victim of unforeseen events affecting its viability such a as a fire destroying an essential area of its plant and equipment or of rampaging dumping. One or more or all of these factors (without being exhaustive), whether or not of varying degree and whether or not in combination of some may well have been the cause of a corporation's difficulty. The point here is that Stelco's difficulty exists; the only question is whether Stelco is insolvent within the meaning of that in the "debtor company" definition of the CCAA. However, I would point out, as I did in closing, that no matter how this motion turns out, Stelco does have a problem which has to be addressed - addressed within the CCAA process if Stelco is insolvent or addressed outside that process if Stelco is determined not to be insolvent. The status quo will lead to ruination of Stelco (and its Sub Applicants) and as a result will very badly affect its stakeholder, including pensioners, employees (unionized and non-unionized), management, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and other governments and the local communities. In such situations, time is a precious commodity; it cannot be wasted; no matter how much some would like to take time outs, the clock cannot be stopped. The watchwords of the Commercial List are equally applicable in such circumstances. They are communication, cooperation and common sense. I appreciate that these cases frequently invoke emotions running high and wild; that is understandable on a human basis but it is the considered, rational approach which will solve the problem.

4 The time to determine whether a corporation is insolvent for the purpose of it being a "debtor company" and thus able to make an application to proceed under the CCAA is the date of filing, in this case January 29, 2004.

5 The Monitor did not file a report as to this question of insolvency as it properly advised that it wished to take a neutral role. I understand however, that it did provide some assistance in the preparation of Exhibit C to Hap Steven's affidavit.

6 If I determine in this motion that Stelco is not insolvent, then the initial order would be set aside. See *Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (P.E.I. C.A.). The onus is on Stelco as I indicated in my January 29, 2004 endorsement.

7 S. 2 of the CCAA defines "debtor company" as:

"debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent;

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ["BIA"] or deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;

(c) has made an authorized assignment against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or

(d) is in the course of being wound-up under the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act because the company is insolvent.

8 Counsel for the Existing Stelco Lenders and the DIP Lenders posited that Stelco would be able to qualify under (b) in light of the fact that as of January 29, 2004 whether or not it was entitled to receive the CCAA protection under (a) as being insolvent, it had ceased to pay its pre-filing debts. I would merely observe as I did at the time of the hearing that I do not find this argument attractive in the least. The most that could be said for that is that such game playing would be ill advised and in my view would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable need, then such ought not to be granted. However, I would point out that if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process (including likely the ouster of management including directors who authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial discretion.

9 This judicial discretion would be exercised in the same way generally as is the case where s. 43(7) of the BIA comes into play whereby a bankruptcy receiving order which otherwise meets the test may be refused. See *Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44 (Ont. Bktcy.) where at p. 45 I observed:

The discretion must be exercised judicially based on credible evidence; it should be used according to common sense and justice and in a manner which does not result in an injustice: See *Re Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd.* (1971), 16 C.B.R. (NS) 158 (Man. Q.B.).

10 Anderson J. in *MTM Electric Co., Re* (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29 (Ont. Bktcy.) at p. 30 declined to grant a bankruptcy receiving order for the eminently good sense reason that it would be counterproductive: "Having regard for the value of the enterprise and having regard to the evidence before me, I think it far from clear that a receiving order would confer a benefit on anyone." This common sense approach to the judicial exercise of discretion may be contrasted by the rather more puzzling approach in *TDM Software Systems Inc., Re* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92 (Ont. S.C.).

11 The Union, supported by the International United Steel Workers of America ("International"), indicated that if certain of the obligations of Stelco were taken into account in the determination of insolvency, then a very good number of large Canadian corporations would be able to make an application under the CCAA. I am of the view that this concern can be addressed as follows. The test of insolvency is to be determined on its own merits, not on the basis that an otherwise technically insolvent corporation should not be allowed to apply. However, if a technically insolvent corporation were to apply and there was no material advantage to the corporation and its stakeholders (in other words, a pressing need to restructure), then one would expect that the court's discretion would be judicially exercised against granting CCAA protection and ancillary relief. In the case of Stelco, it is recognized, as discussed above, that it is in crisis and in need of restructuring - which restructuring, if it is insolvent, would be best accomplished within a CCAA proceeding. Further, I am of the view that the track record of CCAA proceedings in this country demonstrates a healthy respect for the fundamental concerns of interested parties and stakeholders. I have consistently observed that much more can be achieved by negotiations outside the courtroom where there is a reasonable exchange of information, views and the exploration of possible solutions and negotiations held on a without prejudice basis than likely can be achieved by resorting to the legal combative atmosphere of the courtroom. A mutual problem requires a mutual solution. The basic interest of the CCAA is to rehabilitate insolvent corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders. To do this, the cause(s) of the insolvency must be fixed on a long term viable basis so that the corporation may be turned around. It is not achieved by positional bargaining in a tug of war between two parties, each trying for a larger slice of a defined size pie; it may be achieved by taking steps involving shorter term equitable sacrifices and implementing sensible approaches to improve productivity to ensure that the pie grows sufficiently for the long term to accommodate the reasonable needs of the parties.

12 It appears that it is a given that the Sub Applicants are in fact insolvent. The question then is whether Stelco is insolvent.

13 There was a question as to whether Stelco should be restricted to the material in its application as presented to the Court on January 29, 2004. I would observe that CCAA proceedings are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in our courtrooms. It seems to me that it would be doing a disservice to the interest of the CCAA to artificially keep the Court in the dark on such a question. Presumably an otherwise deserving "debtor company" would not be allowed access to a continuing CCAA proceeding that it would be entitled to merely because some potential evidence were excluded for traditional adversarial technical reasons. I would point out that in such a case, there would be no prohibition against such a corporation reapplying (with the additional material) subsequently. In such a case, what would be the advantage for anyone of a "pause" before being able to proceed under the rehabilitative process under the CCAA. On a practical basis, I would note that all too often corporations will wait too long before applying, at least this was a significant problem in the early 1990s. In *Inducon Development Corp., Re* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I observed:

Secondly, CCAA is designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative. CCAA should not be the *last* gasp of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a stage prior to the death throe.

14 It seems to me that the phrase "death throe" could be reasonably replaced with "death spiral". In *Cumberland Trading Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), I went on to expand on this at p. 228:

I would also observe that all too frequently debtors wait until virtually the last moment, the last moment, or in some cases, beyond the last moment before even beginning to think about reorganizational (and the attendant support that any successful reorganization requires from the creditors). I noted the lamentable tendency of debtors to deal with these situations as "last gasp" desperation moves in *Re Inducon Development Corp*. (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To deal with matters on this basis minimizes the chances of success, even if "success" may have been available with earlier spade work.

I have not been able to find in the CCAA reported cases any instance where there has been an objection to a corporation availing itself of the facilities of the CCAA on the basis of whether the corporation was insolvent. Indeed, as indicated above, the major concern here has been that an applicant leaves it so late that the timetable of necessary steps may get impossibly compressed. That is not to say that there have not been objections by parties opposing the application on various other grounds. Prior to the 1992 amendments, there had to be debentures (plural) issued pursuant to a trust deed; I recall that in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), the initial application was rejected in the morning because there had only been one debenture issued but another one was issued prior to the return to court that afternoon. This case stands for the general proposition that the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation. I should note that there was in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) a determination that in a creditor application, the corporation was found not to be insolvent, but see below as to BIA test (c) my views as to the correctness of this decision.

16 In Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) I observed at p. 32:

One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors.

17 In Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), the court stated to the same effect:

The second submission is that the plan is contrary to the purposes of the CCAA. Courts have recognized that the purpose of the CCAA is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and the company and to keep the company alive and out of the hands of liquidators.

18 Encompassed in this is the concept of saving employment if a restructuring will result in a viable enterprise. See *Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Gen. Div.). This concept has been a continuing thread in CCAA cases in this jurisdiction stretching back for at least the past 15 years, if not before.

19 I would also note that the jurisprudence and practical application of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in place in Canada has been constantly evolving. The early jails of what became Canada were populated to the extent of almost half their capacity by bankrupts. Rehabilitation and a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor came afterwards. Most recently, the Bankruptcy Act was revised to the BIA in 1992 to better facilitate the rehabilitative aspect of making a proposal to creditors. At the same time, the CCAA was amended to eliminate the threshold criterion of there having to be debentures issued under a trust deed (this concept was embodied in the CCAA upon its enactment in 1933 with a view that it would only be large companies with public issues of debt securities which could apply). The size restriction was continued as there was now a threshold criterion of at least \$5 million of claims against the applicant. While this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when viewed from the perspective of \$5 million. These costs would be prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of a proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible extensions) whereas under CCAA, the length is in the discretion of the court judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the circumstances of the case. Certainly sooner is better than later. However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently exceed a year.

20 Restructurings are not now limited in practical terms to corporations merely compromising their debts with their creditors in a balance sheet exercise. Rather there has been quite an emphasis recently on operational restructuring as well so that the emerging company will have the benefit of a long term viable fix, all for the benefit of stakeholders. See *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 314 where Borins J. states:

The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised reorganization for the Applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which its carries on and carried on its business operations.

21 The CCAA does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto, Carswell; 2003) at p. 1107 (N5) states:

In interpreting "debtor company", reference must be had to the definition of "insolvent person" in s. 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy* and *Insolvency Act*...

To be able to use the Act, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (*Canada*), 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75. The company must, in its application, admit its insolvency.

It appears to have become fairly common practice for applicants and others when reference is made to insolvency in the context of the CCAA to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the BIA. That definition is as follows:

s. 2(1) . . .

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,

(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or

(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

23 Stelco acknowledges that it does not meet the test of (b); however, it does assert that it meets the test of both (a) and (c). In addition, however, Stelco also indicates that since the CCAA does not have a reference over to the BIA in relation to the (a) definition of "debtor company" as being a company that is "(a) bankrupt or insolvent", then this term of "insolvent" should be given the meaning that the overall context of the CCAA requires. See the modern rule of statutory interpretation which directs the court to take a contextual and purposive approach to the language of the provision at issue as illustrated by *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at p. 580:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

24 I note in particular that the (b), (c) and (d) aspects of the definition of "debtor company" all refer to other statutes, including the BIA; (a) does not. S. 12 of the CCAA defines "claims" with reference over to the BIA (and otherwise refers to the BIA and the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act). It seems to me that there is merit in considering that the test for insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA and those corporations which would apply under it. In that respect, I am mindful of the above discussion regarding the time that is usually and necessarily (in the circumstances) taken in a CCAA reorganization restructuring which is engaged in coming up with a plan of compromise and arrangement. The BIA definition would appear to have been historically focussed on the question of bankruptcy - and not reorganization of a corporation under a proposal since before 1992, secured creditors could not be forced to compromise their claims, so that in practice there were no reorganizations under the former Bankruptcy Act unless all secured creditors voluntarily agreed to have their secured claims compromised. The BIA definition then was essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the "end" situation of a bankruptcy petition or voluntary receiving order where the upshot would be a realization on the bankrupt's assets (not likely involving the business carried on - and certainly not by the bankrupt). Insolvency under the BIA is also important as to the Paulian action events (eg., fraudulent preferences, settlements) as to the conduct of the debtor *prior* to the bankruptcy; similarly as to the question of provincial preference legislation. Reorganization under a plan or proposal, on the contrary, is with a general objective of the applicant continuing to exist, albeit that the CCAA may also be used to have an orderly disposition of the assets and undertaking in whole or in part.

It seems to me that given the time and steps involved in a reorganization, and the condition of insolvency perforce requires an expanded meaning under the CCAA. Query whether the definition under the BIA is now sufficient in that light for the allowance of sufficient time to carry through with a realistically viable proposal within the maximum of six months allowed under the BIA? I think it sufficient to note that there would not be much sense in providing for a rehabilitation program of restructuring/reorganization under either statute if the entry test was that the applicant could not apply until a rather late stage of its financial difficulties with the rather automatic result that in situations of complexity of any material degree, the applicant

would not have the financial resources sufficient to carry through to hopefully a successful end. This would indeed be contrary to the renewed emphasis of Parliament on "rescues" as exhibited by the 1992 and 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA.

Allow me now to examine whether Stelco has been successful in meeting the onus of demonstrating with credible evidence on a common sense basis that it is insolvent within the meaning required by the CCAA in regard to the interpretation of "debtor company" in the context and within the purpose of that legislation. To a similar effect, see *PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc.* (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [(1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix (S.C.C.)] wherein it was determined that the trial judge was correct in holding that a party was not insolvent and that the statutory definition of insolvency pursuant to the BIA definition was irrelevant to determine that issue, since the agreement in question effectively provided its own definition by implication. It seems to me that the CCAA test of insolvency advocated by Stelco and which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the BIA definition of (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring. That is, there should be a reasonable cushion, which cushion may be adjusted and indeed become in effect an encroachment depending upon reasonable access to DIP between financing. In the present case, Stelco accepts the view of the Union's affiant, Michael Mackey of Deloitte and Touche that it will otherwise run out of funding by November 2004.

On that basis, allow me to determine whether Stelco is insolvent on the basis of (i) what I would refer to as the CCAA test as described immediately above, (ii) BIA test (a) or (iii) BIA test (c). In doing so, I will have to take into account the fact that Stephen, albeit a very experienced and skilled person in the field of restructurings under the CCAA, unfortunately did not appreciate that the material which was given to him in Exhibit E to his affidavit was modified by the caveats in the source material that in effect indicated that based on appraisals, the fair value of the real assets acquired was in excess of the purchase price for two of the U.S. comparators. Therefore the evidence as to these comparators is significantly weakened. In addition at Q. 175-177 in his cross examination, Stephen acknowledged that it was reasonable to assume that a purchaser would "take over some liabilities, some pension liabilities and OPEB liabilities, for workers who remain with the plant." The extent of that assumption was not explored; however, I do note that there was acknowledgement on the part of the Union that such an assumption would also have a reciprocal negative effect on the purchase price.

The BIA tests are disjunctive so that anyone meeting any of these tests is determined to be insolvent: see *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re* (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 756; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 161. Thus, if I determine that Stelco is insolvent on *any one* of these tests, then it would be a "debtor company" entitled to apply for protection under the CCAA.

In my view, the Union's position that Stelco is not insolvent under BIA (a) because it has not entirely used up its cash and cash facilities (including its credit line), that is, it is not yet as of January 29, 2004 run out of liquidity conflates inappropriately the (a) test with the (b) test. The Union's view would render the (a) test necessarily as being redundant. See *R. v. Proulx*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.) at p. 85 for the principle that no legislative provision ought to be interpreted in a manner which would "render it mere surplusage." Indeed the plain meaning of the phrase "unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due" requires a construction of test (a) which permits the court to take a purposive assessment of a debtor's ability to meet his future obligations. See *King Petroleum Ltd., Re* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.) where Steele J. stated at p. 80:

With respect to cl. (a), it was argued that at the time the disputed payments were made the company was able to meet its obligations as they generally became due because no major debts were in fact due at that time. This was premised on the fact that the moneys owed to Imperial Oil were not due until 10 days after the receipt of the statements and that the statements had not then been received. I am of the opinion that this is not a proper interpretation of cl. (a). *Clause (a) speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past*. I am of the opinion that the company was an "insolvent person" within the meaning of cl. (a) because by the very payment-out of the money in question it placed itself in a position that it was unable to meet its obligations as they would generally become due. In other words, it had placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate future. [Emphasis added.]

30 *King Petroleum Ltd.* was a case involving the question in a bankruptcy scenario of whether there was a fraudulent preference during a period when the corporation was insolvent. Under those circumstances, the "immediate future" does not have the same expansive meaning that one would attribute to a time period in a restructuring forward looking situation.

31 Stephen at paragraphs 40-49 addressed the restructuring question in general and its applicability to the Stelco situation. At paragraph 41, he outlined the significant stages as follows:

The process of restructuring under the CCAA entails a number of different stages, the most significant of which are as follows:

- (a) identification of the debtor's stakeholders and their interests;
- (b) arranging for a process of meaningful communication;
- (c) dealing with immediate relationship issues arising from a CCAA filing;
- (d) sharing information about the issues giving rise to the debtor's need to restructure;
- (e) developing restructuring alternatives; and
- (f) building a consensus around a plan of restructuring.

32 I note that January 29, 2004 is just 9-10 months away from November 2004. I accept as correct his conclusion based on his experience (and this is in accord with my own objective experience in large and complicated CCAA proceedings) that Stelco would have the liquidity problem within the time horizon indicated. In that regard, I also think it fair to observe that Stelco realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access further outside funding. To bridge the gap it must rely upon the stay to give it the uplift as to prefiling liabilities (which the Union misinterpreted as a general turnaround in its cash position without taking into account this uplift). As well, the Union was of the view that recent price increases would relieve Stelco's liquidity problems; however, the answers to undertaking in this respect indicated:

With respect to the Business Plan, the average spot market sales price per ton was \$514, and the average contract business sales price per ton was \$599. The Forecast reflects an average spot market sales price per ton of \$575, and average contract business sales price per ton of \$611. The average spot price used in the forecast considers further announced price increases, recognizing, among other things, the timing and the extent such increases are expected to become effective. The benefit of the increase in sales prices from the Business Plan is essentially offset by the substantial increase in production costs, and in particular in raw material costs, primarily scrap and coke, as well as higher working capital levels and a higher loan balance outstanding on the CIT credit facility as of January 2004.

I accept that this is generally a cancel out or wash in all material respects.

I note that \$145 million of cash resources had been used from January 1, 2003 to the date of filing. Use of the credit facility of \$350 million had increased from \$241 million on November 30, 2003 to \$293 million on the date of filing. There must be a reasonable reserve of liquidity to take into account day to day, week to week or month to month variances and also provide for unforeseen circumstances such as the breakdown of a piece of vital equipment which would significantly affect production until remedied. Trade credit had been contracting as a result of appreciation by suppliers of Stelco's financial difficulties. The DIP financing of \$75 million is only available if Stelco is under CCAA protection. I also note that a shut down as a result of running out of liquidity would be complicated in the case of Stelco and that even if conditions turned around more than reasonably expected, start-up costs would be heavy and quite importantly, there would be a significant erosion of the customer base (reference should be had to the Slater Hamilton plant in this regard). One does not liquidate assets which one would not sell in the ordinary course of business to thereby artificially salvage some liquidity for the purpose of the test: see *Pacific Mobile Corp., Re* (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (C.S. Que.) at p. 220. As a rough test, I note that Stelco (albeit on a consolidated basis

with all subsidiaries) running significantly behind plan in 2003 from its budget of a profit of \$80 million now to a projected loss of \$192 million and cash has gone from a positive \$209 million to a negative \$114 million.

34 Locker made the observation at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that:

8. Stelco has performed poorly for the past few years primarily due to an inadequate business strategy, poor utilization of assets, inefficient operations and generally weak management leadership and decision-making. This point is best supported by the fact that Stelco's local competitor, Dofasco, has generated outstanding results in the same period.

Table 1 to his affidavit would demonstrate that Dofasco has had superior profitability and cashflow performance than its "neighbour" Stelco. He went on to observe at paragraphs 36-37:

36. Stelco can achieve significant cost reductions through means other than cutting wages, pensions and benefits for employees and retirees. Stelco could bring its cost levels down to those of restructured U.S. mills, with the potential for lowering them below those of many U.S. mills.

37. Stelco could achieve substantial savings through productivity improvements within the mechanisms of the current collective agreements. More importantly, a major portion of this cost reduction could be achieved through constructive negotiations with the USWA in an out-of-court restructuring that does not require intervention of the courts through the vehicle of CCAA protection.

I accept his constructive comments that there is room for cost reductions and that there are substantial savings to be achieved through productivity improvements. However, I do not see anything detrimental to these discussions and negotiations by having them conducted within the umbrella of a CCAA proceeding. See my comments above regarding the CCAA in practice.

But I would observe and I am mystified by Locker's observations at paragraph 12 (quoted above), that Stelco should have borrowed to fund pension obligations to avoid its current financial crisis. This presumes that the borrowed funds would not constitute an obligation to be paid back as to principal and interest, but rather that it would assume the character of a costfree "gift".

I note that Mackey, without the "laundry list" he indicates at paragraph 17 of his second affidavit, is unable to determine at paragraph 19 (for himself) whether Stelco was insolvent. Mackey was unable to avail himself of all available information in light of the Union's refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement. He does not closely adhere to the BIA tests as they are defined. In the face of positive evidence about an applicant's financial position by an experienced person with expertise, it is not sufficient to displace this evidence by filing evidence which goes no further than raising questions: see *Anvil Range Mining Corp.*, *supra* at p. 162.

The Union referred me to one of my decisions *Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co.* (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where I stated as to the MacGirr affidavit:

The Trustee's cause of action is premised on MacGirr's opinion that STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 and therefore the STC common shares and promissory note received by Trustco in return for the Injection had no value at the time the Injection was made. Further, MacGirr ascribed no value to the opportunity which the Injection gave to Trustco to restore STC and salvage its thought to be existing \$74 million investment. In stating his opinion MacGirr defined solvency as:

- (a) the ability to meet liabilities as they fall due; and
- (b) that assets exceed liabilities.

On cross-examination MacGirr testified that in his opinion on either test STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 since as to (a) STC was experiencing then a negative cash flow and as to (b) the STC financial statements incorrectly reflected values. As far as (a) is concerned, I would comment that while I concur with MacGirr that at some time in the long run a

company that is experiencing a negative cash flow will eventually not be able to meet liabilities as they fall due but that is not the test (which is a "present exercise"). On that current basis STC was meeting its liabilities on a timely basis.

As will be seen from that expanded quote, MacGirr gave his own definitions of insolvency which are not the same as the s. 2 BIA tests (a), (b) and (c) but only a very loose paraphrase of (a) and (c) and an omission of (b). Nor was I referred to the *King Petroleum Ltd.* or *Proulx* cases *supra*. Further, it is obvious from the context that "*sometime in the long run*... *eventually*" is not a finite time in the foreseeable future.

I have not given any benefit to the \$313 - \$363 million of improvements referred to in the affidavit of William Vaughan at paragraph 115 as those appear to be capital expenditures which will have to be accommodated within a plan of arrangement or after emergence.

It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on a prospective basis being answered "24 hours") then Stelco would not be insolvent under that test. However, I am of the view that that would be unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the say and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization pursuant to an order. I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of BIA (a) test in the context of a reorganization or "rescue" as opposed to a threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences proceeding. On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of filing. Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) test, clearly for the above reasons and analysis, if one looks at the meaning of "insolvent" within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity crisis would occur in the sense of running out of "cash" but for the grant of the CCAA order. On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn recently experienced and anticipated.

41 What about the BIA (c) test which may be roughly referred to as an assets compared with obligations test. See *New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen*, [1993] O.J. No. 727 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) as to fair value and fair market valuation. The Union observed that there was no intention by Stelco to wind itself up or proceed with a sale of some or all of its assets and undertaking and therefore some of the liabilities which Stelco and Stephen took into account would not crystallize. However, as I discussed at the time of the hearing, the (c) test is what one might reasonably call or describe as an "artificial" or notional/hypothetical test. It presumes certain things which are in fact not necessarily contemplated to take place or to be involved. In that respect, I appreciate that it may be difficult to get one's mind around that concept and down the right avenue of that (c) test. See my views at trial in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3394 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraphs 13, 21 and 33; affirmed [2003] O.J. No. 5242 (Ont. C.A.). At paragraph 33, I observed in closing:

33... They (and their expert witnesses) all had to contend with dealing with rambling and complicated facts and, in Section 100 BIA, a section which is difficult to administer when fmv [fair market value] in a notational or hypothetical market involves ignoring what would often be regarded as self evidence truths but at the same time appreciating that this notational or hypothetical market requires that the objects being sold have to have realistic true to life attributes recognized.

42 The Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 24-25 as follows:

24. Nor are the appellants correct to argue that the trial judge also assumed an imprudent vendor in arriving at his conclusion about the fair market value of the OYSF note would have to know that in order to realize value from the note any purchaser would immediately put OYSF and thus OYDL itself into bankruptcy to pre-empt a subsequent triggering event in favour of EIB. While this was so, and the trial judge clearly understood it, the error in this submission is that it seeks to inject into the analysis factors subjected to the circumstances of OYDL as vendor and not intrinsic to the value of the OYSF note. The calculation of fair market value does not permit this but rather must assume an unconstrained vendor.

25. The Applicants further argue that the trial judge eroded in determining the fair market value of the OYSF note by reference to a transaction which was entirely speculative because it was never considered by OYDL nor would have it been since it would have resulted in OYDL's own bankruptcy. I disagree. The transaction hypothesized by the trial judge was one between a notational, willing, prudent and informed vendor and purchaser based on factors relevant to the OYSF note itself rather than the particular circumstances of OYDL as the seller of the note. This is an entirely appropriate way to determine the fair market value of the OYSF note.

43 Test (c) deems a person to be insolvent if "the aggregate of [its] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or of disposed at a fairly conducted sale under legal process would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [its] obligations, due and accruing due." The origins of this legislative test appear to be the decision of Spragge V-C in *Davidson v. Douglas* (1868), 15 Gr. 347 (Ont. Ch.) at p. 351 where he stated with respect to the solvency or insolvency of a debtor, the proper course is:

to see and examine whether all his property, real and personal, be sufficient if presently realized for the payment of his debts, and in this view we must estimate his land, as well as his chattel property, not at what his neighbours or others may consider to be its value, but at what it would bring in the market at a forced sale, or a sale where the seller cannot await his opportunities, but must sell.

In *Clarkson v. Sterling* (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) at p. 463, Rose J. indicted that the sale must be fair and reasonable, but that the determination of fairness and reasonableness would depend on the facts of each case.

The Union essentially relied on garnishment cases. Because of the provisions relating as to which debts may or may not be garnished, these authorities are of somewhat limited value when dealing with the test (c) question. However I would refer to one of the Union's cases *Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd.*, [1996] S.J. No. 655 (Sask. C.A.) where it is stated at paragraph 11:

11. Few phrases have been as problematic to define as "debt due or accruing due". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,

3<sup>rd</sup> ed. defines "accruing" as "arising in due course", but an examination of English and Canadian authority reveals that not all debts "arising in due course" are permitted to be garnisheed. (See Professor Dunlop's extensive research for his British Columbia Law Reform Commission's Report on Attachment of Debts Act, 1978 at 17 to 29 and is text Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. at 374 to 385.)

46 In *Barsi v. Farcas* (1923), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154 (Sask. C.A.), Lamont J.A. was cited for his statement at p. 522 of *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) that: "an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

47 Saunders J. noted in *633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 81 that a sale out of the ordinary course of business would have an adverse effect on that actually realized.

48 There was no suggestion by any of the parties that any of the assets and undertaking would have any enhanced value from that shown on the financial statements prepared according to GAAP.

49 In *King Petroleum Ltd.*, *supra* at p. 81 Steele J. observed:

To consider the question of insolvency under cl. (c) I must look to the aggregate property of the company and come to a conclusion as to whether or not it would be sufficient to enable payment of all obligations due and accruing due. There are two tests to be applied: First, its fair value and, secondly, its value if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process. The balance sheet is a starting point, but the evidence relating to the fair value of the assets and what they might realize if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process must be reviewed in interpreting it. In this case, I find no difficulty in accepting the obligations shown as liabilities because they are known. I have more difficulty with respect to the assets.

To my view the preferable interpretation to be given to "sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due" is to be determined in the context of this test as a whole. What is being put up to satisfy those obligations is the debtor's assets and undertaking *in total*; in other words, the debtor in essence is taken as having sold everything. There would be no residual assets and undertaking to pay off any obligations which would not be encompassed by the phrase "all of his obligations, due and accruing due". Surely, there cannot be "orphan" obligations which are left hanging unsatisfied. It seems to me that the intention of "due and accruing due" was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind and leave nothing in limbo.

51 S. 121(1) and (2) of the BIA, which are incorporated by reference in s. 12 of the CCAA, provide in respect to provable claims:

S. 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such claim shall be made in accordance with s. 135.

52 Houlden and Morawetz 2004 Annotated supra at p. 537 (G28(3)) indicates:

The word "liability" is a very broad one. It includes all obligations to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which he becomes bankrupt except for contingent and unliquidated claims which are dealt with in s. 121(2).

However contingent and unliquidated claims would be encompassed by the term "obligations".

53 In Gardner v. Newton (1916), 29 D.L.R. 276 (Man. K.B.), Mathers C.J.K.B. observed at p. 281 that "contingent claim, that is, a claim which may or may not ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen." See A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) at p. 268 for the definition of a "liquidated sum" which is an amount which can be readily ascertained and hence by corollary an "unliquidated claim" would be one which is not easily ascertained, but will have to be valued. In Gagnier, Re (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74 (Ont. S.C.), there appears to be a conflation of not only the (a) test with the (c) test, but also the invocation of the judicial discretion not to grant the receiving order pursuant to a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that "[the judge was] unable to find the debtor is bankrupt". The debtor was able to survive the (a) test as he had the practice (accepted by all his suppliers) of providing them with post dated cheques. The (c) test was not a problem since the judge found that his assets should be valued at considerably more than his obligations. However, this case does illustrate that the application of the tests present some difficulties. These difficulties are magnified when one is dealing with something more significantly complex and a great deal larger than a haberdashery store - in the case before us, a giant corporation in which, amongst other things, is engaged in a very competitive history including competition from foreign sources which have recently restructured into more cost efficient structures, having shed certain of their obligations. As well, that is without taking into account that a sale would entail significant transaction costs. Even of greater significance would be the severance and termination payments to employees not continued by the new purchaser. Lastly, it was recognized by everyone at the hearing that Stelco's plants, especially the Hamilton-Hilton works, have extremely high environmental liabilities lurking in the woodwork. Stephen observed that these obligations would be substantial, although not quantified.

54 It is true that there are no appraisals of the plant and equipment nor of the assets and undertaking of Stelco. Given the circumstances of this case and the complexities of the market, one may realistically question whether or not the appraisals would be all that helpful or accurate.

I would further observe that in the notional or hypothetical exercise of a sale, then all the obligations which would be triggered by such sale would have to be taken into account.

All liabilities, contingent or unliquidated would have to be taken into account. See *King Petroleum Ltd., supra* p. 81; *Salvati, supra* pp. 80-1; *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd.* (1989), 45 B.L.R. 14 (N.S. T.D.) at p. 29; *Challmie, Re* (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78 (B.C. S.C.), at pp. 81-2. In *Challmie* the debtor ought to have known that his guarantee was very much exposed given the perilous state of his company whose liabilities he had guaranteed. It is interesting to note what was stated in *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of)*, even if it is rather patently obvious. Tidman J. said in respect of the branch of the company at p. 29:

Mr. MacAdam argues also that the \$4.8 million employees' severance obligation was not a liability on January 20, 1986. The *Bankruptcy Act* includes as obligations both those due and accruing due. Although the employees' severance obligation was not due and payable on January 20, 1986 it was an obligation "accruing due". The Toronto facility had experienced severe financial difficulties for some time; in fact, it was the major, if not the sole cause, of Maybank's financial difficulties. I believe it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonably astute perspective buyer of the company has a going concern would have considered that obligation on January 20, 1986 and that it would have substantially reduced the price offered by that perspective buyer. Therefore that obligation must be considered as an obligation of the company on January 20, 1986.

57 With the greatest of respect for my colleague, I disagree with the conclusion of Ground J. in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc.*, *supra* as to the approach to be taken to "due and accruing due" when he observed at pp. 139-140:

It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the principle amount of the Notes constitutes an obligation "due or accruing due" as of the date of this application.

There is a paucity of helpful authority on the meaning of "accruing due" for purposes of a definition of insolvency. Historically, in 1933, in *P. Lyall & Sons Construction Co. v. Baker*, [1933] O.R. 286 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal, in determining a question of set-off under the *Dominion Winding-Up Act* had to determine whether the amount claimed as set-off was a debt due or accruing due to the company in liquidation for purposes of that Act. Marsten J. at pp. 292-293 quoted from Moss J.A. in *Mail Printing Co. v. Clarkson* (1898), 25 O.R. 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8:

A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all event, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. And an accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation: Per Lindley L.J. in *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.D.D. at p. 529.

Whatever relevance such definition may have had for purposes of dealing with claims by and against companies in liquidation under the old winding-up legislation, it is apparent to me that it should not be applied to definitions of insolvency. To include every debt payable at some future date in "accruing due" for the purposes of insolvency tests would render numerous corporations, with long term debt due over a period of years in the future and anticipated to be paid out of future income, "insolvent" for the purposes of the BIA and therefore the CCAA. For the same reason, I do not accept the statement quoted in the Enterprise factum from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in *Centennial Textiles Inc., Re*, 220 B.R. 165 (U.S.N.Y.D.C. 1998) that "if the present saleable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debt as they mature, the debtor is insolvent". In my view, the obligations, which are to be measured against the fair valuation of a company's property as being obligations due and accruing due, must be limited to obligations currently payable or properly chargeable to the accounting period during which the test is being applied as, for example, a sinking fund payment due within the current year. Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrued liability" as "an obligation or debt which is properly chargeable in a given accounting period, but which is not yet paid or payable". The principal amount of the Notes is neither due nor accruing due in this sense.

There appears to be some confusion in this analysis as to "debts" and "obligations", the latter being much broader than debts. Please see above as to my views concerning the floodgates argument under the BIA and CCAA being addressed by judicially exercised discretion even if "otherwise warranted" applications were made. I pause to note that an insolvency test under general corporate litigation need not be and likely is not identical, or indeed similar to that under these insolvency statutes. As well, it is curious to note that the cut off date is the end of the current fiscal period which could have radically different results if there were a calendar fiscal year and the application was variously made in the first week of January, mid-summer or the last day of December. Lastly, see above and below as to my views concerning the proper interpretation of this question of "accruing due".

59 It seems to me that the phrase "accruing due" has been interpreted by the courts as broadly identifying obligations that will "become due". See *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* below at pp. 163-4 - at least at some point in the future. Again, I would refer to my conclusion above that *every obligation* of the corporation in the hypothetical or notional sale must be treated as "accruing due" to avoid orphan obligations. In that context, it matters not that a wind-up pension liability may be discharged over 15 years; in a test (c) situation, it is crystallized on the date of the test. See *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. supra* at pp. 756-7; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 164-63-4; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re* (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 163. In *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.*, Spencer J. at pp. 162-3 stated:

In my opinion, a futures broker is not in that special position. The third definition of "insolvency" may apply to a futures trader at any time even though he has open long positions in the market. Even though Consolidated's long positions were not required to be closed on 10<sup>th</sup> December, the chance that they might show a profit by March 1981 or even on the following day and thus wipe out Consolidated's cash deficit cannot save it from a condition of insolvency on that day. The circumstances fit precisely within the third definition; if all Consolidated's assets had been sold on that day at a fair value, the proceeds would not have covered its obligations due and accruing due, including its obligations to pay in March 1981 for its long positions in rapeseed. The market prices from day to day establish a fair valuation. . . .

The contract to buy grain at a fixed price at a future time imposes a present obligation upon a trader taking a long position in the futures market to take delivery in exchange for payment at that future time. It is true that in the practice of the market, that obligation is nearly always washed out by buying an offsetting short contract, but until that is done the obligation stands. The trader does not know who will eventually be on the opposite side of his transaction if it is not offset but all transactions are treated as if the clearing house is on the other side. It is a present obligation due at a future time. It is therefore an obligation accruing due within the meaning of the third definition of "insolvency".

60 The possibility of an expectancy of future profits or a change in the market is not sufficient; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.* at p. 162 emphasizes that the test is to be done on that day, the day of filing in the case of an application for reorganization.

I see no objection to using Exhibit C to Stephen's affidavit as an aid to review the balance sheet approach to test (c). While Stephen may not have known who prepared Exhibit C, he addressed each of its components in the text of his affidavit and as such he could have mechanically prepared the exhibit himself. He was comfortable with and agreed with each of its components. Stelco's factum at paragraphs 70-1 submits as follows:

70. In Exhibit C to his Affidavit, Mr. Stephen addresses a variety of adjustments to the Shareholder's Equity of Stelco necessary to reflect the values of assets and liabilities as would be required to determine whether Stelco met the test of insolvency under Clause C. In cross examination of both Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Stephen only one of these adjustments was challenged - the "Possible Reductions in Capital Assets."

71. The basis of the challenge was that the comparative sales analysis was flawed. In the submission of Stelco, none of these challenges has any merit. Even if the entire adjustment relating to the value in capital assets is ignored, the remaining adjustments leave Stelco with assets worth over \$600 million less than the value of its obligations due and accruing due. This fundamental fact is not challenged.

62 Stelco went on at paragraphs 74-5 of its factum to submit:

74. The values relied upon by Mr. Stephen if anything, understate the extent of Stelco's insolvency. As Mr. Stephen has stated, and no one has challenged by affidavit evidence or on cross examination, in a fairly conducted sale under legal process, the value of Stelco's working capital and other assets would be further impaired by: (i) increased environmental liabilities not reflected on the financial statements, (ii) increased pension deficiencies that would be

generated on a wind up of the pension plans, (iii) severance and termination claims and (iv) substantial liquidation costs that would be incurred in connection with such a sale.

75. No one on behalf of the USWA has presented any evidence that the capital assets of Stelco are in excess of book value on a stand alone basis. Certainly no one has suggested that these assets would be in excess of book value if the related environmental legacy costs and collective agreements could not be separated from the assets.

63 Before turning to that exercise, I would also observe that test (c) is also disjunctive. There is an insolvency condition if the total obligation of the debtor exceed either (i) a fair valuation of its assets or (ii) the proceeds of a sale fairly conducted under legal process of its assets.

As discussed above and confirmed by Stephen, if there were a sale under legal process, then it would be unlikely, especially in this circumstance that values would be enhanced; in all probability they would be depressed from book value. Stephen took the balance sheet GAAP calculated figure of equity at November 30, 2003 as \$804.2 million. From that, he deducted the loss for December 2003 - January 2004 of \$17 million to arrive at an equity position of \$787.2 million as at the date of filing.

From that, he deducted, reasonably in my view, those "booked" assets that would have no value in a test (c) sale namely: (a) \$294 million of future income tax recourse which would need taxable income in the future to realize; (b) \$57 million for a write-off of the Platemill which is presently hot idled (while Locker observed that it would not be prohibitive in cost to restart production, I note that neither Stephen nor Vaughn were cross examined as to the decision not to do so); and (c) the captialized deferred debt issue expense of \$3.2 million which is being written off over time and therefore, truly is a "nothing". This totals \$354.2 million so that the excess of value over liabilities before reflecting obligations not included in the financials directly, but which are, substantiated as to category in the notes would be \$433 million.

On a windup basis, there would be a pension deficiency of \$1252 million; however, Stephen conservatively in my view looked at the Mercer actuary calculations on the basis of a going concern finding deficiency of \$656 million. If the \$1252 million windup figure had been taken, then the picture would have been even bleaker than it is as Stephen has calculated it for test (c) purposes. In addition, there are deferred pension costs of \$198.7 million which under GAAP accounting calculations is allowed so as to defer recognition of past bad investment experience, but this has no realizable value. Then there is the question of Employee Future Benefits. These have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 by the Mercer actuary as \$909.3 million but only \$684 million has been accrued and booked on the financial statements so that there has to be an increased provision of \$225.3 million. These off balance sheet adjustments total \$1080 million.

Taking that last adjustment into account would result in a *negative* equity of (\$433 million minus \$1080 million) or *negative* \$647 million. On that basis without taking into account possible reductions in capital assets as dealt with in the somewhat flawed Exhibit E nor environmental and other costs discussed above, Stelco is insolvent according to the test (c). With respect to Exhibit E, I have not relied on it in any way, but it is entirely likely that a properly calculated Exhibit E would provide comparators (also being sold in the U.S. under legal process in a fairly conducted process) which tend to require a further downward adjustment. Based on test (c), Stelco is significantly, not marginally, under water.

In reaching my conclusion as to the negative equity (and I find that Stephen approached that exercise fairly and constructively), please note my comments above regarding the possible assumption of pension obligations by the purchaser being offset by a reduction of the purchase price. The 35% adjustment advocated as to pension and employee benefits in this regard is speculation by the Union. Secondly, the Union emphasized cash flow as being important in evaluation, but it must be remembered that Stelco has been negative cash flow for some time which would make that analysis unreliable and to the detriment of the Union's position. The Union treated the \$773 million estimated contribution to the shortfall in the pension deficiency by the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund as eliminating that as a Stelco obligation. That is not the case however as that Fund would be subrogated to the claims of the employees in that respect with a result that Stelco would remain liable for that \$773 million. Lastly, the Union indicated that there should be a \$155 million adjustment as to the negative equity in Sub Applicants when calculating Stelco's equity. While Stephen at Q. 181-2 acknowledged that there was no adjustment for

that, I agree with him that there ought not to be since Stelco was being examined (and the calculations were based) on an unconsolidated basis, not on a consolidated basis.

69 In the end result, I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that Stelco is insolvent and therefore it is a "debtor company" as at the date of filing and entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order. My conclusion is that (i) BIA test (c) strongly shows Stelco is insolvent; (ii) BIA test (a) demonstrates, to a less certain but sufficient basis, an insolvency and (iii) the "new" CCAA test again strongly supports the conclusion of insolvency. I am further of the opinion that I properly exercised my discretion in granting Stelco and the Sub Applicants the initial order on January 29, 2004 and I would confirm that as of the present date with effect on the date of filing. The Union's motion is therefore dismissed.

I appreciate that all the employees (union and non-union alike) and the Union and the International have a justifiable pride in their work and their workplace - and a human concern about what the future holds for them. The pensioners are in the same position. Their respective positions can only be improved by engaging in discussion, an exchange of views and information reasonably advanced and conscientiously listened to and digested, leading to mutual problem solving, ideas and negotiations. Negative attitudes can only lead to the detriment to all stakeholders. Unfortunately there has been some finger pointing on various sides; that should be put behind everyone so that participants in this process can concentrate on the future and not inappropriately dwell on the past. I understand that there have been some discussions and interchange over the past two weeks since the hearing and that is a positive start.

Motion dismissed.

#### APPENDIX

# TAB 2

#### 1993 CarswellOnt 183 Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992 Judgment: January 6, 1993 Docket: Doc. B366/92

Counsel: Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison and Melissa J. Kennedy, for applicants.
L. Crozier, for Royal Bank of Canada.
R.C. Heintzman, for Bank of Montreal.
J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and James Hilton, for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.
Jay Schwartz, for Citibank Canada.

Stephen Golick, for Peat Marwick Thorne<sup>\*</sup> Inc., proposed monitor. John Teolis, for Fuji Bank Canada. Robert Thorton, for certain of the advisory boards.

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application

XIX.2.b Grant of stay

XIX.2.b.i General principles

#### Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also sought a stay of all proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

#### Held:

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies were so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for a stay to be granted to the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

# **Table of Authorities**

#### **Cases considered:**

Amirault Fish Co., Re, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) - referred to

Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211, 38 B.L.R. 148, (sub nom. *Re First Investors Corp.*) 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Q.B.), reversed (1988), 71 C.B.R. 71, 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 242, 89 A.R. 344 (C.A.) — referred to

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) - referred to

*Canada Systems Group (EST) v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) [affirmed (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (C.A.)] — referred to

Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank, [1947] O.R. 775 [H.C.] - referred to

Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re, 28 C.B.R. 124, [1947] Que. K.B. 348 (C.A.) - referred to

*Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 87, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 293, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to* 

*Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) [affirmed (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.)] — *referred to* 

*Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — *referred to* 

Inducon Development Corp. Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) - referred to

International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd. (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) - considered

Keppoch Development Ltd., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) - referred to

Langley's Ltd., Re, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) - referred to

McCordic v. Bosanquet (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) - referred to

*Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — *referred to* 

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — *referred to* 

*Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.), affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — referred to

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — referred to

Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R. (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.), affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Slavik, Re (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) - referred to

*Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon)* 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to* 

*United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative, Re* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.), varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.), reversed (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253, (sub nom. Cdn. Co-op. Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.) 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (C.A.) — referred to

#### Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

s. 85

s. 142

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 - preamble

s. 2	
s. 3	
s. 4	
s. 5	
s. 6	
s. 7	
s. 8	
s. 11	
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.	
Judicature Act, The, R.S.O. 1937, c. 100.	

Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 s. 2(2) s. 3(1) s. 8 s. 9 s. 11 s. 12(1) s. 13 s. 15(2) s. 24 Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 — Pt. 2

s. 75

#### **Rules considered:**

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

#### Farley J.:

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

(a) short service of the notice of application;

(b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;

(c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;

(d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

(e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures

issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnership Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately \$370 million, LPC \$45 million and LPC II \$7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately \$543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lendor also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

- (a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.
- (b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.
- (c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.
- (d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.
- (e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.
- (f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.
- (g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.
- (h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and
- (i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage

Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.); *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.). The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.), at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.), reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.), at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* ) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon* ) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta, O.B.) at pp. 219-220; Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.), at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) .; Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of), supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.), at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey* (*Trustee of*), supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of*), supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252.

One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.). It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(*a*) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel executory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (C.A. Que.) ). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik*, unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) ]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.

13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.*, unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 ] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a compromise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. *That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these*. (Emphasis added.)

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) ] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

#### The Power to Stay

The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.), and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:

106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discre tionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.

#### The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings

By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness.": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.), and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct against the debtor company the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period.

## (emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance*, supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66

[C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in Canada Systems, supra, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at 71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.) ). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach* (*Executor of Estate of George William Willis*), [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, (sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach*) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.) .

In Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122, appeal allowed by consent without costs (sub nom. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc. Inc.) 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.), Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:

The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al.*, [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:

(1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence combines the flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited

liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepburn, *Limited Partnerships*, (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner is interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the *Bankruptcy Act* (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure*, O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership*, 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.), affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership property, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited

partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide this as a conditional right: *Control Test*, (1992), supra, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

Application allowed.

#### Footnotes

\* As amended by the court.

# TAB 3

#### 2015 ONSC 303 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 620, 2015 ONSC 303, [2015] O.J. No. 247, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, 248 A.C.W.S. (3d) 753

## In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC.

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: January 15, 2015 Judgment: January 16, 2015 Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Tracy Sandler, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC

Jay Swartz for Target Corporation

Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner, Jesse Mighton for Proposed Monitor, Alvarez and Marsal Canada ULC ("Alvarez") Terry O'Sullivan for Honourable J. Ground, Trustee of the Proposed Employee Trust Susan Philpott for Proposed Employee Representative Counsel, for Employees of the Applicants

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.e Proceedings subject to stay XIX.2.e.vi Miscellaneous Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.2 Initial application

XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

## Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Proceedings subject to stay — Miscellaneous

Applicant group of companies were involved in Canadian operations of U.S. retailer T Co. — Canadian operations suffered significant loss in every quarter — T Co. decided to stop funding Canadian operations — Applicants sought to wind down Canadian operations and applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial order granted — Stay of proceedings granted — Stay extended to certain limited partnerships, which were related to or carried on operations integral to applicants' business — Stay of proceedings extended to rights of third party tenants against landlords that arose out of insolvency — Stay extended to T Co. and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims derivative of claims against Canadian operations.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Initial application -- Miscellaneous

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Canadian operations and applied for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Application granted — Initial order granted — Stay of proceedings granted — It was appropriate to grant broad relief to ensure status quo was maintained — Applicants were all insolvent — Although there was no prospect restructured "going concern" solution would result, use of CCAA protection was appropriate in circumstances — Creation of employee trust to cover payments to employees was approved — Key employee retention program (KERP) and charge as security for KERP payments were approved — Appointment of Employee Representative Counsel was approved — DIP Lenders' Charge and DIP Facility were approved — Administration charge and Directors' and Officers' charge approved.

#### **Table of Authorities**

#### Cases considered by Morawetz R.S.J.:

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 196, 75 C.C.P.B. 206, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — followed

*Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) - referred to

*Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) — referred to *T. Eaton Co., Re* (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 1914, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

*Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.))* [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada)* 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re)* 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re)* 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re)* 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re (2014), 2014 ONSC 6145, 2014 CarswellOnt 16465 (Ont. S.C.J.) - considered

#### Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.02(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 36 — considered **Rules considered:**  *Rules of Civil Procedure*, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 Generally — referred to **Words and phrases considered:** 

#### insolvent

"Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (CCAA)]. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*... or if it is "insolvent" as described in Stelco Inc. (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [Stelco], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring".

## Morawetz R.S.J.:

1 Target Canada Co. ("TCC") and the other applicants listed above (the "Applicants") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"). While the limited partnerships listed in Schedule "A" to the draft Order (the "Partnerships") are not applicants in this proceeding, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other benefits of an initial order under the CCAA extended to the Partnerships, which are related to or carry on operations that are integral to the business of the Applicants.

2 TCC is a large Canadian retailer. It is the Canadian operating subsidiary of Target Corporation, one of the largest retailers in the United States. The other Applicants are either corporations or partners of the Partnerships formed to carry on specific aspects of TCC's Canadian retail business (such as the Canadian pharmacy operations) or finance leasehold improvements in leased Canadian stores operated by TCC. The Applicants, therefore, do not represent the entire Target enterprise; the Applicants consist solely of entities that are integral to the Canadian retail operations. Together, they are referred as the "Target Canada Entities".

3 In early 2011, Target Corporation determined to expand its retail operations into Canada, undertaking a significant investment (in the form of both debt and equity) in TCC and certain of its affiliates in order to permit TCC to establish and operate Canadian retail stores. As of today, TCC operates 133 stores, with at least one store in every province of Canada. All but three of these stores are leased.

4 Due to a number of factors, the expansion into Canada has proven to be substantially less successful than expected. Canadian operations have shown significant losses in every quarter since stores opened. Projections demonstrate little or no prospect of improvement within a reasonable time.

5 After exploring multiple solutions over a number of months and engaging in extensive consultations with its professional advisors, Target Corporation concluded that, in the interest of all of its stakeholders, the responsible course of action is to cease funding the Canadian operations.

6 Without ongoing investment from Target Corporation, TCC and the other Target Canada Entities cannot continue to operate and are clearly insolvent. Due to the magnitude and complexity of the operations of the Target Canada Entities, the Applicants are seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to accomplish a fair, orderly and controlled wind-down of their operations. The Target Canada Entities have indicated that they intend to treat all of their stakeholders as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow, particularly the approximately 17,600 employees of the Target Canada Entities.

7 The Applicants are of the view that an orderly wind-down under Court supervision, with the benefit of inherent jurisdiction of the CCAA, and the oversight of the proposed monitor, provides a framework in which the Target Canada Entities can, among other things:

a) Pursue initiatives such as the sale of real estate portfolios and the sale of inventory;

b) Develop and implement support mechanisms for employees as vulnerable stakeholders affected by the winddown, particularly (i) an employee trust (the "Employee Trust") funded by Target Corporation; (ii) an employee representative counsel to safeguard employee interests; and (iii) a key employee retention plan (the "KERP") to provide essential employees who agree to continue their employment and to contribute their services and expertise to the Target Canada Entities during the orderly wind-down;

c) Create a level playing field to ensure that all affected stakeholders are treated as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow; and

d) Avoid the significant maneuvering among creditors and other stakeholders that could be detrimental to all stakeholders, in the absence of a court-supervised proceeding.

8 The Applicants are of the view that these factors are entirely consistent with the well-established purpose of a CCAA stay: to give a debtor the "breathing room" required to restructure with a view to maximizing recoveries, whether the restructuring takes place as a going concern or as an orderly liquidation or wind-down.

9 TCC is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Target Corporation and is the operating company through which the Canadian retail operations are carried out. TCC is a Nova Scotia unlimited liability company. It is directly owned by Nicollet Enterprise 1 S. à r.l. ("NE1"), an entity organized under the laws of Luxembourg. Target Corporation (which is incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota) owns NE1 through several other entities.

10 TCC operates from a corporate headquarters in Mississauga, Ontario. As of January 12, 2015, TCC employed approximately 17,600 people, almost all of whom work in Canada. TCC's employees are not represented by a union, and there is no registered pension plan for employees.

11 The other Target Canada Entities are all either: (i) direct or indirect subsidiaries of TCC with responsibilities for specific aspects of the Canadian retail operation; or (ii) affiliates of TCC that have been involved in the financing of certain leasehold improvements.

12 A typical TCC store has a footprint in the range of 80,000 to 125,000 total retail square feet and is located in a shopping mall or large strip mall. TCC is usually the anchor tenant. Each TCC store typically contains an in-store Target brand pharmacy, Target Mobile kiosk and a Starbucks café. Each store typically employs approximately 100 - 150 people, described as "Team Members" and "Team Leaders", with a total of approximately 16,700 employed at the "store level" of TCC's retail operations.

13 TCC owns three distribution centres (two in Ontario and one in Alberta) to support its retail operations. These centres are operated by a third party service provider. TCC also leases a variety of warehouse and office spaces.

14 In every quarter since TCC opened its first store, TCC has faced lower than expected sales and greater than expected losses. As reported in Target Corporation's Consolidated Financial Statements, the Canadian segment of the Target business has suffered a significant loss in every quarter since TCC opened stores in Canada.

15 TCC is completely operationally funded by its ultimate parent, Target Corporation, and related entities. It is projected that TCC's cumulative pre-tax losses from the date of its entry into the Canadian market to the end of the 2014 fiscal year (ending January 31, 2015) will be more than \$2.5 billion. In his affidavit, Mr. Mark Wong, General Counsel and Secretary of TCC, states that this is more than triple the loss originally expected for this period. Further, if TCC's operations are not wound down, it is projected that they would remain unprofitable for at least 5 years and would require significant and continued funding from Target Corporation during that period.

16 TCC attributes its failure to achieve expected profitability to a number of principal factors, including: issues of scale; supply chain difficulties; pricing and product mix issues; and the absence of a Canadian online retail presence.

17 Following a detailed review of TCC's operations, the Board of Directors of Target Corporation decided that it is in the best interests of the business of Target Corporation and its subsidiaries to discontinue Canadian operations.

Based on the stand-alone financial statements prepared for TCC as of November 1, 2014 (which consolidated financial results of TCC and its subsidiaries), TCC had total assets of approximately \$5.408 billion and total liabilities of approximately \$5.118 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC's financial situation.

Mr. Wong states that TCC's operational funding is provided by Target Corporation. As of November 1, 2014, NE1 (TCC's direct parent) had provided equity capital to TCC in the amount of approximately \$2.5 billon. As a result of continuing and significant losses in TCC's operations, NE1 has been required to make an additional equity investment of \$62 million since November 1, 2014.

NE1 has also lent funds to TCC under a Loan Facility with a maximum amount of \$4 billion. TCC owed NE1 approximately \$3.1 billion under this Facility as of January 2, 2015. The Loan Facility is unsecured. On January 14, 2015, NE1 agreed to subordinate all amounts owing by TCC to NE1 under this Loan Facility to payment in full of proven claims against TCC.

As at November 1, 2014, Target Canada Property LLC ("TCC Propco") had assets of approximately \$1.632 billion and total liabilities of approximately \$1.643 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC Propco's financial situation. TCC Propco has also borrowed approximately \$1.5 billion from Target Canada Property LP and TCC Propco also owes U.S. \$89 million to Target Corporation under a Demand Promissory Note.

TCC has subleased almost all the retail store leases to TCC Propco, which then made real estate improvements and subsub leased the properties back to TCC. Under this arrangement, upon termination of any of these sub-leases, a "make whole" payment becomes owing from TCC to TCC Propco.

23 Mr. Wong states that without further funding and financial support from Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities are unable to meet their liabilities as they become due, including TCC's next payroll (due January 16, 2015). The Target Canada Entities, therefore state that they are insolvent.

Mr. Wong also states that given the size and complexity of TCC's operations and the numerous stakeholders involved in the business, including employees, suppliers, landlords, franchisees and others, the Target Canada Entities have determined that a controlled wind-down of their operations and liquidation under the protection of the CCAA, under Court supervision and with the assistance of the proposed monitor, is the only practical method available to ensure a fair and orderly process for all stakeholders. Further, Mr. Wong states that TCC and Target Corporation seek to benefit from the framework and the flexibility provided by the CCAA in effecting a controlled and orderly wind-down of the Canadian operations, in a manner that treats stakeholders as fairly and as equitably as the circumstances allow.

25 On this initial hearing, the issues are as follows:

a) Does this court have jurisdiction to grant the CCAA relief requested?

a) Should the stay be extended to the Partnerships?

b) Should the stay be extended to "Co-tenants" and rights of third party tenants?

c) Should the stay extend to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims that are derivative of claims against the Target Canada Entities?

d) Should the Court approve protections for employees?

e) Is it appropriate to allow payment of certain pre-filing amounts?

f) Does this court have the jurisdiction to authorize pre-filing claims to "critical" suppliers;

g) Should the court should exercise its discretion to authorize the Applicants to seek proposals from liquidators and approve the financial advisor and real estate advisor engagement?

h) Should the court exercise its discretion to approve the Court-ordered charges?

<sup>26</sup> "Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the CCAA. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") or if it is "insolvent" as described in *Stelco Inc.*, *Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), [*Stelco*], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.), where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring" (at para 26). The decision of Farley, J. in *Stelco* was followed in *Priszm Income Fund*, *Re*, [2011] O.J. No. 1491 (Ont. S.C.J.), 2011 and *Canwest Global Communications Corp.*, *Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Canwest*].

27 Having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, I am satisfied that the Target Canada Entities are all insolvent and are debtor companies to which the CCAA applies, either by reference to the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA") or under the test developed by Farley J. in *Stelco*.

I also accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants that without the continued financial support of Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities face too many legal and business impediments and too much uncertainty to wind-down their operations without the "breathing space" afforded by a stay of proceedings or other available relief under the CCAA.

I am also satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction over the proceeding. Section 9(1) of the CCAA provides that an application may be made to the court that has jurisdiction in (a) the province in which the head office or chief place of business of the company in Canada is situated; or (b) any province in which the company's assets are situated, if there is no place of business in Canada.

30 In this case, the head office and corporate headquarters of TCC is located in Mississauga, Ontario, where approximately 800 employees work. Moreover, the chief place of business of the Target Canada Entities is Ontario. A number of office locations are in Ontario; 2 of TCC's 3 primary distribution centres are located in Ontario; 55 of the TCC retail stores operate in Ontario; and almost half the employees that support TCC's operations work in Ontario.

The Target Canada Entities state that the purpose for seeking the proposed initial order in these proceedings is to effect a fair, controlled and orderly wind-down of their Canadian retail business with a view to developing a plan of compromise or arrangement to present to their creditors as part of these proceedings. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that although there is no prospect that a restructured "going concern" solution involving the Target Canada Entities will result, the use of the protections and flexibility afforded by the CCAA is entirely appropriate in these circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, I have noted the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) ("*Century Services*") that "courts frequently observe that the CCAA is skeletal in nature", and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred". The flexibility of the CCAA, particularly in the context of large and complex restructurings, allows for innovation and creativity, in contrast to the more "rules-based" approach of the BIA.

32 Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

34 In this case, the sheer magnitude and complexity of the Target Canada Entities business, including the number of stakeholders whose interests are affected, are, in my view, suited to the flexible framework and scope for innovation offered by this "skeletal" legislation.

35 The required audited financial statements are contained in the record.

36 The required cash flow statements are contained in the record.

Pursuant to s. 11.02 of the CCAA, the court may make an order staying proceedings, restraining further proceedings, or prohibiting the commencement of proceedings, "on any terms that it may impose" and "effective for the period that the court considers necessary" provided the stay is no longer than 30 days. The Target Canada Entities, in this case, seek a stay of proceedings up to and including February 13, 2015.

38 Certain of the corporate Target Canada Entities (TCC, TCC Health and TCC Mobile) act as general or limited partners in the partnerships. The Applicants submit that it is appropriate to extend the stay of proceedings to the Partnerships on the basis that each performs key functions in relation to the Target Canada Entities' businesses.

39 The Applicants also seek to extend the stay to Target Canada Property LP which was formerly the sub-leasee/sub-sub lessor under the sub-sub lease back arrangement entered into by TCC to finance the leasehold improvements in its leased stores. The Applicants contend that the extension of the stay to Target Canada Property LP is necessary in order to safeguard it against any residual claims that may be asserted against it as a result of TCC Propeo's insolvency and filing under the CCAA.

40 I am satisfied that it is appropriate that an initial order extending the protection of a CCAA stay of proceedings under section 11.02(1) of the CCAA should be granted.

41 Pursuant to section 11.7(1) of the CCAA, Alvarez & Marsal Inc. is appointed as Monitor.

42 It is well established that the court has the jurisdiction to extend the protection of the stay of proceedings to Partnerships in order to ensure that the purposes of the CCAA can be achieved (see: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, 2011 ONSC 2061 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Canwest Publishing Inc./ Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Publishing*") and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Global*").

43 In these circumstances, I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the stay to the Partnerships as requested.

The Applicants also seek landlord protection in relation to third party tenants. Many retail leases of non-anchored tenants provide that tenants have certain rights against their landlords if the anchor tenant in a particular shopping mall or centre becomes insolvent or ceases operations. In order to alleviate the prejudice to TCC's landlords if any such non-anchored tenants attempt to exercise these rights, the Applicants request an extension of the stay of proceedings (the "Co-Tenancy Stay") to all rights of these third party tenants against the landlords that arise out of the insolvency of the Target Canada Entities or as a result of any steps taken by the Target Canada Entities pursuant to the Initial Order. The Applicants contend that the authority to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay derives from the broad jurisdiction under sections 11 and 11.02(1) of the CCAA to make an initial order on any terms that the court may impose. Counsel references *T. Eaton Co., Re*, 1997 CarswellOnt 1914 (Ont. Gen. Div.) as a precedent where a stay of proceedings of the same nature as the Co-Tenancy Stay was granted by the court in Eaton's second CCAA proceeding. The Court noted that, if tenants were permitted to exercise these "co-tenancy" rights during the stay, the claims of the landlord against the debtor company would greatly increase, with a potentially detrimental impact on the restructuring efforts of the debtor company.

In these proceedings, the Target Canada Entities propose, as part of the orderly wind-down of their businesses, to engage a financial advisor and a real estate advisor with a view to implementing a sales process for some or all of its real estate portfolio. The Applicants submit that it is premature to determine whether this process will be successful, whether any leases will be conveyed to third party purchasers for value and whether the Target Canada Entities can successfully develop and implement a plan that their stakeholders, including their landlords, will accept. The Applicants further contend that while this process is being resolved and the orderly wind-down is underway, the Co-Tenancy Stay is required to postpone the contractual rights of these tenants for a finite period. The Applicants contend that any prejudice to the third party tenants' clients is significantly outweighed by the benefits of the Co-Tenancy Stay to all of the stakeholders of the Target Canada Entities during the wind-down period.

47 The Applicants therefore submit that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay in these circumstances.

I am satisfied the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time. To the extent that the affected parties wish to challenge the broad nature of this stay, the same can be addressed at the "comeback hearing".

49 The Applicants also request that the benefit of the stay of proceedings be extended (subject to certain exceptions related to the cash management system) to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims against these entities that are derivative of the primary liability of the Target Canada Entities.

I am satisfied that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time and the stay is granted, again, subject to the proviso that affected parties can challenge the broad nature of the stay at a comeback hearing directed to this issue.

51 With respect to the protection of employees, it is noted that TCC employs approximately 17,600 individuals.

52 Mr. Wong contends that TCC and Target Corporation have always considered their employees to be integral to the Target brand and business. However, the orderly wind-down of the Target Canada Entities' business means that the vast majority of TCC employees will receive a notice immediately after the CCAA filing that their employment is to be terminated as part of the wind-down process.

53 In order to provide a measure of financial security during the orderly wind-down and to diminish financial hardship that TCC employees may suffer, Target Corporation has agreed to fund an Employee Trust to a maximum of \$70 million.

54 The Applicants seek court approval of the Employee Trust which provides for payment to eligible employees of certain amounts, such as the balance of working notice following termination. Counsel contends that the Employee Trust was developed in consultation with the proposed monitor, who is the administrator of the trust, and is supported by the proposed Representative Counsel. The proposed trustee is The Honourable J. Ground. The Employee Trust is exclusively funded by Target Corporation and the costs associated with administering the Employee Trust will be borne by the Employee Trust, not the estate of Target Canada Entities. Target Corporation has agreed not to seek to recover from the Target Canada Entities estates any amounts paid out to employee beneficiaries under the Employee Trust.

55 In my view, it is questionable as to whether court authorization is required to implement the provisions of the Employee Trust. It is the third party, Target Corporation, that is funding the expenses for the Employee Trust and not one of the debtor Applicants. However, I do recognize that the implementation of the Employee Trust is intertwined with this proceeding and is beneficial to the employees of the Applicants. To the extent that Target Corporation requires a court order authorizing the implementation of the employee trust, the same is granted.

56 The Applicants seek the approval of a KERP and the granting of a court ordered charge up to the aggregate amount of \$6.5 million as security for payments under the KERP. It is proposed that the KERP Charge will rank after the Administration Charge but before the Directors' Charge.

57 The approval of a KERP and related KERP Charge is in the discretion of the Court. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings, including *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Nortel Networks (KERP)]*, and *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, 2014 ONSC 6145 (Ont. S.C.J.), I recently approved the KERP for employees whose continued services were critical to the stability of the business and for the implementation of the marketing process and whose services could not easily be replaced due, in part, to the significant integration between the debtor company and its U.S. parent.

In this case, the KERP was developed by the Target Canada Entities in consultation with the proposed monitor. The proposed KERP and KERP Charge benefits between 21 and 26 key management employees and approximately 520 store-level management employees.

59 Having reviewed the record, I am of the view that it is appropriate to approve the KERP and the KERP Charge. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account the submissions of counsel to the Applicants as to the importance of having stability among the key employees in the liquidation process that lies ahead.

The Applicants also request the Court to appoint Koskie Minsky LLP as employee representative counsel (the "Employee Representative Counsel"), with Ms. Susan Philpott acting as senior counsel. The Applicants contend that the Employee Representative Counsel will ensure that employee interests are adequately protected throughout the proceeding, including by assisting with the Employee Trust. The Applicants contend that at this stage of the proceeding, the employees have a common interest in the CCAA proceedings and there appears to be no material conflict existing between individual or groups of employees. Moreover, employees will be entitled to opt out, if desired.

I am satisfied that section 11 of the CCAA and the *Rules of Civil Procedure* confer broad jurisdiction on the court to appoint Representative Counsel for vulnerable stakeholder groups such as employee or investors (see *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (Nortel Networks Representative Counsel)). In my view, it is appropriate to approve the appointment of Employee Representative Counsel and to provide for the payment of fees for such counsel by the Applicants. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account:

(i) the vulnerability and resources of the groups sought to be represented;

- (ii) the social benefit to be derived from the representation of the groups;
- (iii) the avoidance of multiplicity of legal retainers; and
- (iv) the balance of convenience and whether it is fair and just to creditors of the estate.

62 The Applicants also seek authorization, if necessary, and with the consent of the Monitor, to make payments for prefiling amounts owing and arrears to certain critical third parties that provide services integral to TCC's ability to operate during and implement its controlled and orderly wind-down process.

63 Although the objective of the CCAA is to maintain the status quo while an insolvent company attempts to negotiate a plan of arrangement with its creditors, the courts have expressly acknowledged that preservation of the status quo does not necessarily entail the preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor. 64 The Target Canada Entities seek authorization to pay pre-filing amounts to certain specific categories of suppliers, if necessary and with the consent of the Monitor. These include:

a) Logistics and supply chain providers;

b) Providers of credit, debt and gift card processing related services; and

c) Other suppliers up to a maximum aggregate amount of \$10 million, if, in the opinion of the Target Canada Entities, the supplier is critical to the orderly wind-down of the business.

In my view, having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant this requested relief in respect of critical suppliers.

In order to maximize recovery for all stakeholders, TCC indicates that it intends to liquidate its inventory and attempt to sell the real estate portfolio, either en bloc, in groups, or on an individual property basis. The Applicants therefore seek authorization to solicit proposals from liquidators with a view to entering into an agreement for the liquidation of the Target Canada Entities inventory in a liquidation process.

TCC's liquidity position continues to deteriorate. According to Mr. Wong, TCC and its subsidiaries have an immediate need for funding in order to satisfy obligations that are coming due, including payroll obligations that are due on January 16, 2015. Mr. Wong states that Target Corporation and its subsidiaries are no longer willing to provide continued funding to TCC and its subsidiaries outside of a CCAA proceeding. Target Corporation (the "DIP Lender") has agreed to provide TCC and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Borrower") with an interim financing facility (the "DIP Facility") on terms advantageous to the Applicants in the form of a revolving credit facility in an amount up to U.S. \$175 million. Counsel points out that no fees are payable under the DIP Facility and interest is to be charged at what they consider to be the favourable rate of 5%. Mr. Wong also states that it is anticipated that the amount of the DIP Facility will be sufficient to accommodate the anticipated liquidity requirements of the Borrower during the orderly wind-down process.

The DIP Facility is to be secured by a security interest on all of the real and personal property owned, leased or hereafter acquired by the Borrower. The Applicants request a court-ordered charge on the property of the Borrower to secure the amount actually borrowed under the DIP Facility (the "DIP Lenders Charge"). The DIP Lenders Charge will rank in priority to all unsecured claims, but subordinate to the Administration Charge, the KERP Charge and the Directors' Charge.

69 The authority to grant an interim financing charge is set out at section 11.2 of the CCAA. Section 11.2(4) sets out certain factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant the DIP Financing Charge.

The Target Canada Entities did not seek alternative DIP Financing proposals based on their belief that the DIP Facility was being offered on more favourable terms than any other potentially available third party financing. The Target Canada Entities are of the view that the DIP Facility is in the best interests of the Target Canada Entities and their stakeholders. I accept this submission and grant the relief as requested.

Accordingly, the DIP Lenders' Charge is granted in the amount up to U.S. \$175 million and the DIP Facility is approved.

Section 11 of the CCAA provides the court with the authority to allow the debtor company to enter into arrangements to facilitate a restructuring under the CCAA. The Target Canada Entities wish to retain Lazard and Northwest to assist them during the CCCA proceeding. Both the Target Canada Entities and the Monitor believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration to be paid to Lazard and Northwest is fair and reasonable. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the engagement of Lazard and Northwest.

73 With respect to the Administration Charge, the Applicants are requesting that the Monitor, along with its counsel, counsel to the Target Canada Entities, independent counsel to the Directors, the Employee Representative Counsel, Lazard and Northwest be protected by a court ordered charge and all the property of the Target Canada Entities up to a maximum amount of \$6.75

million as security for their respective fees and disbursements (the "Administration Charge"). Certain fees that may be payable to Lazard are proposed to be protected by a Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

<sup>74</sup> In *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Pepall J. (as she then was) provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in approving an administration charge, including:

a. The size and complexity of the business being restructured;

- b. The proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- c. Whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- d. Whether the quantum of the proposed Charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- e. The position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the Charge; and
- f. The position of the Monitor.

Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied, that it is appropriate to approve the Administration Charge and the Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

The Applicants seek a Directors' and Officers' charge in the amount of up to \$64 million. The Directors Charge is proposed to be secured by the property of the Target Canada Entities and to rank behind the Administration Charge and the KERP Charge, but ahead of the DIP Lenders' Charge.

Pursuant to section 11.51 of the CCAA, the court has specific authority to grant a "super priority" charge to the directors and officers of a company as security for the indemnity provided by the company in respect of certain obligations.

I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that the requested Directors' Charge is reasonable given the nature of the Target Canada Entities retail business, the number of employees in Canada and the corresponding potential exposure of the directors and officers to personal liability. Accordingly, the Directors' Charge is granted.

79 In the result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Initial Order in these proceedings.

80 The stay of proceedings is in effect until February 13, 2015.

A comeback hearing is to be scheduled on or prior to February 13, 2015. I recognize that there are many aspects of the Initial Order that go beyond the usual first day provisions. I have determined that it is appropriate to grant this broad relief at this time so as to ensure that the status quo is maintained.

82 The comeback hearing is to be a "true" comeback hearing. In moving to set aside or vary any provisions of this order, moving parties do not have to overcome any onus of demonstrating that the order should be set aside or varied.

83 Finally, a copy of Lazard's engagement letter (the "Lazard Engagement Letter") is attached as Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report. The Applicants request that the Lazard Engagement Letter be sealed, as the fee structure contemplated in the Lazard Engagement Letter could potentially influence the structure of bids received in the sales process.

Having considered the principles set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to seal Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report.

85 The Initial Order has been signed in the form presented.

Application granted.

# TAB 4

## 2015 ONSC 124 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

4519922 Canada Inc., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 178, 2015 ONSC 124, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 44, 249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 508

## In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36 as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of 4519922 Canada Inc.

Newbould J.

Heard: December 8, 2014; January 6, 2015 Judgment: January 12, 2015 Docket: CV-1410791-00CL

Counsel: Robert I. Thornton, John T. Porter, Lee M. Nicholson, Asim Iqbal for Applicant Harry M. Fogul for 22, former CLCA partners Orestes Pasparakis, Evan Cobb for Insurers Avram Fishman, Mark Meland for German and Canadian Bank Groups, Widdrington Estate and Trustee of Castor Holdings Limited James H. Grout for 22, former CLCA partners Chris Reed for 8, former CLCA partners Andrew Kent for 5, former CLCA partners Richard B. Jones for one, former CLCA partne John MacDonald for Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP James A. Woods, Sylvain Vauclair, Bogdan Catanu, Neil Peden for Chrysler Canada Inc. and CIBC Mellon Trust Company Jay A. Swartz for proposed Monitor Ernst & Young Inc.

**Related Abridgment Classifications** 

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.b Grant of stay XIX.2.b.vii Extension of order Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.b Grant of stay XIX.2.b.viii Miscellaneous Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.2 Initial application

XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Extension of order

Applicant was corporation and was partner in accounting firm — In 1993, 96 plaintiffs commenced negligence actions against accounting firm and 311 of its individual partners claiming approximately \$1 billion in damages — Test case in this litigation

resulted in judgment of \$4,978,897.51, and leave to appeal this judgment was dismissed by Supreme Court of Canada in January 2014 — Applicant engaged in negotiations with remaining plaintiffs in negligence actions — These negotiations culminated with execution of term sheet outlining plan of arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) that could achieve global resolution to outstanding litigation — In December 2014, applicant obtained initial order granting it and accounting firm protection under CCAA — C Inc., which had very large claim against accounting firm, had not been given notice of CCAA application — C Inc. brought motion to set aside initial order and to dismiss CCAA application — Motion dismissed — CCAA proceeding would permit applicant and its stakeholders means of attempting to arrive at global settlement of all claims — There was no issue as to good faith of applicant in CCAA proceeding — Initial order should not be set aside and CCAA application dismissed on basis of defence tactics in test case — Term sheet was supported by overwhelming number of creditors — C Inc. was seeking to impose its will on all other creditors by attempting to prevent them from voting on proposed plan — Court's primary concern under CCAA had to be for debtor and all of its creditors — There was no prejudice to C Inc. given that its contingent claim was not scheduled to be tried until 2017 at earliest — Issues raised by C Inc. with respect to term sheet were premature and could be dealt with later in proceedings as required.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Initial application --- Miscellaneous

Creditors' committee — Applicant was corporation and was partner in accounting firm — In 1993, 96 plaintiffs commenced negligence actions against accounting firm and 311 of its individual partners claiming approximately \$1 billion in damages — Test case in this litigation resulted in judgment of \$4,978,897.51, and leave to appeal this judgment was dismissed by Supreme Court of Canada in January 2014 — Applicant engaged in negotiations with remaining plaintiffs in negligence actions — These negotiations culminated with execution of term sheet outlining plan of arrangement under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) that could achieve global resolution to outstanding litigation — In December 2014, applicant obtained initial order granting it and accounting firm protection under CCAA — Initial order provided for creditors' committee (committee), and it also provided that accounting firm should be entitled to pay reasonable fees and disbursements of legal counsel to committee

— C Inc., which had very large claim against accounting firm, had not been given notice of CCAA application — C Inc. brought motion to vary initial order to delete appointment of committee and provision for payment of committee's legal fees and expenses — Motion dismissed — Committee was result of intensely negotiated term sheet that formed foundation of plan — Altering term sheet removing committee could frustrate applicant's ability to develop viable plan and could jeopardize existing support from majority of claimants — Other creditors had no objection if C Inc. wanted to join committee — C Inc.'s complaints about claim process proposed in term sheet was not reason to deny existence of committee, but rather would be matter for discussion when claims process came before court for approval — Costs of paying committee in relation to amounts at stake would be relatively minimal.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Miscellaneous Extending stay to include insurers of insolvent accounting firm.

#### **Table of Authorities**

#### Cases considered by *Newbould J*.:

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Tallgrass Energy Corp (2013), 8 C.B.R. (6th) 161, 2013 ABQB 432, 2013 CarswellAlta 1496 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Alexis Paragon Limited Partnership, Re (2014), 2014 ABQB 65, 2014 CarswellAlta 165, 9 C.B.R. (6th) 43 (Alta. Q.B.) - considered

*Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

*Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 27, 410 W.A.C. 25, 417 A.R. 25, 2007 ABCA 266, 2007 CarswellAlta 1097, 80 Alta. L.R. (4th) 60, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 94 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

*Crystallex International Corp., Re* (2011), 2011 ONSC 7701, 2011 CarswellOnt 15034, 89 C.B.R. (5th) 313 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re* (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 2559, 2012 ONSC 1299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 1990 CarswellBC 394, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, (sub nom. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada) [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.) - considered Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — followed Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. (Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Cie), Re (2013), 2013 CarswellQue 8420, 2013 QCCS 3777 (Que. Bktcy.) — considered Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54, 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 57, 2006 CarswellOnt 720 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) - referred to Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) - referred to **Statutes considered:** Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 s. 2 "insolvent person" - considered Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 Generally - referred to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally - referred to s. 2(1) "debtor company" (a) — considered s. 3(1) — considered s. 11 - considered Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.5

Generally — referred to

## Newbould J.:

1 On December 8, 2014 the applicant 4519922 Canada Inc. ("451"), applied for an Initial Order granting it protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"), extending the protection of the Initial Order to the partnership Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accounts ("CLCA"), of which it is a partner and to CLCA's insurers, and to stay the outstanding litigation in the Quebec Superior Court relating to Castor Holdings Limited ("Castor") during the pendency of these proceedings. The relief was supported by the Canadian and German bank groups who are plaintiffs in the Quebec litigation, by the Widdrington Estate that has a final judgment against CLCA, by the insurers of CLCA and by 22 former CLCA partners who appeared on the application.

2 The material in the application included a term sheet which the applicant wishes to use as a basis of a plan and which provides for an injection of approximately \$220 million in return for a release from any further litigation. The term sheet was supported by all parties who appeared.

3 I granted the order with a stay to January 7, 2015 for reasons to follow, but in light of the fact that Chrysler Canada Inc., with a very large claim against CLCA in the litigation, had not been given notice of the application, ordered that Chrysler be given notice to make any submissions regarding the Initial Order if it wished to do so.

4 Chrysler has now moved to set aside the Initial Order, or in the alternative to vary it to delete the appointment of a creditors' committee and the provision for payment of the committee's legal fees and expenses. On the return of Chrysler's motion, a number of other former CLCA partners and PricewaterhouseCoopers appeared in support of the granting of the Initial Order.

### Structure of Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accounts

5 The applicant 451 is a corporation continued pursuant to the provisions of the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, and its registered head office is in Toronto, Ontario. It and 4519931 Canada Inc. ("4519931") are the only partners of CLCA.

6 CLCA is a partnership governed by the *Partnerships Act (Ontario)* with its registered head office located in Toronto, Ontario. It was originally established in 1980 under the name of "Coopers & Lybrand" and was engaged in the accountancy profession. On September 2, 1985, the name "Coopers & Lybrand" was changed to "Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accountants" and the partnership continued in the accountancy profession operating under the new name. Until 1998, CLCA was a national firm of chartered accountants that provided audit and accounting services from offices located across Canada and was a member of a global network of professional firms.

7 In order to comply with the requirements of the various provincial Institutes of Chartered Accountants across Canada, many of which restricted chartered accountants providing audit services from being partners with persons who were not chartered accountants, Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group ("CLCG") was established under the *Partnerships Act (Ontario)* in September 1985 to provide management consulting services. Concurrent with the formation of CLCG, Coopers & Lybrand ("OpCo") was established as a partnership of CLCA, CLCG and two other parties to develop and manage the CLCA audit and CLCG management consulting practices that had to remain separate. Until 1998, OpCo owned most of the operating assets of CLCA and CLCG. OpCo is governed by the Partnerships Act (Ontario) and its registered head office is in Toronto.

8 In 1998, the member firms of the global networks of each of Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse agreed upon a business combination of the two franchises. To effect the transaction in Canada, substantially all of CLCA's and CLCG's business assets were sold to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC"), which entity combined the operations of the Coopers & Lybrand entities and Price Waterhouse entities, and the partners of CLCA and CLCG at that time became partners of PwC. Subsequent to the closing of the PwC transaction, CLCA continued for the purpose of winding up its obligations and CLCA and CLCG retained their partnership interests in OpCo. By 2006, all individual CLCA partners had resigned and been replaced by two corporate partners to ensure CLCA's continued existence to deal with the continuing claims and obligations.

9 Since 1998, OpCo has administered the wind up of CLCA and CLCG's affairs, in addition to its own affairs, including satisfying outstanding legacy obligations, liquidating assets and administering CLCA's defence in the Castor litigation. In conjunction with OpCo, 451 and 4519931 have overseen the continued wind up of CLCA's affairs. The sole shareholders of 451 and 4519931 are two former CLCA partners. 451 and 4519931 have no assets or interests aside from their partnership interests in CLCA.

## **Castor Holdings litigation**

10 Commencing in 1993, 96 plaintiffs commenced negligence actions against CLCA and 311 of its individual partners claiming approximately \$1 billion in damages. The claims arose from financial statements prepared by Castor and audited by CLCA, as well as certain share valuation letters and certificates for "legal for life" opinions. The claims are for losses relating to investments in or loans made to Castor in the period 1988 to 1991. A critical issue in the Castor litigation was whether CLCA was negligent in doing its work during the period 1988-1991.

11 Fifty-six claims have either been settled or discontinued. Currently, with interest, the plaintiffs in the Castor litigation collectively claim in excess of \$1.5 billion.

12 Due to the commonality of the negligence issues raised in the actions, it was decided that a single case, brought by Peter Widdrington claiming damages in the amount of \$2,672,960, would proceed to trial and all other actions in the Castor litigation would be suspended pending the outcome of the Widdrington trial. All plaintiffs in the Castor litigation were given status in the Widdrington trial on the issues common to the various claims and the determination regarding common issues, including the issues of negligence and applicable law, was to be binding in all other cases. 13 The first trial in the Widdrington action commenced in September 1998, but ultimately was aborted in 2006 due to the presiding judge's illness and subsequent retirement. The new trial commenced in January 2008 before Madam Justice St. Pierre. A decision was rendered in April 2011 in which she held that Castor's audited consolidated financial statements for the period of 1988-1990 were materially misstated and misleading and that CLCA was negligent in performing its services as auditor to Castor during that period. She noted that that the overwhelming majority of CLCA's partners did not have any involvement with Castor or the auditing of the financial statements prepared by Castor.

14 The decision in the Widdrington action was appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal which on the common issues largely upheld the lower court's judgment. The only common issue that was overturned was the nature of the defendant partners' liability. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that under Quebec law, the defendant partners were severally liable. As such, each individual defendant partner is potentially and contingently responsible for his or her several share of the damages suffered by each plaintiff in each action in the Castor litigation for the period that he or she was a partner in the years of the negligence.

15 On January 9, 2014, the defendants' application for leave to appeal the Widdrington decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.

16 The Widdrington action has resulted in a judgment in the amount of \$4,978,897.51, inclusive of interest, a cost award in the amount of \$15,896,297.26 plus interest, a special fee cost award in the amount of \$2.5 million plus interest, and a determination of the common issue that CLCA was negligent in performing its services as auditor to Castor during the relevant period.

17 There remain 26 separate actions representing 40 claims that have not yet been tried. Including interest, the remaining plaintiffs now claim more than \$1.5 billion in damages. Issues of causation, reliance, contributory negligence and damages are involved in them.

18 The Castor Litigation has given rise to additional related litigation:

(a) Castor's trustee in bankruptcy has challenged the transfer in 1998 of substantially all of the assets used in CLCA's business to PwC under the provisions of Quebec's bulk sales legislation. As part of the PwC transaction, CLCA, OpCo and CLCG agreed to indemnify PwC from any losses that it may suffer arising from any failure on the part of CLCA, OpCo or CLCG to comply with the requirements of any bulk sales legislation applicable to the PwC transaction. In the event that PwC suffers any loss arising from the bulk sales action, it has the right to assert an indemnity claim against CLCA, OpCo and CLCG.

(b) Certain of the plaintiffs have brought an action against 51 insurers of CLCA. They seek a declaration that the policies issued by the insurers are subject to Quebec law. The action would determine whether the insurance coverage is costs-inclusive (i.e. defence costs and other expenses are counted towards the total insurance coverage) or costs-in-addition (i.e. amounts paid for the defence of claims do not erode the policy limits). The insurers assert that any insurance coverage is costs-inclusive and has been exhausted. If the insurers succeed, there will be no more insurance to cover claims. If the insurers do not succeed and the insurance policies are deemed to be costs-in-addition, the insurers may assert claims against CLCA for further premiums resulting from the more extensive coverage.

(c) The claim against the insurers was set to proceed to trial in mid-January 2015 for approximately six months. CLCA is participating in the litigation as a mis-en-cause and it has all the rights of a defendant to contest the action and is bound by the result. As a result of the stay in the Initial Order, the trial has been put off.

(d) There have been eight actions brought in the Quebec Superior Court challenging transactions undertaken by certain partners and parties related to them (typically a spouse) (the "Paulian Actions").

(e) There is a pending appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal involving an order authorizing the examination after judgment in the Widdrington action of Mr. David W. Smith.

19 The next trial to proceed against CLCA and the individual partners will be in respect of claims made by three German banks. It is not expected to start until at the least the fall of 2015 and a final determination is unlikely until 2017 at the earliest, with any appeals taking longer. It is anticipated that the next trial after the three German banks trial will be in respect of Chrysler's claim. Mr. Woods, who acts for Chrysler, anticipates that it will not start until 2017 with a trial decision perhaps being given in 2019 or 2020, with any appeals taking longer. The remaining claims will not proceed until after the Chrysler trial.

20 The fees incurred by OpCo and CLCA in the defence of the Widdrington action are already in excess of \$70 million. The total spent by all parties already amounts to at least \$150 million. There is evidence before me of various judges in Quebec being critical of the way in which the defence of the Widdrington action has been conducted in a "scorched earth" manner.

## Individual partner defendants

Of the original 311 defendant partners, twenty-seven are now deceased. Over one hundred and fifty are over sixty-five years of age, and sixty-five more will reach sixty-five years of age within five years. There is a dispute about the number of defendant partners who were partners of CLCA at the material time. CLCA believes that twenty-six were wrongly named in the Castor litigation (and most have now been removed), a further three were named in actions that were subsequently discontinued, some were partners for only a portion of the 1988-1991 period and some were named in certain actions but not others. Six of the defendant partners have already made assignments in bankruptcy.

## Analysis

# (i) Applicability of the CCAA

Section 3(1) of the CCAA provides that it applies to a debtor company where the total claims against the debtor company exceed \$5 million. By virtue of section 2(1)(a), a debtor company includes a company that is insolvent. Chrysler contends that the applicant has not established that it is insolvent.

The insolvency of a debtor is assessed at the time of the filing of the CCAA application. While the CCAA does not define "insolvent", the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* is commonly referred to for guidance although the BIA definition is given an expanded meaning under the CCAA. See Holden, Morawetz & Sarra, *the 2013-2014 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Carswell) at N§12 and *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (per Farley J.); leave to appeal to the C of A refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.).

24 The BIA defines "insolvent person" as follows:

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,

(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or

(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due;

25 The applicant submits that it is insolvent under all of these tests.

The applicant 451 is a debtor company. It is a partner of CLCA and is liable as a principal for the partnership's debts incurred while it is a partner.

At present, CLCA's outstanding obligations for which the applicant 451 is liable include: (i) various postretirement obligations owed to former CLCA partners, the present value of which is approximately \$6.25 million (the "Pre-71 Entitlements"); (ii) \$16,026,189 payable to OpCo on account of a loan advanced by OpCo on October 17, 2011 to allow CLCA to pay certain defence costs relating to the Castor litigation; (iii) the Widdrington costs award in the amount of \$18,783,761.66, inclusive of interest as at December 1, 2014, which became due and payable to the plaintiff's counsel on November 27, 2014; (iv) the special fee in the amount of \$2,675,000, inclusive of interest as at December 1, 2014, awarded to the plaintiff's counsel in the Widdrington action; and (v) contingent liabilities relating to or arising from the Castor litigation, the claims of which with interest that have not yet been decided being approximately \$1.5 billion.

The only asset of the applicant 451 on its balance sheet is its investment of \$100 in CLCA. The applicant is a partner in CLCA which in turn is a partner in OpCo. At the time of the granting of the Initial Order, Ernst & Young Inc., the proposed Monitor, stated in its report that the applicant was insolvent based on its review of the financial affairs of the applicant, CLCA and OpCo.

Mr. Peden in argument on behalf of Chrysler analyzed the balance sheets of CLCA and OpCo and concluded that there were some \$39 million in realizable assets against liabilities of some \$21 million, leaving some \$18 million in what he said were liquid assets. Therefore he concluded that these assets of \$18 million are available to take care of the liabilities of 451.

I cannot accept this analysis. It was unsupported by any expert accounting evidence and involved assumptions regarding netting out amounts, one of some \$6.5 million owing to pre-1971 retired partners, and one of some \$16 million owing by CLCA to OpCo for defence costs funded by OpCo. He did not consider the contingent claims against the \$6.5 million under the indemnity provided to PWC, nor did he consider that the \$16 million was unlikely to be collectible by OpCo as explained in the notes to the financial statements of 451.

This analysis also ignored the contingent \$1.5 billion liabilities of CLCA in the remaining Castor litigation and the effect that would have on the defence costs and for which the applicant 451 will have liability and a contingent liability for cost awards rendered in that litigation against CLCA. These contingent liabilities must be taken into account in an insolvency analysis under the subsection (c) definition of an insolvent person in the BIA which refers to obligations due and accruing due. In *Stelco Inc., Re, supra*, Farley J. stated that all liabilities, contingent or unliquidated, have to be taken into account. See also *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (per Farley J.).

It is obvious in this case that if the litigation continues, the defence costs for which the applicant 451 will have liability alone will continue and will more than eat up whatever cash OpCo may have. As well, the contingent liabilities of CLCA in the remaining \$1.5 billion in claims cannot be ignored just because CLCA has entered defences in all of them. The negligence of CLCA has been established for all of these remaining cases in the Widdrington test case. The term sheet provides that the claims of the German and Canadian banks, approximately \$720 million in total, and the claim of the Trustee of CLCA of approximately \$108 million, will be accepted for voting and distribution purposes in a plan of arrangement. While there is no evidence before me at this stage what has led to the decision of CLCA and its former partners to now accept these claims, I can only conclude that in the circumstances it was considered by these defendants that there was exceptional risk in the actions succeeding. I hesitate to say a great deal about this as the agreement in the term sheet to accept these claims for voting and distribution purposes will no doubt be the subject of further debate in these proceedings at the appropriate time.

As stated, the balance sheet of the applicant 451 lists as its sole asset its investment of \$100 in CLCA. The notes to the financial statements state that CLCA was indebted to OpCo at the time, being June 30, 2014, for approximately \$16 million and that its only asset available to satisfy that liability was its investment in OpCo on which it was highly likely that there would be no recovery. As a result 451 would not have assets to support its liabilities to OpCo.

For this reason, as well as the contingent risks of liability of CLCA in the remaining claims of \$1.5 billion, it is highly likely that the \$100 investment of the applicant 451 in CLCA is worthless and unable to fund the current and future obligations of the applicant caused by the CLCA litigation.

I accept the conclusion of Ernst & Young Inc. that the applicant 451 is insolvent. I find that the applicant has established its insolvency at the time of the commencement of this CCAA proceeding.

(ii) Should an Initial Order be made and if so should it extend to CLCA?

36 The applicant moved for a stay in its favour and moved as well to extend the stay to CLCA and all of the outstanding Castor litigation. I granted that relief in the Initial Order. Chrysler contends that there should be no stay of any kind. It has not expressly argued that if a stay is granted against the applicant it should not be extended to CLCA, but the tenor of its arguments would encompass that.

I am satisfied that if the stay against the applicant contained in the Initial Order is maintained, it should extend to CLCA and the outstanding Castor litigation. A CCAA court may exercise its jurisdiction to extend protection by way of the stay of proceedings to a partnership related to an applicant where it is just and reasonable or just and convenient to do so. The courts have held that this relief is appropriate where the operations of a debtor company are so intertwined with those of a partner or limited partnership in question that not extending the stay would significantly impair the effectiveness of a stay in respect of the debtor company. See *Priszm Income Fund, Re* (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) per Morawetz J. The stay is not granted under section 11 of the CCAA but rather under the court's inherent jurisdiction. It has its genesis in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and has been followed in several cases, including *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) per Pepall J. (as she then was) and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.) per Romaine J.

The applicant 451's sole asset is its partnership interest in the CLCA partnership and its liabilities are derived solely from that interest. The affairs of the applicant and CLCA are clearly intertwined. Not extending the stay to CLCA and the Castor litigation would significantly impair the effectiveness of the stay in respect of 451. It would in fact denude it of any force at all as the litigation costs would mount and it would in all likelihood destroy any ability to achieve a global settlement of the litigation. CLCA is a necessary party to achieve a resolution of the outstanding litigation, and significant contributions from its interest in OpCo and from its former partners are anticipated under the term sheet in exchange for releases to be provided to them.

39 Chrysler relies on the principle that if the technical requirements for a CCAA application are met, there is discretion in a court to deny the application, and contends that for several reasons the equities in this case require the application to be met. It says that there is no business being carried on by the applicant or by CLCA and that there is no need for a CCAA proceeding to effect a sale of any assets as a going concern. It says there will be no restructuring of a business.

40 Cases under the CCAA have progressed since the earlier cases such as *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.) which expressed the purpose of the CCAA to be to permit insolvent companies to emerge and continue in business. The CCAA is not restricted to companies that are to be kept in business. See *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 1299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 33 (per Brown J. as he then was). There are numerous cases in which CCAA proceedings were permitted without any business being conducted.

41 To cite a few, in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) the applicants sought relief under the CCAA principally as a means of achieving a global resolution of a large number of product liability and other lawsuits. The applicants had sold all of its operating assets prior to the CCAA application and had no remaining operating business. In *Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. (Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Cie), Re*, 2013 QCCS 3777 (Que. Bktcy.) arising out of the Lac-Mégant train disaster, it was acknowledged that the debtor would be sold or dismantled in the course of the CCAA proceedings. The CCAA proceedings were brought to deal with litigation claims against it and others. In *Crystallex International Corp., Re*, 2011 ONSC 7701 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) the CCAA is currently being utilized by a company with no operating business, the only asset of which is an arbitration claim.

42 Chrysler contends, as stated in its factum, that the pith and substance of this case is not about the rescue of a business; it is to shield the former partners of CLCA from their liabilities in a manner that should not be approved by this court. Chrysler refers to several statements by judges beginning in 2006 in the Castor litigation who have been critical of the way in which the Widdrington test case has been defended, using such phrases as "a procedural war of attrition" and "scorched earth" strategies. Chrysler contends that now that the insurance proceeds have run out and the former partners face the prospect of bearing the cost of litigation which that plaintiffs have had to bear throughout the 22-year war of attrition, the former partners have convinced the German and Canadian banks to agree to the compromise set out in the term sheet. To grant them relief now would, it is contended, reward their improper conduct.

43 Chrysler refers to a recent decision in Alberta, *Alexis Paragon Limited Partnership, Re*, 2014 ABQB 65 (Alta. Q.B.) in which a CCAA application was denied and a receiver appointed at the request of its first secured creditor. In that case Justice Thomas referred to a statement of Justice Romaine in *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Tallgrass Energy Corp*, 2013 ABQB 432 (Alta. Q.B.) in which she stated that an applicant had to establish that it has acted and is acting in good faith and with due diligence. Justice Thomas referred to past failures of the applicant to act with due diligence in resolving its financial issues and on that ground denied the CCAA application. Chrysler likens that to the manner in which the Widdrington test case was defended by CLCA.

I am not entirely sure what Justice Romaine precisely had in mind in referring to the need for an applicant to establish that "it has acted and is acting with good faith and with due diligence" but I would think it surprising that a CCAA application should be defeated on the failure of an applicant to have dealt with its affairs in a diligent manner in the past. That could probably said to have been the situation in a majority of cases, or at least arguably so, and in my view the purpose of CCAA protection is to attempt to make the best of a bad situation without great debate whether the business in the past was properly carried out. Did the MM&A railway in Lac-Mégantic act with due diligence in its safety practices? It may well not have, but that could not have been a factor considered in the decision to give it CCAA protection.

I do understand that need for an applicant to act in the CCAA process with due diligence and good faith, but I would be reluctant to lay down any fixed rule as to how an applicant's actions prior to the CCAA application should be considered. I agree with the statement of Farley J. in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) that it is the good faith of an applicant in the CCAA proceedings that is the issue:

Allegations ... of bad faith as to past activities have been made against the CCAA applicants and the Gardiner interests. However, the question of good faith is with respect to how these parties are conducting themselves in these CCAA proceedings.

46 There is no issue as to the good faith of the applicant in this CCAA proceeding. I would not set aside the Initial Order and dismiss the application on the basis of the defence tactics in the Widdrington test case.

The Castor litigation has embroiled CLCA and the individual partners for over 20 years. If the litigation is not settled, it will take many more years. Chrysler concedes that it likely will take at least until 2020 for the trial process on its claim to play out and then several more years for the appellate process to take its course. Other claims will follow the Chrysler claim. The costs have been enormous and will continue to escalate.

48 OpCo has dedicated all of its resources to the defence of the Castor litigation and it will continue to do so. OpCo has ceased distributions to its partners, including CLCA, in order to preserve funds for the purpose of funding the defence of the litigation. If the Castor litigation continues, further legal and other costs will be incurred by OpCo and judgments may be rendered against CLCA and its partners. If so, those costs and judgments will have to be paid by OpCo through advances from OpCo to CLCA. Since CLCA has no sources of revenue or cash inflow other than OpCo, the liabilities of CLCA, and therefore the applicant, will only increase.

49 If the litigation is not settled, CLCA's only option will be to continue in its defence of the various actions until either it has completely depleted its current assets (thereby exposing the defendant partners to future capital calls), or a satisfactory settlement or judicial determination has been reached. If no such settlement or final determination is achieved, the cost of the defence of the actions could fall to the defendant partners in their personal capacities. If a resolution cannot be reached, the amount that will be available for settlement will continue to decrease due to ongoing legal costs and other factors while at the same time, the damages claimed by the plaintiffs will continue to increase due to accruing interest. With the commencement of further trials, the rate of decrease of assets by funding legal costs will accelerate. 50 After a final determination had been reached on the merits in the Widdrington action, CLCA's board of directors created a committee comprised of certain of its members to consider the next steps in dealing with CLCA's affairs given that, with the passage of time, the defendant partners may ultimately be liable in respect of negligence arising from the Castor audits without a settlement.

51 Over the course of several months, the committee and the defendant partners evaluated many possible settlement structures and alternatives and after conferring with counsel for various plaintiffs in the Castor litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a further mediation. Multiple attempts had earlier been made to mediate a settlement. Most recently, over the course of four weeks in September and October 2014, the parties attended mediation sessions, both plenary and individually. Chrysler participated in the mediation.

52 Although a settlement could not be reached, the applicant and others supporting the applicant believe that significant progress was achieved in the mediation. In light of this momentum, the applicant and CLCA continued settlement discussions with certain plaintiffs willing to engage in negotiations. These discussions culminated with the execution of a term sheet outlining a plan of arrangement under the CCAA that could achieve a global resolution to the outstanding litigation.

53 A CCAA proceeding will permit the applicant and its stakeholders a means of attempting to arrive at a global settlement of all claims. If there is no settlement, the future looks bleak for everyone but the lawyers fighting the litigation.

54 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It is also intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Without a stay, such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan would succeed. See *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) per Farley J.

In this case it would be unfair to one plaintiff who is far down the line on a trial list to have to watch another plaintiff with an earlier trial date win and collect on a judgment from persons who may not have the funds to pay a later judgment. That would be chaos that should be avoided. A recent example of a stay being made to avoid such a possibility is the case of *Montreal*, *Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. (Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Cie), Re* which stayed litigation arising out of the Lac-Mégant train disaster. See also *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*.

56 In this case, the term sheet that the applicant anticipates will form the basis of a proposed Plan includes, among other elements:

(a) the monetization of all assets of CLCA and its partnership OpCo to maximize the net proceeds available to fund the plan, including all applicable insurance entitlements that are payable or may become payable, which proceeds will be available to satisfy the determined or agreed claims of valid creditors;

(b) contributions from a significant majority of the defendant partners;

(c) contributions from non-defendant partners of CLCA and CLCG exposed under the PwC indemnity;

(d) contributions from CLCA's insurers and other defendants in the outstanding litigation;

(e) the appointment of Ernst & Young Inc. as Monitor to oversee the implementation of the plan, including to assist with the realization and monetization of assets and to oversee (i) the capital calls to be made upon the defendant partners, (ii) a claims process, and (iii) the distribution of the aggregate proceeds in accordance with the plan; and

(f) provision to all parties who contribute amounts under the plan, of a court-approved full and final release from and bar order against any and all claims, both present and future, of any kind or nature arising from or in any way related to Castor.

57 This term sheet is supported by the overwhelming number of creditors, including 13 German banks, 8 Canadian banks, over 100 creditors of Castor represented by the Trustee in bankruptcy of Castor and the Widdrington estate. It is also supported by the insurers. The plaintiffs other than Chrysler, representing approximately 71.2% of the face value of contingent claims asserted in the outstanding litigation against CLCA, either support, do not oppose or take no position in respect of the granting of the Initial Order. Chrysler represents approximately 28.8% of the face value of the claims.

58 Counsel for the German and Canadian banks points out that it has been counsel to them in the Castor claims and was counsel for the Widdrington estate in its successful action. The German and Canadian banks in their factum agree that during the course of the outstanding litigation over the past 20 years, they have been subjected to a "scorched earth", "war of attrition" litigation strategy adopted by CLCA and its former legal counsel. Where they seriously part company with Chrysler is that they vigorously disagree that such historical misconduct should prevent the CLCA group from using the CCAA to try to achieve the proposed global settlement with their creditors in order to finally put an end to this war of attrition and to enable all valid creditors to finally receive some measure of recovery for their losses.

59 It is argued by the banks and others that if Chrysler is successful in defeating the CCAA proceedings, the consequence would be to punish all remaining Castor plaintiffs and to deprive them of the opportunity of arriving at a global settlement, thus exacerbating the prejudice which they have already suffered. Chrysler, as only one creditor of the CLCA group, is seeking to impose its will on all other creditors by attempting to prevent them from voting on the proposed Plan; essentially, the tyranny of the minority over the majority. I think the banks have a point. The court's primary concern under the CCAA must be for the debtor and all of its creditors. While it is understandable that an individual creditor may seek to obtain as much leverage as possible to enhance its negotiating position, the objectives and purposes of a CCAA should not be frustrated by the self-interest of a single creditor. See *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*, 2007 ABCA 266 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para 38, per O'Brien J.A.

60 The German and Canadian banks deny that their resolve has finally been broken by the CLCA in its defence of the Castor litigation. On the contrary, they state a belief that due to litigation successes achieved to date, the time is now ripe to seek to resolve the outstanding litigation and to prevent any further dissipation of the assets of those stakeholders funding the global settlement. Their counsel expressed their believe that if the litigation continues as suggested by Chrysler, the former partners will likely end up bankrupt and unable to put in to the plan what is now proposed by them. They see a change in the attitude of CLCA by the appointment of a new committee of partners to oversee this application and the appointment of new CCAA counsel in whom they perceive an attitude to come to a resolution. They see CLCA as now acting in good faith.

61 Whether the banks are correct in their judgments and whether they will succeed in this attempt remains to be seen, but they should not be prevented from trying. I see no prejudice to Chrysler. Chrysler's contingent claim is not scheduled to be tried until 2017 at the earliest, and it will likely still proceed to trial as scheduled if a global resolution cannot be achieved in the course of this CCAA proceeding. Further, since Chrysler has not obtained a judgment or settlement in respect of its contingent claim, the Initial Order has not stayed any immediate right available to Chrysler. The parties next scheduled to proceed to trial in the outstanding litigation who have appeared, the insurers and then the three German banks, which are arguably the most affected by the issuance of a stay of proceedings, have indicated their support for this CCAA proceeding and Initial Order, including the stay of proceedings.

62 What exactly Chrysler seeks in preventing this CCAA application from proceeding is not clear. It is hard to think that it wants another 10 years of hard fought litigation before its claim is finally dealt with. During argument, Mr. Vauclair did say that Chrysler participated in the unsuccessful mediation and that it has been willing to negotiate. That remains to be seen, but this CCAA process will give it that opportunity.

63 Chrysler raises issues with the term sheet, including the provision that the claims of the German and Canadian banks and the Trustee of Castor will be accepted but that the Chrysler claim will be determined in a claims process. Chrysler raises issues regarding the proposed claims process and whether the individual CLCA former partners should be required to disclose all of their assets. These issues are premature and can be dealt with later in the proceedings as required.

Mr. Kent, who represents a number of former CLCA partners, said in argument that the situation cries out for settlement and that there are many victims other than the creditors, namely the vast majority of the former CLCA partners throughout Canada who had nothing to do with the actions of the few who were engaged in the Castor audit. The trial judge noted that the main CLCA partner who was complicit in the Castor Ponzi scheme hid from his partners his relationships with the perpetrators of the scheme.

Mr. Kent's statement that the situation cries out for settlement has support in the language of the trial judge in the Widdrington test case. Madame Justice St. Pierre said in her opening paragraph on her lengthy decision:

1 Time has come to put an end to the longest running judicial saga in the legal history of Quebec and Canada.

66 At the conclusion of her decision, she stated:

**3637** Defendants say litigation is far from being finished since debates will continue on individual issues (reliance and damages), on a case by case basis, in the other files. They might be right. They might be wrong. They have to remember that litigating all the other files is only one of multiple options. Now that the litigants have on hand answers to all common issues, resolving the remaining conflicts otherwise is clearly an option (for example, resorting to alternative modes of conflict resolution).

In my view the CCAA is well able to provide the parties with a structure to attempt to resolve the outstanding Castor litigation. The Chrysler motion to set aside the Initial Order and to dismiss the CCAA application is dismissed.

#### (iii) Should the stay be extended to the insurers?

The applicant 451 moves as well to extend the stay to the insurers of CLCA. This is supported by the insurers. The trial against the insurers was scheduled to commence on January 12, 2015 but after the Initial Order was made, it was adjourned pending the outcome of the motion by Chrysler to set aside the Initial Order. Chrysler has made no argument that if the Initial Order is permitted to stand that it should be amended to remove the stay of the action against the insurers.

69 Under the term sheet intended to form the basis of a plan to be proposed by the applicant, the insurers have agreed to contribute a substantial amount towards a global settlement. It could not be expected that they would be prepared to do so if the litigation were permitted to proceed against them with all of the costs and risks associated with that litigation. Moreover, it could well have an effect on the other stakeholders who are prepared to contribute towards a settlement.

A stay is in the inherent jurisdiction of a court if it is in the interests of justice to do so. While many third party stays have been in favour of partners to applicant corporations, the principle is not limited to that situation. It could not be as the interests of justice will vary depending on the particulars of any case.

71 In *Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. (Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Cie), Re,* Castonguay, J.C.S. stayed litigation against the insurers of the railway. In doing so, he referred to the exceptional circumstances and the multiplicity of proceedings already instituted and concluded it was in the interests of sound administration of justice to stay the proceedings, stating:

En raison des circonstances exceptionnelles de la présente affaire et devant la multiplicité des recours déjà intentés et de ceux qui le seront sous peu, il est dans l'intérêt d'une saine administration de la justice d'accorder cette demande de MMA et d'étendre la suspension des recours à XL.

72 In my view, it is in the interests of justice that the stay of proceedings extend to the action against the insurers.

## (iv) Should a creditors' committee be ordered and its fees paid by CLCA?

73 The Initial Order provides for a creditors' committee comprised of one representative of the German bank group, one representative of the Canadian bank group, and the Trustee in bankruptcy of Castor. It also provides that CLCA shall be entitled to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of legal counsel to the creditors' committee. Chrysler opposes these provisions.

The essential argument of Chrysler is that a creditors' committee is not necessary as the same law firm represents all of the banks and the Trustee of Castor. Counsel for the banks and the Trustee state that the German bank group consists of 13 distinct financial institutions and the Canadian bank group consists of 8 distinct financial institutions and that there is no evidence in the record to the effect that their interests do not diverge on material issues. As for the Castor Trustee, it represents the interests of more than 100 creditors of Castor, including Chrysler, the German and Canadian bank groups, and various other creditors. They says that a creditors' committee brings order and allows for effective communication with all creditors.

75 CCAA courts routinely recognize and accept *ad hoc* creditors' committees. It is common for critical groups of critical creditors to form an *ad hoc* creditors' committee and confer with the debtor prior to a CCAA filing as part of out-of-court restructuring efforts and to continue to function as an *ad hoc* committee during the CCAA proceedings. See Robert J. Chadwick & Derek R. Bulas, "*Ad Hoc Creditors' Committees in CCAA Proceedings: The Result of a Changing and Expanding Restructuring World*", in Janis P. Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2011 (Toronto:Thomson Carswell) 119 at pp 120-121.

Chrysler refers to the fact that it is not to be a member of the creditors' committee. It does not ask to be one. Mr. Meland, counsel for the two bank groups and for the Trustee of Castor said during argument that they have no objection if Chrysler wants to join the committee. If Chrysler wished to join the committee, however, it would need to be considered as to whether antagonism, if any, with other members would rob the committee of any benefit.

77 Chrysler also takes exception to what it says is a faulty claims process proposed in the term sheet involving the creditors' committee. Whether Chrysler is right or not in its concern, that would not be a reason to deny the existence of the committee but rather would be a matter for discussion when a proposed claims process came before the court for approval.

78 The creditors' committee in this case is the result of an intensely negotiated term sheet that forms the foundation of a plan. The creditors' committee was involved in negotiating the term sheet. Altering the terms of the term sheet by removing the creditors' committee could frustrate the applicant's ability to develop a viable plan and could jeopardize the existing support from the majority of claimants. I would not accede to Chrysler's request to remove the Creditors' committee.

So far as the costs of the committee are concerned, I see this as mainly a final cri de couer from Chrysler. The costs in relation to the amounts at stake will no doubt be relatively minimal. Chrysler says it is galling to see it having to pay 28% (the size of its claim relative to the other claims) to a committee that it thinks will work against its interests. Whether the committee will work against its interests is unknown. I would note that it is not yet Chrysler's money, but CLCA's. If there is no successful outcome to the CCAA process, the costs of the committee will have been borne by CLCA. If the plan is successful on its present terms, there will be \$220 million available to pay claims, none of which will have come from Chrysler. I would not change the Initial Order an deny the right of CLCA to pay the costs of the creditors' committee.

<sup>80</sup> Finally, Chrysler asks that if the costs are permitted to be paid by CLCA, a special detailed budget should be made and provided to Chrysler along with the amounts actually paid. I see no need for any particular order. The budget for these fees is and will be continued to be contained in the cash flow forecast provided by the Monitor and comparisons of actual to budget will be provided by the Monitor in the future in the normal course.

## Conclusion

81 The motion of Chrysler is dismissed. The terms of the Initial Order are continued.

Order accordingly.

# TAB 5

## 2019 ONSC 7473 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Lydian International Limited (Re)

2019 CarswellOnt 21645, 2019 ONSC 7473, 314 A.C.W.S. (3d) 12, 75 C.B.R. (6th) 314

# IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGMENT OF LYDIAN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, LYDIAN CANADA VENTURES CORPORATION AND LYDIAN U.K. CORPORATION LIMITED (Applicants)

Geoffrey B. Morawetz C.J. Ont. S.C.J.

Heard: December 23, 2019 Judgment: December 23, 2019 Docket: CV-19-00633392-00CL

Proceedings: additional reasons at *Lydian International Limited (Re)* (2020), 2020 CarswellOnt 200, 2020 ONSC 34, Geoffrey B. Morawetz C.J. Ont. S.C.J. (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: Elizabeth Pillon, Sanja Sopic, Nicholas Avis, for Applicants Pamela Huff, for Resource Capital Fund VI L.P. Alan Merskey, for OSISKO Bermuda Limited D.J. Miller, for proposed Monitor, Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. David Bish, for ORION Capital Management Bruce Darlington, for ING Bank N.V./ABS Svensk Exportkrerdit (publ)

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.d "Come-back" clause

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — "Come-back" clause Applicants were part of project of gold exploration and development business in Armenia — Applicants were experiencing liquidity issues due to blockades of project and other external factors — Applicants contended that they required immediate protection under federal Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") for breathing room to pursue remedial steps on timesensitive basis — Applicants brought application for creditor protection and other relief under CCAA — Application granted — Section 11.02(1) of CCAA had been recently amended — Maximum stay period permitted in initial application was reduced from 30 days to 10 days — Previous s. 11.02 of CCAA provided that after initial stay of up to 30 days, "comeback" hearing was scheduled, and parties could request that certain provisions addressed in initial order could be reconsidered — Practice of granting wide-sweeping relief at initial hearing had to be altered in light of recent amendments — Intent of amendments is to limit relief granted on first day — Ensuing 10-day period allows for stabilization of operations and negotiating window, followed by comeback hearing where request for expanded relief can be considered, on proper notice to all affected parties — This is consistent with objectives of amendments, which include requirement for "participants in an insolvency proceeding to act in good faith" and "improving participation of all players" — It may also result in more meaningful comeback hearings — Absent exceptional circumstances, relief to be granted in initial hearing "shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period" — Period being no more than 10 days, and whenever possible, status quo should be maintained during that period — It was appropriate to grant order under s. 11.02 of CCAA in respect of applicants — Applicants were "debtor companies" under CCAA, were insolvent and had liabilities in excess of \$5 million — Under circumstances, it was appropriate to grant order that extended stay to non-applicant parties — Applicants also granted charge on their assets in maximum amount of US \$350,000 and charge over property in favour of their former and current directors in limited amount of \$200,000 Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s 11.001; Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s 11.02.

#### **Table of Authorities**

#### Cases considered by Geoffrey B. Morawetz C.J. Ont. S.C.J.:

*Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Cinram International Inc., Re* (2012), 2012 ONSC 3767, 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re (2019), 2019 ONSC 6966, 2019 CarswellOnt 20001 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered

*Jaguar Mining Inc., Re* (2013), 2014 ONSC 494, 2013 CarswellOnt 18630, 12 C.B.R. (6th) 290 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Sino-Forest Corp., Re* (2012), 2012 ONSC 2063, 2012 CarswellOnt 4117 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to *Target Canada Co., Re* (2015), 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

#### Statutes considered:

Business Corporations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9

Generally — referred to

Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57

Generally — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

Generally — referred to

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "company" — considered

s. 11.001 [en. 2019, c. 29, s. 136] - considered

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 11.02(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.02(2) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 11.7 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

#### Geoffrey B. Morawetz C.J. Ont. S.C.J.:

#### Introduction

1 Lydian International Limited ("Lydian International"), Lydian Canada Ventures Corporation ("Lydian Canada") and Lydian UK Corporation Limited ("Lydian UK", and collectively, the "Applicants") apply for creditor protection and other relief under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"). The Applicants seek an initial order, substantially in the form attached to the application record. No party attending on the motion opposed the requested relief.

2 The Applicants are part of a gold exploration and development business in south central Armenia (the "Amulsar Project"). The Amulsar Project is directly owned and operated by Lydian Armenia CJSC ("Lydian Armenia"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Applicants.

3 As set out in the affidavit of Edward A. Sellers sworn December 22, 2019 (the "Sellers Affidavit"), the Applicants have been experiencing and continue to experience liquidity issues due to blockades of the Amulsar Project and other external factors. The Sellers Affidavit details such activities and Mr. Sellers deposes that these activities have prevented Lydian Armenia and its employees, contractors and suppliers from accessing, constructing and ultimately operating the Amulsar Project.

4 Mr. Sellers states that the lack of progress at the Amulsar Project has prevented the Lydian Group (as that term is defined below) from generating any positive cash flow and has also triggered defaults on certain of the Lydian Group's obligations to its lenders which, if enforced, the Lydian Group would be unable to satisfy.

5 The Lydian Group has operated under forbearance agreements in respect of these defaults since October 2018, but the most recent forbearance agreement expired on December 20, 2019.

6 The Applicants contend that they now require immediate protection under the CCAA for the breathing room they require to pursue remedial steps on a time sensitive basis.

7 The Applicants intend to continue discussions with their lenders and other stakeholders, including the Government of Armenia ("GOA"). The Applicants also intend to continue evaluating potential financing and/or sale options, all with a view to achieving a viable path forward.

# The Applicants

8 Lydian International is a corporation continued under the laws of the Bailiwick of Jersey, Channel Islands, from the Province of Alberta pursuant to the *Companies (Jersey) Law 1991*. Lydian International was originally incorporated under the Business Corporations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9 (Alberta) on February 14, 2006 as "Dawson Creek Capital Corp.", and subsequently became Lydian International on December 12, 2007.

9 Lydian International's registered office is located in Jersey. On June 12, 2019, Lydian International shareholders approved its continuance under the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44, but this continuance has yet to be implemented.

10 Lydian International has two types of securities listed on the Toronto Stock exchange: (1) ordinary shares and (2) warrants that expired in 2017.

11 Lydian Canada is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Lydian International. Lydian Canada is incorporated under the Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 (British Columbia) and has a registered head office in Toronto. Its registered and records office is located in British Columbia.

12 Lydian UK is a corporation incorporated in the United Kingdom and is a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of Lydian Canada with a head office located in the United Kingdom. Lydian UK has no material assets in the UK.

13 Lydian International and Lydian UK have assets in Canada in the form of deposits with the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto.

14 The Applicants are part of a corporate group (the "Lydian Group") with a number of other subsidiaries ultimately owned by Lydian International. Other than the Applicants, certain of the Lydian Group's subsidiaries are Lydian U.S. Corporation ("Lydian

US"), Lydian International Holdings Limited ("Lydian Holdings"), Lydian Resources Armenia Limited ("Lydian Resources") and Lydian Armenia, a corporation incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Armenia. Together, Lydian U.S., Lydian Holdings, Lydian Resources and Lydian Armenia are the "Non-Applicant" parties.

15 The Applicants submit that due to the complete integration of the business and operations of the Lydian Group, an extension of the stay of proceedings over the Non-Applicant parties is appropriate.

16 The Applicants contend that the Lydian Group is highly integrated and its business and affairs are directed primarily out of Canada. Substantially all of its strategic business affairs, including key decision-making, are conducted in Toronto and Vancouver.

17 Further, all the Applicants and Non-Applicant Parties are borrowers or guarantors of the Lydian Group's secured indebtedness. The Lydian Group's loan agreements are governed primarily by the laws of Ontario.

18 Finally, the Lydian Group's forbearance and restructuring efforts have been directed out of Toronto.

19 The Lydian Group is focused on constructing the Amulsar Project, its wholly-owned development stage gold mine in Armenia. The Amulsar Project was funded by a combination of equity and debt capital and stream financing. The debt and stream financing arrangements are secured over substantially all the assets of Lydian Armenia and Lydian International in the shares of various groups of the Lydian Group.

20 The Applicants contend that time is of the essence given the Applicants' minimal cash position and negative cash flow.

#### Issues

21 The issues for consideration are whether:

(a) the Applicants meet the criteria for protection under the CCAA;

(b) the CCAA stay should be extended to the Non-Applicant Parties;

- (c) the proposed monitor, Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. ("A&M") should be appointed as monitor;
- (d) Ontario is the appropriate venue for this proceeding;

(e) this court should issue a letter of request of the Royal Court of Jersey;

(f) this Court should exercise its discretion to grant the Administration Charge and the D & O Charge (as defined below); and

(g) it is appropriate to grant a stay extension immediately following the issuance of the Initial Order.

## Law and Analysis

22 Pursuant to section 11.02(1) of the CCAA, a court may make an order staying all proceedings in respect of a debtor company for a period of not more than 10 days, provided that the court is satisfied that circumstances exist to make the order appropriate.

23 Section 11.02(1) of the CCAA was recently amended and the maximum stay period permitted in an initial application was reduced from 30 days to 10 days. Section 11.001 which came into force at the same time as the amendment to s. 11.02(1), limits initial orders to "ordinary course" relief.

24 Section 11.001 provides:

11.001 An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

25 The News Release issued by Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada specifically states that these amendments "limit the decisions that can be taken at the outset of a CCAA proceeding to measures necessary to avoid the immediate liquidation of an insolvent company, thereby improving participation of all players."

In my view, the intent of s. 11.001 is clear. Absent exceptional circumstances, the relief to be granted in the initial hearing "shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period". The period being no more than 10 days, and whenever possible, the *status quo* should be maintained during that period.

27 Following the granting of the initial order, a number of developments can occur, including:

(a) notification to all stakeholders of the CCAA application;

(b) stabilization of the operation of debtor companies;

- (c) ongoing negotiations with key stakeholders who were consulted prior to the CCAA filing;
- (d) commencement of negotiations with stakeholders who were not consulted prior to the CCAA filing;
- (e) negotiations of DIP facilities and DIP Charges;
- (f) negotiations of Administration Charges;
- (g) negotiation of Key Employee Incentives Programs;
- (h) negotiation of Key Employee Retention Programs;
- (i) consultation with regulators;
- (j) consultation with tax authorities;
- (k) consideration as to whether representative counsel is required; and
- (l) consultation and negotiation with key suppliers.

28 This list is not intended to be exhaustive. It is merely illustrative of the many issues that can arise in a CCAA proceeding.

29 Prior to the recent amendments, it was not uncommon for an initial order to include provisions that would affect some or all of the aforementioned issues and parties. The previous s. 11.02 provided that the initial stay period could be for a period of up to 30 days. After the initial stay, a "comeback" hearing was scheduled and, in theory, parties could request that certain provisions addressed in the initial order could be reconsidered.

30 The practice of granting wide-sweeping relief at the initial hearing must be altered in light of the recent amendments. The intent of the amendments is to limit the relief granted on the first day. The ensuing 10-day period allows for a stabilization of operations and a negotiating window, followed by a comeback hearing where the request for expanded relief can be considered, on proper notice to all affected parties.

In my view, this is consistent with the objectives of the amendments which include the requirement for "participants in an insolvency proceeding to act in good faith" and "improving participation of all players". It may also result in more meaningful comeback hearings.

32 It is against this backdrop that the requested relief at the initial hearing should be scrutinized so as to ensure that it is restricted to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company during the initial stay period.

33 For the reasons that follow, I conclude that it is appropriate to grant a s. 11.02 order in respect of the Applicants.

34 I am satisfied that Lydian Canada meets the CCAA definition of "company" and is eligible for CCAA protection.

I have also considered whether the foreign incorporated companies are "companies" pursuant to the CCAA. Such entities must satisfy the disjunctive test of being an "incorporated company" either "having assets or doing business in Canada".

36 In *Cinram International Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 3767, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), I stated that the threshold for having assets in Canada is low and that holding funds in a Canadian bank account brings a foreign corporation within the definition of "company" under the CCAA.

37 In this case, both Lydian International and Lydian UK meet the definition of "company" because both corporations have assets in and do business in Canada.

In my view the Applicants are each "debtor companies" under the CCAA. The Applicants are insolvent and have liabilities in excess of \$5 million. I am satisfied that the Applicants are eligible for CCAA protection.

The Applicants seek to extend the stay to Lydian Armenia, Lydian Holdings, Lydian Resources Armenia Limited and Lydian US. I am satisfied that, in the circumstances, it is appropriate to grant an order that extends the stay to the Non-Applicant Parties. The stay is intended to stabilize operations in the Lydian Group. This finding is consistent with CCAA jurisprudence: see e.g., *Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at paras. 5, 18, and 31; Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re200959 C.B.R. (5th) 72(Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); and *Target Canada Co., Re*, 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 49-50.

40 I am also satisfied that is appropriate to appoint A & M as monitor pursuant to the provisions of s. 11.7 of the CCAA.

41 With respect to whether Ontario is the appropriate venue for this proceeding, Lydian Canada's registered head office is located in Toronto and its registered and records offices are located in Vancouver. In my view, Ontario has jurisdiction over Lydian Canada. The registered head offices for Lydian International and Lydian UK are in Jersey and the UK respectively, however, both entities have assets in Ontario, those being funds on deposit with the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. Further, it seems to me that both Lydian International and Lydian UK have a strong nexus to Ontario and accordingly I am satisfied that Ontario is the appropriate jurisdiction to hear this application.

42 I am also satisfied that, in these circumstances, it is appropriate for this court to issue to the Royal Court of Jersey a letter of request as referenced in the application record.

## **Administration Charge**

43 The Applicants seek a charge on their assets in the maximum amount of US \$350,000 to secure the fees and disbursements incurred in connection with services rendered by counsel to the Applicants, A & M and A & M's counsel, in respect of the CCAA proceedings (the "Administration Charge").

44 Section 11.52 of the CCAA provides the ability for the court to grant the Administration Charge.

45 The recently enacted s. 11.001 of the CCAA limits the requested relief on this motion, including the Administration Charge, to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the Applicants during the Initial Stay Period. The Sellers Affidavit outlines the complex issues facing the Applicants.

46 In *Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Pepall J. (as she then was) identified six non-exhaustive factors that the court may consider in addition to s. 11.52 of the CCAA when determining whether to grant an administration charge. These factors include:

- (a) the size and complexity of business being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the monitor.

47 It seems to me that the proposed restructuring will require extensive input from the professional advisors and there is an immediate need for such advice. The requested relief is supported by A & M.

I am satisfied that the Administration Charge in the limited amount of US \$350,000 is appropriate in the circumstances and is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the business at this time.

#### D & O Charge

49 The Applicants also seek a charge over the property in favour of their former and current directors in the limited amount of \$200,000 (the "D & O Charge").

50 The Applicants maintain Directors' and Officers' liability insurance (the "D & O Insurance") which provides a total of \$10 million in coverage.

51 The D & O Insurance is set to expire on December 31, 2019.

52 Section 11.51 of the CCAA provides the court with the express statutory jurisdiction to grant the D & O charge in an amount the court considers appropriate, provided notice is given to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected.

53 In *Jaguar Mining Inc., Re*, 2014 ONSC 494, 12 C.B.R. (6th) 290 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), I set out a number of factors to be considered in determining whether to grant a directors' and officers' charge:

(a) whether notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;

(b) whether the amount is appropriate;

(c) whether the Applicant could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director at a reasonable cost; and

(d) whether the charge applies in respect of any obligation incurred by a director or officer as a result of the directors' or officers' gross negligence or willful misconduct.

54 Having reviewed the Sellers Affidavit, it seems to me that the granting of the D & O charge is necessary in the circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, I have also taken into account that the D & O Insurance will lapse shortly; having directors involved in the process is desirable; that the secured creditors likely to be affected do not object; and that A & M

has advised that it is supportive of the D & O Charge. Further, the requested amount is one that I consider to be reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the Applicants.

## **Extension of the Stay of Proceedings**

55 The Applicants have requested that, if the initial order is granted, I should immediately entertain and grant an order extending the Stay Period until and including January 17, 2020 which will provide the Applicants and all stakeholders with enough time to adequately prepare for a comeback hearing.

The Applicants submit that I am authorized to grant a stay extension immediately after granting the initial order because section 11.02(2) of the CCAA does not provide a minimum waiting time before an applicant can seek a stay extension. The Applicants reference recent decisions where courts have scheduled hearings within two or three days after the granting of an initial order. Reference is made to *Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re,* 2019 ONSC 6966 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *Re Wayland group Corp. et al.* (2 December 2019), Toronto CV-19-00632079-00CL. In *Clover Leaf*, the stay extension for 36 days and additional relief including authorization for DIP financing was granted three days after the initial order and in *Wayland*, the stay extension was granted two days after the initial order.

I acknowledge that, in this case, it may be challenging for the Applicants to return to court at or near the end of the 10day initial stay period due to the year-end holidays. I also acknowledge that the offices of many of the parties involved in these proceedings may not be open during the holidays.

However, the statutory maximum 10-day stay as referenced in s. 11.02(1) expires on January 2, 2020 and the courts are open on that day.

59 As noted above, absent exceptional circumstances, I do not believe that it is desirable to entertain motions for supplementary relief in the period immediately following the granting of an initial order.

60 It could very well be that circumstances existed in both *Clover Leaf* and *Wayland* that justified the stay extension and the ancillary relief being granted shortly after the initial order.

61 However, in this case, I have not been persuaded on the evidence that it is necessary for the stay extension to be addressed prior to January 2, 2020 and I decline to do so.

## Disposition

The initial order is granted with a Stay Period in effect until January 2, 2020. In view of the holiday schedules of many parties, the following procedures are put in place. The Applicants can file a motion returnable on January 2, 2020, requesting that the stay be extended to January 23, 2020. Any party that wishes to oppose the extension of the stay to January 23, 2020 is required to notify the Applicant, A & M and the Commercial List Office of their intention to do so no later than 2:00 p.m. on December 30, 2019. In the event that the requested stay extension is unopposed, there will be no need for counsel to attend on the return of the motion. I will consider the motion based on the materials filed.

If any objections are received by 2:00 p.m. on December 30, 2019, the hearing on January 2, 2020 will address the opposed extension request. Any further relief will be considered at the Comeback Motion on January 23, 2020.

Application granted.

### 2019 ONSC 6966 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re

#### 2019 CarswellOnt 20001, 2019 ONSC 6966, 312 A.C.W.S. (3d) 691, 75 C.B.R. (6th) 124

## IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CLOVER LEAF HOLDINGS COMPANY, CONNORS BROS. CLOVER LEAF SEAFOODS COMPANY, K.C.R. FISHERIES LTD., 6162410 CANADA LIMITED, CONNORS BROS. HOLDINGS COMPANY AND CONNORS BROS. SEAFOODS COMPANY

Hainey J.

Heard: November 25, 2019 Judgment: December 4, 2019 Docket: CV-19-631523-00CL

Counsel: Kevin Zych, Sean Zweig, Mike Shakra, for Applicants Marc Wasserman, Martino Calvaruso, for Monitor Natasha MacParland, for FCF Co. Ltd. Peter Rubin, for Wells Forgo Jeremy Opolsky, for Lion Capital Robert Chadwick, Christopher Armstrong, for Terms Lenders

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Initial application -- Miscellaneous

Applicants were Canadian affiliates of BBF, which was international seafood supplier based in United States — Applicants operated CL group of companies in Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and had 650 employees — While CL business in Canada was cash flow positive and profitable, balance sheet of BBF, including applicants, had suffered extreme financial pressures primarily due to extensive litigation against BBF in United States — BBF filed voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of United States Code and U.S. Bankruptcy Court granted certain First Day Orders in those proceedings — Applicants sought similar relief to stabilize and protect business in order to complete comprehensive and coordinated restructuring of CL in Canada and BBF in United States — Applicants obtained initial order pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for appointment of Monitor and staying all proceedings against applicants and Monitor until December 2, 2019 — Applicants brought application for amended and restated order to supplement limited relief obtained pursuant to initial order — Applicants had acted in good faith and with due diligence and required extra time to restore solvency — Proposed debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing was approved — Proposed DIP financing would preserve value and going concern operations of applicants' business, which was in best interests of applicants and stakeholders — Monitor supported proposed DIP financing and confirmed that applicants had sufficient liquidity to operate business in ordinary course — It was appropriate to amend initial order to allow for payment of pre-filing obligations — KERP and KEIP charge were approved — Terms and scope of KEIP were limited to what was

reasonably necessary — Intercompany charge, administrative charge and directors' charge were all granted to protect interests of creditors, secure professional fees and disbursements of Monitor and provide indemnification to directors.

# Table of Authorities

# Statutes considered:

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.001 [en. 2019, c. 29, s. 136] - considered

s. 11.2(5) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 s. 137(2) — considered

# Hainey J.:

# Overview

1 On November 22, 2019, the applicants ("Clover Leaf"), obtained an initial order pursuant to the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended ("*CCAA*") which appointed Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. as Monitor and stayed all proceedings against the applicants, their officers, directors and the Monitor until December 2, 2019.

2 On November 25, 2019 the applicants sought an amended and restated order to supplement the limited relief obtained pursuant to the initial order. I granted the order and indicated that I would provide a more detailed endorsement. This is my endorsement.

# Facts

3 The applicants are the Canadian affiliates of Bumble Bee Foods, an international seafood supplier based in the United States ("Bumble Bee").

4 The applicants operate the Clover Leaf business in Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. They have approximately 650 employees in Canada. The Clover Leaf business has long been associated with well-known brands of canned seafood products in Canada.

5 While the Clover Leaf business in Canada is cash flow positive and profitable, the balance sheet of the Bumble Bee group, including the applicants, has suffered extreme financial pressures primarily due to extensive litigation against Bumble Bee in the United States.

6 As a result, the Bumble Bee group has filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code ("Chapter 11 proceedings") and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has granted certain First Day Orders in those proceedings.

7 The applicants are seeking similar relief in these proceedings to stabilize and protect their business in order to complete a comprehensive and coordinated restructuring of Clover Leaf in Canada and Bumble Bee in the United States. This will include an asset sale of each of their respective businesses ("Sale Transaction"). This outcome is the result of extensive consideration of various options and consultations with Bumble Bee's secured lenders in an attempt to restructure the business.

# **Applicants' Position**

8 The applicants submit that this *CCAA* proceeding is in the best interests of their stakeholders and will result in their business being conveyed on a going concern basis with minimal disruption. The breathing room afforded by the *CCAA* and Chapter 11 proceedings, and the other relief sought, will allow the applicants to continue operations in the ordinary course, maintaining the stability of their business and operations, and preserving the value of their business while the Sale Transaction is implemented.

9 Although the applicants are party to a stalking horse asset purchase agreement, they are not seeking any relief in connection with it or the Sale Transaction at this stage. The applicants will return to court for that relief at a later date. They are, instead, only seeking the limited relief required at this time.

#### Issues

10 I must determine the following issues:

a) Is the relief sought on this application consistent with the amendments to the *CCAA* which came into effect on November 1, 2019?

b) Should I extend the stay of proceedings to December 31, 2019?

c) Should I approve the proposed DIP financing and grant the DIP charge?

d) Should I grant the administration charge and the directors' charge?

e) Should I approve the KEIP and the KEIP charge, and grant a sealing order?

f) Should I authorize the applicants to pay their ordinary course pre-filing debts? and

g) Should I grant the intercompany charge?

#### Analysis

#### The New CCAA Amendments

11 In determining this application I must consider the amendments made to the *CCAA* that came into force on November 1, 2019.

12 Section 11.001 of the CCAA provides as follows:

An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

13 The purpose of this new section of the *CCAA* is to make the insolvency process fairer, more transparent and more accessible by limiting the decisions made at the outset of the proceedings to measures that are reasonably necessary to avoid the immediate liquidation of an insolvent company and to allow for broader participation in the restructuring process.

14 The applicants submit that the relief sought on this application is limited to what is reasonably necessary in the circumstances for the continued operation of their business. Further relief, including approval of the Sale Transactions and related bidding procedures, will not be sought until a later date on reasonable notice to a broader group of stakeholders.

15 I am satisfied that the relief sought on this motion is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the applicants for the period covered by the order sought to allow them to take the next steps toward a smooth transition of their business to a new owner for the following reasons:

(a) Prior to initiating insolvency proceedings here and in the United States the applicants conducted a thorough assessment of their options and consulted with all their major creditors before arriving at the proposed Sale Transaction;

(b) The applicants' stakeholder such as employees, customers and suppliers who have not yet been consulted about these CCAA proceedings will not be prejudiced by the order sought. In fact, in my view, they will suffer prejudice if the order is not granted;

(c) The applicants have the support of their secured creditors who are expected to suffer a shortfall if the Sale Transaction closes;

(d) The applicants are not the cause of these insolvency proceedings; and

(e) The applicants are only seeking relief that is reasonably necessary to take the next steps toward a smooth transition to a new owner.

- 16 For these reasons, I have concluded that the relief sought is consistent with the new amendments to the *CCAA*.
- 17 I will now consider whether it is appropriate to grant certain of the specific terms of the amended and restated initial order.

#### Stay of Proceedings

- 18 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings to December 31, 2019.
- 19 I am satisfied that the stay of proceedings should be extended as requested for the following reasons:

(a) The applicants have acted and are acting in good faith with due diligence;

(b) The stay of proceedings requested is appropriate to provide the applicants with breathing room while they seek to restore their solvency and emerge from these *CCAA* proceedings on a going-concern basis;

(c) Without continued protection under the *CCAA* and the support of their lenders the stability and value of the applicants' business will quickly deteriorate and will be unable to continue to operate as a going-concern;

(d) If existing or new proceedings are permitted to continue against the applicants, they will be destructive to the overall value of their business and jeopardize the proposed Sale Transaction; and

(e) The Monitor supports the requested extension of the stay of proceedings.

#### **DIP** Financing

20 The applicants submit that the proposed DIP financing should be approved for the following reasons:

(a) The proposed DIP financing is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of Clover Leaf in the ordinary course of business during the period covered by the order sought within the meaning of s. 11.2(5) of the *CCAA*. It is also consistent with the existing jurisprudence that DIP financing should be granted "to keep the lights on" and should be limited to terms that are reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the company; and

(b) The proposed DIP financing is reasonably necessary to allow the applicants to maintain liquidity and preserve the enterprise value of their business while the Sale Transaction is being pursued. The proposed DIP financing will be used to honour commitments to employees, customers and trade creditors.

21 I am satisfied for these reasons that the requirements of s. 11.2(5) of the CCAA are satisfied.

In this case, the applicants are not borrowers under the proposed DIP financing but they are proposed to be guarantors. The applicable jurisprudence has established the following factors which should be considered to determine the appropriateness of authorizing a Canadian debtor to guarantee a foreign affiliate's DIP financing:

(a) The need for additional financing by the Canadian debtor to support a going concern restructuring;

(b) The benefit of the breathing space afforded by CCAA protection;

(c) The lack of any financing alternatives to those proposed by the DIP lender;

(d) The practicality of establishing a stand-alone solution for the Canadian debtor;

(e) The contingent nature of the liability of the proposed guarantee and the likelihood that it will be called upon;

(f) Any potential prejudice to the creditors of the Canadian entity if the request is approved; and

(g) The benefits that may accrue to the stakeholders if the request is approved and the prejudice to those stakeholders if the request is denied.

23 I have concluded that I should approve the proposed DIP financing and the proposed DIP charge for the following reasons:

(a) Because of its current financial circumstances, the Bumble Bee Group cannot obtain alternative financing outside of the Chapter 11 and *CCAA* proceedings;

(b) The applicants' liquidity is dependent on the secured lenders providing the proposed DIP financing;

(c) The proposed DIP financing is necessary to maintain the ongoing business and operations of the Bumble Bee Group, including the applicants;

(d) While the proposed DIP financing is being provided by the applicants' existing secured lenders rather than new third-party lenders, eleven third-party lenders were solicited with no viable proposal being received. In my view, this demonstrates that the proposed DIP financing represents the best available DIP financing option in the circumstances;

(e) The proposed DIP financing will preserve the value and going concern operations of the applicant's business, which is in the best interests of the applicants and their stakeholders;

(f) Because the DIP lenders are the existing secured lenders, they are familiar with the applicants' business and operations which will reduce administrative costs that would otherwise arise with a new-third party DIP lender;

(g) Protections have been included in the amended and restated initial order to minimize any prejudice to the applicants and their stakeholders;

(h) The amount of the proposed DIP Financing is appropriate having regard to the applicants' cash-flow statement; and

(i) The Monitor supports the proposed DIP financing and its report confirms that the applicants will have sufficient liquidity to operate their business in the ordinary course.

# Payment of Pre-Filing Obligations

To preserve normal course business operations, the applicants seek authorization to continue to pay their suppliers of goods and services, honour rebate, discount and refund programs with their customers and pay employees in the ordinary course consistent with existing compensation arrangements.

The court has broad jurisdiction to permit the payment of pre-filing obligations in a *CCAA* proceeding. In granting authority to pay certain pre-filing obligations, courts have considered the following factors:

(a) Whether the goods and services are integral to the applicants' business;

(b) The applicants' need for the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

(c) The fact that no payments will be made without the consent of the Monitor;

(d) The Monitors' support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments in respect of pre-filing liabilities are appropriate;

(e) Whether the applicants have sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet their needs; and

(f) The effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they are unable to make pre-filing payments.

I am satisfied that it is critical to the operation of their business that the applicants preserve key relationships. Any disruption in the services proposed to be paid could jeopardize the value of their business and the viability of the Sale Transaction. The authority in the proposed amended and restated initial order to pay pre-filing obligations is appropriately tailored and responsive to the needs of the applicants and is specifically provided for in the applicants' cash flows and in the DIP budget. In particular, the payments are limited to those necessary to preserve critical relationships with employees, suppliers, and customers, to ensure the stability and continued operation of the applicants' business and will only be made with the consent of the Monitor. The relief sought is consistent with orders in other *CCAA* cases.

Further, in keeping with the requirements in s. 11.001 of the *CCAA* the contemplated payments are all reasonably necessary to the continued operation of the applicants' business so that there will be no disruption in services provided to the applicants and no deterioration in their relationships with their suppliers, customers and employees.

# **KEIP** and **KEIP** Charge

28 I have also concluded that the KEIP and KEIP charge should be approved because of the following:

(a) The KEIP was developed in consultation with AlixPartners, Bennett Jones LLP and with the involvement of the Monitor. The Monitor is supportive of the KEIP. The secured creditors also support the KEIP charge;

(b) The KEIP is reasonably necessary to retain key employees who are necessary to guide the applicants through the *CCAA* proceedings and the Sale Transaction;

(c) The KEIP is incentive-based and will only be earned if certain conditions are met; and

(d) The amount of the KEIP, and corresponding KEIP charge, is reasonable in the circumstance.

In approving the KEIP and KEIP charge pursuant to s. 11 of the *CCAA* I have determined that the terms and scope of the KEIP have been limited to what is reasonably necessary at this time in accordance with s. 11.001 of the *CCAA*.

30 As the KEIP contains personal confidential information about the applicants' employees, including their salaries, I am granting a sealing order pursuant to s. 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, RSO 1990, c. C. 43. This will prevent the risk of disclosure of this personal and confidential information.

# Intercompany Charge

I am also granting the requested Intercompany Charge to preserve the status quo between all entities within the Bumble Bee group to protect the interest of creditors against individual entities within the group. The Monitor supports the charge which ranks behind all the other court-ordered charges.

# Administrative Charge

32 I am also granting an administration charge in the amount of \$1.25 million to secure the professional fees and disbursements of the Monitor, its counsel and the applicants' counsel for the following reasons:

(a) The beneficiaries of the administration charge have, and will continue to, contribute to these *CCAA* proceedings and assist the applicants with their business;

(b) Each beneficiary of the administration charge is performing distinct functions and there is no duplication of roles;

(c) The quantum of the proposed charge is reasonable having regard to administration charges granted in other similar *CCAA* proceedings;

(d) The secured creditors support the administrative charge; and

(e) The Monitor supports the administrative charge.

#### **Directors'** Charge

Finally, I am granting a directors' charge in the amount of \$2.3 million to secure the indemnity of the applicants' directors and officers for liabilities they may incur during these *CCAA* proceedings for the following reasons:

(a) The directors and officers may be subject to potential liabilities in connection with the *CCAA* proceedings and have expressed their desire for certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities;

(b) The applicants' liability insurance policies provide insufficient coverage for their officers and directors;

(c) The directors' charge applies only to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under another directors and officers' insurance policy;

(d) The directors' charge would only cover obligations and liabilities that the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of the *CCAA* proceedings and does not cover willful misconduct or gross negligence;

(e) The applicants will require the active and committed involvement of its directors and officers, and their continued participation is necessary to complete the Sale Transaction;

(f) The amount of the directors' charge has been calculated based on the estimated potential exposure of the directors and officers and is appropriate given the size, nature and employment levels of the applicants; and

(g) The calculation of the directors' charge has been reviewed with the Monitor and the Monitor supports it.

# Conclusion

34 For these reasons the amended and restated initial order is granted.

35 I thank counsel for their helpful submissions.

Application granted.

# TAB 6

2021 ONSC 1793 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Re Just Energy Corp.

2021 CarswellOnt 3724, 2021 ONSC 1793, 331 A.C.W.S. (3d) 418

# IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF JUST ENERGY GROUP INC., JUST ENERGY CORP., ONTARIO ENERGY COMMODITIES INC., UNIVERSAL ENERGY CORPORATION, JUST ENERGY FINANCE CANADA ULC, HUDSON ENERGY CANADA CORP., JUST MANAGEMENT CORP., JUST ENERGY FINANCE HOLDING INC., 11929747 CANADA INC., 12175592 CANADA INC., JE SERVICES HOLDCO I INC., JE SERVICES HOLDCO II INC., 8704104 CANADA INC., JUST ENERGY ADVANCED SOLUTIONS CORP., JUST ENERGY (U.S.) CORP., JUST ENERGY ILLINOIS CORP., JUST ENERGY INDIANA CORP., JUST ENERGYMASSACHUSETTS CORP., JUST ENERGY NEW YORK CORP., JUST ENERGY TEXAS I CORP., JUST ENERGY, LLC, JUST ENERGY PENNSYLVANIA CORP., JUSTENERGY MICHIGAN CORP., JUST ENERGY SOLUTIONS INC., HUDSON ENERGY SERVICES LLC, HUDSON ENERGY CORP., INTERACTIVE ENERGY GROUP LLC, HUDSON PARENT HOLDINGS LLC, DRAG MARKETING LLC, JUST ENERGY ADVANCED SOLUTIONS LLC, FULCRUM RETAIL ENERGY LLC, FULCRUM RETAIL HOLDINGS LLC, TARA ENERGY, LLC, JUST ENERGY MARKETING CORP., JUST ENERGY CONNECTICUT CORP., JUST ENERGY LIMITED, JUST SOLAR HOLDINGS CORP. AND JUST ENERGY (FINANCE) HUNGARY ZRT. (Applicants)

Koehnen J.

Heard: March 9, 2021 Judgment: March 9, 2021 Docket: CV-21-00658423-00CL

Counsel: Marc Wasserman, Michael De Lellis, Jeremy Dacks, Shawn Irving, Waleed Malik, David Rosenblatt, Justine Erickson, for Applicants Robert Thornton, Rebecca Kennedy, Rachel Bengino, Puya Fesharaki, Paul Bishop, Jim Robinson, for Proposed Monitor Scott Bomhof, for Term Loan Lenders Heather Meredith, James D. Gage, for Credit Facility Lenders Ryan Jacobs, Jane Dietrich, Michael Wunder, for DIP Lender Howard Gorman, for Shell Robert Kennedy, Kenneth Kraft, for BP Paul Bishop, Jim Robinson - Proposed Monitor Brian Schartz, Mary Kogut Brawley (US counsel), for Applicants Chad Nichols, David Botter (U.S. counsel), for DIP Lender Kelli Norfleet (U.S. counsel), for BP **Related Abridgment Classifications** 

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.b Grant of stay XIX.2.b.i General principles Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.h Miscellaneous Judges and courts XVI Jurisdiction XVI.11 Jurisdiction of court over own process XVI.11.c Sealing files

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Miscellaneous

Applicant bought electricity and natural gas from power generators and re-sold it to consumer and commercial customers — Unusually intense winter storms in Texas led to breakdown of equipment used to generate and transmit electricity, which led Texas regulators to impose radical and immediate price increases for power applicant bought — Amounts regulators imposed must be paid within two days, failing which applicant could lose its licence and its customers, and price increases imposed serious, temporary liquidity crisis upon applicant — It appeared that price increases may have been imposed in error by computer program, and applicant was appealing price increases and was seeking rebates from Texas regulators, but that process had not been completed — Applicant applied for initial order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) for period of 10 days with debtor in possession (DIP) financing of \$125 million and stay of regulatory action — Application granted — Circumstances facing applicant were precisely sort for which CCAA was appropriate, namely, sudden, unexpected liquidity crisis, brought on by action of others, which actions may still be rescinded — Without stay applicant faced almost certain bankruptcy with loss of approximately 1,000 jobs and possibility that good part of debt it owed would not be repaid — Those catastrophic consequences may be avoidable if applicant succeeded in its appeal of Texas price increases and if all players were given adequate time to find solutions in more orderly fashion than weather crisis allowed them to — Ontario was centre of main interest (COMI) for CCAA proceeding as its registered office was in Toronto, and no other evidentiary factors displaced presumption of registered office being COMI - Applicant met insolvency requirements of CCAA as its liabilities exceeded \$5 million, its liabilities exceeded value of its assets, it would imminently cease to be able to meet its obligations as they became due, and it would run out of liquidity soon — Proposed DIP financing was approved as although amount was high, it was necessary for applicant to remain viable, and its secured creditors did not oppose DIP — Commodity suppliers and ISO service providers who signed qualified service agreements would benefit from charge — Administrative, financial advisor and directors and officers charges were granted as applicant's business was large and complex, and no CCAA proceeding could advance without monitor or counsel, and addition of financial advisor appeared to be prudent step — Bonus payments were not approved on initial order.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — General principles

Applicant bought electricity and natural gas from power generators and re-sold it to consumer and commercial customers — Unusually intense winter storms in Texas led to breakdown of equipment used to generate and transmit electricity, which led Texas regulators to impose radical and immediate price increases for power applicant bought — Amounts regulators imposed must be paid within two days, failing which applicant could lose its licence and its customers, and price increases imposed serious, temporary liquidity crisis upon applicant — It appeared that price increases may have been imposed in error by computer program, and applicant was appealing price increases and was seeking rebates from Texas regulators, but that process had not been completed — Applicant applied for initial order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) for period of 10 days with debtor in possession (DIP) financing of \$125 million and stay of regulatory action — Application granted — Applicant was acting in good faith and with diligence — Granting 10-day stay against regulatory conduct was consistent with remedial purpose of CCAA to avoid social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of insolvent company - CCAA automatically stayed enforcement of any payments of money ordered by regulator, but it did not automatically stay other steps that regulator may take against regulated entity — Court may stay such other steps if it was of view that failure to stay those other steps meant that viable compromise or arrangement could not be made, as long as additional stay was not contrary to public interest — It was appropriate to stay exercise of other regulatory powers against applicant for at least interim 10- day period — It would be unjust to take regulatory steps that might shut down entire business when financial concerns that prompted those steps may turn out to be unjustified if Texas regulators adjusted some or all of price increases imposed during storm —

Foreign regulator was not "regulatory body" within plain meaning of s. 11.1(1) of CCAA, it did not benefit from same exemption from stay as Canadian regulator, and foreign regulator was presumptively subject to stay with respect to matters that fell within jurisdiction of Canadian CCAA court — Set off rights of banks which may allow them to sweep accounts were stayed, as that would give them preferred position over other creditors and deprive applicant of working capital, which was contrary to remedial purposes of CCAA — On its face CCAA applied to corporations, but where operations of partnerships were integral and closely related to applicant, court had jurisdiction to extend protection of stay to partnerships to ensure purposes of CCAA could be achieved — It would be illusory here to grant stay in favour of applicant's corporate entities but not extend its benefit to its partnership entities, and non-corporate entities were captured by stay.

Judges and courts --- Jurisdiction --- Jurisdiction of court over own process --- Sealing files

Applicant bought electricity and natural gas from power generators and re-sold it to consumer and commercial customers — Unusually intense winter storms in Texas led to breakdown of equipment used to generate and transmit electricity, which led Texas regulators to impose radical and immediate price increases for power applicant bought — Amounts regulators imposed must be paid within two days, failing which applicant could lose its licence and its customers, and price increases imposed serious, temporary liquidity crisis upon applicant — It appeared that price increases may have been imposed in error by computer program, and applicant was appealing price increases and was seeking rebates from Texas regulators, but that process had not been completed — Applicant applied for initial order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) for period of 10 days with debtor in possession (DIP) financing of \$125 million and stay of regulatory action — Application granted — Applicant met test for sealing order — Materials contained commercially sensitive information and/or personal information — Order was necessary to prevent serious risk to important personal or commercial interest, and benefits of sealing order outweighed rights of others to fair determination of issues — No one advanced any need to see information that was proposed to be sealed, and there was no need for anyone to access such information in order to assert their rights fully within proceeding. **Table of Authorities** 

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*Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re* (2019), 2019 ONSC 6966, 2019 CarswellOnt 20001, 75 C.B.R. (6th) 124 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Laurentian University of Sudbury (2021), 2021 ONSC 659, 2021 CarswellOnt 1224, 87 C.B.R. (6th) 278 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

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*Lydian International Limited (Re)* (2019), 2019 ONSC 7473, 2019 CarswellOnt 21645, 75 C.B.R. (6th) 314 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Massachusetts Elephant & Castle Group Inc., Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 4201, 2011 CarswellOnt 6610, 81 C.B.R. (5th) 102 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

*Miniso International Hong Kong Limited v. Migu Investments Inc.* (2019), 2019 BCSC 1234, 2019 CarswellBC 2208, 71 C.B.R. (6th) 250 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

*Mountain Equipment Co-Operative (Re)* (2020), 2020 BCSC 1586, 2020 CarswellBC 2639, 83 C.B.R. (6th) 272 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2010), 2010 ONSC 1304, 2010 CarswellOnt 1597, 65 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*North American Tungsten Corp. v. Global Tungsten and Powders Corp.* (2015), 2015 BCCA 390, 2015 CarswellBC 2629, 76 C.P.C. (7th) 1, 377 B.C.A.C. 6, 648 W.A.C. 6, 32 C.B.R. (6th) 175 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

*North American Tungsten Corp., Re* (2015), 2015 BCSC 1382, 2015 CarswellBC 2287, 28 C.B.R. (6th) 147 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

*Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 625, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314, 96 O.T.C. 272 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 287 N.R. 203, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — followed

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*Target Canada Co., Re* (2015), 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2010), 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1, 2010 CSC 60 (S.C.C.) — followed

4519922 Canada Inc., Re (2015), 2015 ONSC 124, 2015 CarswellOnt 178, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 44 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

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Chapter 15 — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "insolvent person" — referred to Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 Generally — referred to

s. 192 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — considered

s. 2(1) "debtor company" (a) — referred to

s. 3(1) — pursuant to

s. 11 — pursuant to

s. 11.1(1) "regulatory body" [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.1(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - referred to

s. 11.1(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — pursuant to

s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - referred to

s. 11.2(5) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 21 — considered

s. 34(1) — referred to

s. 34(7) — referred to s. 34(8) — referred to s. 34(9) — referred to s. 45(2) — referred to

# Koehnen J.:

#### Overview

1 The applicant, Just Energy Group Inc. ("Just Energy") seeks protection under *the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, (the "*CCAA*")<sup>1</sup> by way of an initial order. Just Energy is the ultimate parent of the Just Energy group of companies and limited partnerships.

2 Just Energy buys electricity and natural gas from power generators and re-sells it to consumer and commercial customers, usually under long term, fixed price contracts.

3 Unusually intense winter storms in Texas led to a breakdown of equipment used to generate and transmit electricity. This led Texas regulators to impose radical and immediate price increases for the power Just Energy buys. The amounts the regulator imposes must be paid within 2 days, failing which Just Energy could lose its licence and have its customers distributed among other distributors.

4 Those price increases have imposed a serious, temporary liquidity crisis upon Just Energy and others in its position. That liquidity crisis prompts the *CCAA* application. It appears that the price increases may have been imposed by a computer program that misunderstood the data it received as indicating a shortage of power that could be corrected by price increases. Price increase could not lead to more power being generated because the energy shortage was caused by the freezing and consequent breakdown of generating and transmission equipment. Price increases could not remedy that.

5 Just Energy is appealing the price increases and is seeking rebates from the Texas regulator. That process has not been completed.

6 The issue before me today is whether to grant *CCAA* protection for an initial period of 10 days. It is complicated by the fact that Just Energy also seeks a stay of regulatory action in Canada and the United States and seeks what at first blush, is an unusually large amount of debtor in possession financing (the "DIP") of \$125 million for the initial 10 day period.

For the reasons set out below, I grant the stay and the DIP. It strikes me that the circumstances facing Just Energy are precisely the sort for which the *CCAA* is appropriate: a sudden, unexpected liquidity crisis, brought on by the action of others, which actions may still be rescinded. Without a stay, Just Energy faces almost certain bankruptcy with a loss of approximately 1,000 jobs and the possibility that a good part of the debt it owes will not be repaid. Those catastrophic consequences may be avoidable if Just Energy succeeds in its appeals of the Texas price increases and if all players are given adequate time to find solutions in a more orderly fashion than the weather crisis allowed them to.

A number of critical parties were given notice of today's hearing. Just Energy had consulted widely with them before the hearing. These parties included secured creditors, banks, unsecured term lenders and essential suppliers. Some, including banks and some of the term lenders wish to "reserve their rights" to the comeback hearing. The DIP lender, and two important suppliers (Shell and BP) expressed concern about the reservation of rights. While those who are "reserving their rights" are of course free to do so, as a practical matter, they will be hard-pressed to undo rights that I am affording today in the initial order when the recipients of those rights will be relying on them to their detriment over the next 10 days and when the parties "reserving their rights" have not opposed the relief I am granting.

# I Background to the Liquidity Crisis

9 Just Energy Group Inc. ("Just Energy") is incorporated under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*. Its shares are publicly traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange. Its registered office is in Toronto, Ontario. Just Energy is primarily a holding company that directly or indirectly owns the other companies in the Just Energy Group, including operating subsidiaries.

10 At the risk of oversimplifying, it sells energy to customers under long-term fixed-price contracts and then purchases energy in the market to fulfil those contracts. It has over 950,000 customers, for the most part in Canada and the United States, approximately 979 full-time employees and debts estimated at \$1.25 billion.

11 In recent years Just Energy has suffered challenges that it has sought to remedy by way of a recapitalization through a plan of arrangement under section 192 of the CBCA which was approved by this court on September 2, 2020.

12 Just Energy's largest market in the United States is in the state of Texas.

13 Just Energy faces a sudden and unexpected liquidity crisis as a result of an extreme winter storm that hit Texas on February 12, 2021. The storm caused a surge in demand for electrical power. In response, natural gas prices jumped from US \$3.00 to over US \$150/mmBTU on February 12.

14 The demand for power was exacerbated by the fact that much of the Texas electrical grid began to shut down because it was not equipped to deal with cold weather. As a result, critical components necessary for the generation and transmission of electricity froze thereby increasing demand even further on the limited resources that remained available. By the early morning hours of February 15, 2021, the stress on the electrical grid was so great that it came within minutes of a catastrophic failure.

15 In response, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT") which is responsible for managing the Texas electrical grid ordered transmission operators to implement deep cuts in the form of rotating outages to avoid a complete collapse of the grid.

16 In an apparent effort to stimulate more power production, ERCOT's regulator, the Texas Public Utility Commission ("PUCT") increased the real-time settlement price of power from approximately US \$1,200 per megawatt hour to US \$9,000 per megawatt hour. It appears that this price was set by a computer program that was supposed to adjust prices to help match supply and demand. The increase in price to \$9,000 per megawatt hour did not, however, increase supply because supply was blocked by frozen equipment. The price remained at \$9,000 MWh for four days. The real time settlement price did not reach \$9,000 even for a single 15 minute interval in all of 2020.

17 In addition, Just Energy pays ERCOT a fee referred to as the Reliability Deployment Ancillary Service Imbalance Revenue Neutrality. It ranges between U.S. \$0 to U.S. \$23,500 per day. Between June 2015 and February 16, 2021, Just Energy paid approximately \$504,000 in respect of this charge. For February 17, 18 and 19, 2021, the aggregate charge was over U.S. \$53 million.

18 ERCOT and PUCT have issued additional invoices of US \$55 billion to wholesale energy purchasers as a result of the storm. Just Energy's share of that is approximately \$250 million.

19 These additional fees pose a severe liquidity challenge for Just Energy because it is required to pay them within two days of being imposed. Although Just Energy has a means to dispute ERCOT's invoices, it must pay them before it can initiate the dispute resolution process. ERCOT has already barred two electricity sellers from the Texas power market for failing to make timely payments arising out of the storm.

20 There is considerable controversy surrounding these fees. PUCT and ERCOT have been subject to severe criticism for their actions. The chair of PUCT and several of ERCOT's board members have resigned. The board of ERCOT terminated the employment of its CEO.

21 Others in the Texas electrical market have also suffered. The largest power generation and transmission cooperative in Texas, Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on March 1, 2021.

Although Just Energy hedges for weather risks, its hedging and pricing models did not, however, take into account the extraordinary power demands caused by the storm and the unprecedented fees that ERCOT and PUCT imposed during and after the storm. By way of example, Just Energy's weather hedges contemplate a 50% increase in power usage above average consumption for the month of February. During the storm, usage was 200% above the previous week.

As a result of the additional payments it has had to make to date because of the storm, Just Energy's liquidity facilities are down to approximately \$2.9 million. By the end of day on March 9, 2021 it will have to pay ERCOT an additional US \$96.24 million.

On March 22, 2021 Just Energy expects to have to pay \$250,000,000 to counterparties for purchases at inflated prices during the storm and its aftermath. Sudden and unexpected obligations of that magnitude have a cascading effect on Just Energy's financial stability.

In response to the dramatically increased charges by ERCOT, companies that have issued surety bonds in Just Energy's favour have demanded \$30 million in additional collateral of which \$10 million remains outstanding. Just Energy was obligated to provide additional collateral because the bonding companies had threatened to cancel their surety bonds if Just Energy did not do so. The cancellation of the bonds may have resulted in the revocation of licenses necessary for the Just Energy group to carry on business in certain jurisdictions.

On March 8, 2021, the Just Energy group received another invoice from ERCOT for US \$30.92 million, of which U.S. \$23.89 million will be due by March 10, 2021.

While Just Energy had sufficient liquidity to pay the obligations that it expected, it does not have enough liquidity to pay the additional fees charged by ERCOT, PUCT and creditors who have demanded more stringent terms in response to the ERCOT and PUCT fees. If Just Energy does not pay the fees to ERCOT, the latter can simply transfer all of the Just Energy Group's customers in Texas to another service provider. That would be devastating to Just Energy's business.

In addition to the foregoing financial stresses, at least three provincial regulators have expressed concern about Just Energy's viability. Two regulators made inquiries as a result of media reports arising from Just Energy's disclosure about its storm related financial challenges. The third inquiry was prompted by a formal petition by another market participant who seeks to prevent the Just Energy operating entity in Manitoba from selling to new customers.

# **II. General Principles**

29 At a high level, this is precisely the sort of situation that the CCAA is designed for.

30 The policy underlying the *CCAA* is that the best commercial outcomes are achieved when stays of proceedings provide debtors with breathing space during which solvency is restored or a reorganization of liabilities is explored. The *CCAA* offers a flexible mechanism to make it more responsive to the commercial needs of complex reorganizations. The overriding object is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating the business.<sup>2</sup>

31 This will be a complex restructuring. It involves balancing the interests of various types of debt including secured debt, unsecured term loans, working capital provided by service providers, trade debt to commodities providers, ongoing obligations to customers, just shy of 1000 employees all overlaid with varying regulatory requirements of several different Canadian provinces and American states. 32 Today's application invites me to make a number of rulings on a variety of discretionary issues. The Supreme Court of Canada provided guidance about whether and how to exercise that discretionary authority in Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)<sup>3</sup> It described the guiding principles as follows:

[70] The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

33 Three principles emerge from this passage: good faith, diligence and appropriateness. There is no suggestion that Just Energy is not proceeding in good faith or with diligence. I will return to the issue of appropriateness in my review of the individual forms of relief.

Today I am being asked for a 10 day stay of proceedings, including a stay of proceedings by regulatory authorities. Such relief is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

To have Just Energy fail would cause severe hardship to 979 employees and their families and cause losses of up to \$1.25 billion for creditors all because

(i) Just Energy is being forced to pay unprecedented fees that ERCOT and PUCT imposed,

(ii) which fees Just Energy is challenging,

(iii) which fees are highly controversial,

(iv) and which fees were imposed in circumstances where ERCOT's and PUCT's overall management of the crisis has led to the departure of their CEOs and the resignation of several of their board members.

In granting the relief I ask myself, as the Supreme Court of Canada did in *Century Services* whether granting a stay will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA*. If I apply that principle to the circumstances before me today, the question becomes whether a 10 day stay will avoid the social and economic losses resulting from the liquidation of Just Energy and give participants a chance to achieve common ground while treating all stakeholders as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

I am satisfied that it does. This is precisely the sort of situation that demands breathing space for all actors involved, including regulators, to begin to sort things out in a calmer, more rational, orderly fashion than has been possible to date.

I underscore that in making these comments I am not intending to criticize the Texas regulators. Whether there is anything to be criticized in their conduct or whether their imposition of dramatically higher fees is appropriate will be for another day and another forum. I frame the issue in this way only to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue about the circumstances giving rise to Just Energy's liquidity crisis and a genuine issue about how best to sort out that crisis. Working out those issues in a manner that is as advantageous and fair to all stakeholders as the circumstances permit requires the calm deliberation and reflection that a *CCAA* stay will afford.

# **III. Specific Issues**

39 This application requires me to address the following specific issues:

- A. Is Ontario the Centre of Main Interest?
- B. Does Just Energy meet the insolvency requirements of the CCAA?
- C. Should the DIP be approved?
- D. Should the regulatory actions be stayed?
- E. Should suppliers' charges and pre-filing payments be authorized?
- F. Should set off rights be stayed?
- G. Should administrative and directors and officers charges be granted?
- H. Should noncorporate entities be captured by the stay?
- I. Should third-quarter bonuses be paid?
- J. Should a sealing order be granted?

#### A. Is Ontario the Centre of Main Interest?

40 Just Energy has operations primarily in Canada and the United States. It has advised that it intends to commence a recognition proceeding under chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code in Texas. This will ensure that actions taken in relation to US entities and US property or by US regulators are overseen by the US courts.

41 The presence of significant business activities in the United States and the intention to commence a chapter 15 proceeding, engages the principle of the Centre of Main Interest or COMI.

42 Section 45 (2) of the CCAA provides that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a debtor company's registered office is deemed to be its centre of main interest.

43 The registered office of Just Energy is located in Toronto.

44 Other evidentiary factors can displace the presumption of the registered office being the COMI. These include the location of the debtor's headquarters or head office functions, location of the debtor's management and the location that significant creditors recognize as being the centre of the company's operations.<sup>4</sup>

45 Here, the parent company, Just Energy Group Inc. is a CBCA corporation. Although it has offices in Mississauga and Houston, its registered office is in Toronto. Its common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange. Just Energy is primarily a holding company although it is also the primary debtor or guarantor on substantially all of the obligations of its subsidiaries, including licenses granted by regulators to members of the Just Energy group. Just Energy has a number of subsidiaries throughout Canada, the United States and India. It has 333 Employees in Canada, 381 in the United States and 265 in India.

46 The following additional factors point to Canada as the COMI:

a. During the recent *CCAA* plan of arrangement which was recognized under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, Canada was recognized as the COMI for the Just Energy group.

b. The operations of the Just Energy group are directed in part from its head office in Toronto. In particular, decisions relating to the Just Energy's primary business (buying, selling and hedging energy) are primarily made in Canada.

c. All other members of the Just Energy group report to Just Energy.

d. Just Energy Corp. (a Canadian subsidiary) acts as a centralized entity providing operational and administrative functions for the Just Energy group as a whole. These functions are performed by Canadian Just Energy employees and include, among other things:

i. most enterprise-wide IT services;

ii. enterprise-wide support for finance functions, including working capital management, credit management (including credit checks for customers), payment processing, financial reconciliations, managing business expenses, insurance, and taxation;

iii. oversight for the legal, regulatory, and compliance functions across the entire Just Energy Group;

iv. certain enterprise-wide HR functions, such as designing in-house learning and development programs;

v. financial planning and analysis services, including customer enrollment, billing, customer service, and load forecasting;

vi. supply planning services, including creating demand models which predict the amount of energy that each entity needs to purchase from suppliers and determining the proper distributor and pipeline necessary to get the gas to the end-consumer; and

vii. internal audit services.

47 In the foregoing circumstances I am satisfied Canada is the appropriate COMI.

#### B. Does Just Energy Meet the Insolvency Requirements?

48 There is no doubt that Just Energy meets the threshold required by s. 3(1) of the CCAA that it be a company with liabilities in excess of \$5,000,000.

49 A company must be "insolvent" to obtain protection under the *CCAA*. <sup>5</sup> Although the *CCAA* does not define "insolvent," the definition of insolvent under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("BIA") <sup>6</sup> is usually referred to meet this criteria. <sup>7</sup> Section 2 of the BIA defines "insolvent person" as meaning (i) one who is unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due, (ii) who has ceased paying current obligations in the ordinary course or

(iii) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

50 In addition, Ontario courts have also held that a financially troubled Corporation that is "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within a reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring" should also be considered to be insolvent for purposes of seeking CCAA protection.<sup>8</sup>

51 I am satisfied from the affidavit of Michael Carter sworn March 9, 2021 that the liabilities of Just Energy exceed the value of its assets, that it will imminently cease to be able to meet its obligations as they become due, and will run out of liquidity in very short order.

# C. Should a Priming DIP be Approved?

52 Section 11.2(1) of the CCAA authorizes the court to approve debtor-in-possession financing (the "DIP") that primes existing debt.

53 However, section 11.2 (5) provides that, on an initial application:

(5) .... no order shall be made under subsection (1) unless the court is also satisfied that the terms of the loan are limited to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

In other words, I have no jurisdiction to authorize a priming DIP except for that amount of debt and on those terms as are required to see the debtor through the next 10 days.

<sup>55</sup> The object is to put those measures in place that are necessary to avoid an immediate liquidation and thereby improve the ability of all players to participate in a more orderly resolution of the company's affairs.<sup>9</sup> The objective is to preserve the status quo the company for those 10 days but to go no further.<sup>10</sup>

56 As Morawetz J. (as he then was) pointed out in para. 27 of *Lydian International Limited*, <sup>11</sup> a 10 day stay allows a number of other steps to occur including notification of parties who could not be consulted before the initial application as well as further consultations with key stakeholders.

57 This is a material limitation on the court's jurisdiction on an initial application. It is a recent amendment introduced by Parliament which restricts the powers the court had previously. Before the amendment, initial applications were granted for a period of 30 days. That length of time often required more substantial DIPS which had the potential to prejudice other creditors without giving those creditors a meaningful opportunity to make submissions to the court. The 10 day rule is designed to correct that issue. I take that as a direct message from Parliament that is meant to be enforced seriously.

58 Even before the amendment limiting initial orders to 10 days, the policy of courts was to limit DIP financing in initial orders to what was required to meet the company's "urgent needs over the sorting out period." <sup>12</sup> As Farley J. Noted in Re Royal Oak Mines Inc.

... the object should be to "keep the lights [of the company] on" and enable it to keep up with appropriate preventative maintenance measures, but the Initial Order itself should approach that objective in a judicious and cautious matter.<sup>13</sup>

59 Several *CCAA* courts have approved interim financing as part of the initial order since the 10 day rule came into effect.<sup>14</sup>

The distinguishing factor in this case is that even the 10 day DIP that Just Energy requests is large. It seeks a DIP of \$125,000,000 almost all of which will be drawn in the initial 10 day period. Interest accrues at 13% annually. There is a 1% commitment fee and 1% origination fee.

61 Section 11.2(4) of the CCAA lists some of the factors the Court should consider when deciding whether to approve DIP financing. These include:

- (a) The period during which the Applicants are expected to be subject to the CCAA proceeding;
- (b) How the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) Whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) Whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement;
- (e) The nature and value of the company's property;
- (f) Whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the DIP charge; and
- (g) The Monitor's pre-filing report (if any).

62 In *Re AbitibiBowater Inc*, <sup>15</sup> Gascon J.S.C., as he then was, described the analysis as having the court satisfy itself that the benefits of DIP financing to all creditors, shareholders and employees outweigh the potential prejudice to some creditors.

Although the amount of the DIP for the initial 10 day stay is high, it is nevertheless necessary to "keep the lights on." Just Energy is required to pay ERCOT US \$96.24 million by the end of today (March 9, 2021) or risk losing its licences. It will have to pay a further \$54 million by March 14, 2021. Texas represents approximately 47% of Just Energy's margin. Without its Texas licenses, Just Energy would likely collapse.

Just Energy's secured creditors do not oppose the DIP. Although they wish to "reserve their rights" on the comeback hearing, I take that to mean that they may wish to make arguments about the existence or the terms of the DIP from the comeback hearing onward. As noted earlier, they would be hard-pressed to challenge any priority given to the DIP for advances during the 10 day period the absence of any opposition today.

The DIP lender is a consortium of Just Energy's largest unsecured lenders. For unsecured lenders to offer a DIP of that size to cover a 10 day stay suggests that they believe their prospects for recovery on their unsecured loan are better with a significant 10 day DIP than without.

The loan clearly enhances the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement. Without the loan, Just Energy cannot continue. Regulators will quickly take steps to suspended licenses. Even with the stay of regulatory proceedings, it would be difficult to allow Just Energy to continue to operate if it has no working capital and no means of purchasing power to sell to customers.

57 Just Energy's business is capital-intensive. It requires the expenditure of large amounts of money to buy power and the subsequent receipt of large amounts from the sale of power. That requires substantial liquidity.

In addition, the regulated nature of Just Energy's business can lead to unforeseen liquidity demands that may need to be satisfied to ensure the Applicants' ability to operate as a going concern. The added charges by PUCT and ERCOT are prime examples of that. Those charges must be paid within as short a period as 2 business days. While those charges may ultimately be reversed through the dispute resolution process and while additional collateral that has been required may ultimately be released, those steps will take time to work out. Even if the charges are not reversed, it may well be possible to absorb those price shocks if given the time. Financing Just Energy at least through an interim period allows for greater insight into those possibilities.

I am also mindful of the need to keep essential suppliers and regulators comfortable. Even though I am staying provincial regulatory proceedings, I do that knowing that I am treading on public policy territory that Parliament and provincial legislatures have chosen to ascribe to specialized bodies with specialized knowledge. A larger 10 day DIP decreases the risk that I am harming the public policy objectives they have been mandated to pursue than would a smaller DIP.

The Monitor points out that, after netting out cash receipts and expenditures, approximately \$33,000,000 of the DIP will remain at the end of day 10. One could see that as grounds to pare back the DIP by an equivalent amount I do not think it would be appropriate to do. As noted, the Just Energy business is unpredictable. It requires large amount of liquidity and liquidity buffers to take into account unexpected charges from regulators. The regulators who impose those charges do so to protect other interests. As a result, they cannot simply be dismissed. It strikes me that providing a business of this sort with a buffer is appropriate. The Monitor recommends allowing the buffer to continue. None of the other stakeholders object.

71 In the foregoing circumstances, I am satisfied that the DIP should be approved as requested.

# D. Should Regulatory Actions be Stayed?

Just Energy is subject to a wide variety of provincial and state regulators in Canada and the United States. By way of example, in Canada five different provincial regulators have issued licenses to 16 different Just Energy entities allowing them to sell gas and electricity. Power cannot be sold to new customers or delivered to existing customers without these licenses.

73 Concerns about a licensee's solvency can lead provincial regulators to suspend or cancel licenses or impose more onerous terms on license holders. Such steps can include prohibitions on sales to new customers, termination of the ability to sell to existing customers and the forced transfer of customers to other suppliers. This would cause a licensee to instantly lose revenue streams and threaten their long-term viability. Regulators have the power to impose such terms in extremely short order.

74 The filing of this *CCAA* application could lead to such adverse steps by regulators.

As part of the proposed Initial Order, the Applicants seek to stay provincial and foreign regulators from, among other things, terminating the licenses granted to any Just Energy entity.

With the benefit of the DIP Facility, the Applicants intend to continue paying amounts owing to their contractual counterparties (primarily utilities) in the ordinary course. Just Energy is concerned that even if it continues making such payments, regulators may still try to terminate its licenses or impose other conditions.

77 In my view it is appropriate to stay the conduct of provincial regulators in Canada.

78 Section 11.1 of the CCAA provides:

11.1 (1) In this section, regulatory body means a person or body that has powers, duties or functions relating to the enforcement or administration of an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province and includes a person or body that is prescribed to be a regulatory body for the purpose of this Act.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), no order made under section 11.02 affects a regulatory body's investigation in respect of the debtor company or an action, suit or proceeding that is taken in respect of the company by or before the regulatory body, other than the enforcement of a payment ordered by the regulatory body or the court.

(3) On application by the company and on notice to the regulatory body and to the persons who are likely to be affected by the order, the court may order that subsection (2) not apply in respect of one or more of the actions, suits or proceedings taken by or before the regulatory body if in the court's opinion

(a) a viable compromise or arrangement could not be made in respect of the company if that subsection were to apply; and

(b) it is not contrary to the public interest that the regulatory body be affected by the order made under section 11.02.

More plainly put, the *CCAA* automatically stays enforcement of any payments of money ordered by the regulator. It does not, however, automatically stay other steps that a regulator may take against a regulated entity. The court may nevertheless stay such other steps if it is of the view that the failure to stay those other steps means that a viable compromise or arrangement could not be made, provided that the additional stay is not contrary to the public interest.

80 In the circumstances of this case, it is, in my view, appropriate to stay the exercise of other regulatory powers against Just Energy at least for the interim 10 day period.

As noted earlier, Just Energy's liquidity crisis arises because of controversial steps taken by PUCT and ERCOT which steps Just Energy is in the process of challenging.

It would appear to me to be unjust to take regulatory steps that might shut down entire business when the financial concerns that prompt those steps may turn out to be unjustified if PUCT and ERCOT adjust some or all of the price increases they imposed during the storm. Even if PUCT and ERCOT are unable or unwilling to adjust their price increases, it may be appropriate for regulators to consider whether Just Energy should be shut down because of a temporary liquidity crisis and whether Just Energy should be given a window of opportunity to work out its liquidity crunch. That will obviously need to be measured against the objectives the regulator was created to further. It strikes me, however, that the circumstances of this

case warrant at least a 10 day period to allow all parties to assess the issue with the benefit of more reflection than the instant application of a regulatory policy may afford.

One of the primary goals of regulators is to ensure that providers of electrical power are paid and that customers receive electrical power on competitive business terms. A stay does not offend these policy objectives. The goal of the stay and the financing associated with it is to be able to continue to pay providers of power to Just Energy and to continue to service Just Energy customers according to their existing contracts. The DIP financing and the charge in favour of essential suppliers will ensure that this remains the case.

84 Section 11.1 (3) of the CCAA allows the court to stay action by regulators on notice to the regulator. Regulators have not been given notice of today's hearing. I am nevertheless inclined to grant the relief sought.

Providing notice would have potentially allowed regulators to cancel or suspend Just Energy's licenses before the hearing occurred. If such suspensions or cancellations were ultimately set aside, they would still have caused substantial disruption to the marketplace as a whole and to Just Energy in particular. Just one of the many regulators to whom Just Energy is subject could cause material disruption.

86 Cancellation or suspension of licenses would, for example, mean that upstream suppliers of gas and electricity to Just Energy would have their contracts terminated. Any new power supplier to whom Just Energy's customers would be transferred would have their own source of power supply. That would create more market disruption than would a stay.

In this light, the granting a 10 day stay against regulatory conduct is consistent with the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* which is to avoid social and economic losses resulting from the liquidation of an insolvent company. To permit the immediate termination of Just Energy's licenses would not avoid social and economic losses but amplify them by extending them beyond Just Energy to its upstream suppliers.

I am also mindful of the admonition of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Century Services* to the effect that general language in the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. Although the *CCAA* contains specific provisions relating to regulatory stays which require notice to the regulator, the general power to make such orders as are appropriate should not, in my view, be restricted by the notice requirement when the relief sought relates only to a 10 day temporary stay, when providing notice could undermine the entire scheme of the *CCAA* and when there are adequate financing mechanisms in place to ensure that the regulators' policy objectives are not undermined during the 10 day period.

A foreign regulator is not a "regulatory body" within the plain meaning of section 11.1(1) of the CCAA. As such, foreign regulators do not benefit from the same exemption from the stay as a Canadian regulator. A foreign regulator is therefore presumptively subject to the Stay, with respect to matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Canadian *CCAA* Court. Canadian courts have held that a foreign regulator is precluded by the stay from taking steps in Canada in relation to matters that are within the *CCAA* court's jurisdiction. <sup>16</sup>

90 This result is consistent with the language of the model CCAA order which stays, among other things, all rights and remedies of any "governmental body or agency"

91 Whether and to what extent the stay should apply to American regulators will be for an American court to determine. To give effect to that stay in the United States, Just Energy intends to commence chapter 15 proceedings immediately for such a determination.

# E. Should Supplier Charges and Prefiling Payments be Authorized?

Just Energy seeks a charge in favour of what it has referred to as commodity suppliers and ISO Service Providers. Commodity suppliers are those who provide gas and electricity to Just Energy. ISO Service Providers are often commodity suppliers as well but also provide additional services to Just Energy such as working capital and credit support. By way of example, as noted earlier, ERCOT sends invoices to service providers like Just Energy. Those invoices must be paid within two days. In certain cases, Just Energy uses and ISO Service Provider to act as the front facing entity to the regulator. In those cases, ERCOT sends its invoice to the ISO Service Provider who is obliged to pay within two days. The ISO Service Provider then looks to Just Energy for payment but gives Just Energy extended time to pay, say for example 30 days. In effect, the ISO Service Provider is providing Just Energy with working capital and liquidity.

93 Just Energy has received advice to the effect that these arrangements amount to Eligible Financial Contracts under the *CCAA*. This poses a challenge because Eligible Financial Contracts are not subject to the prohibition on the exercise of termination rights under the *CCAA*. <sup>17</sup> Since the parties to Eligible Financial Contracts cannot be prevented from terminating, Just Energy is of the view that counterparties to those contracts must be given incentives to continue to provide power supply and financial services. The proposed incentive takes the form of a charge in favour of those counterparties that continue to provide commodities or services to Just Energy.

Shell and BP, the two largest commodity and ISO Service Providers, have already entered into such arrangements. The proposed order would allow any other commodity provider or ISO Service Provider to enter into a similar arrangement with Just Energy and benefit from a similar charge.

No one has challenged that analysis for today's purposes and no one opposes the proposed charges. Given the possibility of mischief in the absence of such charges and given that the relief today is sought for only 10 days, in my view it would be preferable to offer the protection of the charges as requested.

<sup>96</sup> I note that in certain circumstances, the court can compel commodity and service providers to continue supplying a *CCAA* debtor. I am, however, somewhat reluctant to use those provisions given that the suppliers and service providers in question are part of a highly regulated, interwoven industry. Compelling a supplier in such an industry to continue to provide supply or services may well infringe on the regulators' objective of maintaining a financially sound electrical market. Given the urgency with which the application arose, it is preferable to provide financial incentives to such parties and not risk imperiling the financial stability of other regulated actors by forcing them to supply.

97 This court has already observed in the past that the availability of critical supplier provisions under the *CCAA* does not oust the court's jurisdiction under section 11 to make any other order it considers appropriate.  $^{18}$ 

98 The proposed charges would rank either *pari passu* with the DIP or immediately below it, depending on the nature of the transaction. Although Just Energy's secured creditors were present at today's hearing, they did not object to the proposed charges.

99 Certain prefiling obligations such as tax arrears could result in directors of Just Energy being held personally liable. The company seeks authorization to make prefiling payments with that sort of critical character that are integral to its ability to operate. In the absence of any objection, that relief is granted.

# F. Should Set off Rights to Be Stayed?

100 As part of the stay, Just Energy seeks an order precluding financial institutions from exercising any "sweep" remedies under their arrangements with Just Energy.

101 The concern is that the financial institutions would empty Just Energy's accounts by reason of a claim to a right of set off. Exercise of such rights would effectively undermine any reorganization by depriving Just Energy of working capital and thereby impairing its business.

102 Although s. 21 of the CCAA preserves rights of set-off, the Court may defer the exercise of those rights. Section 21 does not exempt set-off rights from the stay. This differs from other provisions of the *CCAA*, which provide that certain rights are immune from the stay. <sup>19</sup> As Savage J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal observed, the broad discretion accorded to the *CCAA* Court to make orders in furtherance of the objectives of the statute must, as a matter of logic, extend to set-off. <sup>20</sup>

103 Allowing banks to exercise a self-help remedy of sweeping the accounts by claiming set-off would in effect give them a preferred position over other creditors and deprive Just Energy of working capital. That would be contrary to the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* because it would ultimately shut down Just Energy and allow the banks to advantage themselves to the detriment of others in the process.

104 Just Energy had consulted widely with various stakeholder groups had before today's hearing. Those included the banks with sweep rights, at least some of home were represented at today's hearing and did not object.

105 In the foregoing circumstances it is appropriate to at least temporarily stay the exercise of any rights of set-off by the banks.

# G. Should Administrative and D & O Charges be Granted?

106 The Applicants propose that an Administration Charge for the first ten days be set at \$2.2 million.

107 The largest expenditures in the administration charge involve the retainer of counsel in Canada and the United States for Just Energy and the retainer of the Monitor and its counsel.

108 In addition, the company seeks a financial advisor charge of \$1.8 million to retain BMO Nesbitt Burns as a financial advisor to assist in exploring potential alternative transactions.

109 The directors and officers charge sought is in the amount of \$30 million.

110 The Monitor estimates that director liabilities in the United States for sales taxes, wages, source deductions and accrued vacation come to approximately \$13.1 million. Director and officer exposure in Canada may be as high as \$5.8 million.

111 While insurance with an aggregate limit of \$38.5 million is in place, the complexity of the overall enterprise creates the risk that it might not provide sufficient coverage against the potential liability that the directors and officers could incur in relation to this *CCAA* proceeding.

In determining whether to approve administration charges, the Court will consider: (a) the size and complexity of the businesses under *CCAA* protection; (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge; (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles; (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge is fair and reasonable; (e) the position of secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and (f) the position of the Monitor.<sup>21</sup>

113 The Just Energy business is large and complex. The proposed beneficiaries are essential to the success of the *CCAA*. No *CCAA* proceeding can advance without a Monitor or counsel. The addition of a financial advisor would appear to be a prudent step given the complexity of the business. Monetizing or restructuring all or portions of the Just Energy business is substantially more complicated than a sale of hard assets. It would appear to make good sense to have a financial advisor involved. The Monitor agrees to the appointment of a financial advisor. I infer from the Monitor's agreement that Nesbitt Burns will bring to the table a skill set or attributes that the Monitor either does not have or cannot exercise given its role as Monitor.

#### H. Should Noncorporate Entities Be Captured by The Stay?

114 Many of the gas and electricity licences pursuant to which the Just Energy group conducts business in Canada are granted to limited partnerships.

115 On its face, the *CCAA* applies to corporations, not partnerships.<sup>22</sup>

116 Where, however, the operations of partnerships are integral and closely related to the operations of the *CCAA* debtor, it is well-established that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the protection of the stay to partnerships in order to ensure that the purposes of the *CCAA* can be achieved. Relief of that sort has been granted on several occasions.<sup>23</sup>

117 Here, it would be illusory to grant a stay in favour of the Just Energy corporate entities but not extend its benefit to the partnership entities. That would defeat the entire purpose of the exercise. As a result, is appropriate to extend *CCAA* protection to the Just Energy partnership entities.

# I. Should Third Quarter Bonuses be Paid?

118 The applicant seeks approval from the initial order for payment of third Quarter bonuses for fiscal 2021 on April 2, 2021. The bonuses were approved by the Compensation Committee on February 9, 2021 after it was reported that the third quarter base EBITDA result was \$55.785 million compared to a target of \$42 million.

119 The Compensation Committee approved and asked the Board to approve a third-quarter bonus pool in the amount of \$3.23 million. The Board approved the bonus on February 10, 2021.

120 I am disinclined to approve the bonus payment on an initial order. The relief on the initial order is limited to the amount to keep the company afloat for 10 days. The bonus does not fit into that category. Even on the applicant's view of events, the bonuses are not payable until April 2, 2021. That is well after the comeback date.

121 In addition, the Monitor has not yet had an opportunity to review and comment on the employee bonus and intends to do so in a further report to the court.

122 Whether bonuses should or should not be paid will depend on a variety of factors that are not in the evidence before me. By way of example, I would want a better understanding of whether the beneficiaries of the bonuses are also intended beneficiaries of the key employee retention plan that Just Energy will be asking for on the comeback date. In addition, I will want a better sense of who the recipients of the bonuses are. If they are relatively modest income earners for whom the bonus is a key source of income, such as, for example, retail sales people, I would probably be inclined to pay the bonuses without question. If, however, they are high income earners, the intended beneficiaries of the KERP, or if they are executives who make decisions about risk allocation, what Just Energy should insure against, to what extent it should hedge against weather risks and so on, I would want a more granular understanding about why the bonuses should be paid.

# J. Should a Sealing order be Granted?

123 Just Energy requests a sealing order in relation to the BMO Engagement Letter and the summary of the KERP, both of which are attached as confidential exhibits to the affidavit of Michael Carter sworn March 9, 2021.

124 I am satisfied that the applicants have met the test established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sierra Club of Canada

v Canada (Minister of Finance)<sup>24</sup> The materials contain commercially sensitive information and/or personal information (in the case of the KERP). The order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important personal or commercial interest and the benefits of a sealing order outweigh the rights of others to a fair determination of the issues. No one advanced any need to see the information that is proposed to be sealed nor can I see any need for anyone to access such information in order to assert their rights fully within this proceeding.

#### Disposition

125 In view of the foregoing, I granted an initial order in the form requested with the exception of authorization for bonus payments which will be addressed at the comeback hearing.

126 The order will in effect provide that:

- (a) Ontario is the Centre of Main Interest for the CCAA proceeding.
- (b) Just Energy meets the insolvency requirements of the CCAA.

- (c) The proposed DIP financing is approved.
- (d) Any regulatory actions should be stayed.
- (e) Commodity suppliers and ISO Service Providers who sign qualified service agreements will benefit from a charge.
- (f) Set off rights of banks which may allow them to sweep accounts will be stayed.
- (g) The administrative, financial advisor and directors and officers charges are granted.
- (h) Noncorporate entities will be captured by the stay.
- (i) A sealing order will be granted.
- 127 The comeback date for the continuation of any CCAA relief is set for 10 AM on Friday, March 19, 2021.

Application granted.

#### Footnotes

- 1 R.C.C. 1985, c. c-36, as amended
- 2 Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at paras. 14-15.
- 3 Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 (CanLII), [2010] 3 SCR 379
- 4 Re Massachusetts Elephant & Castle Group2011 ONSC 4201
- 5 CCAA s. 2(1)(a) definition of a debtor company.
- 6 R. S. C. 1985, c. B-3
- 7 Laurentian University of Sudbury2021 ONSC 659
- 8 Laurentian University2021 ONSC 659 at para. 32; Stelco Inc., Re, 2004 CanLII 24933at para. 26.
- 9 Re Lydian International Limited, 2019 ONSC 7473 at para. 25.
- 10 *Lydian* at para. 26
- 11 2019 ONSC 7473.
- 12 Re Royal Oak Mines Inc. (1999), 1999 CanLII 14840 (ON SC), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 ((Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) at para 24.
- 13 Re Royal Oak Mines Inc. (1999), 1999 CanLII 14840 (ON SC), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 ((Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) at para 24.
- 14 Re Clover Leaf Holdings Company, 2019 ONSC 6966 at para. 21; Miniso International Hong Kong Limited v. Migu Investments Inc.,2019 BCSC 1234, at para. 90; Re Mountain Equipment Co-Operative, 2020 BCSC 1586, at para. 2.
- 15 Re AbitibiBowater Inc,2009 QCCS 6453 at para 16.
- 16 Nortel Networks Corp., Re, 2010 ONSC 1304 at para. 41 and 42.
- 17 CCAA s. 34 (1), (7), (8) and (9).
- 18 Re CanWest Publishing Inc., 2010 ONSC 222.

- 19 North American Tungsten Corp. (Re), 2015 BCSC 1382 at para. 28; leave to appeal to BCCA refused, 2015 BCCA 390 [*Tungsten* (Leave)], leave to appeal decision affirmed by Review Panel of the BCCA.
- 20 *Tungsten* (Leave), above at para. 12-16; see also Air Canada (Re), 2003 CarswellOnt 4016 at para. 25.
- 21 Canwest 2010, at para 54. Target, at paras 74 and 75; Lydian, paras 43 to 54; Laurentian, at paras. 48 to 59.
- 22 CCAA, s. 2, definition of "Debtor company."
- 23 See, for example, Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at para. 21; Re Target Canada Co., 2015 ONSC 303 at paras 42 and 43; 4519922 Canada Inc., Re, 2015 ONSC 124 at para. 37.
- 24 Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41; see also Target above at paras 28-30; Laurentian University, above at paras. 60 to 64.

# TAB 7

# 2021 QCCS 2946

#### Quebec Superior Court

#### Arrangement relatif à Bloom Lake General

2021 CarswellQue 11345, 2021 QCCS 2946, 337 A.C.W.S. (3d) 436, 93 C.B.R. (6th) 285, EYB 2021-394691

# BLOOM LAKE GENERAL PARTNER LIMITED, QUINTO MINING CORPORATION, CLIFFS QUÉBEC IRON MINING ULC, WABUSH IRON CO. LIMITED, WABUSH RESOURCES INC. (PETITIONERS) and THE BLOOM LAKE IRON ORE MINE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, BLOOM LAKE RAILWAY COMPANY LIMITED, WABUSH MINES, ARNAUD RAILWAY COMPANY, WABUSH LAKE RAILWAY COMPANY LIMITED (MISES-EN-CAUSE) and FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC. (MONITOR) and TWIN FALLS POWER CORPORATION AND CHURCHILL FALLS (LABRADOR) CORPORATION LIMITED (TWINCO MISES-EN-CAUSE)

Pinsonnault, J.S.C.

Heard: June 3, 2021 Judgment: July 14, 2021 Docket: C.S. Montréal 500-11-048114-157

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Me Gerry Apostolatos, for the Mises-en-cause Quebec North Shore & Labrador Railway Company and Iron Ore Company of Canada

Me Nicolas Brochu, for the Mise-en-cause for the Salaried/non-union employees and retirees

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.3 Arrangements

XIX.3.e Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act - Arrangements - Miscellaneous

Debtors sought protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) and monitor was appointed — Debtors submitted plan of arrangement, which was judicially approved — Under supervision of monitor, debtors sold all of their assets other than interest held by debtors in company T — Proceeds of sale were distributed among creditors according to terms of plan of arrangement — As result, debtors' interest in T was last asset to realize in context of CCAA proceedings — Debtors brought motion seeking order granting additional powers to monitor to complete final distribution — Motion granted — Court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine scope of monitor's powers in furtherance of purposes of CCAA — This is especially true if such powers relate directly to asset or property of debtor that is part of previously approved plan — Hence, exercise of judicial discretion was appropriate to grant to monitor expanded powers sought by debtors — Circumstances and nature of issues confronting debtors and monitor to bring CCAA process to conclusion within reasonable delay were taken into consideration — Expanded powers sought were necessary and appropriate to enable monitor to fulfill its statutory duties to properly value assets and liabilities of debtors — Powers were also necessary to recover value from last significant asset in debtors' estate — Ultimate objective was to facilitate winding up and termination of CCAA proceedings — Therefore, it was only appropriate to grant expanded powers requested.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies --- Arrangements --- Divers Débitrices se sont placées sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies et un contrôleur a été nommé — Débitrices ont soumis un plan d'arrangement, lequel a été approuvé par un tribunal — Sous la supervision du contrôleur, les débitrices ont vendu tous leurs actifs, sauf un intérêt détenu par elles dans la compagnie T — Produit de la vente a été distribué parmi les créanciers selon les termes du plan d'arrangement — Ainsi, l'intérêt des débitrices dans T constituait le dernier actif à réaliser dans le contexte des procédures entamées en vertu de la Loi — Débitrices ont déposé une requête visant à obtenir une ordonnance accordant au contrôleur des pouvoirs additionnels lui permettant de compléter la distribution finale — Requête accordée — Tribunal jouissait de la compétence exclusive de déterminer la portée des pouvoirs du moniteur dans la mise en application des objectifs de la Loi - Cela est particulièrement vrai lorsque ces pouvoirs se rapportent directement à un actif ou une propriété du débiteur faisant l'objet d'un plan déjà approuvé — Ainsi, l'exercice de la discrétion judiciaire était approprié pour accorder au contrôleur les pouvoirs élargis recherchés par les débitrices — Circonstances et la nature des questions confrontant les débitrices et le contrôleur dans le processus de conclusion des présentes procédures à l'intérieur d'un délai raisonnable ont été prises en considération — Pouvoirs élargis recherchés étaient nécessaires et appropriés pour permettre au contrôleur de remplir ses obligations statutaires d'évaluer de manière appropriée les actifs et les dettes des débitrices — Pouvoirs étaient également nécessaires pour récupérer la valeur associée au dernier actif d'importance dans le patrimoine des débitrices — Objectif ultime était de faciliter la liquidation et la conclusion des procédures entamées sous la Loi — Par conséquent, il était véritablement approprié d'accorder les pouvoirs élargis recherchés.

#### **Table of Authorities**

#### Cases considered by Michel A. Pinsonnault J.C.S.:

Arrangement relatif à 9227-1584 Québec inc. (2021), 2021 QCCS 1342, 2021 CarswellQue 5039 (C.S. Que.) — considered Arrangement relatif à 9323-7055 Québec inc. (Aquadis International Inc.) (2020), 2020 QCCA 659, 2020 CarswellQue 4335, 79 C.B.R. (6th) 165 (C.A. Que.) — considered

Bouygues Building Canada inc. v. Iannitello et Associés inc. (2018), 2018 QCCA 504, 2018 CarswellQue 2458 (C.A. Que.) — considered

Confederation Treasury Services Ltd., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 2301 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) - considered

*Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Limited* (2017), 2017 ONCA 1014, 2017 CarswellOnt 20162, 54 C.B.R. (6th) 173, 139 O.R. (3d) 1, 420 D.L.R. (4th) 23, 76 B.L.R. (5th) 171 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

*Osztrovics (Trustee of) v. Osztrovics Farms Ltd.* (2015), 2015 ONCA 463, 2015 CarswellOnt 9303, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 156 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.* (2020), 2020 SCC 10, 2020 CSC 10, 2020 CarswellQue 3772, 2020 CarswellQue 3773, 78 C.B.R. (6th) 1, 444 D.L.R. (4th) 373, 1 B.L.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) — followed

#### Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 15 — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 163 — considered

s. 164 — considered Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 Generally — referred to

s. 155 — referred to

s. 214 - referred to

s. 214(1)(b)(ii) — referred to

s. 214(2) - referred to

s. 215 — referred to
s. 217 — referred to
s. $241(3)(f)$ — referred to
s. 241(3)(l) — referred to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to
s. 11 — considered
s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to
s. 23 — considered
s. 23(1)(c) — considered
s. 23(1)(k) — considered
s. 36.1 [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 78] — referred to
Pinsonnault, J.S.C.:

# OVERVIEW

1 With their Motion, the Petitioners and the Mises en cause are seeking an order from this Court granting additional powers to the Monitor (the "*Motion*") so that the latter may, directly or through its counsel, do the following:

a) compel the production, from time to time, from any Person having possession, custody or control of any books, records, accountings, documents, correspondences or papers, electronically stored or otherwise, relating to the Twinco Interest, CFLCo Indemnity and CFLCo Maintenance Obligations (each as defined hereafter), including the Twinco Requested Information (as defined below) (the "*Requested Information*") in respect of the period from and after January 1, 2010, and such earlier periods as may be approved by further order of the Court (the "*Disclosure Period*");

b) require any Requested Information to be delivered within thirty (30) days of the Monitor's request or such a longer period as the Monitor may agree to in its discretion; and

c) conduct investigations from time to time, including examinations under oath of any Person reasonably thought to have knowledge relating to the Requested Information, in respect of the Disclosure Period.

[the "Expanded Monitor Powers"]

2 Previously, on June 29, 2018, Mr. Justice Stephen W. Hamilton issued an order to sanction the Joint Plan of Compromise and Arrangement dated as of May 16, 2018 (the "*Plan*") submitted jointly by the Petitioners and the Mises en cause (collectively the "*CCAA Parties*" for the purposes hereof).

3 During the present CCAA proceedings initiated in January 2015 pursuant to the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "*CCAA*"), the CCAA Parties have sold all of their assets other than the combined 17.062% equity interest (the "*Twinco Interest*") held in Twin Falls Power Corporation ("*Twinco*") by Wabush Iron Co. Limited and Wabush Resources Inc. (collectively "*Wabush*"). <sup>4</sup> Pursuant to the Plan, the net proceeds of sales and other recoveries are to be distributed to the creditors of the Participating CCAA Parties <sup>1</sup> in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Plan.

5 Since the implementation of the Plan, the CCAA Parties, with the assistance of the Monitor, have been working to wind down the estates of the CCAA Parties so that the net proceeds from such recoveries and realizations can finally be distributed to the creditors of the CCAA Parties as soon as possible.

6 The initial interim distributions to the creditors with proven claims under the Plan took place in August and September 2018.

7 A second interim distribution to such creditors with proven claims took place in mid-of May 2021.

8 A final distribution will not occur until the realization or collection of all material assets of the CCAA Parties including the Twinco Interest.

9 The CCAA Parties were informed by the Monitor that a significant majority of the creditors of Wabush are former employees of Wabush Mines, many of whom are elderly, and who are reasonably assumed to be anxious to receive their final distributions as soon as possible.

10 Subject to the resolution and collection of certain outstanding tax refunds, the CCAA Parties have realized on all of their assets other than the Twinco Interest.

11 On November 16, 2020, in furtherance of the CCAA Parties' efforts to monetize the Twinco Interest, the CCAA Parties filed a *Motion for the Winding up and Dissolution, Distribution of Assets, Reimbursement of Monies and Additional Relief* (the "*CBCA Motion*") on a *pro forma* basis, which was subsequently scheduled by the Court to be heard on January 29, 2021.

12 On January 29, 2021, the Court adjourned the CBCA Motion, the CFLCo Contestation<sup>2</sup> and the Twinco Dismissal Motion<sup>3</sup> *sine die*, and on February 22, 2021, the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador (the "*Newfoundland Court*") adjourned the Twinco Liquidation Motion<sup>4</sup>, in order to allow the parties an opportunity to explore the possibility of a consensual resolution of the matters raised in those proceedings which essentially boils down to disposing of the Twinco Interest.

13 As those negotiations did not proceed in any meaningful way, the CCAA Parties are seeking this *Motion for the Expansion* of the Monitor's Powers to facilitate the recovery of assets for the benefit of the CCAA Parties' creditors and the winding up of the CCAA Parties' estate and the termination of the CCAA Proceedings.

14 As can be noted above, the Expanded Monitor Powers sought herein all relate to the Twinco Interest which is, to all intents and purposes, the last asset to monetize and realize in the context of the CCAA proceedings.

15 Until now, Twinco and its shareholder CFLCo have been steadfastly blocking all attempts of the CCAA Parties and the Monitor to monetize the Twinco Interest in the furtherance of the Plan, which involves obtaining the relevant and necessary documentation required to determine with reasonable certainty the value of the Twinco Interest in the context of the present CCAA Proceedings.

16 Twinco's and CFLCo's refusal to deal with the Twinco Interest has left little alternative but to seek the wind down and the dissolution of Twinco in the context of the present CCAA Proceedings to finally permit the CCAA Parties, with the assistance of the Monitor, to realize this asset of Wabush, complete the final distribution to the Plan creditors and terminate at last the CCAA Proceedings that have been ongoing since 2015.

# 1. THE PROCEDURAL CONTEXT INVOLVING TWINCO

# 1.1 The Twin Falls Power Corporation (Twinco)

17 Based on the Motion, the Court retains the following relevant facts:

• Twinco is an incorporated joint venture formed under the *Canada Business Corporations Act* (the "*CBCA*") on February 18, 1960, among Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited ("*CFLCo*"), Wabush Iron Co. Limited and Wabush Resources Inc. (collectively "*Wabush*") and the Iron Ore Company of Canada ("*IOC*"), among others;

• As at December 31, 2019, Twinco was owned 33.3% by CFLCo, 49.6% by IOC, and 17.062% interest held jointly by Wabush<sup>5</sup>:

• Pursuant to Twinco's fiscal year 2019 Audited Financial Statements, Twinco has approximately \$6.1M in cash and cash equivalent assets (the "*Twinco Cash*") and approximately \$46,000 of liabilities <sup>6</sup>;

• The history of the Twinco Plant<sup>7</sup> is long and complicated and is set out in significant detail in the CBCA Motion. However the highlights are set out hereafter;

• In 1961, CFLCo licensed to Twinco the rights to develop a 225-megawatt hydroelectric generating plant on the Unknown River in Labrador (the "*Twinco Plant*");

• In addition to the Twinco Plant, Twinco owned a number of other assets including (i) the physical building which houses the Twinco Plant (the "*Twinco Building*"); (ii) the transmission lines from the Twinco Plant to its consumers (the "*Twinco Transmission Lines*"); and (iii) the equipment which comprises the Twinco Plant and which was used in the production of hydroelectric power (the "*Twinco Machinery*") (collectively, with the Twinco Building and Twinco Transmission Lines, and such other assets of Twinco the "*Twinco Assets*");

• In 1974, CFLCo took over the Twinco Plant and undertook comprehensive maintenance obligations in respect of the Twinco Plant (the "*CFLCo Maintenance Obligations*"), and indemnified Twinco in respect of those obligations and environmental liabilities in connection with the Twinco Plant and Twinco Assets (the "*CFLCo Indemnity*")<sup>8</sup>;

• The Twinco Plant was placed into an extended shutdown in 1974. Since that time until today, based on various environmental assessments commissioned by Twinco over the years as summarized in various Audited Financial Statements of Twinco, the CCAA Parties understand that potential environmental liabilities may have occurred in respect of the Twinco Plant and Twinco Assets (the "*Potential Environmental Liabilities*");

• The CCAA Parties are of the view that the responsibility for any environmental liability lies squarely with CFLCo and not Twinco, pursuant to CFLCo's Maintenance Obligations and CFLCo Indemnity<sup>9</sup>;

• It is not clear to the CCAA Parties and the Monitor whether, and to what extent, Twinco may have funded maintenance or environmental remediation that was CFLCo's responsibility, and for which Twinco may have a claim against CFLCo for reimbursement;

• As stated in the CBCA Motion, for years, both prior to and after the commencement of the present CCAA Proceedings, the CCAA Parties, with the support of IOC, have sought to obtain a distribution of the Twinco Cash to Twinco's shareholders, but such distribution has been continuously resisted by Twinco and CFLCo;

• The CCAA Parties believe that CFLCo did not support further distributions to the shareholders because it wants to ensure a cash pool from Twinco to pay for the Potential Environmental Liabilities notwithstanding the CFLCo Indemnity and CFLCo Maintenance Obligations;

• Pursuant to Twinco's Articles of Continuance dated August 1, 1980<sup>10</sup>, the shareholders are entitled to share rateably in the remaining property of Twinco upon dissolution;

• Wabush's share of the Remaining Twinco Cash<sup>11</sup> is approximately \$1,040,000, a material amount, together with their *pro rata* share of what other money may be subject to reimbursement claims against CFLCo;

• As the information to determine the amount of maintenance and other indemnifiable expenses that may be subject to reimbursement by CFLCo is within the knowledge of Twinco, an accounting was requested in the CBCA Motion;

• Without this information, it is impossible for the CCAA Parties or the Monitor to calculate what the approximate true value of the Twinco Interest may be to ensure that the CCAA Parties' creditors receive appropriate recovery from the Twinco Interest.

# 1.2 The CBCA Motion and the relief sought

18 The history of the CCAA Parties' repeated attempts to engage in a constructive dialogue with Twinco and its majority shareholder CFLCo, is more fully set out in detail in the CBCA Motion, which has been continued *sine die* until now.

19 While the CCAA Parties had been hopeful that a consensual resolution could be achieved, they concluded that based on the lack of desire of Twinco and CFLCo to engage in a constructive manner, a consensual resolution was not possible.

20 Accordingly, on November 16, 2020, the CCAA Parties filed the CBCA Motion, seeking the issuance of Orders against Twinco and CFLCo:

a) confirming CFLCo's liability for Twinco's maintenance obligations and environmental liabilities related to the Twinco Plant from and after July 1, 1974;

b) compelling an accounting from Twinco of all monies expended by Twinco in respect of maintenance and environmental costs that have not been reimbursed by CFLCo pursuant to the CFLCo Indemnity and CFLCo Maintenance Obligations (collectively, the "*Reimbursable Environmental/Maintenance Costs*");

c) directing CFLCo to reimburse all Reimbursable Environmental/Maintenance Costs (such amount to be reimbursed by CFLCo, being the "*CFLCo Reimbursement*") to Twinco for distribution to the shareholders as part of the winding up and dissolution of Twinco pursuant to the relief requested in paragraph (d) below;

d) directing the winding up and dissolution of Twinco pursuant to section 214 and/or section 241 (3)(1) of the CBCA and a distribution of: (i) the Twinco Cash net of all reasonable fees and expenses incurred by Twinco to implement and complete the wind-up and dissolution being sought in this Motion (the "*Remaining Twinco Cash*"), and (ii) the CFLCo Reimbursement to Twinco's shareholders, including Wabush, on a *pro rata* basis; and

e) in the alternative to (d), directing Twinco and/or CFLCo to purchase the shares of Twinco held by Wabush pursuant to section 214 (2) and/or section 241 (3)(f) of the CBCA for a purchase price equal to the amount of Wabush's *pro rata* share of: (i) the Twinco Cash, and (ii) the CFLCo Reimbursement.

[the "CBCA Motion Proposed Orders"]

# 1.3 Twinco's and CFLCo's response to the CBCA Motion

21 In response to the CBCA Motion, Twinco filed a proceeding entitled "*Motion by Twin Falls Power Corporation to Dismiss the Application for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Forum Non-Conveniens*" dated January 15, 2021<sup>12</sup>, seeking to dismiss the CBCA Motion for lack of jurisdiction of this Court to hear the CBCA Motion and alternatively, for *forum non-conveniens* (the "*Twinco Dismissal Motion*"). The latter motion is scheduled to be heard in August 2021.

22 Concurrently, CFLCo filed a proceeding entitled "*Contestation to the CBCA Motion*" dated January 15, 2021<sup>13</sup> (the "*CFLCo Contestation*"), substantially to the same effect while announcing that it was also filing an *Originating Application* 

for the Issuance of a Court-Supervised Liquidation and Dissolution Order before the Newfoundland Court pursuant to sections 214 (1)(b)(ii), 215, and 217 of the CBCA, seeking, *inter alia*, the court-supervised liquidation of Twinco.

23 Seemingly in reaction to the CBCA Motion, CFLCo advised the CCAA Parties in its CFLCo Contestation that despite years of resisting to do so, CFLCo was going to imminently commence in the Newfoundland Court an originating application for a court-supervised liquidation and dissolution of Twinco (the "*Twinco Liquidation Motion*")<sup>14</sup>.

The Twinco Liquidation Motion was formally filed on January 21, 2021, to be heard in Newfoundland on February  $23, 2021^{15}$ .

At the time, subject to obtaining a court hearing date for the Twinco Dismissal Motion and CFLCo Contestation and the CBCA Motion, the parties agreed to seek an adjournment of the CBCA Motion, the Twinco Dismissal Motion, the CFLCo Contestation and the Twinco Liquidation Motion, in each case without prejudice to each party's right to seek a new hearing date for any of such proceedings on 14 days' prior written notice to the other parties.

26 On January 27, 2021, this Court adjourned *sine die* the CBCA Motion, the Twinco Dismissal Motion, and the CFLCo Contestation and on February 22, 2021, CFLCo confirmed the adjournment *sine die* of the Twinco Liquidation Motion with the Newfoundland Court (all such adjourned proceedings, the "*Adjourned Proceedings*").

By letter dated February 1, 2021 (the "*February 1*<sup>st</sup> Letter"), counsel for the CCAA Parties sought to confirm its understanding of the terms of the adjournment of the Adjourned Proceedings as among the parties  $^{16}$ .

In the February 1<sup>st</sup> Letter, CCAA Parties' counsel also set out the documents and information that was to be provided by Twinco and CFLCo in furtherance of the proposed efforts to reach a potential consensual resolution. The requested documents and information were to be provided within 30 days of the letter, or within a reasonably anticipated time that would be required to obtain any requested information that was not readily available for delivery to the CCAA Parties.

29 The requested documents and information were intended to provide the CCAA Parties and the Monitor with a general understanding of the approximate range of Reimbursable Environmental/Maintenance Costs that could be at issue to better enable the CCAA Parties and Monitor to determine the approximate potential value of the Twinco Interest. Without this information, a potential consensual resolution would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reach.

30 The requested documents and information in the February 1<sup>st</sup> Letter included, among other things, the following information:

a) amount of cash and cash equivalents held by Twinco as at January 31, 2021, and a budget of expenses anticipated to be incurred by Twinco to the date of the wind-up and liquidation that are not currently anticipated to be subject to any reimbursement or sharing obligation;

b) copies of audited financial statements for Twinco for the years ended December 31, 1974, to 2019 (excluding audited financial statements for the year-ended December 31, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2013-2019); and

c) a summary of all expenses incurred by Twinco in respect to environmental and maintenance and other costs in respect to the Twinco Plant, Twinco Building and equipment located thereon for which Twinco has not received full reimbursement from CFLCo or any other party, for the period from July 1974 to December 31, 2020, as described in more detail in the February 1<sup>st</sup> Letter.

# [the "Twinco Requested Information"]

31 The CCAA Parties pointed out that as shareholders, Wabush Iron and Wabush Resources were already entitled to copies of all annual financial statements of Twinco pursuant to section 155 of the CBCA. The balance of the information requested

was in the nature of information relating to expenses incurred by Twinco in connection with the maintenance and environmental liabilities and Twinco's updated cash position as at January 31, 2021, and Twinco's go forward budget to the anticipated date of its wind-up and dissolution.

32 However, according to the CCAA Parties' counsel, the respective counsels for Twinco and CFLCo both denied any undertaking to use in good faith efforts to provide any of the Twinco Requested Information to the CCAA Parties and Monitor and both resisted the production of any documentation to the CCAA Parties and Monitor.

By letter dated February 4, 2021, counsel for Twinco stated that Twinco made no such undertakings, any request would be taken under consideration — "nothing more" — that they would not, without specific direction from the Twinco directors, offer to provide any documents, and that it would seek instructions from Twinco's directors in respect to the Twinco Requested Information and whether it was reasonable to "even consider" undertaking to provide the Twinco Requested Information.<sup>17</sup>

34 Likewise, by letter dated February 5, 2021, CFLCo's counsel denied any good faith undertaking to provide any information requested by the CCAA Parties and stated that the "ultimate decision to provide the requested documentation lies with Twinco".<sup>18</sup>

35 On February 16, 2021, Twinco's counsel sent a subsequent letter to the CCAA Parties' counsel confirming that Twinco's board of directors, a majority of whom are CFLCo's nominees, decided that Twinco would not provide any of the Twinco Requested Information to the CCAA Parties, as there was no "use" in such undertaking. Instead, Twinco's counsel informed the CCAA Parties that Twinco's directors have decided only to provide the CCAA Parties with Twinco's audited financial statements from 2013-2019, which financial statements, in the February 1<sup>st</sup> Letter, already expressly noted were excluded from the CCAA Parties' request (as the CCAA Parties already had copies of these financial statements). <sup>19</sup>

36 While counsels for Twinco and CFLCo expressed concern that the CCAA Parties' requests went back to 1974, neither counsel proposed to narrow the scope of the information requested to a shorter time period but instead issued blanket refusals and denied any good faith undertaking to engage in the disclosure of such information.

37 Based on the Expanded Monitor Powers being sought in this Motion, the CCAA Parties and the Monitor are initially proposing to go back to January 1, 2010, only, with the ability to request the Court to expand the time period to include earlier periods, if needed.

38 The counsels for the CCAA Parties and the Monitor sought to engage Twinco's and CFLCo's counsels to try to find a resolution to the disclosure impasse and have been informed by Twinco's counsel that Twinco was not prepared to provide any additional documentation beyond the financial statements it provided which the CCAA Parties already had.

<sup>39</sup> By letter dated May 6, 2021, counsel for the CCAA Parties expressed their disappointment and frustration over the lack of good faith demonstrated by Twinco and CFLCo towards pursuing a consensual resolution and the resulting delay that ensued since January 27, 2021, when the Adjourned Proceedings were adjourned. In that letter, Twinco and CFLCo were advised that the CCAA Parties had no alternative but to seek the present Motion and to reactivate the CBCA Motion.<sup>20</sup>

# 1.4 The relief sought by the CCAA Parties and the Monitor

40 The CCAA Parties are seeking the Expanded Monitor Powers, with the support of the Monitor, pursuant to sections 11 and 23 of the CCAA, specifically sections 23(1)(c) and (k), for the expansion of the powers of the Monitor in these CCAA Proceedings, so that the Monitor may, directly or through its counsel exercise the Expanded Monitor Powers more fully described above.

41 The Expanded Monitor Powers are necessary to enable the Monitor to: (i) assist the CCAA Parties with the recovery of value for the CCAA Parties' creditors from the last remaining asset of the CCAA Parties' estate outside of tax refunds (ii)

fulfill its statutory duties to investigate and properly value, the assets and the liabilities of the CCAA Parties, and (iii) facilitate the winding up and termination of these CCAA Proceedings.

42 The true value of the Twinco Interest is unknown as both Twinco and CFLCo have continuously refused to provide the CCAA Parties or the Monitor with any information in respect of the nature and quantum of the Reimbursable Environmental/ Maintenance Costs that would assist the CCAA Parties and Monitor to properly value the Twinco Interest.

43 In the opinion of the CCAA Parties, the valuation of the Twinco Interest is of particular importance as, among other things:

a) the Twinco Interest is the last asset of the CCAA Parties that has not yet been monetized in these CCAA Proceedings, apart the collection of outstanding tax refunds;

b) the Twinco Interest would increase the Plan creditors' recoveries;

c) the monetization of the Twinco Interest is one of the last material steps to be taken in these CCAA Proceedings, apart from the collection of the outstanding tax refunds, before the CCAA Parties can complete their wind-up of these CCAA Proceedings and provide a final distribution to the Plan creditors;

d) expanding the Monitor's powers would permit it to further the valid purpose of the CCAA engaged in the present circumstances of maximizing recovery for the CCAA Parties' creditors; and

e) the monetization of the Twinco Interest would fulfill the purpose of the Plan which is to distribute the net proceeds of the Participating CCAA Parties' assets to the Plan creditors.

44 The continuous refusal of Twinco and CFLCo to engage with the CCAA Parties and the Monitor has only served to perpetuate the status quo, resulting in further delays to the ability of the CCAA Parties' creditors to obtain a final distribution and complete the winding up and termination of these CCAA Proceedings.

45 The CCAA Parties contend that:

• the requested relief is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances and is in the best interests of all the CCAA Parties' stakeholders as Twinco and CFLCo have continued to demonstrate that they will not cooperate in connection with the realization of the Twinco Interest and instead, will engage in actions that seek only to preserve the status quo by frustrating and delaying all realization efforts by the CCAA Parties; and

• the valuation of the Twinco Interest is of particular importance to these CCAA Proceedings and should be conducted by the Monitor for the benefit of the creditors irrespective of the proposed liquidation and wind down of Twinco.

Given the inextricable conflict of CFLCo and its new strategic attempt to control the liquidation and wind down process of Twinco in Newfoundland and Labrador, which it had previously steadfastly opposed to frustrate the CCAA Parties, the latter contend that it would be appropriate for this Court to grant their Motion, expand the powers of the Monitor and allow it to proceed with the long-delayed valuation of the Twinco Interest without further obfuscation from CFLCo.

# 1.5 The position of Twinco and CFLCo

47 The position of Twinco and of CFLCo is essentially the same and can be summarized as follows:

• No interpretation of section 11 of the CCAA, alone or read in conjunction with sections 23(1) c) and (k), permits the granting of the Expanded Monitor Powers in the present circumstances;

• The Expanded Monitor Powers aim at Twinco which is not a debtor company pursuant to the CCAA;

• This Court does not have the power to delegate such broad powers (*i.e.*, the power to examine under oath) to the Monitor, without an explicit statutory authorization;

• This Court does not have the power to compel a person outside of Québec to respond to such orders;

• The statutory discretion under section 11 of the CCAA does not extend to the Expanded Monitor Powers sought by the CCAA Parties in the Motion.

48 In connection with the last argument put forward by both Twinco and CFLCo that there is a limit to the statutory discretion under section 11 of the CCAA, they added that the present CCAA Proceedings which aim at restructuring corporations as opposed to their liquidation, are not the appropriate vehicle for investigation of third parties to the CCAA Proceedings.

49 In line with the forgoing, Twinco makes the astonishing if not misleading affirmation that it is a third party (a stranger) herein, with no link to the CCAA Proceedings:

17. Further, neither Twinco nor CFLCo is a party to the CCAA Proceedings, nor is either corporation a party governed by the original or any subsequent order issued in the CCAA Proceedings.

18. Rather, both Twinco and CFLCo are strangers to the CCAA Proceedings in which the Wabush Motion has been brought.

117. <u>Here, Twinco is a third party, with no link with the CCAA Proceedings</u>. [...] <u>Twinco is neither</u> the debtor, nor <u>a creditor</u>, an employee, a director, a shareholder, nor another party doing business with the insolvent company. <u>It has</u> no interest whatsoever in the recovery, and now, in the liquidation of the CCAA Parties.<sup>21</sup>

[Emphasis added]

50 Contrary to the foregoing assertions, Twinco is not a "stranger to the CCAA Proceedings".

51 Pursuant to the Claims Process  $^{22}$  authorized by the Court, Twinco filed a proof of claim against Wabush for approximately \$780,000  $^{23}$ . Twinco's claim was allowed by the Monitor in 2016  $^{24}$ .

52 The Court understands that Twinco even received a partial distribution in respect of its claim under the Plan and is likely to participate in the final distribution.

# ANALYSIS

53 With all due respect, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to rule on the present Motion pursuant to the provisions of the CCAA.

54 For the following reasons, the Court also finds that given the particular circumstances and the nature of the present issues confronting the CCAA Parties and the Monitor to bring the CCAA process to a conclusion within a reasonable delay, it is appropriate for this Court to exercise its judicial discretion and grant to the Monitor the Expanded Monitor Powers sought herein.

# The Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the scope of the powers of the Monitor in furtherance of the purposes of the CCAA

At the outset, the Court is of the opinion that given the nature and the somewhat narrow scope of the Expanded Monitor Powers sought, the present Motion can be entertained regardless of the CBCA Motion, the Twinco Dismissal Motion and the CFLCo Contestation and their eventual outcome as the latter rest essentially on the right of the CCAA Parties to seek to wind down and the dissolution of Twinco via the CCAA Proceedings before the Commercial Division of the Superior Court of Québec rather than allow CFLCo to proceed with its Twinco Liquidation Motion before the Court of Newfoundland. 56 Wabush Iron Co. Limited and Wabush Resources Inc. are undoubtedly shareholders of Twinco and as such, the Twinco Interest is one of their assets to be monetized and realized with the assistance of the Monitor pursuant to the Plan sanctioned by the Court in June 2018.

57 Therefore, the valuation of the Twinco Interest is not only of particular importance to the present CCAA Proceedings, but it should be conducted by the Monitor for the benefit of the creditors irrespective of the dispute between the parties relating to the jurisdiction over the proposed liquidation and wind down of Twinco.

58 In fact, the monetization and the realization of the Twinco Interest do not necessarily require the wind down and the dissolution of Twinco to occur given the apparent extent of the Twinco Interest in Twinco.

59 The Court understands that the Twinco Requested Information is intended to provide the CCAA Parties and the Monitor with a general understanding of the approximate range of the Reimbursable Environmental/Maintenance Costs that could possibly be the subject of the CFLCo Reimbursement to better enable the CCAA Parties and Monitor to calculate the approximate value of the Twinco Interest.

The Twinco Requested Information is purely factual in nature and excludes documents that the Wabush shareholders already have in their possession such as financial statements for December 31, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2013-2019.

61 The Court also understands that it is the steadfast and the somewhat inexplicable refusal of Twinco and of its shareholder CFLCo to provide any of the Twinco Requested Information<sup>25</sup> to the CCAA Parties and to the Monitor that prevents the latter from determining with a minimum of accuracy what is the estimated value of the Twinco Interest.

62 This determination expected to be performed by the Monitor relates directly to an asset of the CCAA Parties that is covered by the Plan sanctioned by this Court, and such a determination falls squarely on the tasks, duties and responsibilities of the Monitor within the present CCAA Proceedings regardless of the eventual dissolution or not of Twinco.

63 Moreover, of obvious significance in the eyes of the Court, Twinco filed a proof of claim for \$780,000 that was accepted by the Monitor pursuant to the Claims Process approved by the Court.

It is somewhat incomprehensible that Twinco would nevertheless affirm that it is a third party, a "stranger" with no link with the CCAA Proceedings and that it is neither the debtor, *nor a creditor*, an employee, a director, a shareholder, nor another party doing business with the CCAA Parties that include two of its shareholders (Wabush).

65 How can Twinco seriously pretend that it has no interest whatsoever in the recovery, and presently, in the liquidation of the CCAA Parties when it filed a proof of claim for \$780,000?

Twinco even stands to retrieve by way of the final distribution, a portion of the Twinco Interest once realized by the Monitor, as the case may be.

67 Moreover, didn't Twinco attorn to the jurisdiction of the Québec Superior Court (Commercial Division) by deciding to file a proof of claim against the Wabush shareholders in the present CCAA Proceedings?<sup>26</sup>

68 The evidence satisfies the Court that Twinco and its shareholder CFLCo have demonstrated that they have no intention of providing any information to the CCAA Parties in a timely fashion that would assist the CCAA Parties and Monitor to determine the true value of the Twinco Interest, which would then form the basis for a potential consensual resolution, leading to a final distribution to creditors and a wind-up and termination the CCAA Proceedings.

69 The Court shares the CCAA Parties' counsel view that it is even possible that with the information on hand, the CCAA Parties and the Monitor may come to a determination that the amount of the CFLCo Reimbursement in dispute may not be sufficiently material on a cost-benefit analysis to continue to pursue recovery of such amount, significantly narrowing the issues in dispute in the CBCA Motion.

Who knows? Should the Twinco Interest be disposed of on a consensual basis, Twinco and CFLCo could very well decide to forgo the wind down and the dissolution proceedings completely, a decision that would rest with them without any further involvement of the CCAA Parties (i.e., the Wabush shareholders).

71 Be that as it may be, the CCAA Parties are *only* seeking to expand the Monitor's powers in the CCAA Proceedings to enable the Monitor to obtain the Requested Twinco Information necessary to value the Twinco Interest, which is now the most significant asset of the CCAA Parties remaining to be realized in the CCAA Proceedings apart from tax refunds.

72 With all due respect, the proposed relief sought with the present Motion does not entail any compromission of the rights and recourses of Twinco and of its shareholder CFLCo vis-à-vis the Twinco Interest other than enabling the CCAA Parties and the Monitor to be aware of its potential estimated value without prejudice to the arguments that Twinco and/or CFLCo may want to put forward in connection therewith.

The Court finds that the Expanded Monitor Powers sought in the present Motion are necessary and appropriate to enable the Monitor to, among other things:

(i) fulfill its statutory duties to investigate and properly value the assets and the liabilities of the CCAA Parties;

(ii) further the valid purpose of the CCAA to maximize the recovery of Plan creditors, by assisting the CCAA Parties with the recovery of value for the CCAA Parties' creditors from the last significant asset remaining of the CCAA Parties' estate other than tax refunds; and

(iii) facilitate the winding up and termination of these CCAA Proceedings.

The Court bears in mind that the Monitor was appointed by this Court pursuant to the authority granted upon this Court under the CCAA<sup>27</sup>.

Therefore, subject to the provisions of the CCAA, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine, *inter alia*, the scope of the powers of the Monitor in furtherance of the purposes of the CCAA especially if such powers relate directly to an asset or the property of the CCAA Parties that is part of the Plan previously sanctioned.

#### Section 23(1)(c) of the CCAA

In *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Limited*<sup>28</sup>, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reminded us that section 23 of the CCAA sets out a basic framework of the minimum mandatory duties and functions of the monitor under the CCAA which may be augmented through the exercise of discretion by the Court, and that, not surprisingly, the monitor's role has evolved since then over time:

[106] The 1997 amendments to the *CCAA* gave legislative recognition to the role of the monitor and made the appointment mandatory. The 2007 amendments to the *CCAA* expanded the description of the monitor's role and responsibilities. In essence, its minimum powers are set out in the Act and they may be augmented through the exercise of discretion by the court, typically the CCAA supervising judge. This framework is reflected in s. 23 of the CCAA, which enumerates certain duties and functions of a monitor. Paragraph 23(1)(k) directs that a monitor shall carry out "any other functions in relation to the company that the court may direct." Its express duties under s. 23(1)(c) include making, or causing to be made, any appraisal or investigation that the monitor "considers necessary to determine with reasonable accuracy the state of the company's business and financial affairs and the cause of its financial difficulties or insolvency". It is then to file a report on its findings.

[107] Not surprisingly, as with the CCAA itself, the role of the monitor has evolved over time. [ . . . ]

[Emphasis added]

<sup>77</sup>Section 23(1)(c) of the CCAA requires the Monitor to "*make, or cause to be made, any appraisal or investigation the monitor considers necessary to determine with reasonable accuracy the state of the company's business and financial affairs*".

In the present instance, the true value of the Twinco Interest is unknown as both Twinco and CFLCo have continuously refused to provide the CCAA Parties or the Monitor with any information in respect to the nature and quantum of the Reimbursable Environmental/Maintenance Costs that would assist the CCAA Parties and the Monitor to properly value the Twinco Interest.

79 The information required to determine the amount of maintenance and other indemnifiable expenses that may be subject to reimbursement by CFLCo is solely within the knowledge of Twinco.

80 Therefore, the Court is satisfied that without the Expanded Monitor Powers presently sought, it will be impossible for the Monitor to calculate what the true approximate value of the Twinco Interest may be in order for the Monitor to fulfill its statutory duties under the CCAA.

81 In the present circumstances, it is only appropriate for this Court to grant the Expanded Monitor Powers requested.

82 Moreover, the present circumstances are not necessarily unique, CCAA monitors have already been granted the type of additional powers sought by the CCAA Parties herein.

Recently, in *Arrangement relatif à 9227-1584 Québec inc.*<sup>29</sup>, Justice Peter Kalichman then sitting in the Commercial Division of the Québec Superior Court reminded that under section 23(1)(c) of the CCAA, a monitor was required to make an assessment or proceed to investigate what the monitor considered necessary to determine the state of the debtor's financial affairs.

As the monitor was attempting to recover an asset, which was possibly of significant value to the debtors, Justice Kalichman also declared that being consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

• The monitor was authorized and empowered to exercise powers of investigation in respect of the debtors to (i) conduct an examination under oath of *any person* thought to have knowledge relating to the debtors, their business or their property; and (ii) to *order any such person to be examined to produce* any books, documents, correspondence or papers in that person's possession or power relating to the debtors, their business or their property;

• Certain persons could be compelled to provide the monitor with a copy of their complete accounting with respect to the sale of certain property, which according to Justice Kalichman, was linked to the debtors and their assets.

In the aforementioned case, Justice Kalichman relied in part on the extended powers that had already been granted to the Monitor by the Court in the Amended and Restated Initial Order.

<sup>86</sup> The Court was taken aback at the suggestion made by Twinco's counsel that such powers granted to a monitor in an Initial Order or the like should be somewhat discounted as they usually form part of a draft Initial Order prepared and submitted by the debtor's lawyer, alas, implying that the Commercial Division Justices blindly rubber stamp such draft Initial Orders, which could not be further from the reality.

With all due respect, the Court believes that the Monitor's powers to investigate, question and compel the communication of information and documents required *to determine with reasonable accuracy the state of the company's business and financial affairs* which includes the assessment of the value of assets or property of the debtor, should not be limited to the only corporate documents available to a shareholder pursuant to the provisions of the CBCA.

88 In Osztrovics (Trustee of) v. Osztrovics Farms Ltd..<sup>30</sup>, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the suggestion that the trustee's power to obtain information "relating in whole or in part to the bankrupt, his dealings or property" only extended to

corporate documentation that pertained solely to the business and affairs of the corporation, and not another company in which the bankrupt held a significant interest.

89 The Ontario Court of Appeal also stated that applying a narrow interpretation of the trustee's investigatory powers only to the corporate documentation, that pertain solely to the business and affairs of the bankrupt, and not to information about another company in which the bankrupt has significantly invested, would frustrate the trustee's ability to discharge its duty to the bankrupt's creditors to value and realize upon the most significant asset in bankrupt's estate.

In *Osztrovics*, the bankrupt was a shareholder in a corporation, owning 48% of the company. The trustee requested that the company provides certain information that the trustee required to value the bankrupt's shares in that corporation. The latter refused and the trustee sought and obtained an order pursuant to sections 163 and 164 of the BIA requiring: (i) that company to disclose to it certain documents; and (ii) certain parties to submit to oral examinations.

91 While *Osztrovics* was decided in the context of bankruptcy proceedings under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*<sup>31</sup>, the Court believes that those principles apply equally to the CCAA proceedings<sup>32</sup>.

92 The Court may add that the fact that we find ourselves in the context of CCAA proceedings involving the liquidation of the CCAA Parties as opposed to their restructuring does not matter.

P3 Liquidating CCAA proceedings have been accepted in practice and case law with an expanded view of the role of the monitor under such circumstances<sup>33</sup>.

All in all, in liquidating CCAA proceedings, the responsibilities and the powers of the Monitor remain essentially the same subject to any additional powers that may be granted by the Court at its discretion.

# Section 23(1)(k) of the CCAA

95 Section 23(1)(k) of the CCAA expressly allows this Court to expand the list of duties and functions of the Monitor by directing the latter to "*carry out any other functions in relation to the debtor company that the court may direct.*"

<sup>96</sup> In previous decisions, Justices sitting in the Commercial Division of the Québec Superior Court expanded the monitor's powers to include the ability to compel *any person* reasonably thought to have knowledge relating to any of the debtors, their business or property to be examined under oath, and to disclose and produce to the monitor any books, documents, correspondence or papers in that person's possession or power. <sup>34</sup>

97 The counsel for the CCAA Parties pointed out, rightly so, to the Court that although CCAA courts have authorized relief similar to the Expanded Monitor Powers in respect to "any person" thought to have knowledge of the debtor, its business or property, the Expanded Monitor Powers here are narrower in that they are only directed at those persons reasonably thought to have knowledge relating to the Twinco Interest, the CFLCo Indemnity and the CFLCo Maintenance Obligations, including the Twinco Requested Information, and, subject to any further order of this Court, they are limited to a disclosure period of only 10 years, going back to 2010.

#### The broad judicial discretion conferred under Section 11 of the CCAA

#### 98 Section 11 of the CCAA stipulates:

11. Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, <u>may</u>, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, <u>make</u> any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

[Emphasis added]

<sup>99</sup> The Court is particularly mindful of the teachings of the Supreme Court of Canada in the recent case of *9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.*.<sup>35</sup>, in which the broad discretion under section 11 of the CCAA, being the "engine" of the CCAA, was confirmed:

[47] One of the principal means through which the CCAA achieves its objectives is by carving out a unique supervisory role for judges (see Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp. 18-19). From beginning to end, each CCAA proceeding is overseen by a single supervising judge. The supervising judge acquires extensive knowledge and insight into the stakeholder dynamics and the business realities of the proceedings from their ongoing dealings with the parties.

[48] The *CCAA* capitalizes on this positional advantage by supplying supervising judges with broad discretion to make a variety of orders that respond to the circumstances of each case and "meet contemporary business and social needs" (*Century Services*, at para. 58) in "real-time" (para. 58, citing R. B. Jones, "*The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law*", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 484). The anchor of this discretionary authority is s. 11, which empowers a judge "to make any order that [the judge] considers appropriate in the circumstances". This section has been described as "the engine" driving the statutory scheme (*Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 36).

[49] The discretionary authority conferred by the *CCAA*, while broad in nature, is not boundless. <u>This authority must</u> be exercised in furtherance of the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, which we have explained above (see *Century Services*, at para. 59). Additionally, the court must keep in mind three "baseline considerations" (at para. 70), which the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating: (1) that the order sought is appropriate in the circumstances, and (2) that the applicant has been acting in good faith and (3) with due diligence (para. 69).

[Emphasis added]

100 In the present instance, the Court is satisfied that the CCAA Parties have demonstrated that the Expanded Monitor Powers are appropriate in the circumstances and that they have been acting in good faith and with diligence in this matter.

101 The Court is also satisfied that granting the Expanded Monitor Powers shall further the purposes of the CCAA.

102 Under the present circumstances, the Court is also guided by the Plan dated May 16, 2018, that was sanctioned by the Court soon after and is satisfied that:

(i) the Expanded Monitor Powers should enable the Monitor to assist the CCAA Parties to recover additional value for the CCAA Parties' creditors;

(ii) the Twinco Interest is the last remaining asset of the CCAA Parties' estate (outside of tax refunds) that has not yet been monetized in these CCAA Proceedings;

(iii) the successful monetization of the Twinco Interest would increase the Plan creditors' recoveries. Wabush Iron and Wabush Resources' share of the Twinco Cash is approximately \$1,040,000, together with their *pro rata* shares of any CFLCo Reimbursement;

(iv) a significant majority of the creditors of Wabush are former employees of Wabush Mines, many of whom are elderly, and who are reasonably assumed to be anxious to receive their final distributions as soon as possible; and

(v) the monetization of the Twinco Interest would fulfill the purpose of the Plan which is to distribute the net proceeds of the Participating CCAA Parties' assets and other recoveries for the creditors' benefit.

The "person" that may be subjected to the Expanded Monitor Powers does not necessarily need to be a debtor company under the CCAA Proceedings

103 The Court shares the view of the counsel for the CCAA Parties that it is not a requirement under section 11 or section 23 of the CCAA that those who are subject to any order granted thereunder need to be debtor companies. As previously seen, there are various examples of CCAA courts granting orders under these sections that provide for relief against third parties, including investigatory powers being granted to monitors to investigate third parties in respect of the debtor's property.

104 Be that as it may, the Expanded Monitor Powers being sought here are in relation to the CCAA Parties' property, namely the Twinco Interest and therefore, the present Motion is clearly "*in respect of a debtor company*" without forgetting that Twinco having elected to file a proof of claim, has chosen to be a party to the CCAA Proceeding.

## The Monitor's neutrality

105 Counsel for CFLCo questioned the neutrality of the Monitor if it is granted the Expanded Monitor Powers given the ongoing litigation in Québec and in Newfoundland.

106 The Court has already stated that the present Motion and the Expanded Monitor Powers sought therein do not impact the rights and recourses of the parties in the CBCA Motion and the Twinco Liquidation Motion instituted subsequently by CFLCo in Newfoundland.

107 It only relates to information to be provided to the Monitor without compromising any of the parties' rights and recourses in connection with the Twinco Interest with the added potential benefit of inducing a consensual settlement and possibly avoid protracted litigation.

In Aquadis International<sup>36</sup>, the Québec Court of Appeal held that in expanding the monitor's powers under section 23 of the CCAA, the principle of the monitor's neutrality is "*far from absolute*" and there are exceptions. The Court stated that "[a]s long as the monitor is objective and not biased and takes positions based on reasoned criteria to further legitimate CCAA purposes, it now appears inescapable that the neutrality it must maintain is attenuated." <sup>37</sup>

109 Moreover, in *Aquadis International*, Justice Schrager made the following comments regarding the involvement of a monitor in liquidating CCAA proceedings which the Court finds quite relevant in the case at hand given the arguments raised by Twinco and CFLCo in that respect:

[68] What is inescapable and particularly applicable here is the acceptance, in the practice and case law, of the liquidating *CCAA*<sup>38</sup> and the expanded view of the role of the monitor, indeed the baptism of the "super monitor".<sup>39</sup> The Appellants concede, if only indirectly, that the Monitor could be authorized to exercise rights of the Debtor against third parties as could a bankruptcy trustee. <u>However, they object to the Monitor's power to sue one</u> group of creditors (the Respondents) on behalf of another group of creditors (the consumers or their insurers).

[69] In my opinion, the Appellants objections are not well founded.

[70] Firstly, the bankruptcy trustee analogy is only a half truth. Trustees are the assignees of a bankrupt's property, and as such, exercise the patrimonial rights of the debtor but they also wear a second hat. <sup>40</sup> Trustees exercise rights and recourses on behalf of creditors against other creditors and against third parties. <sup>41</sup> Such rights and recourses arise from the *BIA* (for example, under s. 95 for preferences) as well as under the civil law generally (for example, the paulian action under arts. 1631 and following *C.C.Q.*). Most significantly, the *BIA* recourses to attack preferences, transfers under value and dividends paid by insolvent corporations have been available to *CCAA* monitors since the amendments adopted in 2007. <sup>42</sup> Thus, the mere fact that the judgment in appeal empowers the Monitor to sue to enforce rights of creditors is not conceptually foreign to the general framework of insolvency law.

[71] Moreover, and without making too fine a point, the Appellants' are not creditors of the *CCAA* estate. They might have been, but <u>they chose not to file claims</u>. As such, they are third parties. This eliminates another conceptual, if not legal, difficulty in that, they do not potentially share in the litigation pool after contributing to it.

[72] The Appellants also object, saying that the power given to the Monitor to sue runs contrary to the principle of a monitor's neutrality. <u>However, the case law and literature recognize that this neutrality is far from absolute</u>:

[110] Of necessity, the positions taken will favour certain stakeholders over others depending on the context. Again, as stated by Messrs. Kent and Rostom:

Quite fairly, monitors state that creditors and the Court currently expect them to express opinions and make recommendations. . . . [T] he expanded role of the monitor forces the monitor more and more into the fray. Monitors have become less the detached observer and expert witness contemplated by the Court decisions, and more of an active participant or party in the proceedings.

(...)

[119] Generally speaking, the monitor plays a neutral role in a *CCAA* proceeding. To the extent it takes positions, typically those positions should be in support of a restructuring purpose. As stated by this court in *Ivaco Inc., Re* (2006), 2006 CanLII 34551 (ON CA), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (C.A.), at paras. 49-53, a monitor is not necessarily a fiduciary; it only becomes one if the court specifically assigns it a responsibility to which fiduciary duties attach.

[120] However, in exceptional circumstances, it may be appropriate for a monitor to serve as a complainant.  $(\ldots)$ .<sup>43</sup>

# [73] As long as the monitor is objective and not biased and takes positions based on reasoned criteria to further legitimate *CCAA* purposes, it now appears inescapable that the neutrality it must maintain is attenuated.

[Emphasis added]

110 Ultimately, Justice Schrager rejected the Appellants' argument that the objectives of the *CCAA* were being thwarted by allowing the Monitor to pursue a remedy to which it was not entitled. In so deciding, Justice Schrager upheld the position of the CCAA Judge who, in the exercise of his judicial discretion, had favoured a *practical resolution of the case* by expanding the powers of the monitor:

[32] The judge rejected the Appellants' argument that the objectives of the *CCAA* are being thwarted by allowing the Monitor to pursue a remedy to which it is not entitled. <u>He characterized this argument as technical and unconvincing because</u>, in the absence of consensual settlements, recourse against the Retailers (and JYIC) is the only possible avenue leading to a global treatment of Aquadis' liabilities. Thus, the powers sought by the Monitor were deemed necessary in order to materially advance the restructuring process. The judge accepted this course of action as the only practical resolution of this case. As such, he indicated that the solution chosen was a sensible use of judicial resources since it avoids the multiplication of individual actions outside the framework of the Plan of Arrangement. [...]

[Emphasis added]

111 In the present instance, the circumstances warrant the expansion of the Monitor's powers as it is also the only practical and most reasonable solution to obtain the Requested Information without necessarily compromising the rights and recourses of the parties.

112 At the very least, the CCAA Parties and the Monitor will, at long last, be in a better position to determine the steps actually needed to realize the Twinco Interest and to terminate the CCAA Proceedings without necessarily proceeding with its CBCA Motion in its present format.

#### Is the Order granting the Expanded Monitor Powers enforceable throughout Canada?

113 It was argued that an Order of this Court granting the Expanded Monitor Powers could not be enforceable in Newfoundland and persons in that Province could not be compelled to testify at the behest of the Monitor in the exercise of his expanded powers.

114 With all due respect, the Court disagrees with such a proposition given the fact that such an Order is made pursuant to the CCAA.

115 Moreover, it is only appropriate to remind Twinco and CFLCo that the Initial Order as it was subsequently amended modified and restated (collectively the "*Initial Order*") already grants to the Monitor the authorization to apply to any other court in Canada *for orders which aid and complement this Order and any subsequent orders of this Court*:

66. **DECLARES** that the Monitor or an authorized representative of the CCAA Parties, and in the case of the Monitor, with the prior consent of the CCAA Parties, shall be authorized to apply as it may consider necessary or desirable, with or without notice, to any other court or administrative body, whether in Canada, the United States of America or elsewhere, for orders which aid and complement this Order and any subsequent orders of this Court and, without limitation to the foregoing, any orders under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, including an order for recognition of these CCAA proceedings as "Foreign Main Proceedings" in the United States of America pursuant to Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and for which the Monitor, or the authorized representative of the CCAA Parties, shall be the foreign representative of the CCAA Parties. All courts and administrative bodies of all such jurisdictions are hereby respectively requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for that purpose.

[Emphasis added]

116 Although the above-mentioned provision already contains a declaration that "*All courts*" are *requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for that purpose*, the following paragraph expands further on the Court's request for aid and assistance as follows:

67. **REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any Court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to give effect to this Order and to assist the CCAA Parties, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All Courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the CCAA Parties and the Monitor as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor or the authorized representative of the CCAA Parties in any foreign proceeding, to assist the CCAA Parties and the Monitor, and to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court, in carrying out the terms of this Order.

[Emphasis added]

117 For greater certainty, the Court shall restate the same requests in the present Order notwithstanding that the same nevertheless already apply without having to restate all the provisions of the Initial Order herein.

#### The provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal

118 It is also appropriate to grant the request of the CCAA Parties to order the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security.

All in all, based on all the circumstances mentioned above, the Court finds that without such an order, the CCAA Parties and the Plan creditors are bound to suffer greater prejudice should Twinco and/or CFLCo appeal the present Order, thus causing further delays in the implementation of the Plan given that the Twinco Interest is essentially the last tangible asset to monetize and to realize in order to permit the final distribution and the termination of the CCAA Proceedings initiated in 2015. 120 Moreover, providing the Requested Information does not cause any prejudice to Twinco and CFLCo other than allowing the CCAA Parties and the Monitor to have at last a better idea of the value of the Twinco Interest without compromising the rights and recourses of the parties.

#### FOR THOSE REASONS, THE COURT:

121 GRANTS the present Motion for the Expansion of the Monitor's Powers (the "Motion");

122 *DECLARES* that the CCAA Parties have given sufficient prior notice of the presentation of this Motion to interested parties;

# DEFINITIONS

123 *ORDERS* that capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion;

#### **EXPANSION OF MONITOR'S POWERS**

124 *ORDERS* that, in addition to any other powers in the Initial Orders or other Orders granted in these CCAA Proceedings, notwithstanding anything to the contrary and without limiting the generality of anything therein, the Monitor is hereby authorized and empowered to, directly or through its counsel:

a) compel any Person (as defined in the Initial Orders) with possession, custody or control to disclose to the Monitor and produce and deliver any books, records, accounting, documents, correspondences or papers, electronically stored or otherwise, relating to the Twinco Interest, the CFLCo Indemnity and the CFLCo Maintenance Obligations, including the Twinco Requested Information (the "*Requested Information*") in respect of the period from and after January 1, 2010, and such earlier periods as may be approved by the Court from time to time (the "*Disclosure Period*"); and

b) conduct investigations, including examinations under oath of any Person reasonably thought to have knowledge relating to the Twinco Interest, the CFLCo Indemnity and the CFLCo Maintenance Obligations, including the Twinco Requested Information, in respect of the Disclosure Period;

#### DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

125 *ORDERS* that requests made by the Monitor for the production of Requested Information pursuant to subparagraph 124 (a) of this Order shall be made in writing and delivered by electronic transmission, registered mail or courier, specifying the Requested Information to be delivered to the Monitor by such Person;

126 *ORDERS* that any Requested Information to be delivered by any Person to the Monitor pursuant to subparagraph 124 (a) of this Order shall be delivered within thirty (30) days of the Monitor's request or such longer periods as the Monitor may agree to in its discretion;

#### POWERS OF EXAMINATION

127 *ORDERS* that the examinations held pursuant to subparagraph 124 (b) of this Order shall be conducted virtually due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic unless otherwise agreed between the Monitor and the Person being examined;

128 *ORDERS* that the Monitor shall deliver by electronic transmission on the Person he wishes to examine pursuant to this Order, at least five (5) days prior to the scheduled date of the examination, a summons to appear specifying the time and the Requested Information that the Person must have in his or her possession during the examination;

129 *ORDERS* that objections raised during examinations held pursuant to this Order shall not prevent the continuation of the examination, the witness being required to respond, unless they relate to the fact that the Person being examined cannot be

compelled or to fundamental rights or to a matter of substantial legitimate interest, in which case the Person being examined may refrain from responding;

For greater certainty, *RESTATES* and *DECLARES* that the Monitor or an authorized representative of the CCAA Parties, and in the case of the Monitor, with the prior consent of the CCAA Parties, shall be authorized to apply as it may consider necessary or desirable, with or without notice, to any other court or administrative body, whether in Canada, the United States of America or elsewhere, for orders which aid and complement this Order and any subsequent orders of this Court and, without limitation to the foregoing, any orders under Chapter 15 of the *U.S. Bankruptcy Code*, including an order for recognition of these CCAA proceedings as "Foreign Main Proceedings" in the United States of America pursuant to Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and for which the Monitor, or the authorized representative of the CCAA Parties, shall be the foreign representative of the CCAA Parties. All courts and administrative bodies of all such jurisdictions are hereby respectively requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for that purpose.

131 For greater certainty, *RESTATES* and *REQUESTS* the aid and recognition of any Court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to give effect to this Order and to assist the CCAA Parties, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All Courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the CCAA Parties and the Monitor as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor or the authorized representative of the CCAA Parties in any foreign proceeding, to assist the CCAA Parties and the Monitor, and to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court, in carrying out the terms of this Order.

132 *ORDERS* the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security;

*THE WHOLE* with judicial costs payable by Twin Falls Power Corporation and Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited.

Motion granted.

#### Footnotes

- 1 As defined in the Plan.
- 2 As defined below.
- 3 As defined below.
- 4 As defined below.
- 5 4.6% held by Wabush Iron Co. Limited and 12.5% by Wabush Resources Inc.
- 6 **R-3**.
- 7 As defined below.
- 8 As more particularly detailed in the CBCA Motion.
- 9 **R-6** of the CBCA Motion.
- 10 **R-4**.
- 11 As defined below.

- 12 **R-5**. The Twinco Dismissal Motion was modified on May 17, 2021.
- 13 **R-6**. The CFLCo Contestation was amended on May 19, 2021, in response to the present Motion.
- 14 **C-1**.
- 15 **R-7**.
- 16 **R-8**.
- 17 **R-9**.
- 18 **R-10**.
- 19 **R-11**.
- 20 **R-12**.
- 21 Paragraphs 17, 18 and 117 of the Twinco's Argument Plan.
- 22 On November 5, 2015, the CCAA Court issued an Order, *inter alia*, approving a procedure for the submission, evaluation and adjudication of claims against the CCAA Parties and their current and former directors and officers (the "Claims Process").
- 23 **R-14**.
- 24 Id.
- 25 Purposely limiting the same to documents that the Wabush shareholders already have.
- 26 Bouygues Building Canada inc. v. Iannitello et Associés inc., 2018 QCCA 504 (C.A. Que.) :

[23] By submitting a proof of claim to the Trustee and appealing the disallowance, the Joint Venture attorned to the jurisdiction of the Quebec Superior Court sitting in bankruptcy matters. It could hardly blame the Trustee after the fact as it did for having decided on the validity of the claim as submitted, since the Trustee was obliged to do so. The Joint Venture did not seek permission to continue the Ontario proceedings with a view to qualifying its contingent claim prior to filing a proof of claim with the Trustee. [References omitted]

- 27 Section 11.7 (1) CCAA.
- 28 2017 ONCA 1014 (Ont. C.A.).
- 29 2021 QCCS 1342 (C.S. Que.), par. 47 and 48.
- 30 Osztrovics (Trustee of) v. Osztrovics Farms Ltd., 2015 ONCA 463 (Ont. C.A.), pars. 7,14 and 15.
- 31 Sections 163 and 164 BIA.
- 32 Confederation Treasury Services Ltd., Re [1995 CarswellOnt 2301 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])], par. 18.
- Arrangement relatif à 9323-7055 Québec inc. (Aquadis International Inc.), 2020 QCCA 659 (C.A. Que.) at para 68:
   [68] What is inescapable and particularly applicable here is the acceptance, in the practice and case law, of the liquidating CCAA and the expanded view of the role of the monitor, indeed the baptism of the "super monitor". [...] [References omitted]
- 34 Amended and Restated Initial Order dated August 24, 2018, in the matter of the Arrangement under the *Compagnies' Creditor's* Arrangement Act, of The S.M. Group Inc., 500-11-055122-184 at para 50.1;

See also Amended and Restated Initial Order dated December 2, 2019, in the matter of the Arrangement under the *Compagnies' Creditor's Arrangement Act*, of *9227-1584 Québec Inc.* & *9336-9262 Québec Inc.*, 500-11-057549-194 at para 39 k).

- 35 2020 SCC 10 (S.C.C.).
- 36 See Note 33.
- 37 Arrangement relatif à 9323-7055 Québec inc. (Aquadis International Inc.), 2020 QCCA 659 (C.A. Que.) at para 73.
- 38 9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp., 2020 SCC 10, para. 42 [Callidus].
- 39 Luc Morin and Arad Mojtahedi, "In Search of a Purpose: The Rise of Super Monitors & Creditor-Driven CCAAs" in Jill Corraini and Blair Nixon (eds.), Annual Review of Insolvency Law, Toronto, Thomson Reuters, 2019, p. 650.
- 40 *Giffen (Re)*, <u>1998 CanLII 844 (SCC)</u>, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 91, para. 33.
- 41 Lefebvre (Trustee of); Tremblay (Trustee of), 2004 SCC 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 326, paras. 32-40.
- 42 S. 36.1 *CCAA*.
- 43 *Essar*, *supra*, note.

# TAB 8

# 2017 ONCA 1014

#### Ontario Court of Appeal

Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Limited

# 2017 CarswellOnt 20162, 2017 ONCA 1014, 139 O.R. (3d) 1, 286 A.C.W.S. (3d) 658, 420 D.L.R. (4th) 23, 54 C.B.R. (6th) 173, 76 B.L.R. (5th) 171

Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as Monitor of all of the following: Essar Steel Algoma Inc., Essar Tech Algoma Inc., Algoma Holdings B.V., Essar Steel Algoma (Alberta) ULC, Cannelton Iron Ore Company and Essar Steel Algoma Inc. USA (Plaintiff / Respondent) and Essar Global Fund Limited, Essar Power Canada Ltd., New Trinity Coal, Inc., Essar Ports Algoma Holding Inc., Algoma Port Holding Company Inc., Port of Algoma Inc., Essar Steel Limited and Essar Steel Algoma Inc. (Defendants / Appellants / Respondent)

R.A. Blair, S.E. Pepall, K. van Rensburg JJ.A.

Heard: August 15-17, 2017 Judgment: December 21, 2017 Docket: CA C63581/C63588

Proceedings: affirming *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd.* (2017), 137 O.R. (3d) 438, 46 C.B.R. (6th) 107, 66 B.L.R. (5th) 189, 2017 CarswellOnt 4049, 2017 ONSC 1366, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); additional reasons at *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd et al* (2017), 50 C.B.R. (6th) 148, 2017 ONSC 4017, 2017 CarswellOnt 12508, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J.); and refusing leave to appeal *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd et al* (2017), 50 C.B.R. (6th) 148, 2017 ONSC 4017, 2017 CarswellOnt 12508, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons to *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd.* (2017), 50 C.B.R. (6th) 148, 2017 ONSC 4017, 2017 CarswellOnt 12508, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons to *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd.* (2017), 137 O.R. (3d) 438, 46 C.B.R. (6th) 107, 66 B.L.R. (5th) 189, 2017 CarswellOnt 4049, 2017 ONSC 1366, Newbould J. (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: Patricia D.S. Jackson, Andrew D. Gray, Jeremy Opolsky, Alexandra Shelley, Davida Shiff, for Appellants, Essar Global Fund Limited, New Trinity Coal, Inc., Essar Ports Algoma Holding Inc., Essar Ports Canada Holding Inc., Algoma Port Holding Company Inc., Port of Algoma Inc., and Essar Steel Limited

Clifton P. Prophet, Nicholas Kluge, Delna Contractor, for Respondent, Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as Monitor of Essar Steel Algoma Inc. et al.

Eliot N. Kolers, Patrick Corney, for Respondent, Essar Steel Algoma Inc.

Peter H. Griffin, Monique Jilesen, Kim Nusbaum, for Appellants, GIP Primus, L.P. and Brightwood Loan Services LLC

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XVII Practice and procedure in courts XVII.8 Costs XVII.8.d Award of costs XVII.8.d.i General principles Bankruptcy and insolvency XVII Practice and procedure in courts XVII.9 Miscellaneous Business associations III Specific matters of corporate organization III.3 Shareholders III.3 e Shareholders' remedies

III.3.e.i Derivative actions III.3.e.i.A At common law III.3.e.i.A.5 Miscellaneous Business associations III Specific matters of corporate organization **III.3** Shareholders III.3.e Shareholders' remedies III.3.e.ii Relief from oppression III.3.e.ii.B Standing to apply III.3.e.ii.B.4 Miscellaneous Business associations III Specific matters of corporate organization **III.3** Shareholders III.3.e Shareholders' remedies III.3.e.ii Relief from oppression III.3.e.ii.C Oppressive conduct III.3.e.ii.C.3 Corporate governance **Business** associations III Specific matters of corporate organization **III.3** Shareholders III.3.e Shareholders' remedies III.3.e.ii Relief from oppression

III.3.e.ii.C Oppressive conduct III.3.e.ii.C.5 Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Shareholders — Shareholders' remedies — Relief from oppression — Standing to apply — Miscellaneous

E Global acquired A Ltd. through its subsidiaries in 2007 — A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global (collectively E Group) — Action arose in context of recapitalization of A Ltd. and transaction between A Ltd. and Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco), two companies indirectly owned by E Global, in which A Ltd.'s port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie were conveyed to Portco (Port Transaction) — Trial judge found Port Transaction and other conduct of E Global to be oppressive and granted remedy designed to address that oppression — E Global and some members of E Group, together with GIP, who were arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect transaction appealed on several grounds, including that Monitor lacked standing to bring oppression claim — Appeal dismissed — Monitor could be complainant under CBCA and should have been made one, however, it would only occur on rare occasions at CCAA supervising judge's discretion — CCAA supervising judge was justified in providing authorization as prima facie case was established; Monitor had reviewed and reported to court on related party transactions; oppression action served to remove insurmountable obstacle to restructuring and Monitor could efficiently advance oppression claim representing stakeholders who were not organized as group and who were similarly affected by alleged oppressive conduct.

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Shareholders — Shareholders' remedies — Relief from oppression — Oppressive conduct — Miscellaneous

E Global acquired A Ltd. through its subsidiaries in 2007 — A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global (collectively E Group) — Action arose in context of recapitalization of A Ltd. and transaction between A Ltd.

and Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco) two companies indirectly owned by E Global, in which A Ltd.'s port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie were conveyed to Portco (Port Transaction) — Trial judge found Port Transaction and other conduct of E Global to be oppressive and granted remedy designed to address that oppression — E Global and some members of E Group, together with GIP, who were arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect transaction appealed on basis trial judge erred in tailoring remedy — Appeal dismissed — Trial judge had broad latitude to fashion oppression remedy based on facts before him — Trial judge properly identified need to avoid overly broad remedy and varying transaction as he did was one such way — Trial judge's remedy removed Portco's control rights and after GIP was paid, restored Port to the ownership of A Ltd. — Remedy was responsive to oppressive conduct unlike award of damages — Further, remedy granted preserved security GIP had bargained for and therefore GIP did not suffer any prejudice as result of remedy — Regarding issue of set-off, trial judge's subsequent ruling was full answer to GIP's submissions and ensured that GIP would not suffer any prejudice as result of remedy granted in response to E Global's oppressive conduct.

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Shareholders — Shareholders' remedies — Derivative actions — At common law — Miscellaneous

E Global acquired A Ltd. through its subsidiaries in 2007 — A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global — Action arose in context of recapitalization of A Ltd. and transaction between A Ltd. and Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco), two companies indirectly owned by E Global, in which A Ltd.'s port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie were conveyed to Portco (Port Transaction) — Trial judge found Port Transaction and other conduct of E Global to be oppressive and granted remedy designed to address that oppression — E Global, along with some companies directly or indirectly owned by E Global, together with GIP, who were arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect transaction appealed on several grounds including alleged harm was to A Ltd. and appropriate redress was derivative action — Appeal dismissed — Court affirmed principles that derivative action and oppression remedy were not mutually exclusive and that there may be circumstances giving rise overlapping derivative actions and oppression remedies where harm was done both to corporation and to stakeholders in their separate stakeholder capacities — Question was whether impugned conduct was "oppressive" and, if so, whether stakeholder suffered harm in its capacity as stakeholder as result of that conduct.

Business associations --- Specific matters of corporate organization — Shareholders — Shareholders' remedies — Relief from oppression — Oppressive conduct — Corporate governance

Business judgment rule — E Global acquired A Ltd. through its subsidiaries in 2007 — A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global (collectively E Group) — Action arose in context of recapitalization of A Ltd. and transaction between A Ltd. and Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco), two companies indirectly owned by E Global, in which A Ltd.'s port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie were conveyed to Portco (Port Transaction) — Trial judge found Port Transaction and other conduct of E Global to be oppressive and granted remedy designed to address that oppression — E Global and some members of E Group, together with GIP, who were arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect transaction appealed — Appeal dismissed — There was evidence of subjective expectations before trial judge, who also drew reasonable inferences from evidence and circumstances that existed at A Ltd. that supported expectations Monitor relied upon — Trial judge did not err in his analysis of wrongful conduct and harm as there was recognition that stakeholders were neither party to nor involved in amended plan of arrangement proceedings - Trial judge made his finding of wrongful conduct on totality of E Global's conduct regarding recapitalization and Port Transaction - Trial judge had not misunderstood E Global's contribution to recaptalization - Causal connection between E Global's Equity Commitment and Port Transaction was factual matter and trial judge's factual finding was supported by evidence — Trial judge also correctly described business judgment rule however appellate court added rule shielded business decisions from court intervention only where they were made prudently and in good faith, and rule's protection was available only to extent that Board of Directors' actions actually evidenced their business.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts --- Costs --- Award of costs --- General principles

A Ltd. owned steel production operations and, in late 2013, was faced with liquidity crisis — Its investments were managed by E Capital — In 2016, order was granted authorizing Monitor appointed under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act for oppression against A Ltd.'s parent, E Global and other companies owned directly or indirectly by E Global — GIP, who were arm's length lenders, sought costs against monitor on partial indemnity scale of \$750,156.18 on basis that relief sought by monitor at various times in one form or another would have affected GIP security — Monitor acknowledged that if only position taken by GIP was scope of relief, they were entitled to costs but GIP took broader attack, including whether monitor had standing to bring action, contending they had veto provision in was commercially reasonable and fair value of transaction was established, none of which was established — GIP appealed oppression decision and requested appellate court order that it was error to find that monitor was proper complainant or to find oppression of A Ltd. and thus it was contended that GIP could not say it was wholly successful

— Court was not privy to GIP's strategy in filing its appeal and issues had been decided at first instance but may be appealed — In circumstances, success was divided between monitor and GIP and no order was made to costs — GIP applied for leave to appeal costs award — Application dismissed — There was no basis on which to interfere with costs award of trial judge as there was no error in principle in trial judge's exercise of discretion.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts --- Miscellaneous

#### Held:

#### **Table of Authorities**

#### Cases considered by K. van Rensburg J.A., R.A. Blair J.A., S.E. Pepall J.A.:

*Indalex Ltd., Re* (2013), 2013 SCC 6, 2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 CarswellOnt 734, D.T.E. 2013T-97, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Sun Indalex Finance LLC v. United Steelworkers*) [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

#### Cases considered by S.E. Pepall J.A.:

*BCE Inc., Re* (2008), 2008 CarswellQue 12595, 2008 CarswellQue 12596, 71 C.P.R. (4th) 303, 52 B.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. *Aegon Capital Management Inc. v. BCE Inc.*) 383 N.R. 119, (sub nom. *Aegon Capital Management Inc. v. BCE Inc.*) 301 D.L.R. (4th) 80, 2008 SCC 69, (sub nom. *BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders*) [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (S.C.C.) — considered *Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc.* (1991), 1 B.L.R. (2d) 225, 3 O.R. (3d) 289, 45 O.A.C. 320, 80 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 1991 CarswellOnt 133 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.* (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 131, 1998 CarswellOnt 1891, 38 B.L.R. (2d) 196, 39 O.R. (3d) 755, 61 O.T.C. 81 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to *Essar Steel Algoma Inc. et al Re* (2017), 2017 ONSC 3930, 2017 CarswellOnt 12528, 53 C.B.R. (6th) 321 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

*Fedel v. Tan* (2010), 2010 ONCA 473, 2010 CarswellOnt 4658, 83 C.C.E.L. (3d) 60, 70 B.L.R. (4th) 157, 101 O.R. (3d) 481, 264 O.A.C. 144 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. Ontario (Municipal Employees Retirement Board)* (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 13, 12 B.L.R. (4th) 189, 206 O.A.C. 61, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 450, 79 O.R. (3d) 81 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

*Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd.* (2003), 2004 SCC 9, 2003 CarswellOnt 5591, 2003 CarswellOnt 5592, 40 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 235 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 316 N.R. 265, 184 O.A.C. 209, 2004 C.L.L.C. 210-025, 70 O.R. (3d) 255 (note), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303, 70 O.R. (3d) 255, 2004 CSC 9 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*Ivaco Inc., Re* (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 6292, 56 C.C.P.B. 1, 2006 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8218 (headnote only), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 176, 83 O.R. (3d) 108, 275 D.L.R. (4th) 132, 26 B.L.R. (4th) 43 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

*J.S.M. Corp. (Ontario) Ltd. v. Brick Furniture Warehouse Ltd.* (2008), 2008 ONCA 183, 2008 CarswellOnt 1348, 41 B.L.R. (4th) 51, 234 O.A.C. 59, 67 R.P.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Korea Data Systems Co. v. Chiang (2009), 2009 ONCA 3, 2009 CarswellOnt 28, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Chiang (Trustee of) v. Chiang)* 93 O.R. (3d) 483, (sub nom. *Chiang (Trustee of) v. Chiang)* 305 D.L.R. (4th) 655, 78 C.P.C. (6th) 110, (sub nom. *Mendlowitz & Associates Inc. v. Chiang)* 257 O.A.C. 64 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*Malata Group (HK) Ltd. v. Jung* (2008), 2008 ONCA 111, 2008 CarswellOnt 699, 89 O.R. (3d) 36, 233 O.A.C. 199, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 343, 44 B.L.R. (4th) 177 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

*Naneff v. Con-Crete Holdings Ltd.* (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 481, 85 O.A.C. 29, 23 B.L.R. (2d) 286, 1995 CarswellOnt 1207 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (October 3, 2012), Doc. Toronto 09-CL-7950 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 266, 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 146, 1988 CarswellBC 531 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

*Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 5210, (sub nom. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.) 180 O.A.C. 158, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 313, 42 B.L.R. (3d) 14, 68 O.R. (3d) 544 (Ont. C.A.) — considered* 

Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp. (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 4035, 113 O.A.C. 253, (sub nom. Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp.) 42 O.R. (3d) 177, 44 B.L.R. (2d) 115 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

*Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 67 B.C.L.R. (2d) 385, 12 C.B.R. (3d) 145, 1992 CarswellBC 489 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

*R. v. Palmer* (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, 30 N.R. 181, 14 C.R. (3d) 22, 17 C.R. (3d) 34 (Fr.), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 193, 106 D.L.R. (3d) 212, 1979 CarswellBC 533, 1979 CarswellBC 541 (S.C.C.) — followed

*Rea v. Wildeboer* (2015), 2015 ONCA 373, 2015 CarswellOnt 7602, 384 D.L.R. (4th) 747, 37 B.L.R. (5th) 101, 126 O.R. (3d) 178, 335 O.A.C. 161 (Ont. C.A.) — distinguished

*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)* (1934), 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75, 1934 CarswellNat 1 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*Sengmueller v. Sengmueller* (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 208, 69 O.A.C. 312, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 19, 25 C.P.C. (3d) 61, 2 R.F.L. (4th) 232, 1994 CarswellOnt 375 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

*Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2010), 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.))* [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

*U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re* (2016), 2016 ONCA 662, 2016 CarswellOnt 14104, 39 C.B.R. (6th) 173, 402 D.L.R. (4th) 450, 61 B.L.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

*UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc.* (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2096, 214 D.L.R. (4th) 496, 32 C.C.P.B. 120, 27 B.L.R. (3d) 53, 19 C.C.E.L. (3d) 203 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc.* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 691, (sub nom. *UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. Repap Enterprises Inc.*) 183 O.A.C. 310, 42 B.L.R. (3d) 34, 32 C.C.E.L. (3d) 68, 40 C.C.P.B. 114, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

*Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 332, 100 D.L.R. (4th) 133, 1993 CarswellBC 75 (B.C. S.C.) — considered Statutes considered:

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 Generally — referred to

s. 13 — considered

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 Generally — referred to

- s. 192 considered
- s. 238 "complainant" (d) considered
- s. 239 considered
- s. 241 considered
- s. 241(1) considered
- s. 241(2) considered

s. 241(3) — considered Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 11 - considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 23 - considered

s. 23(1)(c) — considered

s. 23(1)(k) — considered

#### S.E. Pepall J.A.:

1 This appeal concerns a successful oppression action brought pursuant to s. 241 of the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 (the "*CBCA*"). It involves the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "*CCAA*") restructuring proceedings of the respondent, Essar Steel Algoma Inc. ("Algoma")<sup>1</sup>, one of Canada's largest integrated steel mills and the respondent, Ernst & Young Inc., the court-appointed Monitor.

2 The supervising *CCAA* judge authorized the Monitor to commence an action for oppression against Algoma's parent, the appellant Essar Global Fund Limited ("Essar Global"), and the remaining appellants, other companies owned directly or indirectly by Essar Global (the "Essar Group"). The action arose in the context of a recapitalization of Algoma and a transaction between Algoma and Port of Algoma Inc. ("Portco"), two companies indirectly owned by Essar Global, in which Algoma's port facilities in Sault Ste. Marie (the "Port") were conveyed to Portco.

3 Portco is a single purpose company established by Essar Global. As Portco's name suggests, it currently controls the Sault Ste. Marie Port. Portco obtained control in November 2014 in a transaction between Algoma, Portco, and Essar Global (the "Port Transaction"). The Port Transaction effectively provided Portco with the ability to veto any change in control of Algoma's business. The interveners below and appellants on appeal, GIP Primus, L.P. and Brightwood Loan Services LLC (collectively "GIP"), are arm's length lenders who loaned Portco US\$150 million to effect the transaction.

4 The trial judge found the Port Transaction and other conduct of Essar Global to be oppressive and granted a remedy that was designed to address that oppression. Essar Global and some of the members of the Essar Group, together with GIP, appeal from that judgment. The appellants advance a number of arguments, many of them factual, in support of their appeal. The appellants' two principal legal submissions are first, that the Monitor lacked standing to bring an oppression claim and second, that the alleged harm was to Algoma and that therefore the appropriate redress was a derivative action.

5 For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.

#### A. FACTS

#### (1) Algoma's Operations

6 The City of Sault Ste. Marie sits on the shore of St. Mary's River, a waterway that links Lake Superior to Lake Huron at the heart of the Great Lakes, close to the Canada/U.S. border. The steel production operations that are owned by Algoma have been the primary employer and economic engine of the City since construction of the steel mill in 1901. Not surprisingly, the City's Port, which is situated next to Algoma's buildings and facilities, is integral to the steel operations. Indeed, Algoma is the Port's primary customer and its employees have traditionally run the Port operations. Raw materials used to produce steel are shipped to the Port and the steel that is produced is shipped to market from the Port. The relationship is one of mutual dependence. 7 Unfortunately, Algoma was in and out of *CCAA* protection proceedings both in 1991 and in 2001. In late 2013, Algoma faced another liquidity crisis and restructured under the *CBCA* in 2014. The recent *CCAA* filing occurred on November 9, 2015.

# (2) The Essar Group

8 Essar Global is a Cayman Islands limited liability company and the ultimate parent of the respondent Algoma, which it acquired through its subsidiaries in 2007. Essar Global is also the parent of the appellants Portco, Essar Power Canada Ltd., New Trinity Coal Inc., Essar Ports Algoma Holding Inc., Algoma Port Holding Company Inc., and Essar Steel Limited. Its investments are managed by Essar Capital Limited ("Essar Capital"), which is based in London, England. These companies are part of the Essar Group, a multinational conglomerate that was founded in India by two brothers, Sashi and Ravi Ruia. Members of the Ruia family are the beneficial owners of the Essar Group.

# (3) Algoma's Recapitalization

9 In late 2013, Algoma was facing a liquidity crisis. Algoma anticipated being unable to meet a coupon payment due to unsecured bondholders in June 2014, and its US\$346 million term loan was to mature in September 2014. Although Essar Global had been injecting substantial funds into Algoma, it was hesitant to advance further cash to Algoma. Algoma decided to consider mechanisms to restructure and reduce its debt and therefore embarked on a recapitalization project.

10 At the time of the discussions relating to the recapitalization, Algoma's Board of Directors consisted of five appointees affiliated with the Ruia family or the Essar Group, and three independent directors. In early January 2014, the Board of Directors placed responsibility for Algoma's recapitalization efforts in the hands of Essar Global and Essar Capital employees. Algoma personnel had no day-to-day control over the recapitalization project.

Although the three independent directors had begun expressing concerns about their roles on the Board as early as the fall of 2013, in the face of Algoma's serious financial challenges, their concerns became more acute. Specifically, they were concerned that their requests for timely, full disclosure of information and full participation in the strategic decisions of the Board had not been properly taken into account by the other Board members. On January 19, 2014, the three sent a memo to the Board proposing the establishment of an independent committee to work with outside financial advisors to evaluate options and alternatives for Algoma's recapitalization. The Board held a meeting on February 11, 2014, and rejected this proposal by a vote of four to three, the three being the independent directors. In response, one of the three independent directors resigned. The other two initially remained on the Board.

12 On February 17, 2014, one of the remaining independent directors, Thomas Dodds, wrote to Prashant Ruia seeking a meeting. Prashant Ruia was then the vice-chair of Algoma's Board, the son of one of the founders of Essar Group, and a director of Essar Capital. Mr. Dodds wrote:

If your expectation of [the Algoma] Board is to simply be a formality and our role as independent directors is to essentially "rubberstamp" shareholder and management decisions, we are not prepared to continue serving as directors.

As you know, Directors and particularly independent directors have a legal, fiduciary responsibility to all the stakeholders of the Company starting with the Company first, followed by the shareholders, employees, community and others. This Director responsibility may on occasion conflict with the objectives of the shareholder who may, understandably, be more interested in matters of import to themselves. Most of the time there will be no conflict between the responsibilities of the Directors, objectives of the shareholder and that of the Company stakeholders as broadly defined. However, there are other occasions when they do.

What we as independent directors have experienced in the last few Board meetings is a complete disregard for any discussion or wholesome debate on alternatives to re-financing or contingency planning at [Algoma].

In addition when we ask questions, or propose alternatives, we are asked to wait a while for additional information and told that everything will work out.

We cannot discharge our responsibilities under such an environment.

13 The two remaining independent directors resigned on February 21 and May 5, 2014, respectively. In his resignation letter, Mr. Dodds explained his rationale, stating:

I lacked confidence that I was receiving information and engaged in decision-making in the same manner as those Board members who are directly affiliated with the company or its parent.

14 The trial judge found, at para. 15 of his reasons, that the four directors who voted against the independent committee were "Essar-affiliated directors", that it was clear that the Ruia family did not want an independent committee, and that the Essar-affiliated directors voted accordingly.

15 The trial judge also found that the recapitalization and the Port Transaction were run by Joe Seifert, Chief Investment Officer of Essar Capital. The trial judge rejected the contention that Mr. Seifert was merely an advisor to the Board that independently made all of the critical decisions. Rather, Essar Global and Essar Capital, led by Mr. Seifert, directed and made decisions relating to the recapitalization and the Port Transaction. As the trial judge noted at para. 49, the evidence was "overwhelming" that Essar Global and Essar Capital were "calling the shots".

# (4) Restructuring Support Agreement

16 Essar Global engaged Barclays Capital, an investment bank, to pursue alternative financing structures for Algoma on behalf of Essar Global. Barclays introduced GIP to Mr. Seifert of Essar Capital. In May 2014, representatives of Essar Global, GIP, and Barclays met to discuss Algoma's infrastructure assets and potential asset disposition transactions. They discussed the possibility of a transaction in which Algoma might sell its Port assets to a new corporate entity to generate cash proceeds, but not for the purpose of recapitalizing Algoma. Rather, the proceeds would flow upstream to Essar Global. In light of Algoma's prior insolvencies, GIP thought it important that a separate corporate entity distinct from Algoma be established to hold the Port assets. By the end of June 2014, Algoma had an exclusivity agreement with GIP regarding GIP's loan to finance the Port Transaction.

17 Soon after entering into the exclusivity agreement with GIP, on July 24, 2014, Algoma entered into a Restructuring Support Agreement (the "RSA") with Essar Global and an *ad hoc* committee of Algoma's unsecured noteholders. The RSA set out the principal terms of a restructuring. It provided for a reduction of Algoma's debt through the exchange of the unsecured notes in return for the payment of a percentage of their original principal amount and the issuance of new notes. The note restructuring would be implemented through a court-approved *CBCA* Plan of Arrangement. As a condition of the RSA and pursuant to an Equity Commitment Letter dated July 23, 2014, Essar Global agreed to acquire equity in Algoma for cash in the minimum amount of US\$250 million and subject to a maximum of US\$300 million. The trial judge found that Essar Global never intended to honour this obligation.

18 The Equity Commitment Letter provided a remedy in the event of a breach. The Plan of Arrangement contained a release of any claim arising out of the Equity Commitment Letter in favour of Essar Global, the noteholders, and the other corporations participating in the Arrangement.

19 It was a condition of the proposed Plan of Arrangement that Essar Global would comply with its RSA obligation to provide the aforementioned cash equity infusion. However, as early as March 28, 2014, representatives of the Ruia family had made it clear that they did not have US\$250 million for equity. Efforts were made to reduce Essar Global's contribution. In late July 2014, one of the Ruia representatives wrote that ideally the equity contribution would be kept to US\$150 to US\$160 million.

20 Nonetheless, an application for approval of the Plan of Arrangement was made to the court. The recapitalization contemplated by the RSA was approved as an arrangement under s. 192 of the *CBCA* on September 15, 2014.

Beginning in October 2014, roadshow presentations were made to market the securities being offered through the recapitalization. However the transaction marketed did not accord with the transaction contemplated by the RSA. First, the roadshow presentation described an Essar Global cash equity contribution in Algoma of less than US\$100 million, not the US \$250 to US\$300 million described in the RSA. Second, the presentation provided for the cash to be generated from the sale of the Port by Algoma. The RSA did not allow for such a sale absent the noteholders' consent. No such consent had been obtained. In addition, the proceeds of any sale were to be used to reduce Algoma's debt.

22 The roadshow was unsuccessful and investors failed to subscribe for the securities marketed. The lead bookrunner attributed this failure to the perception among investors that the transaction described in the roadshow presentation contemplated an insufficient contribution of equity into Algoma by Essar Global.

23 And so it was that Algoma was left without the cash to repay or refinance its debt.

Ultimately, the RSA was amended on November 6, 2014, such that Essar Global contributed US\$150 million rather than the cash contribution of between US\$250 and US\$300 million originally contemplated by the Equity Commitment Letter. The amended RSA went on to provide that upon fulfillment of this revised contribution, Essar Global was deemed to have satisfied all of its obligations under the Equity Commitment Letter. The releases contained in the original filing were repeated in the amended Plan of Arrangement.

As subsequently discussed, in light of the amended RSA, an amended Plan of Arrangement was approved on November 10, 2014.

# (5) Port Transaction

The Port Transaction closed on November 14, 2014. In summary, Algoma sold to Portco the Port assets consisting of the Port buildings, the plant, and machinery, but not the land. Algoma leased the realty to Portco for a term of 50 years. Portco agreed to provide Port cargo handling services in return for a monthly payment from Algoma to Portco. Algoma agreed to provide to Portco the services necessary to operate the Port in return for a monthly payment from Portco that would be less than the monthly payment paid by Algoma to Portco for cargo handling services.

Turning to the details of the Port Transaction, Algoma and Portco entered into a Master Sale and Purchase Agreement ("MSPA"). Under the MSPA:

(i) Algoma conveyed to Portco all of the fixed assets owned and used by Algoma in relation to the Port, and agreed to lease the realty to Portco;

(ii) Portco agreed to pay Algoma US\$171.5 million to be satisfied by:

• a cash payment by Portco of US\$151.66 million; and

• the issuance of an unsecured promissory note in the amount of US\$19.84 million payable in full on November 13, 2015.

To fund these obligations, Portco obtained a US\$150 million term loan from GIP. GIP Primus, L.P. lent US\$125 million, while Brightwood Loan Services LLC lent US\$25 million. This term loan was secured by all of Portco's current and future real and personal property and supported by two guarantees in favour of GIP: one from Essar Global, and another from Algoma Port Holding Company Inc., Portco's direct parent.

29 Pursuant to the MSPA, Algoma and Portco executed five additional documents: a promissory note, a lease, a Shared Services Agreement, an Assignment of Material Contracts Agreement, and a Cargo Handling Agreement.

(i) Promissory Note

30 The promissory note was for US\$19.84 million payable by Portco to Algoma. Portco immediately assigned its obligations under the promissory note to Essar Global. Essar Global therefore became the obligor under the note and Algoma released Portco from its obligation. As of the date of the trial, the promissory note remained unpaid. At para. 27 of a subsequent decision released on June 26, 2017, the trial judge granted a declaration that any amounts owing to Algoma under the promissory note given by Portco to Algoma have been set-off against amounts owing by Algoma to Portco under the Cargo Handling Agreement: [*Essar Steel Algoma Inc. et al Re*] 2017 ONSC 3930, 53 C.B.R. (6th) 321 (Ont. S.C.J.). The decision allows for set-off against Portco, but preserves GIP's right to repayment.

# (ii) Lease

Under the lease, Portco leased from Algoma the Port lands, roads, and outdoor storage space for a 50-year term. Portco prepaid Algoma the rent for the entire 50-year period. The present value of this leasehold interest was stated to be US\$154.8 million. Algoma maintained responsibility for all maintenance, repairs, insurance, and property taxes.

#### (iii) Shared Services Agreement

<sup>32</sup> Under the Shared Services Agreement, Algoma was to be responsible for providing all the services necessary for Portco to fulfill its obligations under the Cargo Handling Agreement. These services were to be provided by Algoma employees, not Portco employees. Portco agreed to pay Algoma US\$11 million annually subject to escalation at the rate of 3 percent per annum beginning in 2016.

# (iv) Assignment of Material Contracts

33 Under the Assignment of Material Contracts Agreement, Algoma provided a covenant in favour of GIP, which precluded Algoma from selling or assigning any material contract relating to the Port, including the Cargo Handling Agreement except by way of security granted to its other third party lender.

#### (v) Cargo Handling Agreement

Under the Cargo Handling Agreement, Portco agreed to provide Algoma with cargo handling services for an initial 20year term with automatic renewal for successive three-year periods unless either party gave written notice of termination to the other. Algoma agreed to pay Portco based on tonnage with a minimum monthly assured volume of US\$3 million. In other words, Algoma was obliged to pay a minimum of US\$36 million annually to Portco for 20 years subject to an escalation in price of 1 percent per annum commencing in 2016. Therefore, while Algoma was entitled to US\$11 million annually under the Shared Services Agreement, it had to pay Portco at least US\$36 million annually under the Cargo Handling Agreement, such that Portco would receive an annual revenue stream from Algoma of US\$25 million. This amount was intended to service GIP's term loan at US\$25 million a year. However, GIP's loan had a term of eight years, and therefore Portco would have the full benefit of the US\$25 million for at least 12 years of the initial 20-year term of the Cargo Handling Agreement, and potentially for 42 years if the Agreement was not terminated.

Section 15.2 of the Cargo Handling Agreement also contained a change of control clause that stated that the "Agreement may not be assigned by either Party without the prior written consent of the other Party." This provision became particularly contentious because it effectively gave Portco — and therefore Portco's parent, Essar Global — a veto over any party acquiring Algoma in the *CCAA* proceedings.

Although inclusion of the change of control provision in the Cargo Handling Agreement was driven by GIP, the trial judge found that it was effectively for the benefit of Essar Global, as it gave Portco a veto. Furthermore, the trial judge noted at para. 117 that Essar Global had in fact relied on s. 15.2 to its benefit, by holding out its change of control rights to dissuade competing bidders for Algoma in the restructuring process while Essar Global continued to express its own interest as a prospective bidder.

37 In discussing the financial ramifications of the Shared Services Agreement and the Cargo Handling Agreement, the trial judge observed at para. 26 of his reasons:

When the costs of operating the Port (shared services) are netted from the cargo handling charges, the result is that Algoma will pay approximately \$25 million per year to Portco, which is the amount required by Portco to service the Term Loan each year. That amount of \$25 million for 20 years comes to \$500 million, far more than the amount needed to repay the \$150 million GIP loan.

<sup>38</sup> Duff & Phelps assessed the fair value of the Portco Transaction as ranging between US\$150.9 million and US\$174.2 million with a midpoint of US\$161.7 million. However, this assessment failed to take into account the change of control provision in the Cargo Handling Agreement. Deloitte LLP reviewed Duff & Phelps' assessment and concluded it was reasonable.<sup>2</sup>

#### (6) Final Recapitalization

39 Ultimately the recapitalization of Algoma consisted of the following transactions:

(a) Algoma issued US\$375 million in senior secured notes pursuant to an offering memorandum;

(b) Algoma entered into a new US\$50 million senior secured asset-based revolving credit facility and a new US\$375 million term loan;

(c) Algoma's unsecured noteholders were paid a portion of their principal and were issued new junior secured notes;

(d) Algoma completed the Port Transaction;

(e) Essar Global contributed US\$150 million in cash in exchange for common equity, and also contributed US\$150 million in debt forgiveness; and

(f) All other Algoma lenders were repaid in full.

In addition, GIP entered into a secured term loan for US\$150 million with Portco, secured by a GSA over all of Portco's assets. It also received guarantees — one from Essar Global and one from Algoma Port Holding Company Inc. — guaranteeing Portco's liabilities. In November 2014, the transactions in furtherance of Algoma's recapitalization, including the Port Transaction, were approved unanimously by Algoma's Board of Directors after receiving advice and on the recommendation of Algoma's management. By this time, the Board consisted of four directors: Mr. Kishore Mirchandani, who became a director on June 23, 2014; Mr. Naresh Kothari, who became a director on August 24, 2014; the Board's chair, Mr. Jatinder Mehra of Essar Global; and Algoma's CEO, Mr. Kalyan Ghosh. Mr. Ghosh, and Mr. Rajat Marwah, Algoma's CFO, both testified that they supported the Port Transaction not because it was ideal, but because there was no other option given Essar Global's failure to capitalize Algoma as it had committed to do.

41 As mentioned, the approved Plan of Arrangement that included the original RSA had to be amended in light of the revised equity contribution. A *CBCA* Plan of Arrangement incorporating the recapitalization and authorizing the amendment of the September 2014 approval order was granted by Morawetz J. on November 10, 2014.

Based on the materials before this court, it would appear that the Port Transaction was not mentioned or brought to Morawetz J.'s attention. In this regard, the trial judge found that there was no reference to the Port Transaction in the affidavits filed in support of the amendment to the Plan of Arrangement. The Port Transaction is not mentioned in that order or in any endorsement.

43 The outcome of the Port Transaction was that all Port assets were transferred from Algoma to Portco, the Port lands were leased to Portco for 50 years, and Portco obtained change of control rights. Portco paid Algoma US\$151,660,501.50 in cash, provided the US\$19,840,000 promissory note, and was obliged to pay Algoma US\$11 million per annum under the Shared Services Agreement. In turn, Algoma was obliged to pay Portco US\$36 million per annum for an initial term of 20 years under the Cargo Handling Agreement, subject to renewal, netting Portco US\$25 million per annum as against the Shared Services Agreement payments. Meanwhile, under the revised RSA, Essar Global contributed cash of US\$150 million to Algoma rather than the original cash commitment of US\$250 to US\$300 million.

## (7) Insolvency Protection Proceedings

On November 9, 2015, Newbould J. granted an order placing Algoma, Essar Tech Algoma Inc., Algoma Holdings B.V., Essar Steel Algoma (Alberta) ULC, Cannelton Iron Ore Company, and Essar Steel Algoma Inc. USA (the "*CCAA* Applicants") under *CCAA* protection. As mentioned, he appointed Ernst & Young Inc. as the Monitor. The order contained various paragraphs addressing the rights and obligations of the Monitor, including a direction to perform such duties as were required by the Court. On November 20, 2015, Morawetz J. granted an Amended and Restated Initial Order that, among other things, directed the Monitor to review and report to the Court on any related party transactions (expressly including the Port Transaction).

45 During the *CCAA* proceedings, on February 10, 2016, a sales and investment solicitation process ("SISP") for Algoma's business and property was approved by the Court. Essar North America, a subsidiary of Essar Global, submitted a bid but was disqualified in April 2016 under the terms of the SISP because it failed to provide sufficient evidence of financial ability to purchase. In May and July of 2016, Essar Global persisted in its efforts to be the purchaser of the *CCAA* Applicants. On May 10, 2016, counsel to Portco, who was also counsel to Essar Global, wrote to counsel for Algoma to highlight matters of particular concern in connection with the *CCAA* process. The letter stated that any prospective bidder was to be told of the consent or veto right:

Portco and [Algoma] are party to a Cargo Handling Agreement pursuant to which [Algoma] has committed to long-term use of the port. Portco, has, of course, a keen interest in any successor to [Algoma] as counterparty to that agreement and would like it to be clear to prospective bidders that, pursuant to the terms of the Cargo Handling Agreement, Portco has a consent right in the event of any assignment by [Algoma] of the agreement or a change of control of [Algoma].

Again please confirm that this has been made clear to prospective bidders.

On June 20, 2016, the Monitor filed its Thirteenth Report, which described the Portco Transaction and indicated that there may be grounds for further review of that transaction. The Monitor noted that the renegotiated equity commitment resulted in Essar Global contributing the sum of US\$150 million in equity rather than US\$250 to US\$300 million, and that the Portco Transaction transferred control of one of Algoma's most critical assets, the Port, to Essar Global. The Monitor stated that it remained "particularly concerned about the effect on the completion of a restructuring transaction of the restrictions on assignment in the Portco Transaction documents."

47 On September 26, 2016, Deutsche Bank AG, who led the Debtor-in-Possession ("DIP") Lenders of Algoma and also represented the interests of potential bidders in the *CCAA* process, applied for an order empowering the Monitor to commence certain proceedings and make certain investigations.<sup>3</sup> On September 26, 2016, Newbould J. granted an order authorizing the Monitor to commence and continue proceedings under s. 241 of the *CBCA* in relation to related party transactions, including but not limited to the Port Transaction.

48 The action proceeded on an accelerated timetable due to the progress of the *CCAA* restructuring. <sup>4</sup> On October 20, 2016, the Monitor commenced proceedings claiming oppression pursuant to s. 241 of the *CBCA* against Essar Global and others in the Essar Group including Portco. It pleaded that by reason of its role as a court officer directed to commence the oppression proceedings and to oversee the interests of all stakeholders of Algoma, it was a complainant within the meaning of ss. 238 and 241 of the *CBCA*.

49 It alleged that since June 2007, the Essar Group had exercised *de facto* control over Algoma and had engaged in a course of conduct that consistently preferred the interests of the Essar Group and in particular, Essar Global, to those of Algoma and its stakeholders. This included the transfer to the Essar Group of long-term control over, and a valuable equity interest in, Algoma's Port facilities, an irreplaceable and core strategic asset of Algoma. The value of control over the Port to Algoma and its stakeholders was immeasurable, since Algoma's business could not function without access to the Port.

50 The Monitor pointed out that the Essar Group obtained its control and equity interest in the Port through a cash contribution of less than US\$4.7 million. It pleaded that the US\$150 million raised as part of the Port Transaction came from third party lenders, namely GIP, and was money raised against the security and value of the Port facilities, an asset of Algoma, as well as a promissory note that remained unpaid, and a guarantee from Essar Global. The Monitor also stressed that the control obtained by the Essar Group was not only over the Port facilities, but extended to any sale of the Algoma business such that Essar Global had an indirect veto on transactions involving Algoma's enterprise. Essar Global also obtained a right to substantial payments under the Cargo Handling Agreement.

51 The oppression occasioned was exacerbated by the fact that the borrowed monies raised through the transaction were a substitution for monies Essar Global had promised to contribute as equity in Algoma.

52 The Monitor also argued that s. 15.2 of the Cargo Handling Agreement itself constituted oppression, because it was for the long-term benefit of Essar Global and not in the interests of Algoma's non-shareholder stakeholders. The Monitor took the position that the provision gave Portco and Essar Global a veto over any party acquiring Algoma in the *CCAA* process, thus negatively affecting the sales process. The Monitor also argued that the change of control provision was not necessary for the protection of GIP because it had its own change of control rights under its credit agreement.

53 In addition, the Monitor pleaded that the oppression and prejudice to creditors was continuing as Essar Global and other related companies had insisted that bidders for Algoma's business under the SISP, which was approved by the court on February 11, 2016, be advised of Portco's consent rights under the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement.

Essar Global and the remaining defendants filed their defence rejecting the Monitor's allegations, describing the action as "an improper and ill-conceived leverage tactic". They asserted that the litigation was an attempt to attack the Port Transaction for the benefit of other bidders under the sales process, including the DIP Lenders. They pleaded that the Monitor had no standing, the claim was improperly pleaded, an oppression remedy seeking to unwind or claim damages in respect of the Port Transaction was unavailable at law, and in any event there was no oppression, prejudice, or unfairness.

<sup>55</sup>Portco's lenders, GIP, were granted intervener status as parties on December 22, 2016. They noted that they were *bona fide*, arm's length, and independent commercial parties and no cause of action or wrongful conduct was asserted by the Monitor against them. Nonetheless, the Monitor was seeking remedies that eviscerated the security held by them. They asserted that the Monitor did not have standing and could not establish any oppressive conduct in any event. Moreover, the structure of the Port Transaction was transparent to all of Algoma's stakeholders. Lastly, even if the court granted a remedy to the Monitor, it had no jurisdiction to prejudice the interests of GIP. The Monitor subsequently amended its statement of claim to modify the language on the relief claimed relating to the indebtedness and security interests in favour of GIP.

Various procedural motions were brought. Others who are not before this court intervened: Deutsche Bank AG; the Ad Hoc Committee of Algoma's Noteholders; Algoma Retirees; and two locals from the union United Steelworkers, Locals 2724 and 2251. The Essar Group and GIP brought motions to strike on the basis that the Monitor lacked standing and later also sought an order for particulars. On December 1, 2016, Newbould J. ordered that the standing motions be dealt with at the trial scheduled for January 30, 2017. On January 5, 2017, he urged the Monitor to give as many particulars as it could regarding the relief it might seek.

57 On January 30, 2017, Essar Capital served a motion for an order re-opening the SISP and to make information available to Essar Global to allow it to consider submitting a bid. Newbould J. dismissed the request. At para. 114 of his reasons, the trial judge found that Essar Global was still interested in purchasing the assets of Algoma.

58 The action proceeded to a five-day trial before Newbould J. commencing on January 31, 2017.

# **B. TRIAL JUDGMENT**

59 The trial judge organized his reasons for decision under six principal headings: the Monitor's standing; who directed the recapitalization and the Port Transaction; reasonable expectations and were they violated; the business judgment rule; and the appropriate remedy. I will summarize his conclusions on each issue.

## (1) Monitor's Standing

60 As mentioned, both Essar Global and GIP challenged the Monitor's standing as a complainant under the oppression provisions of the *CBCA*. They also argued that only persons directly damaged by the oppressive conduct could bring the action and that this action was in substance a derivative claim by Algoma. The trial judge rejected these arguments.

61 He found that the stakeholders harmed were Algoma's trade creditors, pensioners, retirees, and employees. At para. 32, he noted that Algoma owed CDN\$911.9 million as of the date of the Port Transaction to a group of creditors including trade creditors, pensioners, retirees, and the City of St. Sault Marie.

The trial judge acknowledged at para. 34 that normally a monitor, who is a court officer, is to be neutral and not take sides. However, there are exceptions. Under s. 23(1)(k) of the *CCAA*, a monitor must carry out any function in relation to the debtor that the court may direct. At para. 35, the trial judge also pointed to the *CCAA* proceedings of Nortel Networks Corp. as a precedent: *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (October 3, 2012), Doc. Toronto 09-CL-7950 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In those proceedings, a monitor was authorized to act as a litigant after all of Nortel's directors and senior executives had resigned.

Moreover, the trial judge observed that determining whether someone is a complainant under s. 238 of the *CBCA* is a discretionary decision. In *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.* (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 544 (Ont. C.A.), this court confirmed that a trustee in bankruptcy acting on behalf of the creditors of a bankrupt estate could be a complainant within the meaning of s. 238. In so doing, the court noted the need for flexibility to ensure that the remedial purpose of the oppression provisions is achieved. The trial judge saw no reason why the principle of collective action — which posits that it is more efficient for creditors to pursue their claims in a bankruptcy collectively with a trustee acting as their representative rather than individually — should not be followed in the present *CCAA* proceeding. At para. 37, he concluded that the Monitor had taken the action as an adjunct to its role in facilitating a restructuring and was therefore a proper complainant.

To respond to Essar Global and GIP's arguments that the claim was properly a derivative action and that no person had been personally harmed beyond Algoma, at para. 40 the trial judge relied on *Rea v. Wildeboer*, 2015 ONCA 373, 126 O.R. (3d) 178 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 27. There, Blair J.A. commented that the derivative action and the oppression remedy are not mutually exclusive. Although on the facts of *Wildeboer*, Blair J.A. had struck out a statement of claim pleading the oppression remedy, the trial judge distinguished *Wildeboer* on the basis that the relief sought was for the benefit of the corporation and there was no allegation that individualized personal interests were affected by the alleged wrongful conduct.

#### (2) Essar Global Directed the Recapitalization and the Portco Transaction

The trial judge observed that in some respects, it did not matter who made the decisions regarding the recapitalization and the Port Transaction — if the conduct was oppressive, relief could be granted. Nonetheless, he found at para. 49, that the evidence was "overwhelming" that Essar Global and Essar Capital were "calling the shots."

66 At para. 52, he accepted the evidence of Mr. Ghosh and Mr. Marwah that they did not negotiate the economic terms of the refinancing or the Port Transaction. Nor was either involved in the renegotiation of the RSA.

The trial judge relied on other evidence, including Algoma's annual Business Plan dated February 3, 2014, to support his factual findings. He also considered evidence of the witnesses. He found at paras. 56-57 that some of the witnesses had been evasive, including: Rewant Ruia, the Ruia family's lead in the Essar Group's North American operations; Mr. Seifert,; and Rajiv Saxena, the Executive Director of Essar Steel India Ltd.

After reviewing the evidence, the trial judge noted at para. 58 that he was satisfied that Mr. Seifert, who represented the Essar Group's interests, had primary responsibility for pursuing the recapitalization negotiations and Algoma's refinancing via the Port Transaction. He concluded at para. 60:

I am satisfied that representatives of Essar Global including Essar Capital carried out the Recapitalization and Portco Transaction negotiations and made the critical decisions. Algoma management were handed the economic terms of the Recapitalization and Port Transaction and implemented them from an operational perspective. Algoma management did not negotiate the terms. Their role was to support the negotiations with regard to non-economic, primarily operational, issues.

## (3) Reasonable Expectations and their Violation

69 The trial judge identified the two-step process to determine whether a violation of reasonable expectations has occurred under s. 241 of the *CBCA*, which is described at para. 68 of *BCE Inc., Re*, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (S.C.C.): (i) does the evidence support the reasonable expectation asserted by the complainant; and (ii) does the evidence establish that the reasonable expectation was violated by conduct that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregards a relevant interest?

70 He described the reasonable expectations asserted by the Monitor as relating to the loss by Algoma of a critical asset and the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement. He stated at para. 64:

The Monitor contends that the reasonable expectations of the creditors of Algoma, including the trade creditors, employees, pensioners and retirees, were that Algoma would not deal with its core assets like the Port in such a way as it would lose long-term control and value over those assets to a related party on terms that permitted the related party to veto or thwart Algoma's ability to do significant transactions or restructure, as was done in this case.

At para. 67, the trial judge did not accept that the expectations of creditors such as the employees, pensioners, and retirees were governed only by their agreements with Algoma. Furthermore, the evidence, including the inferences drawn from the circumstances that existed at Algoma in 2014, supported the expectations relied upon by the Monitor. He noted at para. 73 that stakeholders have a reasonable expectation of fair treatment and this was particularly so in Sault Ste. Marie, where Algoma is of critical importance to the local economy and relied upon greatly by trade creditors and employees.

72 He concluded at para. 75 that:

[T]he reasonable expectations of the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees of Algoma were that Algoma would not deal with a critical asset like the Port in such a way as to lose long-term control over such a strategic asset to a related party on terms that permitted the related party to veto and control Algoma's ability to do significant transactions or restructure and which gave unwarranted value to the third party.

73 The trial judge held that the reasonable expectations of the trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees were violated in two principal ways: first, the Port Transaction itself; and second, the change of control veto provided to Portco, and thus Essar Global, in the Port Transaction.

The Port Transaction was caused by Essar Global's breach of both the RSA and the Equity Commitment Letter. Because the lease of the land from Algoma to Portco was for 50 years and Essar Global was in a position to terminate the Cargo Handling Agreement after 20 years, Algoma would be at Essar Global's mercy for the duration of these agreements. The trial judge found at para. 78 that the transfer of the Port assets to Portco was driven by GIP's desire for a "bankruptcy remote" special purpose vehicle. GIP was aware of Algoma's previous insolvencies and would only lend to a new entity that held the Port assets and that was separate from Algoma.

The Port Transaction and the GIP secured loan to Portco would not have been necessary had Essar Global lived up to its obligations under the RSA and the Equity Commitment Letter under which Essar Global had pledged a cash investment of US \$250 to US\$300 million. The trial judge found at para. 82 that Essar Global had no intention of living up to its promises and had acted in bad faith in this regard. The content of the roadshow presentations reflected the discordance with the RSA. The

alternative transaction in the roadshow presentations contemplated cash being contributed to the recapitalization through the sale of the Port. That these presentations failed was partially attributable, as the trial judge found at para. 82, to Essar Global's insufficient contribution of cash equity into Algoma.

The trial judge concluded that Essar Global's decision not to fund Algoma according to the terms of the Equity Commitment Letter made it necessary to carry out the Port Transaction. GIP's loan of US\$150 million reduced the amount of cash equity Essar Global promised to advance to Algoma. Essar Global's failure to inject cash equity into Algoma as agreed was the root cause of the Port Transaction and the transfer of control. This was, as the trial judge concluded at para. 89, an exercise in bad faith. Had an independent committee of Algoma's Board of Directors been struck, Essar may have been held to its bargain rather than looking to third party financing from GIP under the Port Transaction structure. The Board's failure to examine alternatives to effect Algoma's recapitalization indicated a lack of regard for the interests of Algoma's stakeholders.

Additionally, the long-term value given to Essar Global by the Port Transaction was itself oppressive (although in stating this, the trial judge noted that the Monitor did not pursue its claim that the Port assets were transferred to Portco at an undervalue).

As for the release in the amended RSA, the trial judge observed that it was a release of any claim arising out of the Equity Commitment Letter. The trial judge found at para. 100 that the Monitor was not making a claim under that Letter, nor was it asking that Essar Global provide the equity it had promised in that commitment. Rather, Essar Global's failure to live up to its commitment was part of the factual circumstances to be taken into account in considering whether Algoma's stakeholders were treated fairly under the Port Transaction.

The trial judge also observed that when the court approved the amended Plan of Arrangement under the amended RSA, it did not have knowledge of the Port Transaction. There was no reference to the Port Transaction in the affidavits filed in support of the amendment to the Plan of Arrangement; there was no finding relating to the release of Essar Global; the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees were not parties to the motion approving the amended RSA; and the order was obtained without opposition.

80 Ultimately he concluded that the Port Transaction was itself unfairly prejudicial to, and unfairly disregarded, the interests of Algoma's trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees.

# (4) Change of Control Provision

The trial judge determined at para. 104 that the change of control provision gave effective control to Portco (*i.e.* Essar Global) over who may acquire the Algoma business. Any buyer of Algoma or its business would need to be assigned the Cargo Handling Agreement so that it could operate the steel mill. Therefore the veto under this clause was effectively a veto over any change of control of the Algoma business.

82 Although the evidence indicated that the change of control provision was included for GIP's protection, the trial judge found that this end could have been achieved in other ways. For example, as the trial judge pointed out at para. 110, the parties could have included a provision in the Assignment of Material Contracts Agreement that prevented a change of control of Algoma without GIP's explicit consent. Such an alternative might have been considered had there been a committee of independent directors with advisors independent of Essar Global. But, as the trial judge concluded at para. 111, the reality was that there was no pushback on the change of control provision that was implemented, and which gave Portco/Essar Global a veto.

83 The trial judge concluded at para. 113 that the change of control provision was of considerable value to Essar Global. Furthermore, as mentioned, the trial judge stated at para. 117 that Essar Global had in fact relied on s. 15.2 to its benefit by holding out its change of control rights to dissuade competing bidders for Algoma in the restructuring process while Essar Global continued to express its own interest as a prospective bidder.

84 The May 10, 2016 letter from Portco's counsel, which sought confirmation from Algoma's counsel that prospective bidders would be advised of Portco's rights, exemplified this. In the letter, Essar Global effectively held out its consent to any change of control right to dissuade competing bidders for Algoma in the restructuring process while it continued to express its own interest as a prospective bidder. The trial judge observed at para 115 that: "[I]t is clear that the dictate of Portco through its solicitors that prospective purchasers should be made aware of the change of control provision was successful".

The trial judge also observed that the evidence established that Portco's right to refuse assignment of the Cargo Handling Agreement was a material impediment to restructuring Algoma as Algoma could not survive without access to the Port. He concluded that the change of control provision in favour of Portco in the Cargo Handling Agreement was unfairly prejudicial to, and unfairly disregarded, the interests of Algoma's trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees.

# (5) The Business Judgment Rule

The trial judge also determined that the business judgment rule, which accords deference to a business decision of a Board of Directors so long as the decision lies within a range of reasonable alternatives, did not provide a defence to Essar Global. The Board had not followed advice that it insist Essar Global comply with its commitments under the RSA and the Equity Commitment Letter. As the trial judge stated at para. 123, the result of this was the Port Transaction, which was:

[A]n exercise in self-dealing in that Algoma's critical Port asset was transferred out of Algoma to a wholly owned subsidiary of Essar Global with a change of control provision that benefitted Essar Global at a time that a future insolvency was a possibility.

87 Moreover, there was no evidence that the Board even considered whether protection to GIP could be provided in the absence of the change of control provision in favour of Portco and hence Essar Global. This failure was unreasonable.

#### (6) Remedy

The trial judge stated at para. 136 that if there were no less obtrusive way to remedy the oppression, he would have ordered that Portco's shares be transferred to Algoma. However, mindful that a remedy for oppression should be approached with a scalpel, he instead relied on s. 241(3) of the *CBCA* to order a variation of the Port Transaction. He accordingly deleted s. 15.2 of the Cargo Handling Agreement and inserted a provision in the Assignment of Material Contracts Agreement, which provided that, if GIP becomes the equity owner of Portco, its consent would be required for a change of control of Algoma. He rejected the suggestion that either GIP or Essar Global were taken by surprise by this relief.

He also addressed the imbalance created by the 50-year term of the lease between Algoma and Portco as against the 20year term of the Cargo Handling Agreement (with automatic renewal for successive three year periods, barring either party's termination). As the Port was critical to Algoma's operation and survival, Algoma's ability under the Cargo Handling Agreement to refuse an extension after 20 years was illusory and, in reality, the renewal provision was one-sided in favour of Essar Global.

90 He concluded at para. 144 that the payments under the Cargo Handling Agreement were an unreasonable benefit in favour of Essar Global. If the Agreement lasted only the initial 20-year term, Portco/Essar Global would receive US\$300 million after GIP's loan was paid off. If the Agreement was not terminated before the end of its 50 year life, Portco/Essar Global would receive an additional US\$750 million for the last 30 years.

Accordingly, the trial judge ordered that the lease, the Cargo Handling Agreement, and the Shared Services Agreement be amended to provide Algoma with the option to terminate any of these three agreements once GIP's loan matured and was paid. If Portco elected not to renew after 20 years, or any of the three-year extensions, those three agreements would terminate, and Algoma would then owe Portco US\$4.2 million plus interest.

92 The trial judge decided at para. 147 that the appropriate place for Portco to assert its claims for a declaration that the US \$19.8 million promissory note had been paid as a result of set-off and for amounts owing under the Cargo Handling Agreement was in the ongoing *CCAA* proceedings.

# (7) Costs

<sup>93</sup> Lastly, following the release of the judgment, Essar Global agreed to pay costs of CDN\$1.17 million to the Monitor. The trial judge then ordered Essar Global to pay Algoma CDN\$1.5 million in costs and ordered that no costs be payable by the Monitor or by or to GIP.

#### C. ISSUES

94 There are eight issues to be addressed:

1. Did the Monitor lack standing to be a complainant under s. 238 of the CBCA?

2. Could the claim of the Monitor only be brought as a derivative action under s. 239 of the *CBCA* rather than an oppression action under s. 241 of the *CBCA*?

- 3. Did the trial judge err in his analysis of reasonable expectations?
- 4. Did the trial judge err in his analysis of wrongful conduct and harm?
- 5. Did the trial judge err in tailoring a remedy?
- 6. Was there procedural unfairness?
- 7. Should the fresh evidence be admitted?
- 8. Should leave to appeal costs be granted to GIP and the costs award varied?

#### **D. ANALYSIS**

#### (1) Standing of the Monitor

Essar Global submits that the Monitor is not a proper complainant given the conflict between it and the stakeholders it represents. The trial judge failed to consider whether the Monitor could avoid conflicts.

GIP supports the position of Essar Global. It states that the trial judge erred in assuming that the court's broad jurisdiction under the *CCAA* could be combined with the equally broad jurisdiction under the *CBCA* to create a super remedy that would interfere with the contractual rights of non-offending third parties. A trustee in bankruptcy is a representative of the creditors of the bankrupt. A monitor owes duties to all stakeholders, not just creditors. Its duty to Essar Global as sole shareholder of Algoma cannot be reconciled with the Monitor's oppression claim against it. Also, Algoma can be directed to make the Cargo Handling Agreement payments to GIP directly and therefore the Monitor owed a fiduciary duty to GIP.

97 In addressing this issue, I will first discuss the evolution of the role of a monitor. I will then discuss who can be a complainant under the *CBCA* oppression provisions. Lastly, I will consider whether in the particular circumstances of this case, the trial judge was correct in concluding that the Monitor could have standing to bring an oppression action.

#### (a) The Purpose of CCAA Restructurings

98 As has been repeatedly described, the *CCAA* was originally enacted in 1933 to respond to the ravages of the Great Depression and to allow large corporations with outstanding bonds and debentures to restructure their debt in a court-supervised process through plans of arrangement or compromise negotiated with their creditors.

As outlined by Deschamps J. in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re,* 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Century Services], the *CCAA* fell into disuse after amendments in 1953 that limited its application to companies issuing bonds. Courts breathed new life into the statute in the early 1980s in response to an economic recession, and the *CCAA* became the primary vehicle through which major restructurings were attempted. Amendments to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C.

1985, c. B-3 (the "*BIA*"), introduced in 1992, allowed insolvent debtors to make proposals to creditors under that statute, and were expected to supplant the *CCAA*. However, the *CCAA* continues to be employed as the vehicle of choice to restructure large corporations, particularly where flexibility is needed in the restructuring process: Roderick J. Wood, *Bankruptcy & Insolvency Law*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015), at pp. 336-337; and *Century Services*, at para. 13.

100 The corporate restructuring process at the heart of the *CCAA* "provide[s] a constructive solution for all stakeholders when a company has become insolvent": *Indalex Ltd., Re,* 2013 SCC 6, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 (S.C.C.), at para. 205. There are a number of justifications for why such a process is desirable. The traditional justification for *CCAA*-enabled restructurings, as explained by Duff C.J. shortly after the statute's enactment, was to rescue financially-distressed corporations without forcing them to first declare bankruptcy: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.), at p. 661.

101 The restructuring process can also allow creditors to obtain a higher recovery than may otherwise be available to them through bankruptcy or other liquidation proceedings, by preserving the corporate entity or the value of its business as a going concern: Wood, at pp. 338-339. Additionally, restructuring proceedings can provide an opportunity to evaluate the root of a corporation's financial difficulties, and develop strategies to achieve a turnaround, whether the best option be a full restructuring, or a liquidation of the corporation within the restructuring regime: Wood, at p. 340.

102 The benefits of the restructuring process are not limited to creditors. Even early commentary lauded restructurings as promoting the public interest by salvaging corporations that supply goods or services important to the economy, and that employ large numbers of people: see Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, at p. 593. This view remains applicable today, with restructurings "justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation": *Century Services*, at para. 18.

103 To summarize, by enabling the restructuring process, the *CCAA* can achieve multiple objectives. It permits corporations to rehabilitate and maintain viability despite liquidity issues. It allows for the development of business strategies to preserve going-concern value. It seeks to maximize creditor recovery. It can serve to preserve employment and trade relationships, protecting non-creditor shareholders and the communities within which the corporation operates: see Janis P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2013), at pp. 13-17. The flexibility inherent in the restructuring process permits a broad balancing of these objectives and the multiple stakeholder interests engaged when a corporation faces insolvency.

104 It is against this background that the role of a monitor must be considered.

#### (b) The Role of the Monitor

105 Originally, the *CCAA* was a very slim statute and made no mention of a monitor. Born of the court's inherent jurisdiction, the term "monitor" was first used in *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257 (B.C. S.C.). In that case, an interim receiver was appointed whose role was described at p. 277 as that of a monitor or watchdog. As a watchdog, the monitor could "observe the conduct of management and the operation of the business while a plan was being formulated": A.J.F. Kent and W. Rostom, "The Auditor as Monitor in CCAA Proceedings: What is the Debate?" (2008), online: Mondaq www.mondaq.com. The monitor was thus a court-appointed officer.

The 1997 amendments to the *CCAA* gave legislative recognition to the role of the monitor and made the appointment mandatory. The 2007 amendments to the *CCAA* expanded the description of the monitor's role and responsibilities. In essence, its minimum powers are set out in the Act and they may be augmented through the exercise of discretion by the court, typically the *CCAA* supervising judge. This framework is reflected in s. 23 of the *CCAA*, which enumerates certain duties and functions of a monitor. Paragraph 23(1)(k) directs that a monitor shall carry out "any other functions in relation to the company that the court may direct." Its express duties under s. 23(1)(c) include making, or causing to be made, any appraisal or investigation that the monitor "considers necessary to determine with reasonable accuracy the state of the company's business and financial affairs and the cause of its financial difficulties or insolvency". It is then to file a report on its findings. 107 Not surprisingly, as with the *CCAA* itself, the role of the monitor has evolved over time. As stated by David Mann and Neil Narfason in their article entitled "The Changing Role of the Monitor" (2008) 24 Bank. & Fin. L. Rev. 131, at p. 132:

Born out of invention, the role has developed from one of passive observer to one of active participant. The monitor has enhanced communication, mediated disputes, provided input into plans of reorganization, and provided expert advice in complex affairs. As the business community has become more sophisticated and global, so too has the monitor — taking on larger mandates, often times involving complex, cross-border restructurings.

108 Examples of the use of expanded powers for a monitor are found in *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 67 B.C.L.R. (2d) 385 (B.C. C.A.), where the British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered a monitor to report on the causes of financial problems of the company and report on improper payments made to management, shareholders and directors, and in *Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 332 (B.C. S.C.), where Tysoe J. (as he then was) held that a monitor was to review all transactions and conveyances for fraud, preferences, or other reviewable features and act in a similar manner to a trustee in bankruptcy.

109 Under s. 11.7(1) of the *CCAA*, a monitor must be a licensed trustee in bankruptcy, and as such, under s. 13 of the *BIA*, is subject to the supervision of the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. The monitor is to be the eyes and the ears of the court and sometimes, as is the case here, the nose. The monitor is to be independent and impartial, must treat all parties reasonably and fairly, and is to conduct itself in a manner consistent with the objectives of the *CCAA* and its restructuring purpose. In the course of a *CCAA* proceeding, a monitor frequently takes positions; indeed it is required by statute to do so. See for example s. 23 of the *CCAA* that describes certain duties of a monitor.

110 Of necessity, the positions taken will favour certain stakeholders over others depending on the context. Again, as stated by Messrs. Kent and Rostom:

Quite fairly, monitors state that creditors and the Court currently expect them to express opinions and make recommendations. . . . [T]he expanded role of the monitor forces the monitor more and more into the fray. Monitors have become less the detached observer and expert witness contemplated by the Court decisions, and more of an active participant or party in the proceedings.

#### (c) A Monitor as Complainant in an Oppression Action

111 Turning to the issue of a monitor and an oppression action, there is some difference in academic opinion on the suitability of the oppression remedy in insolvency proceedings. Professor Stephanie Ben-Ishai has argued that the remedy should be unavailable for use once the debtor has entered a court-supervised reorganization under the *BIA* or the *CCAA*. <sup>5</sup> Professor Janis Sarra has countered that the oppression remedy continues to be an important corporate law remedy that should be available in such proceedings. <sup>6</sup> I do not understand the appellants to be taking the former position; rather they simply argue that the Monitor has no standing.

#### 112 Section 238 of the *CBCA* defines a complainant as:

(a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates,

(b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or any of its affiliates,

(c) the Director, or

(d) any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an application under this Part.

For the purposes of this analysis, s. 238(d) is the relevant subsection.

113 Section 241*o*f the *CBCA* describes the oppression remedy:

(1) A complainant may apply to a court for an order under this section.

(2) If, on an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates

(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result,

(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or

(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner

that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an order to rectify the matters complained of.

114 The question here is whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the Monitor had standing to be a complainant. There are two elements to this analysis: can a monitor be a complainant under the *CBCA*; and should the Monitor have been a complainant in this case? I would answer both questions affirmatively.

As is clear from s. 238(d) of the *CBCA*, a court exercises its discretion in determining who may be a complainant, and this discretion is broad. There has been much jurisprudence on who qualifies as a complainant. In *Olympia & York*, a trustee in bankruptcy, acting on behalf of the creditors of the bankrupt estate, was entitled to be a complainant in an oppression action involving an oppressive agreement between the debtor and a non-arm's length party. As this court said in that case at para. 45:

... the trustee is neither automatically barred from being a complainant nor automatically entitled to that status. It is for the judge at first instance to determine in the exercise of his or her discretion whether in the circumstances of the particular case, the trustee is a proper person to be a complainant.

Admittedly, a monitor differs from a trustee in bankruptcy in that the latter represents the interests of the creditors whereas the monitor has a broader mandate. However, like a trustee in bankruptcy, a monitor is neither automatically barred from being a complainant nor automatically entitled to that status.

117 Section 241 speaks of *a* proper person, not *the* proper person, therefore allowing for discretion to be exercised in the face of more than one proper person. The appellants did not direct us to any authority saying that a monitor could not be a complainant. Paragraph 23(1)(k) of the *CCAA* expressly provides that a monitor shall carry out any functions in relation to the company that the court may direct. Moreover, s. 23(1)(c) directs a monitor to conduct any investigation that the monitor considers necessary to determine the state of the company's business and financial affairs. It does not strain credulity that this responsibility will frequently place a monitor at odds with the shareholders or other stakeholders.

Additionally, there is nothing in the *CCAA* itself to suggest that a monitor cannot be authorized to act as a complainant. Indeed, the broad language of s. 11 of the *CCAA*, which permits a supervising court to "make any order it considers appropriate in the circumstances", is permissive of such orders. As this court and the Supreme Court have made clear, the broad language of s. 11 "should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders": *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, 2016 ONCA 662, 39 C.B.R. (6th) 173 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 79, citing *Century Services*, at para. 70. Courts can, and sometimes should, make "creative orders" in the context of *CCAA* proceedings: *U.S. Steel*, at paras. 80, 86-87.

Generally speaking, the monitor plays a neutral role in a *CCAA* proceeding. To the extent it takes positions, typically those positions should be in support of a restructuring purpose. As stated by this court in *Ivaco Inc., Re* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 49-53, a monitor is not necessarily a fiduciary; it only becomes one if the court specifically assigns it a responsibility to which fiduciary duties attach.

120 However, in exceptional circumstances, it may be appropriate for a monitor to serve as a complainant. In my view, this is one such case.

Here, in para. 37(c) of the Amended and Restated Initial *CCAA* Order dated November 20, 2015, the Monitor was directed to investigate whether there were potential related party transactions that should be reviewed. It then reported back to the supervising *CCAA* judge that there were, and on that basis the *CCAA* judge authorized the Monitor to commence proceedings under s. 241 of the *CBCA*. The Monitor proceeded with the oppression action in the interests of the restructuring consistent with the objectives of the *CCAA*. The trial judge ultimately found that aspects of the Port Transaction, such as the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement that gave Essar Global control over who can be a buyer of the Algoma business, were oppressive and also harmful to the restructuring process. The Monitor took the action as an "adjunct to its role in facilitating a restructuring".

122 Moreover, it cannot be said that the Monitor was a fiduciary. Indeed, the appellants did not say this in their pleadings, opening submissions, or closing submissions before the trial judge. The remedy granted by the trial judge was directed at the oppression and removed an insurmountable barrier to a successful restructuring. In addition, it was brought in the face of Essar Global demonstrating a continuous desire to acquire Algoma and, as evident from the letter sent by its counsel, a desire to discourage others from doing so.

123 It will be a rare occasion that a monitor will be authorized to be a complainant. Factors a *CCAA* supervising judge should consider when exercising discretion as to whether a monitor should be authorized to be a complainant include whether:

(i) there is a *prima facie* case that merits an oppression action or application;

(ii) the proposed action or application itself has a restructuring purpose, that is to say, materially advances or removes an impediment to a restructuring; and

(iii) any other stakeholder is better placed to be a complainant.

These factors are not exhaustive, and none of them is necessarily dispositive; they are simply factors to consider.

124 In the circumstances that presented themselves here, the *CCAA* supervising judge was justified in providing authorization. A *prima facie* case had been established; the Monitor had reviewed and reported to the court on related party transactions; the oppression action served to remove an insurmountable obstacle to the restructuring; and the Monitor could efficiently advance an oppression claim, representing a conglomeration of stakeholders, namely the pensioners, retirees, employees, and trade creditors, who were not organized as a group and who were all similarly affected by the alleged oppressive conduct.

125 Quite apart from meeting the aforementioned criteria, I would also observe that as the presiding judge in the *CCAA* proceeding and the trial judge, Newbould J. had insight into the dynamics of the restructuring and was well positioned to supervise all parties including the Monitor to ensure that no unfairness or unwarranted impartiality occurred.

Lastly, I do accept the appellants' position that the *Nortel* proceedings relied upon by the trial judge in support of his conclusion were quite different from this case. In *Nortel*, the monitor's powers were expanded by an order authorizing the Monitor to exercise any powers properly exercisable by a Board of Directors of Nortel or its subsidiaries. But this expansion was a response to the resignations of the Boards of Nortel and its subsidiaries, not, as here, a response to the results of investigations the Monitor had been directed to pursue. That said, the case does illustrate the need to avoid rigid definition of a monitor's role and responsibilities.

127 In conclusion, I would not give effect to the appellants' submission that the trial judge erred in granting the Monitor standing to pursue an action for oppression.

#### (2) Derivative or Oppression Action

128 In addition to attacking the standing of the Monitor to bring the action, the appellants also submit that the Monitor was precluded from bringing the action in the form of an oppression remedy proceeding pursuant to s. 241 of the *CBCA*. In their view, the action could only have been brought as a derivative action pursuant to s. 239 of that *Act*. They say the claim asserted

is a corporate claim belonging to Algoma, if anyone, and the stakeholders, on whose behalf the Monitor asserts the claim, were not harmed directly or personally but only derivatively through harm done to Algoma. I disagree.

129 In support of their submission, the appellants rely heavily on the decision of this Court in *Wildeboer*. This case is not *Wildeboer*, however.

130 In *Wildeboer*, "insiders" who controlled the corporation had misappropriated many millions of dollars from the corporation. The *sole claim* advanced by the complainant minority shareholder by way of oppression remedy was for the return of the misappropriated funds *to the corporation*. There was *no claim* asserted by the complainant, of any kind, *for a personal remedy qua shareholder*. As the court noted at para. 45, "[t]he substantive remedy claimed is the disgorgement of all the ill-gotten gains back to Martinrea [the corporation in question]."

131 The *Wildeboer* decision must be read in that context. It does not stand for the proposition that in all cases where there has been a wrong done to the corporation, the action must be brought as a derivative action. Consistent with a number of other authorities, this court expressly re-affirmed the principles that the derivative action and the oppression remedy are not mutually exclusive and that there may be circumstances giving rise to overlapping derivative actions and oppression remedies where harm is done both to the corporation and to stakeholders in their separate stakeholder capacities. This is clear from para. 26:

I accept that the derivative action and the oppression remedy are not mutually exclusive. Cases like *Malata* [*Malata Group* (*HK*) *Ltd. v. Jung*, 2008 ONCA 111, 89 O.R. (3d) 36] and *Jabalee* [*Jabalee v. Abalmark Inc.*, [1996] O.J. No. 2609 (C.A.)] make it clear that there are circumstances where the factual underpinning will give rise to both types of redress and in which a complainant will nonetheless be entitled to proceed by way of oppression. Other examples include: *Ontario (Securities Commission) v. McLaughlin*, [1987] O.J. No. 1247 (Ont. H.C.); *Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Canada* (1992), 12 O.R. (3d) 131 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Covington Fund Inc. v. White*, [2000] O.J. No. 4589 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff'd [2001] O.J. No. 3918 (Ont. Div. Ct.); *Waxman v. Waxman*, [2004] O.J. No. 1765 (C.A.), at para. 526, leave to appeal refused, (2005), [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 291 (S.C.C.).

132 Or, as Armstrong J.A. put it in Malata Group (HK) Ltd. v. Jung [2008 CarswellOnt 699 (Ont. C.A.)], at para. 30:

[T]here is not a bright line distinction between the claims that may be advanced under the derivative action section of the Act and those that may be advanced under the oppression remedy provisions.

133 In short, there will be circumstances in which a stakeholder suffers harm in the stakeholder's capacity as stakeholder, from the same wrongful conduct that causes harm to the corporation. In my opinion — unlike in *Wildeboer*, where the harm alleged was solely harm to the corporation — this case falls into the overlapping category.

For the purposes of this analysis, it is the nature of the claim put forward by the claimants, on whose behalf the Monitor was pursuing the oppression remedy, that must be examined. As the trial judge noted at para. 31, the Monitor initially cast quite widely the net of stakeholders affected by the Port Transaction and on whose behalf it was claiming a remedy. By the time of the hearing, however, the net's reach had been narrowed to Algoma's trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees.

135 In oppression remedy parlance, the nub of the exercise lies in determining whether the claimant has identified a "reasonable expectation" and shown that it has been violated by wrongful conduct that is "oppressive" (in the broad sense contemplated by the *Act*) of the interests of the claimant: see *BCE*. The Monitor asserted at the hearing, and the trial judge found at para. 75:

[T]hat the reasonable expectations of the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees of Algoma were that Algoma would not deal with a critical asset like the Port in such a way as to lose long-term control over such a strategic asset to a related party on terms that permitted the related party to veto and control Algoma's ability to do significant transactions or restructure and which gave unwarranted value to the third party.

136 It was alleged, and the trial judge found, that these reasonable expectations had been violated both by aspects of the Port Transaction itself, and by the change of control veto provided to Portco, and thus Essar Global, in the Port Transaction.

137 The appellants argue that the reasonable expectations asserted relate only to harm done to Algoma. The trial judge disagreed, as do I. As he concluded at para. 37:

Aspects of the Port Transaction, such as the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement that gives the parent control over who can be a buyer of the Algoma business, are harmful to a restructuring process <u>and negatively</u> <u>impact creditors</u>. [Emphasis added]

138 On this basis, at para. 40, the trial judge distinguished *Wildeboer* because the Monitor was asserting "that the personal interests of the creditors ha[d] been affected."

139 The appellants place considerable emphasis on certain language contained in *Wildeboer* to the effect that, in circumstances where there may be overlapping derivative and oppression claims, the wrong must both harm the corporation and must also affect the claimant's "individualized personal interests". They interpret these comments as mandating not only that each claimant must suffer an identifiable individual harm but also that this harm must be different from other individualized personal harms suffered by others in their same class.

140 For example, the appellants rely on certain aspects of the following comments by this court at paras. 29, 32-33 of *Wildeboer*:

On my reading of the authorities, in the cases where an oppression claim has been permitted to proceed even though the wrongs asserted were wrongs to the corporation, those same wrongful acts have, for the most part, also directly affected the complainant in a manner that was different from the indirect effect of the conduct on similarly placed complainants.

. . .

The appellants are not asserting that their personal interests as shareholders have been adversely affected in any way other than the type of harm that has been suffered by all shareholders as a collectivity. Mr. Rea — the only director plaintiff — does not plead that the Improper Transactions have impacted his interest *qua* director.

Since the creation of the oppression remedy, courts have taken a broad and flexible approach to its application, in keeping with the broad and flexible form of relief it is intended to provide. However, the appellants' open-ended approach to the oppression remedy in circumstances where the facts support a derivative action on behalf of the corporation misses a significant point: the impugned conduct must harm the complainant personally, not just the body corporate, *i.e.*, the collectivity of shareholders as a whole.

141 While pertinent to the *Wildeboer* context, some of the foregoing language, when read in isolation and out of context, may be misconceived when it comes to a more general application. However, I do not read *Wildeboer* as precluding an oppression remedy in respect of individuals forming a homogenous group of stakeholders — for example, trade creditors, employees, retirees, or pensioners — simply because each of them, separately, may have suffered the same type of individualized harm.

142 Instead, I read the reference at para. 29 to the complainant being directly affected "in a manner that was different from the indirect effect of the conduct on similarly placed complainants" to be another way of capturing the notion expressed in paras. 32-33 that the individualized harm is to be distinct from conduct harming only "the body corporate, *i.e.*, the collectivity of shareholders as a whole."

Were the appellants correct in their submissions, as counsel for the Monitor points out, this court would not have upheld an oppression remedy on behalf of *all* shareholders of a company that had suffered harm as a result of a non-market executive compensation contract: see *UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc.* (2002), 214 D.L.R. (4th) 496 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), aff'd (2004), 42 B.L.R. (3d) 34 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 153. Nor would it have upheld an oppression remedy claim on behalf of *a class* of shareholders who were harmed as a result of the existence of a transfer pricing regime that was disadvantageous to the company, as it did in *Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. Ontario (Municipal Employees Retirement Board)* (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 81 (Ont. C.A.). *Wildeboer* contains no suggestion that these authorities are no longer good law; nor would it have done.

The same may be said, in my view, about a group of creditors who have suffered similar harm from a corporate wrong that affects both their interests as creditors and the interests of the corporation. While the oppression remedy is not available as redress for a simple contractual breach (such as the failure to pay a debt), it has long been held to be available, in appropriate circumstances, to creditors whose interests "have been compromised by unlawful and internal corporate manoeuvres against which the creditor cannot effectively protect itself": *J.S.M. Corp. (Ontario) Ltd. v. Brick Furniture Warehouse Ltd.*, 2008 ONCA 183, 41 B.L.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 66. See also: *Fedel v. Tan*, 2010 ONCA 473, 101 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 56.

145 The question is whether the impugned conduct is "oppressive" (in the broad sense contemplated by the *CBCA*) and, if so, whether the stakeholder has suffered harm in its capacity as a stakeholder as a result of that conduct.

Moreover, the circumstances that presented themselves emphasize the need for flexibility in the availability of the oppression remedy. The court and the Monitor were faced with *prima facie* evidence of oppression including bad faith and self-dealing. There was *prima facie* evidence of personal harm to the pensioners, employees, retirees, and trade creditors. While leave of the court is required for a derivative action, in substance, in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding, court supervision is present, thereby neutralizing the need for the derivative action procedural safeguard of leave.

147 I would also note that GIP argues that the decision not to bring this action by way of derivative action may have been a strategic decision made because Algoma was contractually prohibited from seeking to set aside or vary the contracts arising from the Port Transaction, including the Cargo Handling Agreement and the lease. If anything, this argument supports the conclusion that it was appropriate for this action to be brought as an oppression claim.

148 In conclusion, at law, the Monitor was at liberty to bring an action for oppression. I will now turn to the issue of reasonable expectations.

#### (3) Reasonable Expectations

149 Essar Global and GIP submit that the trial judge erred in his analysis of reasonable expectations. They argue that there was no evidence of any subjectively held expectations, that the trial judge did not consider whether the expectations were objectively reasonable, and that he failed to consider factors identified in *BCE*.

150 The Monitor and Algoma respond by saying that the existence of reasonable expectations is a question of fact that can be proved by direct evidence or by the drawing of reasonable inferences. In this case, the trial judge properly considered the evidence that was before him to conclude that the pensioners, employees, retirees, and trade creditors held expectations that had been violated and that those expectations were objectively reasonable.

151 In his analysis, the trial judge correctly identified the two prongs of the oppression inquiry identified by the Supreme Court at para. 68 of *BCE*: (i) does the evidence support the reasonable expectation asserted by a claimant; and (ii) does the evidence establish that the reasonable expectation was violated by conduct falling within the terms "oppression", "unfair prejudice", or "unfair disregard" of a relevant interest?

152 In identifying these two prongs, at paras. 58-59, the Supreme Court made two preliminary observations:

First, oppression is an equitable remedy. It seeks to ensure fairness — what is "just and equitable". It gives a court broad, equitable jurisdiction to enforce not just what is legal but what is fair. . . . It follows that courts considering claims for oppression should look at business realities, not merely narrow legalities.

Second, like many equitable remedies, oppression is fact-specific. What is just and equitable is judged by the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders in the context and in regard to the relationships at play. Conduct that may be oppressive in one situation may not be in another. [Citations omitted.]

153 As also stated in *BCE* at para. 71:

Actual unlawfulness is not required to invoke s. 241; the provision applies "where the impugned conduct is wrongful, even if it is not actually unlawful." The remedy is focused on concepts of fairness and equity rather than on legal rights. In determining whether there is a reasonable expectation or interest to be considered, the court looks beyond legality to what is fair, given all the interests at play.

Evidence of an expectation "may take many forms depending on the facts of the case": *BCE*, at para. 70. The "actual expectation of a particular stakeholder is not conclusive": *BCE*, at para. 62. Furthermore, a stakeholder's reasonable expectation of fair treatment "may be readily inferred", because fundamentally all stakeholders are entitled to expect fair treatment: *BCE*, at paras. 64, 70. Once the expectation at issue is identified, the focus of the inquiry is on whether it has been established that the particular expectation was reasonably held: *BCE*, at para. 70.

155 The Monitor particularized the reasonable expectations in issue. It stated that the stakeholders had reasonable expectations that the Essar Group would not cause Algoma to engage in transactions for their benefit to the detriment of Algoma and its stakeholders, cause Algoma to transfer long-term control over an irreplaceable and core strategic asset of Algoma (*i.e.* the Port) to the Essar Group, and, among other things, provide the Essar Group with a veto. The source and content of the expectations were stated by the Monitor to include commercial practice, the nature of Algoma, and past practice. These particulars would all feed an expectation of fair treatment.

156 Based on the reasonable expectations particularized by the Monitor, as already noted, the trial judge found at para. 75 that:

[T]he reasonable expectations of the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees of Algoma were that Algoma would not deal with a critical asset like the Port in such a way as to lose long-term control over such a strategic asset to a related party on terms that permitted the related party to veto and control Algoma's ability to do significant transactions or restructure and which gave unwarranted value to the third party.

157 There was evidence of subjective expectations before the trial judge. For example, at para. 65 of his reasons, the trial judge considered the evidence of subjective expectations of two trade creditors explaining that they were unaware of the Port Transaction and would not have expected an outcome in which Algoma no longer had full control over the Port facility.

158 The trial judge also drew reasonable inferences from the evidence and circumstances that existed at Algoma in 2014 in support of the expectations relied upon by the Monitor, as he was entitled to do: see *Ford Motor*, at para. 65. In that regard, he noted that Algoma had gone through a number of insolvencies and restructurings since the early 1990s. Given the cyclical nature of the steel business, it was reasonable for the stakeholders to expect a restructuring in the future. The reasonableness of this restructuring-related expectation was confirmed by GIP's insistence on a "bankruptcy remote" structure for its loan "given the fluctuating prices of steel and Algoma's history of insolvencies", as GIP said in its factum.

159 Based on the evidence of subjective expectations and the reasonable inferences the trial judge drew from the record, it cannot be said that there was no evidence supporting the trial judge's conclusion that a future restructuring was not reasonably foreseeable.

160 The trial judge also concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the stakeholders to expect, as he noted at para. 73, that Algoma would not lose its ability to restructure absent the consent of Essar Global — particularly in Sault Ste. Marie, where Algoma is the major industry on which trade creditors and employees rely. Put differently, it would not be reasonable to expect that the shareholder would have the right to veto any restructuring in a *CCAA* proceeding in which it was not an applicant and

have the right to prefer its own interests over those of others such as the retirees, pensioners, trade creditors, and employees. Contrary to the assertions of the appellants, the trial judge expressly considered those issues.

161 Similarly, Essar Global submits that the foreseeability of another insolvency was contradicted by Mr. Marwah's affidavit evidence on the application for approval of the Plan of Arrangement, where he deposed that he believed that Algoma would be solvent. I would not give effect to this argument, as the trial judge's conclusion on the foreseeability of the insolvency is a factual finding, based on his review of the record as a whole. Essar Global has not demonstrated that this finding is subject to any palpable and overriding error.

162 The appellants' complaint that the trial judge failed to consider any of the factors identified in *BCE* is also misplaced. In that decision, the Supreme Court stated at para. 62:

As denoted by "reasonable", the concept of reasonable expectations is objective and contextual. . . . In the context of whether it would be "just and equitable" to grant a remedy, the question is whether the expectation is reasonable having regard to the facts of the specific case, the relationships at issue, and the entire context, including the fact that there may be conflicting claims and expectations.

Essar Global's argument that the trial judge did not turn his mind to the *BCE* factors ignores the trial judge's explicit reasons on this point. At para. 68 of his decision, the trial judge referred to the factors identified by the Supreme Court as "useful" in determining whether an expectation was reasonable. These factors include: i) general commercial practice; ii) the nature of the corporation; iii) the relationship between the parties; iv) past practice; v) steps the claimant could have taken to protect itself; vi) representations and agreements; and vii) the fair resolution of conflicting interests between corporate stakeholders.

164 The trial judge correctly noted that, due to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry into reasonable expectations, not all listed factors must be satisfied in any particular case. I agree with his conclusion. The *BCE* factors are "not hard and fast rules", but are merely intended to "guide the court in its contextual analysis": Dennis H. Peterson and Matthew J. Cumming, *Shareholder Remedies in Canada*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017), at ]§17.47.

Nonetheless, the trial judge did consider a number of the *BCE* factors based on the facts before him. For instance, at para. 68, he concluded that Algoma's prior sale of a non-critical asset, relating to factor iv), past practice, was not helpful in determining reasonable expectations. This was because the sale of a non-critical asset differs from the sale of a critical asset, as in the Port Transaction. Also under the rubric of past practices, he considered Algoma's prior insolvencies and restructuring proceedings. He concluded that while it was reasonable for stakeholders to expect that significant corporate changes might be necessary for Algoma in the future, it was not reasonable for them to expect that Algoma would lose its ability to restructure without the prior agreement of its parent, Essar Global.

166 As the trial judge's reasons reveal, he specifically considered the *BCE* factors and made findings on the objective reasonableness of the expectations at issue. I endorse the comments of the Monitor found at para. 80 of its factum:

In this case, Justice Newbould found that the employees, retirees, and trade creditors all had a reasonable expectation that Essar Group would not engineer a transaction that deprived Algoma of a key strategic asset, rendering it incapable of restructuring or engaging in significant transactions without the approval of Essar Global, for minimal cash consideration in circumstances where there had been no consideration of alternative transactions. This was entirely supported by the entirety of the record adduced at trial.

167 This was essentially a factual exercise. There was conflicting evidence before the trial judge. However it was for the trial judge to weigh the evidence and make factual findings. That is what he did. Based on the record before him, those factual findings were available to him. He considered both subjective expectations and whether the expectations were objectively reasonable. I see no reason to interfere.

168 I therefore reject the appellants' submissions on reasonable expectations.

#### (4) Wrongful Conduct and Harm

169 Essar Global also takes issue with the trial judge's conclusion that Essar Global's conduct was wrongful and harmful.

170 First, Essar Global submits that the trial judge inappropriately relied on the Equity Commitment Letter. It argues that the court approved the amended Plan of Arrangement that released Essar Global from any claim relating to the Equity Commitment Letter, and that reliance on a released obligation in connection with the wrongful conduct requirement of oppression was an impermissible collateral attack on the approval order.

171 I disagree. I can state no more clearly than the trial judge did at para. 100 of his reasons:

The Monitor is not making a claim under the Equity Commitment Letter or asking that Essar Global provide the equity it agreed to provide in that commitment. Nor is the Monitor asking that the release be set aside. The Monitor contends, and I agree, that the failure of Essar Global to fund as agreed in the RSA and Equity Commitment Letter is a part of the factual circumstances to be taken into account in considering whether the affected stakeholders who were not party to the agreements were treated fairly by the Port Transaction.

172 An amended Plan of Arrangement became necessary when Essar Global did not provide the promised equity contribution, the roadshow presentations were unsuccessful, and the Port Transaction was the only available means to generate sufficient cash for Algoma.

173 I also note that the trial judge recognized that the trade creditors, the employees, pensioners and retirees were not parties to nor did they play any role in the amended Plan of Arrangement proceedings. Although the release was in both the original RSA and the amended RSA, it would appear that there was no express reference to the Port Transaction being part of the Plan of Arrangement, nor was there any mention of it in any endorsement or the order approving the amended Plan of Arrangement.

174 In addition, the trial judge did not make his finding of wrongful conduct based on Essar Global's breach of the Equity Commitment Letter. Rather, he found that the totality of Essar Global's conduct regarding the Recapitalization and Port Transaction satisfied the wrongful conduct requirement.

175 Taken in context, the trial judge made no error in his treatment of the release in favour of Essar Global.

176 Second, Essar Global submits that the trial judge made factual errors relating to Essar Global's cash contributions. In particular, it submits that he erred in concluding that the cash Essar Global did advance in the recapitalization, namely US\$150 million rather than the US\$250 to US\$300 million that was originally promised, was generated by the Port Transaction when it was not. They also complain that he erred in granting an oppression remedy when the Equity Commitment Letter provided for a limited remedy in the event of a breach.

177 The reasons of the trial judge on Essar Global's cash contribution are admittedly somewhat confusing. In para. 20 of his reasons, he states that Essar Global's revised cash contribution under the amended RSA was "to be funded largely not by Essar Global but by a loan from third party lenders to Portco of \$150 million." Reading that paragraph in isolation might lend credence to the appellants' submission. That said, having regard to the record before him and reading the reasons as a whole, I am not persuaded that the trial judge misunderstood Essar Global's contribution to the recapitalization.

178 The relevant contributions made to Algoma in November 2014 consisted of:

• US\$150 million in cash from Essar Global under the amended RSA;

• US\$150 million in debt reduction in the form of loan forgiveness for certain loans owed by Algoma to members of the Essar Group under the amended RSA; and

• US\$150 million in cash generated from the Port Transaction.

Essar Global only provided Algoma with US\$150 million in cash equity, not the US\$250 to 300 million in cash equity it had originally promised. The debt forgiveness would not assist Algoma in addressing its impending liquidity issues in the same way a cash injection would. Additionally, as the trial judge noted at para. 88, the US\$150 million in debt reduction related to loans at the bottom of Algoma's capital structure, and therefore this reduction was of "questionable value" to Algoma at the time.

Algoma, the Monitor and Essar Global all provided the trial judge with written submissions describing the cash equity contribution as consisting of US\$150 million in cash from Essar Global and US\$150 million in cash from the Port Transaction. The contributions were also repeatedly referenced in the record. For example, the affidavit of Mr. Seifert — which the trial judge considered in great detail — clearly sets out Essar Global's cash contribution to Algoma and the US\$150 million in cash paid by Portco to Algoma under the Port Transaction as separate transactions. Similarly, these contributions are described as separate transactions in the affidavits of Messrs. Marwah and Ghosh.

181 The trial judge's reasons establish that he understood that there were two separate cash payments made to Algoma — one made by Essar Global in satisfaction of its commitments under the amended RSA and one made by Portco under the Port Transaction. He also understood that these cash payments were made in addition to Essar Global's forgiveness of US\$150 million debt owed to it by Algoma.

Specifically, at para. 85, the trial judge noted that in October 2014, after the original RSA had been executed, Essar Global contemplated reducing the amount of its cash contribution promised under the RSA and the Equity Commitment Letter. The roadshow presentation prepared regarding Algoma's capitalization showed that Essar Global proposed to contribute less than US\$100 million of *cash* rather than the US\$250-\$300 million required. He obviously understood that there was to be a cash component to Essar Global's contribution separate and apart from the proceeds of the Port Transaction.

In addition, at para. 88, the trial judge noted that the Port Transaction "*reduced* the amount of cash equity previously promised by Essar Global to be advanced to Algoma" (emphasis added). This shows that the trial judge understood that the proceeds from the Port Transaction were not *replacing* Essar Global's promised cash contribution. The trial judge recognized that the cash equity contribution of US\$150 million and the debt reduction of US\$150 million were insufficient to successfully refinance Algoma, and using the Port Transaction proceeds was the only way to generate the additional US\$150 million in cash necessary. The trial judge highlighted at para. 96 that Algoma's CEO, Mr. Ghosh, had indicated that "he had had to agree to the Port Transaction" as it was the "only way" to refinance Algoma, since Essar Global's contribution was only "bringing in \$150 million".

184 Even if the appellants were correct in this regard, which I do not accept, on their analysis, they themselves admit that Essar Global's contribution was short by US\$50 million.

185 No matter the correct figure, Essar Global's conduct created a situation where Algoma had no choice but to accept the Port Transaction. There was no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's understanding of the recapitalization requirements.

186 In any event, the reduction in Essar Global's cash contribution was only one aspect of Essar Global's overall conduct considered by the trial judge. He did not conclude that the cash equity reduction was itself the oppressive act. Accordingly, again, any factual error regarding Essar Global's actual cash contribution was not a palpable and overriding error.

187 As mentioned, Essar Global also asserts that the remedy for breach contained in the Equity Commitment Letter precluded any oppression remedy. No one was suing for breach of the Equity Commitment Letter. Rather, it formed part of the context that included a failure to explore alternatives, the Port Transaction itself, control rights that were proffered as a disincentive to other bidders and that erased any possibility of a successful restructuring, all in disregard of the expectations of the pensioners, employees, retirees, and trade creditors.

188 Third, although not identified as a ground of appeal nor advanced as such in their factum, in oral argument, the appellants submitted that the alleged breach of the Equity Commitment Letter did not cause Algoma to enter the Port Transaction.

189 Essar Global contends that the trial judge made factual errors in finding a causal connection between Essar Global's equity commitment and the Port Transaction. It argues that the Port Transaction was a key component of the recapitalization before the execution of the Equity Commitment Letter.

190 At trial, the trial judge rejected Essar Global's argument, finding at para. 87 that the Port Transaction was contemplated as a possible transaction when first introduced in May 2014, but that the transaction was not a certainty. He accurately noted that the first Plan of Arrangement that was approved by the Court required Essar Global to comply with its cash funding commitment of US\$250 to US\$300 million pursuant to the Equity Commitment Letter and that the Port Transaction was not a part of that plan. He found that the Port Transaction had to be carried out because of Essar Global's decision not to fund Algoma according to the terms of the Equity Commitment Letter.

191 The causal connection between Essar Global's equity commitment and the Port Transaction is a factual matter and the trial judge's factual finding was supported by the evidence.

192 Furthermore, the Port Transaction that was floated in May 2014 was an entirely different transaction, in which the proceeds of sale would flow upstream to Essar Global and would not be used to recapitalize Algoma. Moreover, the RSA prohibited a related party transaction without noteholder consent, and the proceeds of any sale in excess of US\$2 million had to be used to reduce Algoma's debt.

193 I am not persuaded that the trial judge made any palpable and overriding error in his finding.

194 Fourth, Essar Global submits that the trial judge erred in disregarding the business judgment rule, which should have applied to prevent judicial second-guessing of the Board's decisions.

195 The trial judge correctly described the business judgment rule relying on para. 40 of *BCE*:

In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to the interests of, *inter alia*, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions. Courts should give appropriate deference to the business judgment of directors who take into account these ancillary interests, as reflected by the business judgment rule. The "business judgment rule" accords deference to a business decision, so long as it lies within a range of reasonable alternatives . . . It reflects the reality that directors, who are mandated under s. 102(1) of the *CBCA* to manage the corporation's business and affairs, are often better suited to determine what is in the best interests of the corporation. This applies to decisions on stakeholders' interests, as much as other directorial decisions.

196 Two additional points should be made with respect to the business judgment rule. First, the rule shields business decisions from court intervention only where they are made prudently and in good faith: *CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.* (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 131 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at pp. 150-151.

197 Second, the rule's protection is available only to the extent that the Board of Directors' actions actually evidence their business judgment: *UPM-Kymmene*, at para. 153.

198 In deciding that the rule afforded no defence to Essar Global, the trial judge, at para. 123, relied on the fact that the Board did not follow "advice to go after Essar Global on its cash equity commitment". The trial judge went on to note that had Algoma's Board formed an independent committee in February 2014, events may have evolved differently, and the Board may have accepted the advice to hold Essar Global to its commitment.

199 Essar Global takes issue with this conclusion by asserting that the trial judge should not have characterized Algoma's Board as lacking independence because of its decision not to strike an independent committee. Essar Global points out that there was no evidence that Mr. Ghosh — who cast the deciding vote in that decision — was not free to vote as he chose.

200 Essar Global's argument ignores the trial judge's key finding that the four directors who voted against the independent committee in February 2014, including Mr. Ghosh, were not independent. The trial judge noted at para. 15 that he could "not

overlook" that Mr. Ghosh had been with Essar Steel India, adding that Algoma's CFO, Mr. Marwah, had described these four directors as "Essar-affiliated directors". On this basis, it was open for the trial judge to find that the Essar-affiliated directors were not free from the influence of Essar Global and the Ruia family, particularly when considered alongside his extensive comments at paras. 43-60 finding that the critical decisions regarding Algoma's recapitalization and the Port Transaction were made not by Algoma's Board, but by Essar Global and Essar Capital as led by Mr. Seifert.

201 Specifically, the trial judge made findings of fact at paras. 51-53 regarding the limited role played by Algoma's Board and management. He accepted the evidence of Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah that they did not negotiate the economic terms of the debt refinancing or the Port Transaction. He also accepted the evidence of Mr. Ghosh that the Transaction was approved because there was no realistic alternative to generate sufficient cash to complete the recapitalization. He rejected the contradictory evidence of Mr. Seifert because the evidence of Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah was consistent with the documentary evidence. In my view, the trial judge was entitled to weigh the evidence as he did and make these findings of fact that were not infected by any palpable and overriding error.

Essar Global maintained before the trial judge, as they do before this court, that the Algoma Board's decisions were nonetheless shielded from court intervention because the Board had the benefit of sophisticated advisors throughout the recapitalization process. And yet, the only evidence tendered of any such advice was advice that the Board elected not to follow.

At para. 122, the trial judge described this advice, which was provided at least in part by Ray Schrock, described by the appellants as Algoma's lawyer. Mr. Schrock told the Board that unsecured noteholders would not react well to the Port Transaction and were likely to seek a higher infusion of cash from Essar Global, as promised in the Equity Commitment Letter. Mr. Schrock said that the Board should insist that Algoma press Essar Global to fulfill its equity commitments. There was no evidence that steps were taken in this regard and the trial judge found that this advice was not followed.

Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the resignation of the independent directors from Algoma's Board lend support to the trial judge's conclusion that reliance on the business judgment rule was unavailable. Mr. Dodds' letter stated that his decision to resign was driven by his conclusion that as an independent director, he lacked confidence that he was "receiving information and engaged in decision-making in the same manner as those Board members who are directly affiliated with the company and/or its parent". It was open to the trial judge to reach the conclusions he did. In these circumstances, the business judgment rule was of little assistance.

Essar Global also submits that the trial judge should not have gone on to censure the activities of the Board in November 2014 (when the Board approved the transactions) by relying on the Board's February 2014 decision regarding the independent committee.

The trial judge did not censure the decisions of the Algoma Board solely based on the February 2014 meeting. The February meeting, and the events surrounding it, are part of a larger context that included the November 2014 meeting, all of which the trial judge considered, and all of which demonstrated that the Board's decisions regarding the recapitalization were not made prudently or in good faith, as found by the trial judge, and thereby failed to attract the application of the business judgment rule.

207 Specifically, the trial judge found at para. 123 that, if the Board had acquiesced to forming an independent committee, or listened to the truly independent directors before they resigned in frustration, subsequent steps taken in pursuit of the recapitalization transaction "may have been taken differently". He then went on to say that:

What happened in the Port Transaction was an exercise in self-dealing in that Algoma's critical Port asset was transferred out of Algoma to a wholly owned subsidiary of Essar Global with a change of control provision that benefited Essar Global at a time that a future insolvency was a possibility.

Additionally, the trial judge found that the Board had accepted the inclusion of the contentious change of control provision in the Cargo Handling Agreement without considering alternatives. If the provision was truly for the benefit of GIP, it could have been accomplished in another way, without providing Essar Global with an effective veto over a change of control of Algoma. All this evidence speaks to the Board's lack of business judgment and good faith, the failure to consider reasonable alternatives, and the Algoma Board's limited role in directing the recapitalization. There is no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Board was precluded from relying on the business judgment rule. His decision was amply supported by the record.

Essar Global makes an additional point relating to the business judgment rule: that, in any event, no independent committee was required under corporate law.

It is a contrivance for Essar Global to impugn the trial judge's conclusion regarding the business judgment rule on the basis that an independent committee was not required. Although it is true that an independent committee was not legally or technically required, the Board's decision not to strike one, in the circumstances surrounding the November 2014 restructuring transactions, speaks volumes. The decision not to strike an independent committee must be considered alongside the evidence I have already reviewed: the Board's lack of independence, the Board's failure to follow its advisors' advice, the Board's failure to consider alternatives, and the Board's acquiescence to recapitalization transactions that primarily benefited the interests of Essar Global over those of Algoma. Again, the totality of the evidence supports the Board's lack of good faith, and renders the business judgment rule inapplicable.

There is one final argument Essar Global raises in invoking the business judgment rule. It claims that it was procedurally offensive for the trial judge to criticize the directors for not following Mr. Schrock's advice because evidence of the advice was not before him. It adds that, had the directors relied on legal advice from Mr. Schrock in the legal proceedings, privilege had not been waived.

Here, the minutes of the Board meeting held in November 2014 describe Mr. Schrock as "informing the Board [that] the [unsecured noteholders] would not react well to the proposed changes and that they were likely to push [Essar Global] for a higher infusion of cash/equity into [Algoma] as set forth in the Commitment [L]etter". Mr. Schrock also commented that the proposed Port Transaction "was likely to cause concern by the [unsecured noteholders]". Accordingly, Mr. Schrock advised the Board to "insist that [Algoma] should press all parties to fully satisfy their . . . obligations regarding the equity contributions".

To the extent that Mr. Schrock's comments amounted to legal advice, I would first note that his advice was only one piece of the evidentiary puzzle in the broader factual context. Even if Mr. Schrock's advice, and the Board's failure to implement it, are disregarded, the record still amply supports the trial judge's conclusions on this issue.

I would also add that Essar Global's claim that the evidence of Mr. Schrock's advice was not before the trial judge is incorrect. The Board minutes were included in the record as an exhibit to an affidavit tendered by Essar Global. Finally, as for Essar Global's argument that privilege had not been waived, any privilege that may have attached to Mr. Schrock's advice belonged to Algoma and not Essar Global.

Fifth, Essar Global submits that the involvement of Algoma's management and Board in the Port Transaction sanitizes that transaction, because the trial judge concluded that Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah acted in good faith thinking they were doing the best for Algoma in the circumstances. Essar Global also claims that the trial judge erred by holding otherwise because the Monitor failed to attack the Board's process in its pleading. I do not accept these arguments.

217 Despite Essar Global's argument, this court has established that good faith corporate conduct does not preclude a finding of oppression: *Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc.* (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.).

218 Moreover, Essar Global's argument on this point ignores the trial judge's findings that Algoma's Board and management played a limited role in the Port Transaction. It also ignores evidence that indicates that Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah's support was only given because there was no alternative to address Algoma's financial straits. This factual background demonstrates why it was open for the trial judge to conclude that the Port Transaction was oppressive, despite the good faith of Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah. 219 On the pleadings issue, I note that the Monitor pleaded that the Port Transaction was the result of Essar Global's "*de facto* control" of Algoma. In response, Essar Global pleaded that the Port Transaction was in the best interests of Algoma, based on the approval of the transaction by Algoma's Board and senior management, who were acting on an informed basis and with the benefit of financial advice. Given the way in which Essar Global framed its defence in its pleadings, it cannot now say that issues related to the Board's process were not properly before the trial judge.

220 Turning to the appellants' last argument relating to wrongful conduct and harm, they submitted that the trial judge identified two potential harms caused by Essar Global, neither of which is actionable in the oppression action: the undervalue of the Port Transaction to Algoma and the impairment of Algoma's ongoing restructuring.

In my view, it is inaccurate to characterize the trial judge's findings and analysis as concluding that harm flowed to stakeholders because the Port Transaction did not provide sufficient value to Algoma.

222 Specifically, he did not find that the US\$171.5 million in consideration paid by Portco to Algoma constituted undervalue. Indeed his remedy that GIP be repaid in full suggests the contrary. Rather, he found that Essar Global received an unreasonable benefit from the Port Transaction.

223 Moreover, it was an exercise in self-dealing. As the trial judge stated at para. 144:

For the balance of the first 20 years under the Cargo Handling Agreement after the GIP loan matures, if that agreement survives only to that date, Algoma will pay a further 12 years at \$25 million, or \$300 million, to Portco which will benefit Essar Global after the balance of the GIP loan is paid off. If the Cargo Handling Agreement is not terminated before the end of its life of 50 years, that will be another 30 years at \$25 million, or \$750 million, paid to Portco/Essar Global. Taken with the small amount paid by Essar Global, the \$4.2 million in cash (and the \$19.8 million note that it has refused to pay), it means that Essar Global will obtain an extremely large amount of cash from Algoma for little money. I realize that if Algoma became solvent and able to pay its debts, it would be able to pay a dividend to Essar Global (or the appropriate subsidiary) so long as Essar Global remained its shareholder. Whether and when Algoma could become solvent with its pension deficits that have existed for some time and be in a position to pay dividends to its shareholder is a significant unknown. But the payments under the Cargo Handling Agreement do not require any solvency test and are in the financial circumstances Algoma finds itself in, a clear contractual benefit for little money. It is an unreasonable benefit that was prejudicial to, and unfairly disregarded, the interests of the creditors on whose behalf this action has been brought by the Monitor.

The trial judge also concluded that the mismatched terms of the Cargo Handling Agreement (20 years renewable) and the 50-year lease offered Essar Global an additional benefit. In that regard, he was not bound to accept the evidence of the appellants' expert. He reasoned, at para. 142, that the Port was critical to Algoma's functioning, and therefore that Algoma would not be in a position to terminate the Cargo Handling Agreement for the duration of the lease:

The other concerns are with respect to the obligations in the Cargo Handling Agreement. I have a concern with the imbalance in the term of the lease to Portco for 50 years against the term of the Cargo Handling Agreement for 20 years with automatic renewal for successive three year periods unless either party gives written notice of termination to the other party. If Essar Global thought that it wanted an increased payment after 20 years, it could refuse to continue the Cargo Handling Agreement and put Algoma at its complete mercy. If the market did not support an increased payment, or indicated that the payments from Algoma to Portco should be less in the future, Algoma would still be at the mercy of Essar Global. As the Port facilities are critical to the operation and survival of Algoma, it would be foolhardy indeed for Algoma to refuse to extend the Cargo Handling Agreement. The language in the Cargo Handling Agreement that Algoma can refuse to extend it after 20 years is illusory and not realistic. In reality, it is a provision that is one-sided in favour of Essar Global.

The change of control provision or veto was also an exercise in "self-dealing". The consent provision unnecessarily tied Algoma's strategic options to Essar Global. The trial judge properly found that the insertion of control rights in the Cargo

Handling Agreement served no practical purpose to GIP and the same rights could have been provided for in the Assignment of Material Contracts.

As the trial judge concluded at para. 138:

In my view, and I so order, the appropriate relief for the oppression involving the change of control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement is to delete section 15.2 from that agreement and to insert a provision in the Assignment of Material Contracts agreement that if GIP becomes the equity owner of Portco, Algoma or its parent cannot agree to or undertake a change of control of Algoma without the consent of GIP.

There was evidence from Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah that supported the trial judge's conclusion that harm had flowed from the presence of the change of control provision and the ensuing letter from counsel. They were not cross-examined and no competing evidence was tendered by the appellants. It was also open to the trial judge to interpret the letter sent by Portco's counsel to Algoma's counsel as a veto threat to potential bidders while Essar Global continued to be interested in being a bidder. I would not give effect to this argument.

228 On the issue of the impairment of Algoma's ongoing restructuring, the appellants argue that no harm could have flowed from this, as the restructuring was not, in fact, impaired. Specifically, they argue that the only evidence of impairment consisted of statements in the affidavits of Messrs. Ghosh and Marwah that potential bidders for Algoma were concerned about the change of control clause. I would reject this argument as well. Again, I note that the appellants chose not to cross-examine on these affidavits, nor did they object to their admission into evidence. They cannot now, after the fact, impugn the trial judge's reliance on these statements.

Additionally, the appellants argue that it was premature for the trial judge to conclude that the control clause impaired the restructuring, because Portco/Essar Global was never asked to consent to a new transaction or to new owners. However, at para. 117, the trial judge noted that the change of control rights had to be considered alongside Essar Global's holding itself out as a prospective buyer in any bidding process for Algoma. That Essar Global has never been asked to consent to a new transaction was immaterial, as it remained in Essar Global's "interest to dissuade other buyers in order for it to achieve the lowest possible purchase price". In coming to this conclusion the trial judge pointed to the letter from counsel for Portco/Essar Global on May 12, 2016, which "sp[oke] volumes" by "clearly invit[ing] any bidder to understand that Essar Global has control rights."

230 I see no error in the trial judge's conclusion.

#### (5) The Remedy

Turning then to the issue of the remedy. Essar Global submits that the trial judge erred in striking out the control clause in the Cargo Handling Agreement and in granting Algoma the option of terminating the Port agreements upon repayment of the GIP loan. They argue that he was only permitted to rectify the harm that was suffered. Deleting the provision was an overly broad remedy that was unconnected to the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders and instead, he should have considered a nominal damages award.

GIP supports the submissions of Essar Global. It argues that the remedy awarded was not sought by any party, no evidence had been called in respect of that remedy, and no submissions were made. The practical effect of granting Algoma a termination right is that GIP does not have the security for which it bargained and it was prejudiced, despite its lack of involvement in the oppression found against Essar Global. GIP also argues that the Monitor and Algoma are seeking to set-off amounts owed by Essar Capital to Algoma against amounts owed to GIP, which results in additional prejudice.

I would not give effect to these submissions. First, trial judges have a broad latitude to fashion oppression remedies based on the facts before them. Once a claim in oppression has been made out, a court may "grant any remedy it thinks fit": *Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.* (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4. The focus is on equitable relief, and deference is owed to the remedy granted: *Fedel*, at para. 100. Second, the trial judge properly identified the need to avoid an overly broad remedy, stating at para. 136 that there were "less obtrusive ways" of remedying the oppression than ordering shares of Portco be transferred to Algoma (the remedy the Monitor had originally requested). Varying the transaction as he did was one such way. The trial judge's remedy removes Portco's control rights (the main obstacle to a successful restructuring) and, after GIP is paid, restores the Port to the ownership of Algoma. If GIP becomes the equity owner of Portco, its consent will be required to any change of control. Unlike a damages award, the remedy was responsive to the oppressive conduct. It served to vindicate the expectations of the stakeholders that Algoma would retain long-term control of the Port and that Essar Global would not have a veto over its restructuring efforts.

Third, the remedy granted preserves the security GIP had bargained for and therefore GIP has not suffered any prejudice as a result of the remedy. The trial judge's remedy, as described at para. 145, ensures that GIP is to be paid in full. Until "payment in cash of all amounts owing to GIP" is made, the Port remains in Portco's hands and the contractual remedies held by GIP to enforce its security remain in place. Moreover, Essar Global guaranteed Portco's liabilities to GIP under GIP's loan in the Port Transaction, which further demonstrates GIP's lack of prejudice. As GIP's own affiant indicated, this guarantee provides GIP with "an extra layer of protection in the event the debtor is unable to repay the loan".

Finally, regarding the issue of set-off, I note that the arguments made by GIP in support of this ground were made prior to Newbould J.'s subsequent ruling dealing with this issue. In that decision, he held that Algoma had set-off amounts owed under the promissory note against Essar Global, but he preserved GIP's right to repayment. This decision is a full answer to GIP's arguments on this point, and ensures that GIP will not suffer any prejudice as a result of the remedy granted in response to Essar Global's oppressive conduct.

#### (6) Was There Procedural Unfairness?

Essar Global submits that the trial judge erred in basing his decision and relief on bases that were not pleaded. GIP supports the position of Essar Global, with particular focus on the remedy that was ultimately imposed.

As mentioned, the trial judge was the supervising *CCAA* judge and deeply acquainted with the facts of the restructuring. Of necessity, and on agreement of all parties to the oppression action, the timelines for pleadings, productions, and examinations were truncated. Additionally, no party objected at trial that the process had been procedurally unfair. Given the context and the complexity of the dispute, the pleadings were not as clear as they might have been in a less abbreviated schedule. That said, on a review of the record, I am not persuaded that there was any procedural unfairness with respect to the claims or that the appellants did not know the case they had to meet.

The focus of at least GIP's complaint lies in the remedy. The appellants are correct that the precise remedy awarded by the trial judge was not pleaded. A trial judge must fashion a remedy that best responds to the oppressive conduct and that is not overly broad. While it is desirable for a party seeking oppression relief to provide particulars of the remedy, a trial judge is not bound by those particulars. Because the discretionary powers under the oppression remedy must be exercised to *rectify* the oppressive conduct complained of (see: *Naneff v. Con-Crete Holdings Ltd.* (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 27), it follows that the remedy will, by necessity, be linked to the oppressive conduct that was pleaded. Therefore a party against whom a specifically-tailored oppression remedy is ordered cannot fairly complain that the remedy caught them by surprise. This conclusion is consistent with *Fedel*, where this court upheld oppression remedies imposed by the trial judge where the relief granted had not been specifically pleaded or sought in argument.

240 Moreover, absent error, a trial judge's decision on remedy is entitled to deference. As I have discussed, there is an absence of error. Furthermore, in this case, there is no prejudice to GIP. Its position is preserved by the remedy granted by the trial judge. At the same time, the remedy is responsive to Essar Global's oppressive conduct.

That said, the trial judge did consider whether Essar Global and GIP could fairly argue that they were taken by surprise by his remedy. At para. 141, he rejected this position, holding that the issue of the change of control clause was pleaded by the Monitor, and affidavit material filed by both Essar Global and GIP provided evidence on the provision's significance. At para. 146, he concluded that issues relating to the relief he ordered were "fully canvassed in the evidence and argument", and that the remedy he ordered in fact was less intrusive than the remedy originally pled by the Monitor. And although he did not think an amendment was necessary, he nonetheless ordered that the Monitor would be granted leave to amend its claim to support the relief he granted.

I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.

#### (7) Fresh Evidence

Essar Global seeks to introduce fresh evidence on appeal that addresses the independence of Algoma's Board of Directors. It takes the position that the trial judge's rejection of the independence of two directors, Messrs. Kothari and Mirchandani, played a significant role in his decision. It adds that the lack of independent directors was not pleaded by the Monitor and so Essar Global had no reason to adduce this evidence earlier.

Messrs. Mirchandani and Kothari joined Algoma's Board in June and August 2014, respectively, after the three independent directors resigned. They were therefore on the Board when the Port Transaction was approved in November 2014.

245 Whether "a proper case" exists to allow fresh evidence is determined by applying the test outlined in *R. v. Palmer* (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759 (S.C.C.), or the slightly modified test from *Sengmueller v. Sengmueller* (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 208 (Ont. C.A.).

As this court has noted, the two tests are quite similar: see *Korea Data Systems Co. v. Chiang*, 2009 ONCA 3, 93 O.R. (3d) 483 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 77. Under the *Palmer* test, the party seeking to admit fresh evidence must demonstrate that the evidence could not, by due diligence, have been adduced at trial; that the evidence is relevant in that it bears on a decisive issue in the trial; that the evidence is credible; and that the evidence, if believed, could be expected to affect the result.

247 Under the *Sengmueller* test, the moving party must demonstrate that the evidence could not have been obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to trial; that the evidence is credible; and that the evidence, if admitted, would likely be conclusive of an issue on appeal.

248 Essar Global has failed to meet either the *Palmer* or the *Sengmueller* test for two main reasons.

In both its original and its amended statement of claim, the Monitor alleged that representatives of Essar Global were members of Algoma's Board and exercised *de facto* control over Algoma, such that they made decisions for the benefit of Essar Global while unfairly disregarding the interests of Algoma's stakeholders. Essar Global cannot claim to have been caught by surprise by the issue of the Board's independence being in play. The fresh evidence could have been obtained with reasonable diligence prior to trial.

In any event, the evidence would not have affected the result at trial, and is not conclusive of any issue on appeal. The fresh evidence Essar Global asks to proffer consists of the affidavit of Mr. Mirchandani, which states that he and Mr. Kothari were determined to be independent Board members as a result of a conflict of interest policy and by virtue of the questionnaires they each completed.

However, there was evidence before the trial judge essentially to this effect, including Algoma's October 2014 offering memorandum, which stated that the Board included two independent directors. Indeed, the trial judge commented on this evidence in footnote 7 of his reasons, and rejected it in concluding that Messrs. Mirchandani and Kothari were not truly independent of Essar Global.

Additionally, and as I have already discussed elsewhere in these reasons, the remainder of the record strongly supported the Board's lack of independence. Even if the trial judge had Mr. Mirchandani's affidavit before him, it would not have made a difference.

253 I would therefore dismiss the motion for fresh evidence.

#### (8) Costs

GIP claimed costs of CDN\$750,156.18 against the Monitor payable on a partial indemnity scale. It claimed it was entirely successful because it successfully resisted relief sought by the Monitor that would have prejudiced GIP. The trial judge exercised his discretion and observed that success between the Monitor and GIP was divided. He also relied on GIP's appeal as a basis to conclude success was divided. He therefore did not order any costs in favour of or against GIP.

GIP seeks leave to appeal the trial judge's costs award. Before this court, GIP in essence renews the arguments made before the trial judge. The awarding of costs is highly discretionary and leave is granted sparingly. I see no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion nor was the award plainly wrong: *Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd.* (2003), 2004 SCC 9, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303 (S.C.C.), at para. 27.

At trial, GIP was unsuccessful in challenging both the Monitor's claim of standing and its claim that the Port Transaction was oppressive. It also seems incongruous for GIP to suggest that it was entirely successful in defeating the Monitor's claims, while it appeals the trial decision.

257 I see no basis on which to interfere with the costs award of the trial judge and would refuse leave to appeal costs.

#### **E. DISPOSITION**

258 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal, the motion for fresh evidence and the motion for leave to appeal costs.

As agreed, I would order that the Monitor and Algoma are entitled to costs of the appeal fixed in the amounts of CDN \$100,000 and CDN\$60,000 respectively, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes on a partial indemnity scale. At the oral hearing, the parties had not agreed on whether the award should be payable on a joint and several basis and requested more time to consider the matter. On September 15, 2017, counsel wrote advising that they had still not agreed on this issue. GIP requested the opportunity to make additional costs submissions on this issue at the appropriate time. Under the circumstances, I would permit GIP to make brief written submissions on this issue by January 10, 2018. Essar Global shall have until January 17, 2018 to file its submissions. The Monitor and Algoma shall have until January 24, 2018 to respond.

#### R.A. Blair J.A.:

I agree.

#### K. van Rensburg J.A.:

I agree.

Appeal dismissed; application dismissed.

#### Footnotes

- 1 Algoma was named in the proceeding below as a defendant, but supports the position taken by the respondent, Ernst & Young Inc. It is therefore a respondent on this appeal.
- In early 2015, Essar Consulting obtained two additional valuations of the Port assets, one in February from Royal Bank of Canada and one in April from ICICI Securities. The RBC valuation, which was an exhibit to the affidavit of Joseph Seifert, was between US \$165 and US\$200 million. The ICICI valuation, which was an exhibit to the affidavit of Anshumali Dwivedi, was US\$349 million.
- 3 Although Deutsche Bank intervened in the proceedings below, it was not involved in this appeal.
- 4 Before this court, no submissions on urgency were advanced.

- 5 Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Catherine Nowak, "The Threat of the Oppression Remedy to Reorganizing Insolvent Corporations" in Janis P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2008* (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) 429, at pp. 430-431 and 436.
- 6 Janis Sarra, "Creating Appropriate Incentives, A Place for the Oppression Remedy in Insolvency Proceedings" in Janis P. Sarra ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2009* (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) 99, at p. 99.

# TAB 9

# **SUPERIOR COURT**

(Commercial Division)

CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL

N°: 500-11-057549-194

DATE: December 2, 2019

PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE PETER KALICHMAN, J.S.C.

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED:

9227-1584 QUÉBEC INC.

9336-9262 QUÉBEC INC.

Debtors

-and-

**KPMG INC.** 

Petitioner / Monitor

-and-

110302 CANADA INC.

9325-7277 QUÉBEC INC.

Mises en cause

JK0261

# AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER

[1] **THE COURT**, upon reading the *Motion for an Extension of the Stay of Proceedings and for the Issuance of an Amended and Restated Initial Order* (the "**Motion**") of the Petitioner / Monitor KPMG Inc. (the "**Monitor**" or "**KPMG**")

pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"), having examined the proceeding, the affidavit and the exhibits;

- [2] **GIVEN** the *Initial Order* issued in respect of the Debtors on November 22, 2019, as rectified on November 25, 2019 (the "**Initial Order**");
- [3] **GIVEN** the *Motion for the Issuance of an Initial Order* (the "**Initial Motion**") of the Monitor, and the affidavit and exhibits in support thereof;
- [4] **GIVEN** the report dated November 21, 2019, prepared by KPMG;
- [5] **GIVEN** the testimony of Mr. Dev Coosa, representative of KPMG;
- [6] **GIVEN** the representations by counsel for KPMG and other parties, both in person and by phone, at the hearing of the Motion;
- [7] **GIVEN** the provisions of the CCAA;

# FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT HEREBY:

- [8] **GRANTS** the Motion;
- [9] **ISSUES** an order pursuant to the CCAA (the "**Order**"), divided under the following headings:
  - a) Service;
  - b) Application of the CCAA and Procedural Consolidation;
  - c) Effective Time;
  - d) Plan of Arrangement;
  - e) Stay of Proceedings against the Debtors and the Property;
  - f) Stay of Proceedings against the Directors and Officers;
  - g) Possession of Property and Operations;
  - h) No Exercise of Rights or Remedies;
  - i) No Interference with Rights;
  - j) Continuation of Services;
  - k) Non-Derogation of Rights;

- I) Restructuring;
- m) Powers of the Monitor;
- n) Priorities and General Provisions Relating to CCAA Charges;
- o) General.

# A. <u>Service</u>

[10] **GIVEN** that the Court has been advised that prior notice has been given by KPMG to interested parties, by way of service to the electronic service list on November 28, 2019.

# B. Application of the CCAA and Procedural Consolidation

- [11] **DECLARES** that the Debtors are debtor companies to which the CCAA applies.
- [12] **ORDERS** that the consolidation of these CCAA proceedings in respect of the Debtors shall be for administrative purposes only and shall not effect a consolidation of the assets and property of each of the Debtors including, without limitation, for the purposes of any Plan or Plans that may be hereafter proposed.

# C. <u>Effective Time</u>

[13] **DECLARES** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Montreal time, province of Quebec, on the date of this Order (the "Effective Time").

# D. <u>Plan of Arrangement</u>

[14] **DECLARES** that the Monitor shall have the authority to cause the Debtors to file with this Court and to submit to their creditors one or more plans of compromise or arrangement (collectively, the "**Plan**") in accordance with the CCAA.

# E. Stay of Proceedings against the Debtors and the Property

[15] **ORDERS** that, until and including December 20, 2019, or such later date as the Court may order (the "**Stay Period**"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal (each, a "**Proceeding**") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Debtors, or affecting the Debtors' business operations and activities (the "**Business**") or the Property (as defined herein), including as provided in paragraph [25] herein except with leave of this Court. Any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Debtors

or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further order of this Court, the whole subject to subsection 11.1 CCAA.

- [15].1 **ORDERS** that the rights of Her Majesty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of a Province are suspended in accordance with the terms and conditions of subsection 11.09 CCAA.
- [16] **ORDERS** that all provisions of the Indivision Agreements and the 9227 Nominee Agreement (as defined in the Initial Motion and filed, respectively, as Exhibits R-3, R-4, and R-5 in support thereof) purporting to affect the rights and obligations of the Debtors with respect to their rights to deal with the Property or otherwise are hereby stayed and suspended until the final Court approval of a Plan or further order of this Court, provided however that nothing in this order shall be construed as suspending the effects of Article 7 and Article 9.2 of the 9227 Indivision Agreement (Exhibit R-3), with the operation of such provisions of the 9227 Indivision Agreement (Exhibit R-3) being subject and subordinate to all of other provisions of this Order, including, notably, paragraphs [17] and [18] below.
- [17] **ENJOINS** the Mises en cause and their respective principals, including any related parties, affiliates or subsidiaries, from disposing of, issuing, encumbering (including without limitation, by way of hypothec or pledge), ceding, assigning, selling, donating, settling, or otherwise transferring any of the Property and moreover **ENJOINS** the Mises en cause or any related entity from exercising any hypothecary right, including the issuance of a sixty-day prior notice pursuant to article 2757 CCQ.
- [18] **ENJOINS** the Mises en cause and their respective principals, including any related parties, affiliates or subsidiaries, from causing the Debtors to enter into any contract, agreement, covenant, pledge, guarantee, settlement, arrangement, commitment, or other obligation.
- [19] **ENJOINS** the Mises en cause and their respective principals from incorporating any new company or setting up any new partnership or other entity, or entering into any new agreement pertaining to any real estate transaction involving the Debtors or the Property without notifying and disclosing to the Monitor any direct or indirect interest of any kind or any nature whatsoever in respect thereof.

# F. <u>Stay of Proceedings against Directors and Officers</u>

[20] **ORDERS** that during the Stay Period and except as permitted under subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA or further order of this Court, no Proceeding may be commenced, or continued against any former, present or future director or officer of the Debtors nor against any person deemed to be a director or an officer of any of the Debtors under subsection 11.03(3) CCAA (each, a "**Director**", and collectively the "**Directors**") in respect of any claim against such

Director which arose prior to the Effective Time and which relates to any obligation of the Debtors where it is alleged that any of the Directors is under any law liable in such capacity for the payment of such obligation.

## G. <u>Possession of Property and Operations</u>

- [21] **ORDERS** that, subject and subordinate to the Monitor's additional powers granted herein, the Debtors shall remain in possession and control of their present and future assets, rights, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situated, including all proceeds thereof (collectively the "**Property**"), which Property shall be deemed to expressly include, without limitation, for all purposes hereof, the immovable properties in the city of Candiac, Québec comprising:
  - a) lots 6 022 112, 6 022 113, 6 022 115, 6 022 117, 6 022 119, 6 022 120, 6 022 121, 6 022 122, 6 073 665, 6 073 666, 6 073 693, 6 073 694 and 6 265 849 at the Land Register, as may have been or may eventually be subdivided, known as the Square Candiac Project; and
  - b) lot number 2 094 091 at the Land Register, as may have been or may eventually be subdivided, bearing civic address 170 de l'Industrie Boulevard, serving as the sales office and to showcase model units of the Square Candiac Project;

the whole in accordance with the terms and conditions of this order including, but not limited, to paragraphs [32], [36] and [38] hereof.

- [22] **ORDERS** that the Debtors, through the Monitor, shall be entitled but not required to pay the fees and disbursements of any agents or legal or other counsel retained or employed by the Monitor, on its own behalf or on behalf of the Debtors, in respect of these proceedings, at their standard rates and charges, whether incurred prior to or after this Order.
- [23] **ORDERS** that, except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein, the Debtors, through the Monitor, shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Debtors during these proceedings and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, which expenses shall include, without limitation:
  - a) all expenses reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business;
  - b) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Debtors following the date of this Order; and
  - c) amounts owing for goods or services actually supplied to the Debtors prior to the date of this Order by third party suppliers up to a maximum

aggregate amount of \$250,000, if, in the opinion of the Monitor, the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the Debtors.

[24] **ORDERS** that the Debtors, through the Monitor, shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay all goods and services, harmonized sales or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "**Sales Taxes**") required to be remitted by the Debtors and in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Debtors, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the date of this Order, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the date of this Order but not required to be remitted until on or after the date of this Order.

## H. <u>No Exercise of Rights or Remedies</u>

- [25] **ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, and subject to, *inter alia*, subsection 11.1 CCAA, all rights and remedies, including, but not limited to modifications of existing rights and events deemed to occur pursuant to any agreement to which either of the Debtors is a party as a result of the insolvency of the Debtors and/or these CCAA proceedings, any events of default or non-performance by the Debtors or any admissions or evidence in these CCAA proceedings, of any individual, natural person, firm, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, trust, joint venture, association, organization, governmental body or agency, or any other entity (all of the foregoing, collectively being "**Persons**" and each being a "**Person**") against or in respect of the Debtors, or affecting the Business, the Property or any part thereof are hereby stayed and suspended except with leave of this Court.
- [26] DECLARES that, to the extent any rights, obligations, or prescription, time or limitation periods including, without limitation, to file grievances relating to the Debtors or any of the Property or the Business may expire (other than pursuant to the terms of any contracts, agreements or arrangements of any nature whatsoever), the term of such rights, obligations, or prescription, time or limitation periods shall hereby be deemed to be extended by a period equal to the Stay Period. Without limitation to the foregoing, in the event that the Debtors, or either of them, become(s) bankrupt or a receiver as defined in subsection 243(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("BIA") is appointed in respect of the Debtors, the period between the date of the Order and the day on which the Stay Period ends shall not be calculated in respect of the Debtors in determining the 30 day periods referred to in Sections 81.1 and 81.2 of the BIA.

# I. No Interference with Rights

[27] **ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, resiliate, terminate or cease to perform

any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Debtors, except with the written consent of the Monitor, or with leave of this Court.

# J. <u>Continuation of Services</u>

- ORDERS that during the Stay Period and subject to paragraph [30] hereof and [28] subsection 11.01 CCAA, all Persons having verbal or written agreements with the Debtors or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods or services, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation, utility or other goods or services made available to the Debtors, are hereby restrained until further order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Debtors, and that the Debtors shall be entitled to the continued use of their current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses, domain names or other services, provided in each case that the normal prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the date of the Order are paid by the Debtors, without having to provide any security deposit or any other security, in accordance with normal payment practices of the Debtors or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and the Monitor, acting on behalf of the Debtors, or as may be ordered by this Court.
- [29] **ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else contained herein and subject to subsection 11.01 CCAA, no Person shall be prohibited from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided to the Debtors on or after the date of this Order, nor shall any Person be under any obligation on or after the date of the Order to make further advance of money or otherwise extend any credit to the Debtors.
- [30] **ORDERS** that, without limiting the generality of the foregoing and subject to Section 21 of the CCAA, if applicable, cash or cash equivalents placed on deposit by either Debtor with any Person during the Stay Period, whether in an operating account or otherwise for itself or for another entity, shall not be applied by such Person in reduction or repayment of amounts owing to such Person or in satisfaction of any interest or charges accruing in respect thereof; however, this provision shall not prevent any financial institution from: (i) reimbursing itself for the amount of any cheques drawn by a Debtor and properly honoured by such institution, or (ii) holding the amount of any cheques or other instruments have been honoured by the financial institution on which they have been drawn.

# K. <u>Non-Derogation of Rights</u>

[31] **ORDERS** that, notwithstanding the foregoing, any Person who provided any kind of letter of credit, guarantee or bond (the "**Issuing Party**") at the request of the Debtors shall be required to continue honouring any and all such letters, guarantees and bonds, issued on or before the date of the Order, provided that all conditions under such letters, guarantees and bonds are met save and except for defaults resulting from this Order; however, the Issuing Party shall be entitled, where applicable, to retain the bills of lading or shipping or other documents relating thereto until paid.

# L. <u>Restructuring</u>

- [32] **DECLARES** that, to facilitate the orderly restructuring of their business and financial affairs (the "**Restructuring**") but subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA or any further order of the Court, the Monitor shall have the right to:
  - a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of the Debtors' operations or locations as it deems appropriate and make provision for the consequences thereof in the Plan;
  - b) pursue all avenues to finance or refinance, market, convey, transfer, assign or in any other manner dispose of the Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to further order of the Court and sections 11.3 and 36 CCAA;
  - c) subject to the provisions of section 32 CCAA, disclaim or resiliate, any of the Debtors' agreements, contracts or arrangements of any nature whatsoever, with such disclaimers or resiliation to be on such terms as may be agreed between the Monitor and the relevant party, or failing such agreement, make provision for the consequences thereof in the Plan; and
  - d) subject to section 11.3 CCAA, assign any rights and obligations of Debtors.
- [33] **DECLARES** that, in order to facilitate the Restructuring, the Monitor may, by agreement or further Order of the Court, settle claims of customers and suppliers that are in dispute.
- [34] **DECLARES** that, pursuant to sub-paragraph 7(3)(c) of the *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act*, S.C. 2000, c. 5, the Monitor is permitted, in the course of these proceedings, to disclose personal information of identifiable individuals in its possession or control to stakeholders or prospective investors, financiers, buyers or strategic partners and to their

advisers (individually, a "Third Party"), but only to the extent desirable or required to negotiate and complete the Restructuring or the preparation and implementation of the Plan or a transaction for that purpose, provided that the Persons to whom such personal information is disclosed enter into confidentiality agreements with the Debtors binding them to maintain and protect the privacy of such information and to limit the use of such information to the extent necessary to complete the transaction or Restructuring then under negotiation. Upon the completion of the use of personal information for the limited purpose set out herein, the personal information shall be returned to the Debtors or destroyed. In the event that a Third Party acquires personal information of the Plan or a transaction in furtherance thereof, such Third Party may continue to use the personal information in a manner which is in all respects identical to the prior use thereof by the Debtors.

[35] **ORDERS** that pursuant to clause 3(c)(i) of the *Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations*, made under *An Act to Promote the Efficiency and Adaptability of the Canadian Economy by Regulating Certain Activities that Discourage Reliance on Electronic Means of Carrying Out Commercial Activities, and to Amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications Act,* S.C. 2010, c. 23, the Debtors and the Monitor are authorized and permitted to send, or cause or permit to be sent, commercial electronic messages to an electronic address of prospective *purchasers or bidders and to their advisors but only to the extent desirable or required to provide information with respect to any sales process in these CCAA proceedings.* 

# M. <u>Powers of the Monitor</u>

- [36] **ORDERS** that the mandate of KPMG pursuant to the QBCA Order is hereby terminated until further order of the Court.
- [37] **ORDERS** that the Monitor is hereby appointed to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Debtors as an officer of this Court and that the Monitor, in addition to the prescribed powers and obligations, referred to in Section 23 of the CCAA:
  - a) shall, as soon as practicable, (i) publish once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks or as otherwise directed by the Court, in La Presse+ and the Globe & Mail National Edition and (ii) within five (5) business days after the date of this Order (A) post on the Monitor's website (the "**Website**") a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA, (B) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (C) send, in the prescribed manner, a notice to all

known creditors having a claim against a Debtor of more than \$1,000, advising them that the Order is publicly available, and (D) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of such creditors and the estimated amounts of their respective claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder;

- b) shall monitor the Debtors' receipts and disbursements;
- c) shall deal with the Debtors' creditors and other interested Persons during the Stay Period;
- d) shall prepare the Debtors' cash flow projections and any other projections or reports and shall develop, negotiate and cause the Debtors to implement the Plan;
- e) shall review the Debtors' business and assess opportunities for cost reduction, revenue enhancement and operating efficiencies;
- f) shall conduct the Restructuring and any negotiations with the Debtors' creditors and other interested Persons and shall hold and shall hold and administer any meetings held to consider the Plan;
- g) shall report to the Court on the state of the business and financial affairs of the Debtors or developments in these proceedings or any related proceedings within the time limits set forth in the CCAA and at such time as considered appropriate by the Monitor or as the Court may order and may file consolidated Reports for the Debtors;
- h) shall report to this Court and interested parties, including but not limited to creditors affected by the Plan, with respect to the Monitor's assessment of, and recommendations with respect to the Plan;
- may retain and employ such agents, advisers and other assistants as are reasonably necessary for the purpose of carrying out the terms of this Order, including, without limitation, one or more entities related to or affiliated with the Monitor;
- may engage legal counsel to the extent the Monitor considers necessary in connection with the exercise of its powers or the discharge of its obligations in these proceedings and any related proceeding, under this Order or under the CCAA;
- k) may give any consent or approval as may be contemplated by this Order or the CCAA;

- may hold and administer funds in connection with arrangements made among the Debtors, any counterparties and the Monitor, or by Order of this Court; and
- m) may perform such other duties as are required by this Order or the CCAA or by this Court from time to time.
- [38] **ORDERS** that neither the board of directors nor the shareholders nor any individual Director or shareholder of the Debtors, nor the Mises en cause, nor any individual director or shareholder of the Mises en cause shall have any power or authority to bind the Debtors or to cause the Debtors to enter into any obligation or to take any other action, and that the Monitor shall have exclusive power and authority in this regard.
- [39] **ORDERS** that, in any other powers herein, notwithstanding anything to the contrary and without limiting the generality of anything herein, the Monitor is hereby authorized and empowered to:
  - a) preserve, protect and maintain the control of the Property, the Debtors' place of business and the premises occupied by the Debtors, or any parts thereof;
  - b) operate and carry on the Business, or any part thereof;
  - carry out the sale or disposition of the Property in the Debtors' ordinary course of business, to transact in that regard, and to sign any document or any contract requires or useful for such purpose or meant to given effect to any sale or disposition;
  - petition the Court for authorization to sell all or part of the Property outside of the ordinary course of business, upon finding a purchaser and pursuant to conditions it deems reasonable under the circumstances;
  - e) take all steps and actions the Monitor considers necessary or desirable in these proceedings including, without limitation:
    - i) causing the Debtors to enter into any agreements;
    - ii) causing the Debtors to incur obligations in the daily ordinary course of business;
    - iii) causing the Debtors to retain or terminate employees or contractors;
    - iv) causing the Debtors to cease to carry on all or part of the Business;

- v) accessing, at all times, the places of business and the premises of the Debtors, the Property, and changing the locks to such places of business and premises of the Debtors;
- vi) accessing all the accounting records of the Debtors, as well as to any document, contract, register of any nature or kind whatsoever, wherever they may be situated and regardless of the medium on which they may be recorded (the "**Records**"), including the powers necessary to make copies of all the Records necessary or useful to the execution of the Monitor's functions,
- vii) all powers necessary to undertake an analysis of the Records;
- viii) controlling the Debtors' receipts and disbursements;
- ix) collecting all accounts receivable and all other claims of the Debtors and transacting in respect of same, including signing any document for this purpose;
- x) opening any required bank account, on the terms and conditions the Monitor may determine, with any chartered Canadian bank or any other financial institution, the whole, in order to cash any item payable to the Debtors, and issuing any payment which, in the opinion of the Monitor, is necessary or useful to the Debtors' operations or the safeguarding of their rights;
- xi) using the Debtors' cash flow to pay any and all amounts due by the Debtors and/or the Monitor in relation to post-filing expenses or services as well as all professional services incurred, including the Monitor's fees and expenses as well as those of its legal counsel;
- xii) marketing or soliciting one or several potential buyers of all or any part of the Property, including, without limitation, the right to carry out a public call for tenders or private solicitations in order to dispose of the Property;
- xiii) reporting to, meeting and discussing with the Debtors' secured lenders, as the Monitor deems appropriate, regarding all matters relating to the Property, the Restructuring and these proceedings, and sharing information with them subject to such terms as to confidentiality as the Monitor deems advisable; and
- xiv) performing such other duties and taking such other steps reasonably incidental to the exercise of these powers and as required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.

- f) engage consultants, appraisers, agents experts, auditors, accountants, managers, counsel and such other person from time to time and on whatever basis, including on a temporary basis, to assist with the exercise of the powers and duties conferred by this Order;
- g) oversee and direct the preparation of cash flow statements and assist in the dissemination of financial or other information in these proceedings;
- receive, collect and take possession of all monies and accounts now owned or hereafter owing to any one or more of the Debtors, including proceeds payable pursuant to the sale of Property;
- i) execute, assign, issue, endorse documents of whatever nature in respect of any of the Property, whether in the Monitor's name or in the name and on behalf of any of the Debtors (including without limitation, financial statements, tax returns and tax filings);
- j) initiate, prosecute, make and respond to applications and motions in, and continue the prosecution of any and all proceedings on behalf of or involving one or more of the Debtors and/or the Property (including the within proceedings) and settle or compromise any proceedings or claims by and against one or more of the Debtors. The authority hereby conveyed shall extend to such appeals or application and motions for judicial review in respect of any order or judgement pronounced in any such proceedings;
- k) exercise powers of investigation in respect of the Debtors by, directly or through its attorneys:
  - i) conducting an examination under oath of any Person reasonably though to have knowledge relating to either or both of the Debtors, the Business or the Property;
  - ii) ordering any Person to be examined pursuant to the preceding subparagraph to disclose to the Monitor and produce any books, documents, correspondence or papers in that Person's possession or power relating to the Debtors, the Business or the Property;
- I) exercise any rights that the Debtors have;
- m) provide instruction and direction to the advisors of the Debtors;
- n) make any distribution or payment required under any Order in these proceedings;

- apply to the Court upon notice as required under the BIA, and, where the Court is of the opinion that it is proper and in the best interests of the estate, to assign the Debtors into bankruptcy or obtain a bankruptcy order against the Debtors. Nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as trustee in bankruptcy of any of the Debtors; and
- p) perform such other duties or take any steps reasonably incidental to the exercise of such powers and obligations conferred upon the Monitor by this Order or any Order of this Court.
- [40] **ORDERS** that, for the purposes any examination conducted pursuant the Monitor's powers of investigation set out at paragraph [39]k) above:
  - a) the Monitor shall serve on the Person to be examined, at least five days prior to the scheduled date of the examination, a summons to appear, specifying the time and place of the examination and, if any, the books, documents, correspondence or papers that the person must have in his or her possession during the examination;
  - b) the examinations held pursuant to this Order shall be conducted in the District of Montréal, unless otherwise agreed between the Monitor and the person being examined;
  - c) objections raised during examinations held pursuant to this Order shall not prevent the continuation of the examination, the witness being required to respond, unless they relate to the fact that the person being examined cannot be compelled or to fundamental rights or to a matter of substantial legitimate interest, in which case the person being examined may refrain from responding.
- [41] **ORDERS** that no provision of this Order is intended to appoint the Monitor as an officer, director or employee of any of the Debtors or to create a fiduciary duty to any party including, without limitation, any creditor or shareholder of the Debtors. Additionally, nothing in this Order shall constitute or be deemed to constitute the Monitor as a receiver, assignee, liquidator, or receiver and manager of any of the Debtors and any distribution made to creditors of the Debtors will be deemed to be have been made by the Debtors.
- [42] **ORDERS** that the Debtors and their employees, current and former shareholders, officers, Directors, agents and representatives shall fully cooperate with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and discharge if its duties, rights and obligations as provided and set out in this Order.
- [43] **ORDERS** that, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Debtors, the Mises en cause and their Directors, officers, employees and agents, accountants, auditors and all other Persons having notice of the Order shall

forthwith provide the Monitor with unrestricted access to all of the Business and Property, including, without limitation, the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and all other documents of the Debtors in connection with the Monitor's duties and responsibilities hereunder.

- [44] **DECLARES** that the Monitor may provide creditors and other relevant stakeholders of the Debtors with information in response to requests made by them in writing addressed to the Monitor and its counsel. In the case of information that is confidential, proprietary or competitive, the Monitor shall not provide such information to any Person unless otherwise directed by this Court.
- [45] **DECLARES** that if the Monitor, in its capacity as Monitor, carries on the business of the Debtors or continues the employment of the Debtors' employees, the Monitor shall benefit from the provisions of section 11.8 of the CCAA.
- [46] **DECLARES** that Section 215 of the BIA applies *mutatis mutandis* and that no action or other proceedings shall be commenced against the Monitor relating to its appointment, its conduct as Monitor or the carrying out of the provisions of any order of this Court, except with prior leave of this Court, on at least seven days' notice to the Monitor and its counsel. The entities related to or affiliated with the Monitor referred to in subparagraph [37]i) hereof shall also be entitled to the protection, benefits and privileges afforded to the Monitor pursuant to this paragraph.
- [47] **DECLARES** that subject to the powers granted to the Monitor pursuant to the terms of this Order, nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, or to otherwise manage all or any part of the Property. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order, be deemed to be in possession of any of the Property within the meaning of environmental legislation, the whole pursuant to the terms of the CCAA.
- [48] **DECLARES** that the powers of the Monitor shall be exercised pursuant to its sole discretion and judgment.
- [49] **ORDERS** that the Debtors shall pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Monitor, the Monitor's legal counsel, and the Monitor's and Debtors' other advisers, directly related to these proceedings, the Plan and the Restructuring, whether incurred before or after this Order, and shall provide each with a reasonable retainer in advance on account of such fees and disbursements, if so requested.
- [50] **DECLARES** that the Monitor, the Monitor's legal counsel (Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP), and the Monitor's and the Debtors' respective advisers, as security for the professional fees and disbursements incurred both before and after the making of this Order and directly related to these proceedings, the Plan

and the Restructuring, be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge and security in the Property, to the extent of the aggregate amount of \$250,000 (the "**Administration Charge**"), having the priority established by paragraphs [51] and [52] of this Order.

# N. Priorities and General Provisions Relating to CCAA Charges

- [51] **DECLARES** that the priorities of the Administration Charge and any other charges that may be created by any subsequent order herein (the "**CCAA Charges**"), as between them with respect to any Property to which they apply, shall be as follows:
  - a) first, the Administration Charge.
- [52] **DECLARES** that each of the CCAA Charges shall rank in priority to any and all other hypothecs, mortgages, liens, security interests, priorities, charges, options, encumbrances or security of whatever nature or kind (collectively, the "**Encumbrances**") affecting the Property whether or not charged by such Encumbrances.
- [53] **ORDERS** that, except as otherwise expressly provided for herein the Debtors or the Monitor shall not grant any Encumbrances in or against any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, any of the CCAA Charges unless the Debtors, as applicable, obtain the prior written consent of the Monitor and the prior approval of the Court.
- [54] **DECLARES** that each of the CCAA Charges shall attach, as of the Effective Time, to all present and future Property of the Debtors, notwithstanding any requirement for the consent of any party to any such charge or to comply with any condition precedent.
- [55] **DECLARES** that the CCAA Charges and the rights and remedies of the beneficiaries of the CCAA Charges, as applicable, shall be valid and enforceable and shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by: (i) these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (ii) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications, or any assignments in bankruptcy made or deemed to be made in respect of any Debtor; or (iii) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any agreement, lease, sub-lease or other arrangement which binds the Debtors (a "**Third-Party Agreement**"), and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Third Party Agreement:

- a) the creation of any of the CCAA Charges shall not create nor be deemed to constitute a breach by the Debtors of any Third-Party Agreement to which any Debtors is a party; and
- b) the beneficiaries of the CCAA Charges shall not have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Third-Party Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the CCAA Charges.
- [56] **DECLARES** that notwithstanding: (i) these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (ii) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications, or any assignments in bankruptcy made or deemed to be made in respect of any Debtor; and (iii) the provisions of any federal or provincial statute, the payments or disposition of Property made by any Debtor pursuant to this Order and the granting of the CCAA Charges, do not and will not constitute settlements, fraudulent preferences, fraudulent conveyances or other challengeable or reviewable transactions or conduct meriting an oppression remedy under any applicable law.
- [57] **DECLARES** that the CCAA Charges shall be valid and enforceable as against all Property of the Debtors and against all Persons, including, without limitation, any trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver of the Debtors.

# O. <u>General</u>

- [58] **ORDERS** that no Person shall commence, proceed with or enforce any Proceedings against any of the Directors, employees, legal counsel or financial advisers of the Debtors or of the Monitor in relation to the Business or Property of the Debtors, without first obtaining leave of this Court, upon five (5) calendar days' written notice to the Monitor's counsel, and to all those referred to in this paragraph whom it is proposed be named in such Proceedings.
- [59] **ORDERS** that, subject to further Order of this Court, the following rules will apply:
  - a) All motions in these CCAA proceedings are to be brought on not less than five (5) calendar days' notice to all Persons on the service list. Each motion shall specify a date (the "Initial Return Date") and time (the "Initial Return Time") for the hearing.
  - b) Any Person wishing to object to the relief sought on a motion in these CCAA proceedings must serve responding motion materials or a notice stating the objection to the motion and the grounds for such objection (a "**Notice of Objection**") in writing to the moving party, the Debtors and

the Monitor, with a copy to all Persons on the service list, no later than 5 p.m. Montreal Time on the date that is three (3) calendar days prior to the Initial Return Date (the "**Objection Deadline**").

- c) If no Notice of Objection is served by the Objection Deadline, the Judge having carriage of the motion (the "**Presiding Judge**") may determine:
   (a) whether a hearing is necessary; (b) whether such hearing will be in person, by telephone or by written submissions only; and (c) the parties from whom submissions are required (collectively, the "Hearing Details"). In the absence of any such determination, a hearing will be held in the ordinary course.
- d) If no Notice of Objection is served by the Objection Deadline, the Monitor shall communicate with the Presiding Judge regarding whether a determination has been made by the Presiding Judge concerning the Hearing Details. The Monitor shall thereafter advise the service list of the Hearing Details and the Monitor shall report upon its dissemination of the Hearing Details to the Court in a timely manner, which may be contained in the Monitor's next report in these proceedings.
- e) If a Notice of Objection is served by the Objection Deadline, the interested parties shall appear before the Presiding Judge on the Initial Return Date at the Initial Return Time, or such earlier or later time as may be directed by the Court, to, as the Court may direct: (a) proceed with the hearing on the Initial Return Date and at the Initial Return Time; or (b) establish a schedule for the delivery of materials and the hearing of the court such other matters, including interim relief, as the Court may direct.
- [60] **DECLARES** that this Order and any proceeding or affidavit leading to this Order, shall not, in and of themselves, constitute a default or failure to comply by the Debtors under any statute, regulation, licence, permit, contract, permission, covenant, agreement, undertaking or other written document or requirement.
- [61] **DECLARES** that, except as otherwise specified herein, the Debtors and the Monitor are at liberty to serve any notice, proof of claim form, proxy, circular or other document in connection with these proceedings by forwarding copies by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission to Persons or other appropriate parties at their respective given addresses as last shown on the records of the Debtors and that any such service shall be deemed to be received on the date of delivery if by personal delivery or electronic transmission, on the following business day if delivered by courier, or three business days after mailing if by ordinary mail.

- [62] **DECLARES** that the Monitor, the Debtors and any party to these proceedings may serve any court materials in these proceedings on all represented parties electronically, by emailing a PDF or other electronic copy of such materials to counsels' email addresses, provided that the Monitor shall deliver "hard copies" of such materials upon request to any party as soon as practicable thereafter.
- [63] **ORDERS** that the Indivision Agreements, the 9227 Nominee Agreement, the Debtors' Financial Statements, the Evaluation Report and the Cash Flow Forecast (as such terms are defined in the Initial Motion) filed in support of the Initial Motion, respectively, as Exhibits R-3, R-4, R-5, R-11, R-12 and R-15, shall be sealed, kept confidential and not form part of the public record, but rather shall be placed, separate and apart from all other contents of the Court file, in a sealed envelope attached to a notice that sets out the title of these proceedings and a statement that the contents are subject to a sealing order and shall only be opened upon further Order of the Court.
- [64] **DECLARES** that, unless otherwise provided herein, under the CCAA, or ordered by this Court, no document, order or other material need be served on any Person in respect of these proceedings, unless such Person has served a Response on the solicitors for the Monitor and has filed such Response with this Court, or appears on the service list prepared by the Monitor or its attorneys, save and except when an order is sought against a Person not previously involved in these proceedings.
- [65] **DECLARES** that the Monitor may, from time to time, apply to this Court for directions concerning the exercise of its powers, duties and rights hereunder or in respect of the proper execution of the Order.
- [66] **DECLARES** that the Order and all other orders in these proceedings shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.
- [67] **ORDERS** the provisional execution of the Order notwithstanding any appeal.

The Honourable Peter Kalichman, J.S.C.

#### 500-11-057549-194

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## 500-11-057549-194

Antoine Lippé Attorney General of Canada Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)

Ministère de la Justice du Québec

Revenu Québec

# TAB 10

## SUPERIOR COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION)

Canada Province of Québec District of Montréal No: 500-11-055122-184 Date: August 24, 2018 (as amended on September 21, 2018)

Presiding: The Honourable Chantal Corriveau, S.C.J.

In the matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, as amended:

LE GROUPE SMI INC./THE SMI GROUP INC.

LE GROUPE S.M. INC./THE S.M. GROUP INC.

CLAULAC INC.

SMI CONSTRUCTION INC.

ÉNERPRO INC.

LE GROUPE S.M. INTERNATIONAL (CONSTRUCTION) INC./S.M. INTERNATIONAL GROUP (CONSTRUCTION) INC.

Debtors

and

LE GROUPE S.M. INTERNATIONAL S.E.C./THE S.M. GROUP INTERNATIONAL LP

ÉNERPRO S.E.C./ENERPRO LP

LES SERVICES DE PERSONNEL S.M. INC.

LE GROUPE S.M. (ONTARIO) INC./THE S.M. GROUP (ONTARIO) INC.

AMÉNATECH INC.

LABO S.M. INC.

LES CONSULTANTS INDUSTRIELS S.M. INC./S.M. INDUSTRIAL CONSULTANTS INC.

LES CONSULTANTS S.M. INC./S.M. CONSULTANTS INC.

FACILIOP EXPERTS CORP.

LE GROUPE S.M. INTERNATIONAL INC./THE S.M. GROUP INTERNATIONAL INC.

CSP CONSULTANTS EN SÉCURITÉ INC./CSP SECURITY CONSULTING INC.

LE GROUPE S.M. INTERNATIONAL (S.A.) INC./THE S.M. GROUP INTERNATIONAL (S.A.) INC.

LE GROUPE S.M. INTERNATIONAL (CONSTRUCTION) EURL

SM SAUDI ARABIA CO LTD.

THE S.M. GROUP INTERNATIONAL SARL

THE S.M. GROUP INTERNATIONAL ALGÉRIE EURL

# S.M. UNITED EMIRATES GENERAL CONTRACTING LLC

COMMANDITÉ SMI-ÉNERPRO FONDS VERT INC./SMI-ENERPRO GREEN FUND GP INC.

# SMI-ÉNERPRO FONDS VERT S.E.C./SMI-ENERPRO GREEN FUND LP

# 9229-4263 QUÉBEC INC.

Mises-en-cause

and

# ALARIS ROYALTY CORP.

# INTEGRATED PRIVATE DEBT FUND V LP

Applicants

and

# DELOITTE RESTRUCTURING INC.

Monitor

and

# LGBM INC.

Chief Restructuring Officer

# AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER

- [1] CONSIDERING the Motion for the Issuance of an Initial Order dated August 22, 2018 (the "**Petition**") of the Debtors;
- [2] CONSIDERING the Application for an Initial Order dated August 23, 2018 (the "Application") of Alaris Royalty Corp. and Integrated Private Debt Fund V LP (the "Applicants") pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 (the "CCAA"), the affidavit and the exhibits;
- [3] CONSIDERING the notification of the Application;
- [4] CONSIDERING the representations of the lawyers present;

# THE COURT:

- [5] GRANTS the Application.
- [6] ISSUES an order pursuant to the CCAA (the "**Order**"), divided under the following headings:
  - Service
  - Application of the CCAA
  - Effective Time
  - Plan of Arrangement
  - Administrative Consolidation

- Stay of Proceedings against the Debtors and the Property
- Stay of Proceedings against the Directors and Officers
- Possession of Property and Operations
- No Exercise of Rights or Remedies
- No Interference with Rights
- Continuation of Services
- Non-Derogation of Rights
- Key Employee Retention Plan
- Interim Financing
- Directors' and Officers' Indemnification
- Restructuring
- Powers of the Monitor
- Appointment of the Chief Restructuring Officer
- Priorities and General Provisions Relating to CCAA Charges
- General

## Service

- [7] ORDERS that any prior delay for the presentation of the Application is hereby abridged and validated so that the Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.
- [8] DECLARES that sufficient prior notice of the presentation of this Application has been given by the Applicants to interested parties, including the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the charges created herein.

## Application of the CCAA

- [9] DECLARES that the Debtors are debtor companies to which the CCAA applies.
- [10] DECLARES that the Mises-en-cause shall benefit from the stay of proceedings and other relief granted herein.

## **Effective Time**

[11] DECLARES that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Montreal time, province of Quebec, on August 24, 2018 (the "Effective Time").

### **Plan of Arrangement**

[12] DECLARES that the Applicants shall have the authority to file with this Court and to submit to the Debtors' creditors one or more plans of compromise or arrangement (collectively, the "**Plan**") in accordance with the CCAA.

## Administrative Consolidation

[13] ORDERS the consolidation of the CCAA proceedings of the Debtors and the Mises-encause (collectively, the "Debtors") under one single Court file, in file number 500-11-055122-184.

- [14] ORDERS that all existing and future proceedings, filings, and other matters (including, without limitation, all applications, applications and cash flows) in the CCAA Proceedings henceforth be filed jointly and together by the Debtors under file number 500-11-055122-184.
- [15] DECLARES that the consolidation of these CCAA proceedings in respect of the Debtors shall be for administrative purposes only and shall not effect a consolidation of the assets and property or of the debts and obligations of each of the Debtors including, without limitation, for the purposes of any Plan or Plans that may be hereafter proposed.

### Stay of Proceedings against the Debtors and the Property

- [16] ORDERS that, until and including November 14, 2018, or such later date as the Court may order (the "Stay Period"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal (each, a "Proceeding") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Debtors, or affecting the Debtors' business operations and activities (the "Business") or the Property (as defined herein below), including as provided in paragraph [25] herein except with leave of this Court. Any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Debtors or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further order of this Court, the whole subject to subsection 11.1 CCAA.
- [17] ORDERS that the rights of Her Majesty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of a Province are suspended in accordance with the terms and conditions of subsection 11.09 CCAA.

### Stay of Proceedings against Directors and Officers

[18] ORDERS that during the Stay Period and except as permitted under subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA, no Proceeding may be commenced, or continued against any former, present or future director or officer of the Debtors nor against any person deemed to be a director or an officer of any of the Debtors under subsection 11.03(3) CCAA (each, a "Director", and collectively the "Directors") in respect of any claim against such Director which arose prior to the Effective Time and which relates to any obligation of the Debtors where it is alleged that any of the Directors is under any law liable in such capacity for the payment of such obligation.

### **Possession of Property and Operations**

- [19] ORDERS that the Debtors shall remain in possession and control of their present and future assets, rights, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situated, including all proceeds thereof (collectively the "**Property**"), the whole in accordance with the terms and conditions of this order including, but not limited, to paragraphs [44] and [57] hereof.
- [20] ORDERS that the Debtors shall be entitled to continue to utilize the central cash management system currently in place as described in the Petition or replace it with another substantially similar central cash management system (the "Cash Management System") and that any present or future bank providing the Cash Management System

shall not be under any obligation whatsoever to inquire into the propriety, validity or legality of any transfer, payment, collection or other action taken under the Cash Management System, or as to the use or application by the Debtors of funds transferred, paid, collected or otherwise dealt with in the Cash Management System, shall be entitled to provide the Cash Management System without any liability in respect thereof to any Person (as defined herein below) other than the Debtors, pursuant to the terms of the documentation applicable to the Cash Management System.

- [21] ORDERS that each of the Debtors are authorized to complete outstanding transactions and engage in new transactions with other Debtors, and to continue, on and after the date of this Order, to buy and sell goods and services, and allocate, collect and pay costs, expenses and other amounts from and to the other Debtors, or any of them (collectively, the "**Intercompany Transactions**") in the ordinary course of business. All ordinary course Intercompany Transactions among the Debtors shall continue on terms consistent with existing arrangements or past practice, subject to such changes thereto, or to such governing principles, policies or procedures as the Monitor may require, or subject to further Order of this Court.
- [22] ORDERS that the Debtors shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses whether incurred prior to or after this Order:
  - (a) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, bonuses, expenses, benefits and vacation pay payable on or after the date of this Order, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements;
  - (b) the fees and disbursements of any agents retained or employed by the Debtors in respect of these proceedings, at their standard rates and charges; and
  - (c) with the consent of the Monitor, amounts owing for goods or services actually supplied to the Debtors prior to the date of this Order by third party suppliers up to a maximum aggregate amount of \$1,000,000, if, in the opinion of the Debtors, the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the Debtors.
- [23] ORDERS that, except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein, the Debtors shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Debtors in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course after this Order, and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, which expenses shall include, without limitation:
  - (a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business; and
  - (b) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Debtors following the date of this Order.
- [24] ORDERS that the Debtors shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:
  - (a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be

deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of (i) employment insurance, (ii) Canada Pension Plan, (iii) Québec Pension Plan, and (iv) income taxes, or, in the case of foreign Debtors any similar amounts payable pursuant to applicable local law; and

(b) all goods and services, harmonized sales or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "Sales Taxes") required to be remitted by the Debtors and in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Debtors, or, in the case of foreign Debtors, any similar amounts payable pursuant to applicable local law, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the date of this Order, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the date of this Order but not required to be remitted until on or after the date of this Order.

## No Exercise of Rights or Remedies

- [25] ORDERS that during the Stay Period, and subject to, *inter alia*, subsection 11.1 CCAA, all rights and remedies, including, but not limited to modifications of existing rights and events deemed to occur pursuant to any agreement to which any of the Debtors is a party as a result of the insolvency of the foreign Debtors and/or these CCAA proceedings, any events of default or non-performance by the Debtors or any admissions or evidence in these CCAA proceedings, of any individual, natural person, firm, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, trust, joint venture, association, organization, governmental body or agency, or any other entity (all of the foregoing, collectively being "**Persons**" and each being a "**Person**") against or in respect of the Debtors, or affecting the Business, the Property or any part thereof, are hereby stayed and suspended except with leave of this Court.
- [26] DECLARES that, to the extent any rights, obligations, or prescription, time or limitation periods, including, without limitation, to file grievances, relating to the Debtors or any of the Property or the Business may expire (other than pursuant to the terms of any contracts, agreements or arrangements of any nature whatsoever), the term of such rights, obligations, or prescription, time or limitation periods shall hereby be deemed to be extended by a period equal to the Stay Period. Without limitation to the foregoing, in the event that the Debtors, or any of them, become(s) bankrupt or a receiver as defined in subsection 243(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) (the "BIA") is appointed in respect of any of the Debtors, the period between the date of this Order and the day on which the Stay Period ends shall not be calculated in respect of the Debtors in determining the 30 day periods referred to in Sections 81.1 and 81.2 of the BIA.

### No Interference with Rights

[27] ORDERS that during the Stay Period, no Person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, resiliate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Debtors, except with the written consent of the Debtors, as applicable, and the Monitor, or with leave of this Court.

### Continuation of Services

- [28] ORDERS that during the Stay Period and subject to paragraph [30] hereof and subsection 11.01 CCAA, all Persons having verbal or written agreements with the Debtors or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods or services, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation, utility or other goods or services made available to the Debtors, are hereby restrained until further order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Debtors, and that the Debtors shall be entitled to the continued use of their current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses, domain names or other services, provided in each case that the normal prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the date of this Order are paid by the Debtors, without having to provide any security deposit or any other security, in accordance with normal payment practices of the Debtors or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and the Debtors, as applicable, with the consent of the Monitor, or as may be ordered by this Court.
- [29] ORDERS that, notwithstanding anything else contained herein and subject to subsection 11.01 CCAA, no Person shall be prohibited from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided to the Debtors on or after the date of this Order, nor shall any Person be under any obligation on or after the date of this Order to make further advance of money or otherwise extend any credit to the Debtors.
- [30] ORDERS that, without limiting the generality of the foregoing and subject to Section 21 of the CCAA, if applicable, cash or cash equivalents placed on deposit by any Debtor with any Person during the Stay Period, whether in an operating account or otherwise for itself or for another entity, shall not be applied by such Person in reduction or repayment of amounts owing to such Person or in satisfaction of any interest or charges accruing in respect thereof; however, this provision shall not prevent any financial institution from: (i) reimbursing itself for the amount of any cheques drawn by a Debtor and properly honoured by such institution, or (ii) holding the amount of any cheques or other instruments deposited into a Debtor's account until those cheques or other instruments have been honoured by the financial institution on which they have been drawn.

### **Non-Derogation of Rights**

[31] ORDERS that, notwithstanding the foregoing, any Person who provided any kind of letter of credit, guarantee or bond (the "**Issuing Party**") at the request of any of the Debtors shall be required to continue honouring any and all such letters, guarantees and bonds, issued on or before the date of this Order, provided that all conditions under such letters, guarantees and bonds are met save and except for defaults resulting from this Order; however, the Issuing Party shall be entitled, where applicable, to retain the bills of lading or shipping or other documents relating thereto until paid.

### Key Employee Retention Plan

[32] ORDERS that the Draft Key Employee Retention Plan (the "KERP"), Exhibit A-10 to the

Application, is hereby approved.

- [33] ORDERS the CRO to finalize the KERP before September 21, 2018.
- [34] ORDERS the Debtors to pay to the Monitor, within five days of the date of this Order, an amount of \$500,000 to be held in trust by the Monitor to make the payments contemplated by the KERP.

#### Interim Financing

- [35] ORDERS that Debtors be and is hereby authorized to borrow, repay and reborrow from Integrated Asset Management Corp. (the "Interim Lender") such amounts from time to time as Debtors may consider necessary or desirable, up to a maximum principal amount of \$2,000,000 outstanding at any time, on the terms and conditions as set forth in the Interim Financing Term Sheet, Exhibit A-9 to the Application, and in the Interim Financing Documents (as defined hereinafter), to fund the ongoing expenditures of Debtors and to pay such other amounts as are permitted by the terms of this Order and the Interim Financing Documents (as defined hereinafter) (the "Interim Facility").
- [36] ORDERS that the CRO, for and on behalf of the Debtors, is hereby authorized to execute and deliver such credit agreements, security documents and other definitive documents (collectively the "Interim Financing Documents") as may be required by the Interim Lender in connection with the Interim Facility and the Interim Financing Term Sheet, and Debtors are hereby authorized to perform all of their obligations under the Interim Financing Documents.
- [37] ORDERS that Debtors shall pay to the Interim Lender, when due, all amounts owing (including principal, interest, fees and expenses, including without limitation, all reasonable fees and disbursements of counsel and all other reasonably required advisers to or agents of the Interim Lender on a full indemnity basis (the "Interim Lender Expenses")) under the Interim Financing Documents and shall perform all of their other obligations to the Interim Lender pursuant to the Interim Financing Term Sheet, the Interim Financing Documents and this Order.
- [38] DECLARES that all of the Property of the Debtors is hereby subject to a charge, hypothec and security for an aggregate amount of \$2,400,000 (such charge, hypothec and security is referred to herein as the "Interim Lender Charge") in favour of the Interim Lender as security for all obligations of Debtors to the Interim Lender with respect to all amounts owing (including principal, interest and the Interim Lender Expenses) under or in connection with the Interim Financing Term Sheet and the Interim Financing Documents. The Interim Lender Charge shall have the priority established by paragraphs [65] and [66] of this Order.
- [39] ORDERS that the claims of the Interim Lender pursuant to the Interim Financing Documents shall not be compromised or arranged pursuant to the Plan or these proceedings and the Interim Lender, in that capacity, shall be treated as an unaffected creditor in these proceedings and in any Plan.
- [40] ORDERS that the Interim Lender may:

- (a) notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, take such steps from time to time as it may deem necessary or appropriate to register, record or perfect the Interim Lender Charge and the Interim Financing Documents in all jurisdictions where it deems it is appropriate; and
- (b) notwithstanding the terms of the paragraph to follow, refuse to make any advance to Debtors if the Debtors fails to meet the provisions of the Interim Financing Term Sheet and the Interim Financing Documents.
- [41] ORDERS that the Interim Lender shall not take any enforcement steps under the Interim Financing Documents or the Interim Lender Charge without providing at least 5 business days written notice (the "**Notice Period**") of a default thereunder to the Debtors, the CRO, the Applicants, the Monitor and to creditors whose rights are registered or published at the appropriate registers or requesting a copy of such notice. Upon expiry of such Notice Period, the Interim Lender shall be entitled to take any and all steps under the Interim Financing Documents and the Interim Lender Charge and otherwise permitted at law, but without having to send any demands under Section 244 of the BIA.
- [42] ORDERS that, subject to further order of this Court, no order shall be made varying, rescinding, or otherwise affecting paragraphs [35] to [41] hereof unless either (a) notice of an application for such order is served on the Interim Lender by the moving party within seven (7) days after that party was served with this Order or (b) the Interim Lender applies for or consents to such order.

### **Directors' and Officers' Indemnification**

[43] ORDERS that the Debtors shall indemnify their Directors from all claims relating to any obligations or liabilities they may incur and which have accrued by reason of or in relation to their respective capacities as directors or officers of the Debtors after the Effective Time, except where such obligations or liabilities were incurred as a result of such Director's gross negligence, wilful misconduct or gross or intentional fault as further detailed in Section 11.51 CCAA.

### Restructuring

- [44] DECLARES that, to facilitate the orderly restructuring of their business and financial affairs (the "**Restructuring**") but subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA, the Debtors shall have the right, subject to approval of the Monitor or further order of the Court, to:
  - (a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of their operations or locations as they deem appropriate and make provision for the consequences thereof in the Plan;
  - (b) pursue all avenues to finance or refinance, market, convey, transfer, assign or in any other manner dispose of the Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to further order of the Court and sections 11.3 and 36 CCAA, and under reserve of subparagraph (c);

- (c) convey, transfer, assign, lease, or in any other manner dispose of the Property, outside of the ordinary course of business, in whole or in part, and that the price and value in each case does not exceed \$200,000 or \$2,000,000 in the aggregate;
- (d) terminate the employment of such of their employees or temporarily or permanently lay off such of their employees as they deem appropriate and, to the extent any amounts in lieu of notice, termination or severance pay or other amounts in respect thereof are not paid in the ordinary course, make provision, on such terms as may be agreed upon between the Debtors, as applicable, and such employee, or failing such agreement, make provision to deal with, any consequences thereof in the Plan, as the Debtors may determine;
- (e) subject to the provisions of section 32 CCAA, disclaim or resiliate, any of their agreements, contracts or arrangements of any nature whatsoever, with such disclaimers or resiliation to be on such terms as may be agreed between the Debtors, as applicable, and the relevant party, or failing such agreement, to make provision for the consequences thereof in the Plan; and
- (f) subject to section 11.3 CCAA, assign any rights and obligations of Debtors.
- [45] DECLARES that, if a notice of disclaimer or resiliation is given to a landlord of any of the Debtors pursuant to section 32 of the CCAA and subsection [44](e) of this Order, then (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours by giving such Debtor and the Monitor 24 hours' prior written notice and (b) at the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such leased premises and re-lease any such leased premises to third parties on such terms as any such landlord may determine without waiver of, or prejudice to, any claims or rights of the landlord against the Debtors, provided nothing herein shall relieve such landlord of their obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith.
- [46] ORDERS that the Debtors, as applicable, shall provide to any relevant landlord notice of the intention of any of the Debtors to remove any fittings, fixtures, installations or leasehold improvements at least seven (7) days in advance. If a Debtor has already vacated the leased premises, it shall not be considered to be in occupation of such location pending the resolution of any dispute between such Debtor and the landlord.
- [47] DECLARES that, in order to facilitate the Restructuring, the Debtors may, subject to the approval of the Monitor, or further order of the Court, settle claims of customers and suppliers that are in dispute.
- [48] DECLARES that, pursuant to sub-paragraph 7(3)(c) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5, the Debtors are permitted, in the course of these proceedings, to disclose personal information of identifiable individuals in their possession or control to stakeholders or prospective investors, financiers, buyers or strategic partners and to their advisers (individually, a "Third Party"), but only to the extent desirable or required to negotiate and complete the

Restructuring or the preparation and implementation of the Plan or a transaction for that purpose, provided that the Persons to whom such personal information is disclosed enter into confidentiality agreements with the Debtors binding them to maintain and protect the privacy of such information and to limit the use of such information to the extent necessary to complete the transaction or Restructuring then under negotiation. Upon the completion of the use of personal information for the limited purpose set out herein, the personal information shall be returned to the Debtors or destroyed. In the event that a Third Party acquires personal information as part of the Restructuring or the preparation or implementation of the Plan or a transaction in furtherance thereof, such Third Party may continue to use the personal information in a manner which is in all respects identical to the prior use thereof by the Debtors.

[49] ORDERS that pursuant to clause 3(c)(i) of the Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations, made under An Act to Promote the Efficiency and Adaptability of the Canadian Economy by Regulating Certain Activities that Discourage Reliance on Electronic Means of Carrying Out Commercial Activities, and to Amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications Act, SC 2010, c 23, the Debtors, the CRO and the Monitor are authorized and permitted to send, or cause or permit to be sent, commercial electronic messages to an electronic address of prospective purchasers or bidders and to their advisors but only to the extent desirable or required to provide information with respect to any sales process in these CCAA proceedings.

## Powers of the Monitor

- [50] ORDERS that Deloitte Restructuring Inc. is hereby appointed to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Debtors as an officer of this Court (the "**Monitor**") and that the Monitor, in addition to the prescribed powers and obligations, referred to in Section 23 of the CCAA:
  - (a) shall, as soon as practicable, (i) publish once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks or as otherwise directed by the Court, in La Presse+ and the Globe & Mail National Edition and (ii) within five (5) business days after the date of this Order (A) post on the Monitor's website (the "Website") a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA, (B) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (C) send, in the prescribed manner, a notice to all known creditors having a claim against the Debtors of more than \$1,000, advising them that this Order is publicly available, and (D) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of such creditors and the estimated amounts of their respective claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder;
  - (b) shall monitor the Debtors' receipts and disbursements;
  - (c) shall assist the Debtors, to the extent required by the Debtors, in dealing with their creditors and other interested Persons during the Stay Period;

- (d) shall assist the Debtors, to the extent required by the Debtors, with the preparation of their cash flow projections and any other projections or reports and the development, negotiation and implementation of the Plan;
- (e) shall advise and assist the Debtors, to the extent required by the Debtors, to review the Debtors' business and assess opportunities for cost reduction, revenue enhancement and operating efficiencies;
- (f) shall assist the Debtors, to the extent required by the Debtors, with the Restructuring and in their negotiations with their creditors and other interested Persons and with the holding and administering of any meetings held to consider the Plan;
- (g) shall report to the Court on the state of the business and financial affairs of the Debtors or developments in these proceedings or any related proceedings within the time limits set forth in the CCAA and at such time as considered appropriate by the Monitor or as the Court may order and may file consolidated Reports for the Debtors;
- (h) shall report to this Court and interested parties, including but not limited to creditors affected by the Plan, with respect to the Monitor's assessment of, and recommendations with respect to, the Plan;
- may retain and employ such agents, advisers and other assistants as are reasonably necessary for the purpose of carrying out the terms of this Order, including, without limitation, one or more entities related to or affiliated with the Monitor;
- (j) may engage legal counsel to the extent the Monitor considers necessary in connection with the exercise of its powers or the discharge of its obligations in these proceedings and any related proceeding, under this Order or under the CCAA;
- (k) may act as a "foreign representative" of any of the Debtors or in any other similar capacity in any insolvency, bankruptcy or reorganisation proceedings outside of Canada;
- (I) may give any consent or approval as may be contemplated by this Order or the CCAA;
- (m) may hold and administer funds in connection with arrangements made among the Debtors, any counter-parties and the Monitor, or by Order of this Court; and
- (n) may perform such other duties as are required by this Order or the CCAA or by this Court from time to time.

Unless expressly authorized to do so by this Court, the Monitor shall not otherwise interfere with the business and financial affairs carried on by the Debtors, and the Monitor is not empowered to take possession of the Property nor to manage any of the

business and financial affairs of the Debtors nor shall the Monitor be deemed to have done so.

- [50.1] AUTHORIZES the Monitor, in consultation with the CRO and the Applicants and without any obligation to do so, to:
  - (a) examine under oath any Person reasonably thought to have knowledge relating to any of the Debtors, the Business or the Property; and
  - (b) order any Person liable to be examined pursuant to the preceding sub-paragraph to disclose to the Monitor and produce any books, documents, correspondence or papers in that person's possession or power relating to the Debtors, the Business or the Property.

[50.2] ORDERS that:

- (a) the Monitor shall serve on the Person he wishes to examine pursuant to this Order, at least five days prior to the scheduled date of the examination, a summons to appear specifying the time, place and books, documents, correspondence or papers that the person must have in his or her possession during the examination.
- (b) the examinations held pursuant to this Order shall be conducted in the District of Montréal, unless otherwise agreed between the Monitor and the person being examined.
- (c) objections raised during examinations held pursuant to this Order shall not prevent the continuation of the examination, the witness being required to respond, unless they relate to the fact that the person being examined cannot be compelled or to fundamental rights or to a matter of substantial legitimate interest, in which case the person being examined may refrain from responding.
- [50.3] AUTHORIZES the Monitor to execute banking and other transactions on behalf of any of the Debtors and to execute any documents or take any other action that is necessary or appropriate for the purpose of the exercise of this power.
- [51] ORDERS that the Debtors and their Directors, officers, employees and agents, accountants, auditors and all other Persons having notice of this Order shall forthwith provide the Monitor with unrestricted access to all of the Business and Property, including, without limitation, the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and all other documents of the Debtors in connection with the Monitor's duties and responsibilities hereunder.
- [52] DECLARES that the Monitor may provide creditors and other relevant stakeholders of the Debtors with information in response to requests made by them in writing addressed to the Monitor and copied to the counsel for the Debtors'. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Debtors is confidential, proprietary or competitive, the Monitor shall not provide such information to any Person without the consent of the Debtors or the CRO unless otherwise directed by this Court.

- [53] DECLARES that if the Monitor, in its capacity as Monitor, carries on the business of the Debtors or continues the employment of the Debtors' employees, the Monitor shall benefit from the provisions of section 11.8 of the CCAA.
- [54] DECLARES that no action or other proceedings shall be commenced against the Monitor relating to its appointment, its conduct as Monitor or the carrying out of the provisions of any order of this Court, except with prior leave of this Court, on at least seven days' notice to the Monitor and its counsel. The entities related to or affiliated with the Monitor referred to in subparagraph [50](i) hereof shall also be entitled to the protection, benefits and privileges afforded to the Monitor pursuant to this paragraph.
- [55] ORDERS that the Debtors shall pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Monitor, the CRO, the Monitor's legal counsel, the Debtors' legal counsel, the legal counsel for the Applicants and other advisers, directly related to these proceedings, the Plan and the Restructuring, whether incurred before or after this Order, and shall be authorized to provide each with a reasonable retainer in advance on account of such fees and disbursements, if so requested.
- [56] DECLARES that the Monitor, the Monitor's legal counsel (Stikeman Elliott LLP), the legal counsel for the Applicants (McCarthy Tétrault LLP and Miller Thomson LLP), Debtors' legal counsel (Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP and Robinson Sheppard Shapiro, L.L.P.), the CRO, as security for the professional fees and disbursements incurred both before and after the making of this Order and directly related to these proceedings, the Plan and the Restructuring, be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge, hypothec and security in the Property to the extent of the aggregate amount of \$250,000 (the "Administration Charge"), having the priority established by paragraphs [65] and [66] of this Order.

## Appointment of the Chief Restructuring Officer

- [57] ORDERS that LGBM Inc. is hereby appointed Chief Restructuring Officer ("**CRO**") over the Debtors and, subject to the Orders of the Court that may be granted from time to time in these proceedings and in consultation with the Monitor and the Applicants, shall be authorized but not required, for and on behalf of the Debtors to:
  - (a) conduct and control the financial affairs and operations of the Debtors and carry on the business of the Debtors;
  - (b) execute and deliver the Interim Financing Documents, as provided for by paragraph [36] of this Order;
  - (c) finalize the KERP, as provided for by paragraph [33] of this Order;
  - (d) exercise the rights provided for by [44] of this Order;
  - (e) execute such documents as may be necessary in connection with any proceedings before or order of the Court;
  - (f) take steps for the preservation and protection of the Property;

- (g) negotiate and enter into agreements with respect to the Property;
- (h) engage and give instructions to legal counsel;
- apply to the Court for any vesting order or orders which may be necessary or appropriate in order to convey the Property to a purchaser or purchasers thereof with the prior consent of the Monitor;
- (j) take any steps required to be taken by the Debtors under any Order of the Court;
- (k) provide information to the Monitor and the Applicants regarding the business and affairs of the Debtors;
- (I) exercise such shareholder or member or rights, as may be available to the Debtors; and
- (m) take any steps, enter into any agreements or incur any obligations necessary or incidental to the exercise of the aforesaid powers.
- [58] ORDERS that the Debtors and their Directors, officers, employees and agents, accountants, auditors and all other Persons having notice of this Order shall forthwith provide the CRO with unrestricted access to all of the Business and Property, including, without limitation, the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and all other documents of the Debtors.
- [59] ORDERS that the Letter of Engagement of the CRO dated July 3, 2018, Exhibit A-6 to the Application (the "CRO Agreement"), is approved and the Debtors are authorized to perform all of their obligations pursuant to the CRO Agreement.
- [60] ORDERS that neither the CRO nor any employee or agent of the CRO shall be deemed to be a director or trustee of the Debtors.
- [61] ORDERS that neither the CRO, nor any officer, director, employee, or agent of the CRO, including, without limitation, Paul Lafrenière, shall incur any liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any liability or obligation incurred as a result of gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its or their part.
- [62] ORDERS that, as provided for by paragraph [56] of this Order, the professional fees and disbursements payable to the CRO pursuant to the CRO Agreement are entitled to the benefit of the Administration Charge.
- [63] ORDERS that during the Stay Period no action or other proceeding shall be commenced directly, or by way of counterclaim, third party claim or otherwise, against or in respect of the CRO and any officers, directors, employees or agents of the CRO who may assist the CRO with the exercise of its powers and obligations under this Order or the CRO Agreement (the "CRO Indemnified Parties") that in any way relates to the Debtors, and all rights and remedies of any Person against or in respect of the CRO Indemnified Parties are hereby stayed and suspended, except with the written consent of the CRO or with leave of this Court on

notice to the CRO and the Monitor. Notice of any such application seeking leave of this Court shall be served upon the CRO and the Monitor at least seven (7) days prior to the return date of any such application for leave.

- [64] ORDERS that the Debtors' indemnity in favour of the CRO Indemnified Parties, as set out in the CRO Agreement, shall survive any termination, replacement or discharge of the CRO.
- [64.1] ORDERS that as security for all obligations arising out of the indemnity granted in favour of the CRO Indemnified Parties, as provided for in the CRO Agreement and as approved and rendered effective pursuant to paragraphs [59] and [64] of this Order (the "CRO Indemnity"), the CRO Indemnified Parties shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "CRO Indemnity Charge") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of \$1,500,000.
- [64.2] ORDERS that, notwithstanding any language in any of the Debtors' applicable insurance policies to the contrary, (a) no insurer of the Debtors shall be entitled to be subrogated to or claim the benefit of the CRO Indemnity Charge, and (b) the CRO Indemnified Parties shall only be entitled to the benefit of the CRO Indemnity Charge to the extent that they do not have coverage under any directors' and officers' insurance policy of the Debtors, or to the extent that such coverage is insufficient to pay amounts for which the CRO Indemnified Parties are entitled to be indemnified in accordance with paragraph [64] of this Order.
- [64.3] ORDERS that the establishment of the CRO Indemnity Charge shall not be read to limit or otherwise affect any of the protections afforded to the CRO under the CRO Agreement or this Order and in particular, paragraphs [59] to [64] of this Order.

### **Priorities and General Provisions Relating to CCAA Charges**

- [65] DECLARES that the priorities of the Administration Charge, the Interim Lender Charge and the CRO Indemnity Charge (collectively, the "**CCAA Charges**"), as between them with respect to any Property to which they apply, shall be as follows:
  - (a) first, the Administration Charge;
  - (b) second, the Interim Lender Charge; and
  - (c) third, the CRO Indemnity Charge.
- [66] DECLARES that each of the CCAA Charges shall rank in priority to any and all other hypothecs, mortgages, liens, security interests, priorities, charges, encumbrances or security of whatever nature or kind (collectively, the "Encumbrances") affecting the Property whether or not charged by such Encumbrances.
- [67] ORDERS that, except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, the Debtors shall not grant any Encumbrances in or against any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, any of the CCAA Charges unless the Debtors, as applicable, obtain the prior written consent of the Monitor and the Applicants, and the prior approval of the Court.

- [68] DECLARES that each of the CCAA Charges shall attach, as of the Effective Time, to all present and future Property of the Debtors, notwithstanding any requirement for the consent of any party to any such charge or to comply with any condition precedent.
- [69] DECLARES that the CCAA Charges and the rights and remedies of the beneficiaries of the CCAA Charges, as applicable, shall be valid and enforceable and not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by: (i) these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (ii) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such application(s) or any assignment(s) in bankruptcy made or deemed to be made in respect of any of the Debtor; or (iii) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any agreement, lease, sub-lease, offer to lease or other arrangement which binds the Debtors (a "Third Party Agreement"), and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Third Party Agreement:
  - the creation of any of the CCAA Charges shall not create nor be deemed to constitute a breach by the Debtors of any Third Party Agreement to which any of the Debtor is a party; and
  - (b) the beneficiaries of the CCAA Charges shall not have any liability to any Debtors whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Third Party Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the CCAA Charges.
- [70] DECLARES that notwithstanding: (i) these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (ii) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such application(s) or any assignment(s) in bankruptcy made or deemed to be made in respect of any of the Debtor; and (iii) the provisions of any federal or provincial statute, the payments or disposition of Property made by any of the Debtor pursuant to this Order and the granting of the CCAA Charges, do not and will not constitute settlements, fraudulent preferences, fraudulent conveyances or other challengeable or reviewable transactions or conduct meriting an oppression remedy under any applicable law.
- [71] DECLARES that the CCAA Charges shall be valid and enforceable as against all Property of the Debtors and against all Persons, including, without limitation, any trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver of the Debtors.

### General

- [72] ORDERS that no Person shall commence, proceed with or enforce any Proceedings against any of the Directors, employees, legal counsel or financial advisors of the Debtors or of the Monitor in relation to the Business or Property of the Debtors, without first obtaining leave of this Court, upon ten (10) days' written notice to the Debtors counsel, the Monitor's counsel, and to all those referred to in this paragraph whom it is proposed be named in such Proceedings.
- [73] ORDERS that, subject to further Order of this Court, all applications in these CCAA proceedings are to be brought on not less than five (5) days' notice to all Persons on the

service list. Each application shall specify a date (the "**Initial Return Date**") and time (the "**Initial Return Time**") for the hearing.

- [74] ORDERS that any Person wishing to object to the relief sought on an application in these CCAA proceedings must serve responding application materials or a notice stating the objection to the application and the grounds for such objection (a "Notice of Objection") in writing to the moving party, the Debtors and the Monitor, with a copy to all Persons on the service list, no later than 5 p.m. Montreal Time on the date that is three (3) days prior to the Initial Return Date (the "Objection Deadline").
- [75] ORDERS that, if no Notice of Objection is served by the Objection Deadline, the Judge having carriage of the application (the "Presiding Judge") may determine: (a) whether a hearing is necessary; (b) whether such hearing will be in person, by telephone or by written submissions only; and (c) the parties from whom submissions are required (collectively, the "Hearing Details"). In the absence of any such determination, a hearing will be held in the ordinary course.
- [76] ORDERS that, if no Notice of Objection is served by the Objection Deadline, the Monitor shall communicate with the Presiding Judge regarding whether a determination has been made by the Presiding Judge concerning the Hearing Details. The Monitor shall thereafter advise the service list of the Hearing Details and the Monitor shall report upon its dissemination of the Hearing Details to the Court in a timely manner, which may be contained in the Monitor's next report in these proceedings.
- [77] ORDERS that, if a Notice of Objection is served by the Objection Deadline, the interested parties shall appear before the Presiding Judge on the Initial Return Date at the Initial Return Time, or such earlier or later time as may be directed by the Court, to, as the Court may direct: (a) proceed with the hearing on the Initial Return Date and at the Initial Return Time; or (b) establish a schedule for the delivery of materials and the hearing of the contested application and such other matters, including interim relief, as the Court may direct.
- [78] DECLARES that this Order and any proceeding or affidavit leading to this Order, shall not, in and of themselves, constitute a default or failure to comply by the Debtors under any statute, regulation, licence, permit, contract, permission, covenant, agreement, undertaking or other written document or requirement.
- [79] DECLARES that, except as otherwise specified herein, the Debtors and the Monitor are at liberty to serve any notice, proof of claim form, proxy, circular or other document in connection with these proceedings by forwarding copies by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission to Persons or other appropriate parties at their respective given addresses as last shown on the records of the Debtors and that any such service shall be deemed to be received on the date of delivery if by personal delivery or electronic transmission, on the following business day if delivered by courier, or three business days after mailing if by ordinary mail.
- [80] DECLARES that the Debtors and any party to these proceedings may serve any court materials in these proceedings on all represented parties electronically, by emailing a PDF or other electronic copy of such materials to counsels' email addresses, provided

that the Debtors shall deliver "hard copies" of such materials upon request to any party as soon as practicable thereafter.

- [81] DECLARES that, unless otherwise provided herein, under the CCAA, or ordered by this Court, no document, order or other material need be served on any Person in respect of these proceedings, unless such Person has served a Notice of Appearance on counsel for the Applicants and counsel for the Monitor and has filed such notice with this Court, or appears on the service list prepared by counsel for the Monitor, save and except when an order is sought against a Person not previously involved in these proceedings.
- [82] DECLARES that the Debtors, the Applicants or the Monitor may, from time to time, apply to this Court for directions concerning the exercise of their respective powers, duties and rights hereunder or in respect of the proper execution of this Order on notice only to each other.
- [83] DECLARES that any interested Person may apply to this Court to vary or rescind this Order or seek other relief at the comeback hearing scheduled for ●, 2018 (the "Comeback Hearing") upon five (5) days' notice to the Debtors, the Applicants and the Monitor and to any other party likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.
- [84] DECLARES that this Order and all other orders in these proceedings shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada.
- [85] AUTHORIZES the Monitor or any of the Debtors, and in the case of the Monitor, with the prior consent of the Debtors, to apply as it may consider necessary or desirable, with or without notice, to any other court or administrative body, whether in Canada, the United States of America or elsewhere, for orders which aid and complement this Order and any subsequent orders of this Court and, without limitation to the foregoing, any orders under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, including an order for recognition of these CCAA proceedings as "Foreign Main Proceedings" in the United States of America pursuant to Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and for which the Monitor, or the authorized representative of the Debtors, shall be the foreign representative of the Debtors. All courts and administrative bodies of all such jurisdictions are hereby respectively requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Debtors and the Monitor as may be deemed necessary or appropriate for that purpose.
- [86] REQUESTS the aid and recognition of any Court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Debtors, the CRO, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All Courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Debtors, the CRO and the Monitor as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor or the authorized representative of the Debtors in any foreign proceeding, to assist the Debtors, the CRO and the Monitor, and to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court, in carrying out the terms of this Order.

- [87] DECLARES that, for the purposes of any applications authorized by paragraphs [85] and [86], Debtors' centre of main interest is located in the province of Québec, Canada.
- [88] ORDERS the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal.
- [89] DECLARES that the mandate letters of Deloitte dated July 27, 2017, January 12, 2018 and June 19, 2018, Exhibit A-4 En Liasse, the Mandate letter of Alternative Capital Group Inc. dated April 30, 2018, Exhibit A-5, the CRO Agreement, Exhibit A-6, the Letter of Intent of Thornhill Investments Inc. dated July 18, 2018, Exhibit A-8, the Interim Financing Term Sheet, Exhibit A-9, and the Draft Key Employee Retention Plan, Exhibit, Exhibit A-10, are confidential and are filed under seal.

The Honorable Justice Chantal Corriveau Superior Court of the Province of Québec, Canada

Term	Paragraph of the Initial Order ascribing the meaning to the term
Administration Charge	[56]
Applicants	[2]
Application	[2]
BIA	[26]
Business	[16]
Cash Management System	[20]
CCAA	[2]
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CRO	[57]
CRO Agreement	[59]
CRO Indemnified Parties	[63]
CRO Indemnity Charge	[64.1]
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Effective Time	[11]
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Interim Financing Documents	[36]
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Interim Lender Charge	[38]
Interim Lender Expenses	[37]
Issuing Party	[31]

# Schedule 1 – Index of defined terms

Term	Paragraph of the Initial Order ascribing the meaning to the term
KERP	[32]
Monitor	[50]
Notice of Objection	[74]
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Order	[6]
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Petition	[1]
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Presiding Judge	[75]
Proceeding	[16]
Property	[19]
Restructuring	[44]
Sales Taxes	[24](b)
Stay Period	[16]
Third Party	[48]
Third Party Agreement	[69]
Website	[50](a)

# TAB 11

### 2020 SCC 10, 2020 CSC 10 Supreme Court of Canada

9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.

2020 CarswellQue 3772, 2020 CarswellQue 3773, 2020 SCC 10, 2020 CSC 10, 1 B.L.R. (6th) 1, 317 A.C.W.S. (3d) 532, 444 D.L.R. (4th) 373, 78 C.B.R. (6th) 1

# 9354-9186 Québec inc. and 9354-9178 Québec inc. (Appellants) and Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier (Respondents) and Ernst & Young Inc., IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited), Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited), Insolvency Institute of Canada and Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (Interveners)

IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited) and Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited (Appellants) and Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier (Respondents) and Ernst & Young Inc., 9354-9186 Québec inc., 9354-9178 Québec inc., Insolvency Institute of Canada and Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (Interveners)

Wagner C.J.C., Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer JJ.

Heard: January 23, 2020 Judgment: May 8, 2020 Docket: 38594

Proceedings: reasons in full to 9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp. (2020), 2020 CarswellQue 237, 2020 CarswellQue 236, Abella J., Côté J., Karakatsanis J., Kasirer J., Moldaver J., Rowe J., Wagner C.J.C. (S.C.C.); reversing Arrangement relatif à 9354-9186 Québec inc. (Bluberi Gaming Technologies Inc.) (2019), 2019 QCCA 171, EYB 2019-306890, 2019 CarswellQue 94, Dumas J.C.A. (ad hoc), Dutil J.C.A., Schrager J.C.A. (C.A. Que.)

Counsel: Jean-Philippe Groleau, Christian Lachance, Gabriel Lavery Lepage, Hannah Toledano, for Appellants / Interveners, 9354-9186 Québec inc. and 9354-9178 Québec inc.

Neil A. Peden, for Appellants / Interveners IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited) and Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited)

Geneviève Cloutier, Clifton P. Prophet, for Respondent, Callidus Capital Corporation

Jocelyn Perreault, Noah Zucker, François Alexandre Toupin, for Respondents, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, François Proulx and François Pelletier

Joseph Reynaud, Nathalie Nouvet, for Intervener, Ernst & Young Inc.

Sylvain Rigaud, Arad Mojtahedi, Saam Pousht-Mashhad, for Interveners, Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

#### XIX.3 Arrangements

XIX.3.e Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act - Arrangements - Miscellaneous

Debtor sought protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Debtor brought application seeking authorization of funding agreement and requested placement of super-priority charge in favour of lender — After its first plan of arrangement was rejected, secured creditor submitted second plan and sought authorization to vote on it — Supervising judge dismissed secured creditor's application, holding that secured creditor was acting with improper purpose — After reviewing terms of proposed financing, supervising judge found it met criteria set out by courts — Finally, supervising judge imposed super-priority charge on debtor's assets in favour of lender — Secured creditor appealed supervising judge's order — Court of Appeal allowed appeal, finding that exercise of judge's discretion was not founded in law nor on proper treatment of facts — Debtor and lender, supported by monitor, appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — By seeking authorization to vote on second version of its own plan, secured creditor was attempting to circumvent creditor democracy CCAA protects — By doing so, secured creditor acted contrary to expectation that parties act with due diligence in insolvency proceeding and was properly barred from voting on second plan — Supervising judge considered proposed financing to be fair and reasonable and correctly determined that it was not plan of arrangement — Therefore, supervising judge's order should be reinstated. Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Arrangements — Divers

Débitrice s'est placée sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — Débitrice a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de conclure un accord de financement et a demandé l'autorisation de grever son actif d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur — Après que son premier plan d'arrangement ait été rejeté, la créancière garantie a soumis un deuxième plan et a demandé l'autorisation de voter sur ce plan — Juge surveillant a rejeté la demande de la créancière garantie, estimant que la créancière garantie agissait dans un but illégitime — Après en avoir examiné les modalités, le juge surveillant a conclu que le financement proposé respectait le critère établi par les tribunaux — Enfin, le juge surveillant a ordonné que les actifs de la débitrice soient grevés d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur — Créancière garantie a interjeté appel de l'ordonnance du juge surveillant — Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel, estimant que l'exercice par le juge de son pouvoir discrétionnaire n'était pas fondé en droit, non plus qu'il ne reposât sur un traitement approprié des faits — Débitrice et le prêteur, appuyés par le contrôleur, ont formé un pourvoi devant la Cour suprême du Canada - Pourvoi accueilli - En cherchant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter sur la deuxième version de son propre plan, la créancière garantie tentait de contourner la démocratie entre les créanciers que défend la LACC - Ce faisant, la créancière garantie agissait manifestement à l'encontre de l'attente selon laquelle les parties agissent avec diligence dans les procédures d'insolvabilité et a été à juste titre empêchée de voter sur le nouveau plan — Juge surveillant a estimé que le financement proposé était juste et raisonnable et a eu raison de conclure que le financement ne constituait pas un plan d'arrangement — Par conséquent, l'ordonnance du juge surveillant devrait être rétablie.

The debtor manufactured, distributed, installed, and serviced electronic casino gaming machines. The debtor sought financing from a secured creditor, the debt being secured in part by a share pledge agreement. Over the following years, the debtor lost significant amounts of money, and the secured creditor continued to extend credit. Eventually, the debtor sought protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). In its petition, the debtor alleged that its liquidity issues were the result of the secured creditor taking de facto control of the corporation and dictating a number of purposefully detrimental business decisions in order to deplete the corporation's equity value with a view to owning the debtor's business and, ultimately, selling it. The debtor's petition succeeded, and an initial order was issued. The debtor then entered into an asset purchase agreement with the secured creditor whereby the secured creditor would obtain all of the debtor's assets in exchange for extinguishing almost the entirety of its secured claim against the debtor. The agreement would also permit the debtor to retain claims for damages against the creditor arising from its alleged involvement in the debtor's financial difficulties. The asset purchase agreement was approved by the supervising judge. The debtor brought an application seeking authorization of a proposed third-party litigation funding agreement (LFA) and the placement of a super-priority charge in favour of the lender. The secured creditor submitted a plan of arrangement along with an application seeking the authorization to vote with the unsecured creditors.

The supervising judge dismissed the secured creditor's application, holding that the secured creditor should not be allowed to vote on its own plan because it was acting with an improper purpose. He noted that the secured creditor's first plan had been rejected and this attempt to vote on the new plan was an attempt to override the result of the first vote. Under the circumstances,

given that the secured creditor's conduct was contrary to the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence, allowing the secured creditor to vote would be both unfair and unreasonable. Since the new plan had no reasonable prospect of success, the supervising judge declined to submit it to a creditors' vote. The supervising judge determined that the LFA did not need to be submitted to a creditors' vote because it was not a plan of arrangement. After reviewing the terms of the LFA, the supervising judge found it met the criteria for approval of third-party litigation funding set out by the courts. Finally, the supervising judge imposed the litigation financing charge on the debtor's assets in favour of the lender. The secured creditor appealed the supervising judge's order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the exercise of the judge's discretion was not founded in law nor on a proper treatment of the facts so that irrespective of the standard of review applied, appellate intervention was justified. In particular, the Court of Appeal identified two errors. First, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the supervising judge erred in finding that the secured creditor had an improper purpose in seeking to vote on its plan. The Court of Appeal relied heavily on the notion that creditors have a right to vote in their own self-interest. Second, the Court of Appeal concluded that the supervising judge erred in approving the LFA as interim financing because, in its view, the LFA was not connected to the debtor's commercial operations. In light of this perceived error, the Court of Appeal substituted its view that the LFA was a plan of arrangement and, as a result, should have been submitted to a creditors' vote. The debtor and the lender, supported by the monitor, appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

#### Held: The appeal was allowed.

Per Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer JJ. concurring): Section 11 of the CCAA empowers a judge to make any order that the judge considers appropriate in the circumstances. A high degree of deference is owed to discretionary decisions made by judges supervising CCAA proceedings. As such, appellate intervention will only be justified if the supervising judge erred in principle or exercised their discretion unreasonably. This deferential standard of review accounts for the fact that supervising judges are steeped in the intricacies of the CCAA proceedings they oversee.

A creditor can generally vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise that affects its rights, subject to any specific provisions of the CCAA that may restrict its voting rights, or a proper exercise of discretion by the supervising judge to constrain or bar the creditor's right to vote. One such constraint arises from s. 11 of the CCAA, which provides supervising judges with the discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. For example, a creditor acts for an improper purpose where the creditor is seeking to exercise its voting rights in a manner that frustrates, undermines, or runs counter to the objectives of the CCAA. Supervising judges are best placed to determine whether the power to bar a creditor from voting should be exercised. Here, the supervising judge made no error in exercising his discretion to bar the secured creditor from voting on its plan. The supervising judge was intimately familiar with the debtor's CCAA proceedings and noted that, by seeking an authorization to vote on a second version of its own plan, the first one having been rejected, the secured creditor was attempting to strategically value its security to acquire control over the outcome of the vote and thereby circumvent the creditor democracy the CCAA protects. By doing so, the secured creditor acted contrary to the expectation that parties act with due diligence in an insolvency proceeding. Hence, the secured creditor was properly barred from voting on the second plan.

Interim financing is a flexible tool that may take on a range of forms, and third-party litigation funding may be one such form. Ultimately, whether proposed interim financing should be approved is a question that the supervising judge is best placed to answer. Here, there was no basis upon which to interfere with the supervising judge's exercise of his discretion to approve the LFA as interim financing. The supervising judge considered the LFA to be fair and reasonable, drawing guidance from the principles relevant to approving similar agreements in the class action context. While the supervising judge did not canvass each of the factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of the CCAA individually before reaching his conclusion, this was not itself an error. It was apparent that the supervising judge was focused on the fairness at stake to all parties, the specific objectives of the CCAA, and the particular circumstances of this case when he approved the LFA as interim financing. The supervising judge correctly determined that the LFA was not a plan of arrangement because it did not propose any compromise of the creditors' rights. The super-priority charge he granted to the lender did not convert the LFA into a plan of arrangement by subordinating creditors' rights. Therefore, he did not err in the exercise of his discretion, no intervention was justified and the supervising judge's order should be reinstated.

La débitrice fabriquait, distribuait, installait et entretenait des appareils de jeux électroniques pour casino. La débitrice a demandé du financement à la créancière garantie que la débitrice a garanti partiellement en signant une entente par laquelle elle mettait en gage ses actions. Au cours des années suivantes, la débitrice a perdu d'importantes sommes d'argent et la créancière garantie a continué de lui consentir du crédit. Finalement, la débitrice s'est placée sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC). Dans sa requête, la débitrice a fait valoir que ses problèmes de liquidité découlaient du fait que la créancière garantie exerçait un contrôle de facto à l'égard de son entreprise et lui dictait un certain nombre de décisions d'affaires dans l'intention de lui nuire et de réduire la valeur de ses actions dans le but de devenir propriétaire de l'entreprise de la débitrice et ultimement de la vendre. La requête de la débitrice a été accordée et une ordonnance initiale a été émise. La débitrice a alors signé une convention d'achat d'actifs avec la créancière garantie en vertu de laquelle la créancière garantie obtiendrait l'ensemble des actifs de la débitrice en échange de l'extinction de la presque totalité de la créance garantie qu'elle détenait à l'encontre de la débitrice. Cette convention prévoyait également que la débitrice se réservait le droit de réclamer des dommages-intérêts à la créancière garantie en raison de l'implication alléguée de celle-ci dans ses difficultés financières. Le juge surveillant a approuvé la convention d'achat d'actifs. La débitrice a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de conclure un accord de financement du litige par un tiers (AFL) et l'autorisation de grever son actif d'une charge super-prioritaire en faveur du prêteur. La créancière garantie a soumis un plan d'arrangement et une requête visant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter avec les créanciers chirographaires.

Le juge surveillant a rejeté la demande de la créancière garantie, estimant que la créancière garantie ne devrait pas être autorisée à voter sur son propre plan puisqu'elle agissait dans un but illégitime. Il a fait remarquer que le premier plan de la créancière garantie avait été rejeté et que cette tentative de voter sur le nouveau plan était une tentative de contourner le résultat du premier vote. Dans les circonstances, étant donné que la conduite de la créancière garantie était contraire à l'opportunité, à la bonne foi et à la diligence requises, lui permettre de voter serait à la fois injuste et déraisonnable. Comme le nouveau plan n'avait aucune possibilité raisonnable de recevoir l'aval des créanciers, le juge surveillant a refusé de le soumettre au vote des créanciers. Le juge surveillant a décidé qu'il n'était pas nécessaire de soumettre l'AFL au vote des créanciers parce qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'un plan d'arrangement. Après en avoir examiné les modalités, le juge surveillant a conclu que l'AFL respectait le critère d'approbation applicable en matière de financement d'un litige par un tiers établi par les tribunaux. Enfin, le juge surveillant a ordonné que les actifs de la débitrice soient grevés de la charge liée au financement du litige en faveur du prêteur. La créancière garantie a interjeté appel de l'ordonnance du juge surveillant.

La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel, estimant que l'exercice par le juge de son pouvoir discrétionnaire n'était pas fondé en droit, non plus qu'il ne reposât sur un traitement approprié des faits, de sorte que, peu importe la norme de contrôle appliquée, il était justifié d'intervenir en appel. En particulier, la Cour d'appel a relevé deux erreurs. D'une part, la Cour d'appel a conclu que le juge surveillant a commis une erreur en concluant que la créancière garantie a agi dans un but illégitime en demandant l'autorisation de voter sur son plan. La Cour d'appel s'appuyait grandement sur l'idée que les créanciers ont le droit de voter en fonction de leur propre intérêt. D'autre part, la Cour d'appel a conclu que le juge surveillant a eu tort d'approuver l'AFL en tant qu'accord de financement provisoire parce qu'à son avis, il n'était pas lié aux opérations commerciales de la débitrice. À la lumière de ce qu'elle percevait comme une erreur, la Cour d'appel a substitué son opinion selon laquelle l'AFL était un plan d'arrangement et que pour cette raison, il aurait dû être soumis au vote des créanciers. La débitrice et le prêteur, appuyés par le contrôleur, ont formé un pourvoi devant la Cour suprême du Canada.

#### Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Wagner, J.C.C., Moldaver, J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer, JJ., souscrivant à leur opinion) : L'article 11 de la LACC confère au juge le pouvoir de rendre toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée dans les circonstances. Les décisions discrétionnaires des juges chargés de la supervision des procédures intentées sous le régime de la LACC commandent un degré élevé de déférence. Ainsi, les cours d'appel ne seront justifiées d'intervenir que si le juge surveillant a commis une erreur de principe ou exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire de manière déraisonnable. Cette norme déférente de contrôle tient compte du fait que le juge surveillant possède une connaissance intime des procédures intentées sous le régime de la LACC dont il assure la supervision.

En général, un créancier peut voter sur un plan d'arrangement ou une transaction qui a une incidence sur ses droits, sous réserve des dispositions de la LACC qui peuvent limiter son droit de voter, ou de l'exercice justifié par le juge surveillant de son pouvoir discrétionnaire de limiter ou de supprimer ce droit. Une telle limite découle de l'art. 11 de la LACC, qui confère au juge surveillant le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'empêcher le créancier de voter lorsqu'il agit dans un but illégitime. Par exemple, un créancier agit dans un but illégitime lorsque le créancier cherche à exercer ses droits de vote de manière à contrecarrer, à miner les objectifs de la LACC ou à aller à l'encontre de ceux-ci. Le juge surveillant est mieux placé que quiconque pour déterminer s'il doit exercer le pouvoir d'empêcher le créancier de voter. En l'espèce, le juge surveillant n'a commis aucune

erreur en exerçant son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour empêcher la créancière garantie de voter sur son plan. Le juge surveillant connaissait très bien les procédures fondées sur la LACC relatives à la débitrice et a fait remarquer que, en cherchant à obtenir l'autorisation de voter sur la deuxième version de son propre plan, la première ayant été rejetée, la créancière garantie tentait d'évaluer stratégiquement la valeur de sa sûreté afin de prendre le contrôle du vote et ainsi contourner la démocratie entre les créanciers que défend la LACC. Ce faisant, la créancière garantie agissait manifestement à l'encontre de l'attente selon laquelle les parties agissent avec diligence dans les procédures d'insolvabilité. Ainsi, la créancière garantie a été à juste titre empêchée de voter sur le nouveau plan.

Le financement temporaire est un outil souple qui peut revêtir différentes formes, et le financement d'un litige par un tiers peut constituer l'une de ces formes. Au bout du compte, la question de savoir s'il y a lieu d'approuver le financement temporaire projeté est une question à laquelle le juge surveillant est le mieux placé pour répondre. En l'espèce, il n'y avait aucune raison d'intervenir dans l'exercice par le juge surveillant de son pouvoir discrétionnaire d'approuver l'AFL à titre de financement temporaire. Se fondant sur les principes applicables à l'approbation d'accords semblables dans le contexte des recours collectifs, le juge surveillant a estimé que l'AFL était juste et raisonnable. Bien que le juge surveillant n'ait pas examiné à fond chacun des facteurs énoncés à l'art. 11.2(4) de la LACC de façon individuelle avant de tirer sa conclusion, cela ne constituait pas une erreur en soi. Il était manifeste que le juge surveillant a mis l'accent sur l'équité envers toutes les parties, les objectifs précis de la LACC et les circonstances particulières de la présente affaire lorsqu'il a approuvé l'AFL à titre de financement temporaire. Le juge surveillant a eu raison de conclure que l'AFL ne constituait pas un plan d'arrangement puisqu'il ne proposait aucune transaction visant les droits des créanciers. La charge super-prioritaire qu'il a accordée au prêteur ne convertissait pas l'AFL en plan d'arrangement en subordonnant les droits des créanciers. Par conséquent, il n'a pas commis d'erreur dans l'exercice de sa discrétion, aucune intervention n'était justifiée et l'ordonnance du juge surveillant devrait être rétablie.

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## Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe and Kasirer JJ. concurring):

## I. Overview

1 These appeals arise in the context of an ongoing proceeding instituted under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"), in which substantially all of the assets of the debtor companies have been liquidated. The proceeding was commenced well over four years ago. Since then, a single supervising judge has been responsible for its oversight. In this capacity, he has made numerous discretionary decisions.

2 Two of the supervising judge's decisions are in issue before us. Each raises a question requiring this Court to clarify the nature and scope of judicial discretion in *CCAA* proceedings. The first is whether a supervising judge has the discretion to bar a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement where they determine that the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. The second is whether a supervising judge can approve third party litigation funding as interim financing, pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*.

3 For the reasons that follow, we would answer both questions in the affirmative, as did the supervising judge. To the extent the Court of Appeal disagreed and went on to interfere with the supervising judge's discretionary decisions, we conclude that it was not justified in doing so. In our respectful view, the Court of Appeal failed to treat the supervising judge's decisions with the appropriate degree of deference. In the result, as we ordered at the conclusion of the hearing, these appeals are allowed and the supervising judge's order reinstated.

## II. Facts

4 In 1994, Mr. Gérald Duhamel founded Bluberi Gaming Technologies Inc., which is now one of the appellants, 9354-9186 Québec inc. The corporation manufactured, distributed, installed, and serviced electronic casino gaming machines. It also provided management systems for gambling operations. Its sole shareholder has at all material times been Bluberi Group Inc., which is now another of the appellants, 9354-9178 Québec inc. Through a family trust, Mr. Duhamel controls Bluberi Group Inc. and, as a result, Bluberi Gaming (collectively, "Bluberi").

5 In 2012, Bluberi sought financing from the respondent, Callidus Capital Corporation ("Callidus"), which describes itself as an "asset-based or distressed lender" (R.F., at para. 26). Callidus extended a credit facility of approximately \$24 million to Bluberi. This debt was secured in part by a share pledge agreement.

6 Over the next three years, Bluberi lost significant amounts of money, and Callidus continued to extend credit. By 2015, Bluberi owed approximately \$86 million to Callidus — close to half of which Bluberi asserts is comprised of interest and fees.

### A. Bluberi's Institution of CCAA Proceedings and Initial Sale of Assets

7 On November 11, 2015, Bluberi filed a petition for the issuance of an initial order under the *CCAA*. In its petition, Bluberi alleged that its liquidity issues were the result of Callidus taking *de facto* control of the corporation and dictating a number of purposefully detrimental business decisions. Bluberi alleged that Callidus engaged in this conduct in order to deplete the corporation's equity value with a view to owning Bluberi and, ultimately, selling it.

8 Over Callidus's objection, Bluberi's petition succeeded. The supervising judge, Michaud J., issued an initial order under the *CCAA*. Among other things, the initial order confirmed that Bluberi was a "debtor company" within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Act; stayed any proceedings against Bluberi or any director or officer of Bluberi; and appointed Ernst & Young Inc. as monitor ("Monitor").

9 Working with the Monitor, Bluberi determined that a sale of its assets was necessary. On January 28, 2016, it proposed a sale solicitation process, which the supervising judge approved. That process led to Bluberi entering into an asset purchase agreement

with Callidus. The agreement contemplated that Callidus would obtain all of Bluberi's assets in exchange for extinguishing almost the entirety of its secured claim against Bluberi, which had ballooned to approximately \$135.7 million. Callidus would maintain an undischarged secured claim of \$3 million against Bluberi. The agreement would also permit Bluberi to retain claims

for damages against Callidus arising from its alleged involvement in Bluberi's financial difficulties ("Retained Claims").<sup>1</sup> Throughout these proceedings, Bluberi has asserted that the Retained Claims should amount to over \$200 million in damages.

10 The supervising judge approved the asset purchase agreement, and the sale of Bluberi's assets to Callidus closed in February 2017. As a result, Callidus effectively acquired Bluberi's business, and has continued to operate it as a going concern.

11 Since the sale, the Retained Claims have been Bluberi's sole remaining asset and thus the sole security for Callidus's \$3 million claim.

### B. The Initial Competing Plans of Arrangement

12 On September 11, 2017, Bluberi filed an application seeking the approval of a \$2 million interim financing credit facility to fund the litigation of the Retained Claims and other related relief. The lender was a joint venture numbered company incorporated as 9364-9739 Québec inc. This interim financing application was set to be heard on September 19, 2017.

13 However, one day before the hearing, Callidus proposed a plan of arrangement ("First Plan") and applied for an order convening a creditors' meeting to vote on that plan. The First Plan proposed that Callidus would fund a \$2.5 million (later increased to \$2.63 million) distribution to Bluberi's creditors, except itself, in exchange for a release from the Retained Claims. This would have fully satisfied the claims of Bluberi's former employees and those creditors with claims worth less than \$3000; creditors with larger claims were to receive, on average, 31 percent of their respective claims.

14 The supervising judge adjourned the hearing of both applications to October 5, 2017. In the meantime, Bluberi filed its own plan of arrangement. Among other things, the plan proposed that half of any proceeds resulting from the Retained Claims, after payment of expenses and Bluberi's creditors' claims, would be distributed to the unsecured creditors, as long as the net proceeds exceeded \$20 million.

On October 5, 2017, the supervising judge ordered that the parties' plans of arrangement could be put to a creditors' vote. He ordered that both parties share the fees and expenses related to the presentation of the plans of arrangement at a creditors' meeting, and that a party's failure to deposit those funds with the Monitor would bar the presentation of that party's plan of arrangement. Bluberi elected not to deposit the necessary funds, and, as a result, only Callidus's First Plan was put to the creditors.

### C. Creditors' Vote on Callidus's First Plan

16 On December 15, 2017, Callidus submitted its First Plan to a creditors' vote. The plan failed to receive sufficient support. Section 6(1) of the *CCAA* provides that, to be approved, a plan must receive a "double majority" vote in each class of creditors — that is, a majority in *number* of class members, which also represents two-thirds in *value* of the class members' claims. All of Bluberi's creditors, besides Callidus, formed a single voting class of unsecured creditors. Of the 100 voting unsecured creditors, 92 creditors (representing \$3,450,882 of debt) voted in favour, and 8 voted against (representing \$2,375,913 of debt). The First Plan failed because the creditors voting in favour only held 59.22 percent of the total value being voted, which did not meet the s. 6(1) threshold. Most notably, SMT Hautes Technologies ("SMT"), which held 36.7 percent of Bluberi's debt, voted against the plan.

17 Callidus did not vote on the First Plan — despite the Monitor explicitly stating that Callidus could have "vote[d] ... the portion of its claim, assessed by Callidus, to be an unsecured claim" (Joint R.R., vol. III, at p.188).

#### D. Bluberi's Interim Financing Application and Callidus's New Plan

18 On February 6, 2018, Bluberi filed one of the applications underlying these appeals, seeking authorization of a proposed third party litigation funding agreement ("LFA") with a publicly traded litigation funder, IMF Bentham Limited or its Canadian

subsidiary, Bentham IMF Capital Limited (collectively, "Bentham"). Bluberi's application also sought the placement of a \$20 million super-priority charge in favour of Bentham on Bluberi's assets ("Litigation Financing Charge").

19 The LFA contemplated that Bentham would fund Bluberi's litigation of the Retained Claims in exchange for receiving a portion of any settlement or award after trial. However, were Bluberi's litigation to fail, Bentham would lose all of its invested funds. The LFA also provided that Bentham could terminate the litigation of the Retained Claims if, acting reasonably, it were no longer satisfied of the merits or commercial viability of the litigation.

20 Callidus and certain unsecured creditors who voted in favour of its plan (who are now respondents and style themselves the "Creditors' Group") contested Bluberi's application on the ground that the LFA was a plan of arrangement and, as such, had to be submitted to a creditors' vote.<sup>2</sup>

On February 12, 2018, Callidus filed the other application underlying these appeals, seeking to put another plan of arrangement to a creditors' vote ("New Plan"). The New Plan was essentially identical to the First Plan, except that Callidus increased the proposed distribution by \$250,000 (from \$2.63 million to \$2.88 million). Further, Callidus filed an amended proof of claim, which purported to value the security attached to its \$3 million claim at *nil*. Callidus was of the view that this valuation was proper because Bluberi had no assets other than the Retained Claims. On this basis, Callidus asserted that it stood in the position of an unsecured creditor, and sought the supervising judge's permission to vote on the New Plan with the other unsecured creditors. Given the size of its claim, if Callidus were permitted to vote on the New Plan, the plan would necessarily pass a creditors' vote. Bluberi opposed Callidus's application.

22 The supervising judge heard Bluberi's interim financing application and Callidus's application regarding its New Plan together. Notably, the Monitor supported Bluberi's position.

#### **III. Decisions Below**

#### A. Quebec Superior Court (2018 QCCS 1040 (C.S. Que.)) (Michaud J.)

The supervising judge dismissed Callidus's application, declining to submit the New Plan to a creditors' vote. He granted Bluberi's application, authorizing Bluberi to enter into a litigation funding agreement with Bentham on the terms set forth in the LFA and imposing the Litigation Financing Charge on Bluberi's assets.

With respect to Callidus's application, the supervising judge determined Callidus should not be permitted to vote on the New Plan because it was acting with an "improper purpose" (para. 48). He acknowledged that creditors are generally entitled to vote in their own self-interest. However, given that the First Plan — which was almost identical to the New Plan — had been defeated by a creditors' vote, the supervising judge concluded that Callidus's attempt to vote on the New Plan was an attempt to override the result of the first vote. In particular, he wrote:

Taking into consideration the creditors' interest, the Court accepted, in the fall of 2017, that Callidus' Plan be submitted to their vote with the understanding that, as a secured creditor, Callidus would not cast a vote. However, under the present circumstances, it would serve an improper purpose if Callidus was allowed to vote on its own plan, especially when its vote would very likely result in the New Plan meeting the two thirds threshold for approval under the CCAA.

As pointed out by SMT, the main unsecured creditor, Callidus' attempt to vote aims only at cancelling SMT's vote which prevented Callidus' Plan from being approved at the creditors' meeting.

It is one thing to let the creditors vote on a plan submitted by a secured creditor, it is another to allow this secured creditor to vote on its own plan in order to exert control over the vote for the sole purpose of obtaining releases. [paras. 45-47]

The supervising judge concluded that, in these circumstances, allowing Callidus to vote would be both "unfair and unreasonable" (para. 47). He also observed that Callidus's conduct throughout the *CCAA* proceedings "lacked transparency" (at para. 41) and that Callidus was "solely motivated by the [pending] litigation" (para. 44). In sum, he found that Callidus's conduct was contrary to the "requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence", and ordered that Callidus would not be permitted to vote on the New Plan (para. 48, citing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Century Services], at para. 70).

26 Because Callidus was not permitted to vote on the New Plan and SMT had unequivocally stated its intention to vote against it, the supervising judge concluded that the plan had no reasonable prospect of success. He therefore declined to submit it to a creditors' vote.

With respect to Bluberi's application, the supervising judge considered three issues relevant to these appeals: (1) whether the LFA should be submitted to a creditors' vote; (2) if not, whether the LFA ought to be approved by the court; and (3) if so, whether the \$20 million Litigation Financing Charge should be imposed on Bluberi's assets.

The supervising judge determined that the LFA did not need to be submitted to a creditors' vote because it was not a plan of arrangement. He considered a plan of arrangement to involve "an arrangement or compromise between a debtor and its creditors" (para. 71, citing *Crystallex International Corp., Re,* 2012 ONCA 404, 293 O.A.C. 102 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 92 ("*Crystallex*")). In his view, the LFA lacked this essential feature. He also concluded that the LFA did not need to be accompanied by a plan, as Bluberi had stated its intention to file a plan in the future.

After reviewing the terms of the LFA, the supervising judge found it met the criteria for approval of third party litigation funding set out in *Musicians' Pension Fund of Canada (Trustee of) v. Kinross Gold Corp.*, 2013 ONSC 4974, 117 O.R. (3d) 150 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 41, and *Hayes v. Saint John (City)*, 2016 NBQB 125 (N.B. Q.B.), at para. 4 (CanLII). In particular, he considered Bentham's percentage of return to be reasonable in light of its level of investment and risk. Further, the supervising judge rejected Callidus and the Creditors' Group's argument that the LFA gave too much discretion to Bentham. He found that the LFA did not allow Bentham to exert undue influence on the litigation of the Retained Claims, noting similarly broad clauses had been approved in the *CCAA* context (para. 82, citing *Schenk v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc.*, 2015 ONSC 3215, 74 C.P.C. (7th) 332 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 23).

30 Finally, the supervising judge imposed the Litigation Financing Charge on Bluberi's assets. While significant, the supervising judge considered the amount to be reasonable given: the amount of damages that would be claimed from Callidus; Bentham's financial commitment to the litigation; and the fact that Bentham was not charging any interim fees or interest (i.e., it would only profit in the event of successful litigation or settlement). Put simply, Bentham was taking substantial risks, and it was reasonable that it obtain certain guarantees in exchange.

31 Callidus, again supported by the Creditors' Group, appealed the supervising judge's order, impleading Bentham in the process.

#### B. Quebec Court of Appeal (2019 QCCA 171 (C.A. Que.)) (Dutil and Schrager JJ.A. and Dumas J. (ad hoc))

32 The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that "[t]he exercise of the judge's discretion [was] not founded in law nor on a proper treatment of the facts so that irrespective of the standard of review applied, appellate intervention [was] justified" (para. 48 CanLII)). In particular, the court identified two errors of relevance to these appeals.

First, the court was of the view that the supervising judge erred in finding that Callidus had an improper purpose in seeking to vote on its New Plan. In its view, Callidus should have been permitted to vote. The court relied heavily on the notion that creditors have a right to vote in their own self-interest. It held that any judicial discretion to preclude voting due to improper purpose should be reserved for the "clearest of cases" (para. 62, referring to *Blackburn Developments Ltd., Re*, 2011 BCSC 1671, 27 B.C.L.R. (5th) 199 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 45). The court was of the view that Callidus's transparent attempt to obtain a release from Bluberi's claims against it did not amount to an improper purpose. The court also considered Callidus's conduct prior to and during the *CCAA* proceedings to be incapable of justifying a finding of improper purpose.

34 Second, the court concluded that the supervising judge erred in approving the LFA as interim financing because, in its view, the LFA was not connected to Bluberi's commercial operations. The court concluded that the supervising judge had both

"misconstrued in law the notion of interim financing and misapplied that notion to the factual circumstances of the case" (para. 78).

In light of this perceived error, the court substituted its view that the LFA was a plan of arrangement and, as a result, should have been submitted to a creditors' vote. It held that "[a]n arrangement or proposal can encompass both a compromise of creditors' claims as well as the process undertaken to satisfy them" (para. 85). The court considered the LFA to be a plan of arrangement because it affected the creditors' share in any eventual litigation proceeds, would cause them to wait for the outcome of any litigation, and could potentially leave them with nothing at all. Moreover, the court held that Bluberi's scheme "as a whole", being the prosecution of the Retained Claims and the LFA, should be submitted as a plan to the creditors for their approval (para. 89).

36 Bluberi and Bentham (collectively, "appellants"), again supported by the Monitor, now appeal to this Court.

#### **IV. Issues**

37 These appeals raise two issues:

(1) Did the supervising judge err in barring Callidus from voting on its New Plan on the basis that it was acting for an improper purpose?

(2) Did the supervising judge err in approving the LFA as interim financing, pursuant to s. 11.2 of the CCAA?

#### V. Analysis

#### A. Preliminary Considerations

Addressing the above issues requires situating them within the contemporary Canadian insolvency landscape and, more specifically, the *CCAA* regime. Accordingly, before turning to those issues, we review (1) the evolving nature of *CCAA* proceedings; (2) the role of the supervising judge in those proceedings; and (3) the proper scope of appellate review of a supervising judge's exercise of discretion.

#### (1) The Evolving Nature of CCAA Proceedings

39 The *CCAA* is one of three principal insolvency statutes in Canada. The others are the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*"), which covers insolvencies of both individuals and companies, and the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11 ("*WURA*"), which covers insolvencies of financial institutions and certain other corporations, such as insurance companies (*WURA*, s. 6(1)). While both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* enable reorganizations of insolvent companies, access to the *CCAA* is restricted to debtor companies facing total claims in excess of \$5 million (*CCAA*, s. 3(1)).

Together, Canada's insolvency statutes pursue an array of overarching remedial objectives that reflect the wide ranging and potentially "catastrophic" impacts insolvency can have (*Indalex Ltd., Re*, 2013 SCC 6, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 (S.C.C.), at para. 1). These objectives include: providing for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of a debtor's insolvency; preserving and maximizing the value of a debtor's assets; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against a debtor; protecting the public interest; and, in the context of a commercial insolvency, balancing the costs and benefits of restructuring or liquidating the company (J. P. Sarra, "The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada's Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law", in J. P. Sarra and B. Romaine, eds., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016* (2017), 9, at pp. 9-10; J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* 2nd ed. (2013), at pp. 4-5 and 14; Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2003), at pp. 9-10; R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2nd ed. 2015), at pp. 4-5).

41 Among these objectives, the *CCAA* generally prioritizes "avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company" (*Century Services*, at para. 70). As a result, the typical *CCAA* case has historically involved an attempt to facilitate the reorganization and survival of the pre-filing debtor company in an operational state — that is, as a going concern. Where such a reorganization was not possible, the alternative course of action was seen as a liquidation through either a receivership or under the *BIA* regime. This is precisely the outcome that was sought in *Century Services* (see para. 14).

That said, the *CCAA* is fundamentally insolvency legislation, and thus it also "has the simultaneous objectives of maximizing creditor recovery, preservation of going-concern value where possible, preservation of jobs and communities affected by the firm's financial distress ... and enhancement of the credit system generally" (Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 14; see also *Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund Limited*, 2017 ONCA 1014, 139 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 103). In pursuit of those objectives, *CCAA* proceedings have evolved to permit outcomes that do not result in the emergence of the pre-filing debtor company in a restructured state, but rather involve some form of liquidation of the debtor's assets under the auspices of the Act itself (Sarra, "The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada's Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law", at pp. 19-21). Such scenarios are referred to as "liquidating CCAAs", and they are now commonplace in the *CCAA* landscape (see *Third Eye Capital Corporation v. Ressources Dianor Inc./Dianor Resources Inc.*, 2019 ONCA 508, 435 D.L.R. (4th) 416 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 70).

Liquidating CCAAs take diverse forms and may involve, among other things: the sale of the debtor company as a going concern; an "en bloc" sale of assets that are capable of being operationalized by a buyer; a partial liquidation or downsizing of business operations; or a piecemeal sale of assets (B. Kaplan, "Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law* (2008), 79, at pp. 87-89). The ultimate commercial outcomes facilitated by liquidating CCAAs are similarly diverse. Some may result in the continued operation of the business of the debtor under a different going concern entity (e.g., the liquidations in *Indalex* and *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), while others may result in a sale of assets and inventory with no such entity emerging (e.g., the proceedings in *Target Canada Co., Re*, 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 7 and 31). Others still, like the case at bar, may involve a going concern sale of most of the assets of the debtor, leaving residual assets to be dealt with by the debtor and its stakeholders.

*CCAA* courts first began approving these forms of liquidation pursuant to the broad discretion conferred by the Act. The emergence of this practice was not without criticism, largely on the basis that it appeared to be inconsistent with the *CCAA* being a "restructuring statute" (see, e.g., *Royal Bank v. Fracmaster Ltd.*, 1999 ABCA 178, 244 A.R. 93 (Alta. C.A.), at paras. 15-16, aff'g 1999 ABQB 379, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 204 (Alta. Q.B.), at paras. 40-43; A. Nocilla, "The History of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Future of Re-Structuring Law in Canada" (2014), 56 *Can. Bus. L.J.* 73, at pp. 88-92).

45 However, since s. 36 of the *CCAA* came into force in 2009, courts have been using it to effect liquidating CCAAs. Section 36 empowers courts to authorize the sale or disposition of a debtor company's assets outside the ordinary course of business.<sup>3</sup> Significantly, when the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce recommended the adoption of s. 36, it observed that liquidation is not necessarily inconsistent with the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, and that it may be a means to "raise capital [to facilitate a restructuring], eliminate further loss for creditors or focus on the solvent operations of the business" (p. 147). Other commentators have observed that liquidation can be a "vehicle to restructure a business" by allowing the business to survive, albeit under a different corporate form or ownership (Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 169; see also K. P. McElcheran, *Commercial Insolvency in Canada* (4th ed. 2019), at p. 311). Indeed, in *Indalex*, the company sold its assets under the *CCAA* in order to preserve the jobs of its employees, despite being unable to survive as their employer (see para. 51).

Ultimately, the relative weight that the different objectives of the *CCAA* take on in a particular case may vary based on the factual circumstances, the stage of the proceedings, or the proposed solutions that are presented to the court for approval. Here, a parallel may be drawn with the *BIA* context. In *Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd.*, 2019 SCC 5, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 150 (S.C.C.), at para. 67, this Court explained that, as a general matter, the *BIA* serves two purposes: (1) the bankrupt's financial rehabilitation and (2) the equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among creditors. However, in circumstances where a debtor corporation will never emerge from bankruptcy, only the latter purpose is relevant (see para. 67). Similarly, under the *CCAA*, when a reorganization of the pre-filing debtor company is not a possibility, a liquidation that preserves going-concern value and the ongoing business operations of the pre-filing company may become the predominant remedial focus. Moreover,

where a reorganization or liquidation is complete and the court is dealing with residual assets, the objective of maximizing creditor recovery from those assets may take centre stage. As we will explain, the architecture of the *CCAA* leaves the case-specific assessment and balancing of these remedial objectives to the supervising judge.

#### (2) The Role of a Supervising Judge in CCAA Proceedings

47 One of the principal means through which the *CCAA* achieves its objectives is by carving out a unique supervisory role for judges (see Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp. 18-19). From beginning to end, each *CCAA* proceeding is overseen by a single supervising judge. The supervising judge acquires extensive knowledge and insight into the stakeholder dynamics and the business realities of the proceedings from their ongoing dealings with the parties.

The *CCAA* capitalizes on this positional advantage by supplying supervising judges with broad discretion to make a variety of orders that respond to the circumstances of each case and "meet contemporary business and social needs" (*Century Services*, at para. 58) in "real-time" (para. 58, citing R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 484). The anchor of this discretionary authority is s. 11, which empowers a judge "to make any order that [the judge] considers appropriate in the circumstances". This section has been described as "the engine" driving the statutory scheme (*Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 36).

49 The discretionary authority conferred by the *CCAA*, while broad in nature, is not boundless. This authority must be exercised in furtherance of the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, which we have explained above (see *Century Services*, at para. 59). Additionally, the court must keep in mind three "baseline considerations" (at para. 70), which the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating: (1) that the order sought is appropriate in the circumstances, and (2) that the applicant has been acting in good faith and (3) with due diligence (para. 69).

50 The first two considerations of appropriateness and good faith are widely understood in the *CCAA* context. Appropriateness "is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*" (para. 70). Further, the well-established requirement that parties must act in good faith in insolvency proceedings has recently been made express in s. 18.6 of the *CCAA*, which provides:

#### Good faith

18.6 (1) Any interested person in any proceedings under this Act shall act in good faith with respect to those proceedings.

#### Good faith — powers of court

(2) If the court is satisfied that an interested person fails to act in good faith, on application by an interested person, the court may make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

(See also BIA, s. 4.2; Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1, S.C. 2019, c. 29, ss. 133 and 140.)

51 The third consideration of due diligence requires some elaboration. Consistent with the *CCAA* regime generally, the due diligence consideration discourages parties from sitting on their rights and ensures that creditors do not strategically manoeuver or position themselves to gain an advantage (*Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at p. 31). The procedures set out in the *CCAA* rely on negotiations and compromise between the debtor and its stakeholders, as overseen by the supervising judge and the monitor. This necessarily requires that, to the extent possible, those involved in the proceedings be on equal footing and have a clear understanding of their respective rights (see McElcheran, at p. 262). A party's failure to participate in *CCAA* proceedings in a diligent and timely fashion can undermine these procedures and, more generally, the effective functioning of the *CCAA* regime (see, e.g., *North American Tungsten Corp. v. Global Tungsten and Powders Corp.*, 2015 BCCA 390, 377 B.C.A.C. 6 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 21-23; *BA Energy Inc., Re*, 2010 ABQB 507, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 24 (Alta. Q.B.); *HSBC Bank Canada v. Bear Mountain Master Partnership*, 2010 BCSC 1563, 72 C.B.R. (4th) 276

(B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), at para. 11; *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. 360networks Corp.*, 2007 BCCA 14, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 51-52, in which the courts seized on a party's failure to act diligently).

52 We pause to note that supervising judges are assisted in their oversight role by a court appointed monitor whose qualifications and duties are set out in the *CCAA* (see ss. 11.7, 11.8 and 23 to 25). The monitor is an independent and impartial expert, acting as "the eyes and the ears of the court" throughout the proceedings (*Essar*, at para. 109). The core of the monitor's role includes providing an advisory opinion to the court as to the fairness of any proposed plan of arrangement and on orders sought by parties, including the sale of assets and requests for interim financing (see *CCAA*, s. 23(1)(d) and (i); Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp-566 and 569).

#### (3) Appellate Review of Exercises of Discretion by a Supervising Judge

A high degree of deference is owed to discretionary decisions made by judges supervising *CCAA* proceedings. As such, appellate intervention will only be justified if the supervising judge erred in principle or exercised their discretion unreasonably (see *Grant Forest Products Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank*, 2015 ONCA 570, 387 D.L.R. (4th) 426 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 98; *Bridging Finance Inc. v. Béton Brunet 2001 inc.*, 2017 QCCA 138, 44 C.B.R. (6th) 175 (C.A. Que.), at para. 23). Appellate courts must be careful not to substitute their own discretion in place of the supervising judge's (*New Skeena Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2005 BCCA 192, 39 B.C.L.R. (4th) 338 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 20).

54 This deferential standard of review accounts for the fact that supervising judges are steeped in the intricacies of the *CCAA* proceedings they oversee. In this respect, the comments of Tysoe J.A. in *Edgewater Casino Inc., Re*, 2009 BCCA 40, 305 D.L.R. (4th) 339 (B.C. C.A.) ("*Re Edgewater Casino Inc.*), at para. 20, are apt:

... one of the principal functions of the judge supervising the *CCAA* proceeding is to attempt to balance the interests of the various stakeholders during the reorganization process, and it will often be inappropriate to consider an exercise of discretion by the supervising judge in isolation of other exercises of discretion by the judge in endeavoring to balance the various interests. ... *CCAA* proceedings are dynamic in nature and the supervising judge has intimate knowledge of the reorganization process. The nature of the proceedings often requires the supervising judge to make quick decisions in complicated circumstances.

55 With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the issues on appeal.

#### B. Callidus Should Not Be Permitted to Vote on Its New Plan

A creditor can generally vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise that affects its rights, subject to any specific provisions of the *CCAA* that may restrict its voting rights (e.g., s. 22(3)), or a proper exercise of discretion by the supervising judge to constrain or bar the creditor's right to vote. We conclude that one such constraint arises from s. 11 of the *CCAA*, which provides supervising judges with the discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. Supervising judges are best-placed to determine whether this discretion should be exercised in a particular case. In our view, the supervising judge here made no error in exercising his discretion to bar Callidus from voting on the New Plan.

#### (1) Parameters of Creditors' Right to Vote on Plans of Arrangement

57 Creditor approval of any plan of arrangement or compromise is a key feature of the *CCAA*, as is the supervising judge's oversight of that process. Where a plan is proposed, an application may be made to the supervising judge to order a creditors' meeting to vote on the proposed plan (*CCAA*, ss. 4 and 5). The supervising judge has the discretion to determine whether to order the meeting. For the purposes of voting at a creditors' meeting, the debtor company may divide the creditors into classes, subject to court approval (*CCAA*, s. 22(1)). Creditors may be included in the same class if "their interests or rights are sufficiently similar to give them a commonality of interest" (*CCAA*, s. 22(2); see also L. W. Houlden, G. B. Morawetz and J. P. Sarra, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada* (4th ed. (loose-leaf)), vol. 4, at N§149). If the requisite "double majority" in each class of creditors — again, a majority in *number* of class members, which also represents two-thirds in *value* of the class members' claims — vote in favour of the plan, the supervising judge may sanction the plan (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe*)

& Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., 2008 ONCA 587, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34; see CCAA, s. 6). The supervising judge will conduct what is commonly referred to as a "fairness hearing" to determine, among other things, whether the plan is fair and reasonable (Wood, at pp. 490-92; see also Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 529; Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra at N§45). Once sanctioned by the supervising judge, the plan is binding on each class of creditors that participated in the vote (CCAA, s. 6(1)).

58 Creditors with a provable claim against the debtor whose interests are affected by a proposed plan are usually entitled to vote on plans of arrangement (Wood, at p. 470). Indeed, there is no express provision in the *CCAA* barring such a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement, including a plan it sponsors.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the appellants submit that a purposive interpretation of s. 22(3) of the *CCAA* reveals that, as a general matter, a creditor should be precluded from voting on its own plan. Section 22(3) provides:

#### **Related creditors**

(3) A creditor who is related to the company may vote against, but not for, a compromise or arrangement relating to the company.

The appellants note that s. 22(3) was meant to harmonize the *CCAA* scheme with s. 54(3) of the *BIA*, which provides that "[a] creditor who is related to the debtor may vote against but not for the acceptance of the proposal." The appellants point out that, under s. 50(1) of the *BIA*, only debtors can sponsor plans; as a result, the reference to "debtor" in s. 54(3) captures *all* plan sponsors. They submit that if s. 54(3) captures all plan sponsors, s. 22(3) of the *CCAA* must do the same. On this basis, the appellants ask us to extend the voting restriction in s. 22(3) to apply not only to creditors who are "related to the company", as the provision states, but to any creditor who sponsors a plan. They submit that this interpretation gives effect to the underlying intention of both provisions, which they say is to ensure that a creditor who has a conflict of interest cannot "dilute" or overtake the votes of other creditors.

We would not accept this strained interpretation of s. 22(3). Section 22(3) makes no mention of conflicts of interest between creditors and plan sponsors generally. The wording of s. 22(3) only places voting restrictions on creditors who are "related to the [debtor] company". These words are "precise and unequivocal" and, as such, must "play a dominant role in the interpretive process" (*Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R.*, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.), at para. 10). In our view, the appellants' analogy to the *BIA* is not sufficient to overcome the plain wording of this provision.

61 While the appellants are correct that s. 22(3) was enacted to harmonize the treatment of related parties in the *CCAA* and *BIA*, its history demonstrates that it is not a general conflict of interest provision. Prior to the amendments incorporating s. 22(3) into the *CCAA* clearly allowed creditors to put forward a plan of arrangement (see Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, at N§33, *Red Cross; 1078385 Ontario Ltd., Re* (2004), 206 O.A.C. 17 (Ont. C.A.)). In contrast, under the *BIA*, only debtors could make proposals. Parliament is presumed to have been aware of this obvious difference between the two statutes (see *ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board)*, 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140 (S.C.C.), at para. 59; see also *Third Eye Capital Corporation*, at para. 57). Despite this difference, Parliament imported, with necessary modification, the wording of the *BIA* related creditor provision into the *CCAA*. Going beyond this language entails accepting that Parliament failed to choose the right words to give effect to its intention, which we do not.

62 Indeed, Parliament did not mindlessly reproduce s. 54(3) of the *BIA* in s. 22(3) of the *CCAA*. Rather, it made two modifications to the language of s. 54(3) to bring it into conformity with the language of the *CCAA*. First, it changed "proposal" (a defined term in the *BIA*) to "compromise or arrangement" (a term used throughout the *CCAA*). Second, it changed "debtor" to "company", recognizing that companies are the only kind of debtor that exists in the *CCAA* context.

63 Our view is further supported by Industry Canada's explanation of the rationale for s. 22(3) as being to "reduce the ability of *debtor companies* to organize a restructuring plan that confers additional benefits to *related parties*" (Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, *Bill C-12: Clause by Clause Analysis*, developed by Industry Canada, last updated March

24, 2015 (online), cl. 71, s. 22 (emphasis added); see also Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, at p. 151).

Finally, we note that the *CCAA* contains other mechanisms that attenuate the concern that a creditor with conflicting legal interests with respect to a plan it proposes may distort the creditors' vote. Although we reject the appellants' interpretation of s. 22(3), that section still bars creditors who are related to the debtor company from voting in favour of *any* plan. Additionally, creditors who do not share a sufficient commonality of interest may be forced to vote in separate classes (s. 22(1) and (2)), and, as we will explain, a supervising judge may bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose.

#### (2) Discretion to Bar a Creditor From Voting in Furtherance of an Improper Purpose

There is no dispute that the *CCAA* is silent on when a creditor who is otherwise entitled to vote on a plan can be barred from voting. However, *CCAA* supervising judges are often called upon "to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*" (*Century Services*, at para. 61; see also para. 62). In *Century Services*, this Court endorsed a "hierarchical" approach to determining whether jurisdiction exists to sanction a proposed measure: "courts [must] rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding" (para. 65). In most circumstances, a purposive and liberal interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* will be sufficient "to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives" (para. 65).

Applying this approach, we conclude that jurisdiction exists under s. 11 of the *CCAA* to bar a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement or compromise where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose.

67 Courts have long recognized that s. 11 of the *CCAA* signals legislative endorsement of the "broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence" (*Century Services*, at para. 68). Section 11 states:

#### General power of court

11 Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

On the plain wording of the provision, the jurisdiction granted by s. 11 is constrained only by restrictions set out in the *CCAA* itself, and the requirement that the order made be "appropriate in the circumstances".

Where a party seeks an order relating to a matter that falls within the supervising judge's purview, and for which there is no *CCAA* provision conferring more specific jurisdiction, s. 11 necessarily is the provision of first resort in anchoring jurisdiction. As Blair J.A. put it in *Stelco*, s. 11 "for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction" in the *CCAA* context (para. 36).

69 Oversight of the plan negotiation, voting, and approval process falls squarely within the supervising judge's purview. As indicated, there are no specific provisions in the *CCAA* which govern when a creditor who is otherwise eligible to vote on a plan may nonetheless be barred from voting. Nor is there any provision in the *CCAA* which suggests that a creditor has an absolute right to vote on a plan that cannot be displaced by a proper exercise of judicial discretion. However, given that the *CCAA* regime contemplates creditor participation in decision-making as an integral facet of the workout regime, creditors should only be barred from voting where the circumstances demand such an outcome. In other words, it is necessarily a discretionary, circumstance-specific inquiry.

Thus, it is apparent that s. 11 serves as the source of the supervising judge's jurisdiction to issue a discretionary order barring a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement. The exercise of this discretion must further the remedial objectives of the *CCAA* and be guided by the baseline considerations of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence. This means that, where

a creditor is seeking to exercise its voting rights in a manner that frustrates, undermines, or runs counter to those objectives — that is, acting for an "improper purpose" — the supervising judge has the discretion to bar that creditor from voting.

The discretion to bar a creditor from voting in furtherance of an improper purpose under the *CCAA* parallels the similar discretion that exists under the *BIA*, which was recognized in *Laserworks Computer Services Inc., Re*, 1998 NSCA 42, 165 N.S.R. (2d) 296 (N.S. C.A.). In *Laserworks Computer Services Inc.*, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal concluded that the discretion to bar a creditor from voting in this way stemmed from the court's power, inherent in the scheme of the *BIA*, to supervise "[e]ach step in the bankruptcy process" (at para. 41), as reflected in ss. 43(7), 108(3), and 187(9) of the Act. The court explained that s. 187(9) specifically grants the power to remedy a "substantial injustice", which arises "when the *BIA* is used for an improper purpose" (para. 54). The court held that "[a]n improper purpose is any purpose collateral to the purpose for which the bankruptcy and insolvency legislation was enacted by Parliament" (para. 54).

72 While not determinative, the existence of this discretion under the *BIA* lends support to the existence of similar discretion under the *CCAA* for two reasons.

First, this conclusion would be consistent with this Court's recognition that the *CCAA* "offers a more flexible mechanism with *greater* judicial discretion" than the *BIA* (*Century Services*, at para. 14 (emphasis added)).

Second, this Court has recognized the benefits of harmonizing the two statutes to the extent possible. For example, in *Indalex*, the Court observed that "in order to avoid a race to liquidation under the *BIA*, courts will favour an interpretation of the *CCAA* that affords creditors analogous entitlements" to those received under the *BIA* (para. 51; see also *Century Services*, at para. 24; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2015 ONCA 681, 391 D.L.R. (4th) 283 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 34-46). Thus, where the statutes are capable of bearing a harmonious interpretation, that interpretation ought to be preferred "to avoid the ills that can arise from [insolvency] 'statute-shopping'" (*Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 234, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274, at para. 78; see also para. 73). In our view, the articulation of "improper purpose" set out in *Laserworks Computer Services Inc.* — that is, any purpose collateral to the purpose of insolvency legislation — is entirely harmonious with the nature and scope of judicial discretion afforded by the *CCAA*. Indeed, as we have explained, this discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the *CCAA*'s objectives as an insolvency statute.

We also observe that the recognition of this discretion under the *CCAA* advances the basic fairness that "permeates Canadian insolvency law and practice" (Sarra, "The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada's Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law", at p. 27; see also *Century Services*, at paras. 70 and 77). As Professor Sarra observes, fairness demands that supervising judges be in a position to recognize and meaningfully address circumstances in which parties are working against the goals of the statute:

The Canadian insolvency regime is based on the assumption that creditors and the debtor share a common goal of maximizing recoveries. The substantive aspect of fairness in the insolvency regime is based on the assumption that all involved parties face real economic risks. Unfairness resides where only some face these risks, while others actually benefit from the situation .... If the *CCAA* is to be interpreted in a purposive way, the courts must be able to recognize when people have conflicting interests and are working actively against the goals of the statute.

("The Oscillating Pendulum: Canada's Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for Insolvency Law", at p. 30 (emphasis added))

In this vein, the supervising judge's oversight of the *CCAA* voting regime must not only ensure strict compliance with the Act, but should further its goals as well. We are of the view that the policy objectives of the *CCAA* necessitate the recognition of the discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose.

76 Whether this discretion ought to be exercised in a particular case is a circumstance-specific inquiry that must balance the various objectives of the *CCAA*. As this case demonstrates, the supervising judge is best-positioned to undertake this inquiry.

(3) The Supervising Judge Did Not Err in Prohibiting Callidus From Voting

In our view, the supervising judge's decision to bar Callidus from voting on the New Plan discloses no error justifying appellate intervention. As we have explained, discretionary decisions like this one must be approached from the appropriate posture of deference. It bears mentioning that, when he made this decision, the supervising judge was intimately familiar with Bluberi's *CCAA* proceedings. He had presided over them for over 2 years, received 15 reports from the Monitor, and issued approximately 25 orders.

The supervising judge considered the whole of the circumstances and concluded that Callidus's vote would serve an improper purpose (paras. 45 and 48). We agree with his determination. He was aware that, prior to the vote on the First Plan, Callidus had chosen not to value *any* of its claim as unsecured and later declined to vote at all — despite the Monitor explicitly inviting it do so<sup>4</sup>. The supervising judge was also aware that Callidus's First Plan had failed to receive the other creditors' approval at the creditors' meeting of December 15, 2017, and that Callidus had chosen not to take the opportunity to amend or increase the value of its plan at that time, which it was entitled to do (see *CCAA*, ss. 6 and 7; Monitor, I.F., at para. 17). Between the failure of the First Plan and the proposal of the New Plan — which was identical to the First Plan, save for a modest increase of \$250,000 — none of the factual circumstances relating to Bluberi's financial or business affairs had materially changed. However, Callidus sought to value the *entirety* of its security at *nil* and, on that basis, sought leave to vote on the New Plan as an unsecured creditor. If Callidus were permitted to vote in this way, the New Plan would certainly have met the s. 6(1) threshold for approval. In these circumstances, the inescapable inference was that Callidus was attempting to strategically value its security to acquire control over the outcome of the vote and thereby circumvent the creditor democracy the *CCAA* protects. Put simply, Callidus was seeking to take a "second kick at the can" and manipulate the vote on the New Plan. The supervising judge made no error in exercising his discretion to prevent Callidus from doing so.

<sup>79</sup> Indeed, as the Monitor observes, "Once a plan of arrangement or proposal has been submitted to the creditors of a debtor for voting purposes, to order a second creditors' meeting to vote on a substantially similar plan would not advance the policy objectives of the CCAA, nor would it serve and enhance the public's confidence in the process or otherwise serve the ends of justice" (I.F., at para. 18). This is particularly the case given that the cost of having another meeting to vote on the New Plan would have been upwards of \$200,000 (see supervising judge's reasons, at para. 72).

We add that Callidus's course of action was plainly contrary to the expectation that parties act with due diligence in an insolvency proceeding — which, in our view, includes acting with due diligence in valuing their claims and security. At all material times, Bluberi's Retained Claims have been the sole asset securing Callidus's claim. Callidus has pointed to nothing in the record that indicates that the value of the Retained Claims has changed. Had Callidus been of the view that the Retained Claims had no value, one would have expected Callidus to have valued its security accordingly prior to the vote on the First Plan, if not earlier. Parenthetically, we note that, irrespective of the timing, an attempt at such a valuation may well have failed. This would have prevented Callidus from voting as an unsecured creditor, even in the absence of Callidus's improper purpose.

As we have indicated, discretionary decisions attract a highly deferential standard of review. Deference demands that review of a discretionary decision begin with a proper characterization of the basis for the decision. Respectfully, the Court of Appeal failed in this regard. The Court of Appeal seized on the supervising judge's somewhat critical comments relating to Callidus's goal of being released from the Retained Claims and its conduct throughout the proceedings as being incapable of grounding a finding of improper purpose. However, as we have explained, these considerations did not drive the supervising judge's conclusion. His conclusion was squarely based on Callidus' attempt to manipulate the creditors' vote to ensure that its New Plan would succeed where its First Plan had failed (see supervising judge's reasons, at paras. 45-48). We see nothing in the Court of Appeal's reasons that grapples with this decisive impropriety, which goes far beyond a creditor merely acting in its own self-interest.

82 In sum, we see nothing in the supervising judge's reasons on this point that would justify appellate intervention. Callidus was properly barred from voting on the New Plan.

83 Before moving on, we note that the Court of Appeal addressed two further issues: whether Callidus is "related" to Bluberi within the meaning of s. 22(3) of the *CCAA*; and whether, if permitted to vote, Callidus should be ordered to vote in

a separate class from Bluberi's other creditors (see CCAA, s. 22(1) and (2)). Given our conclusion that the supervising judge did not err in barring Callidus from voting on the New Plan on the basis that Callidus was acting for an improper purpose, it is unnecessary to address either of these issues. However, nothing in our reasons should be read as endorsing the Court of Appeal's analysis of them.

#### C. Bluberi's LFA Should Be Approved as Interim Financing

In our view, the supervising judge made no error in approving the LFA as interim financing pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*. Interim financing is a flexible tool that may take on a range of forms. As we will explain, third party litigation funding may be one such form. Whether third party litigation funding should be approved as interim financing is a case-specific inquiry that should have regard to the text of s. 11.2 and the remedial objectives of the *CCAA* more generally.

#### (1) Interim Financing and Section 11.2 of the CCAA

Interim financing, despite being expressly provided for in s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*, is not defined in the Act. Professor Sarra has described it as "refer[ring] primarily to the working capital that the debtor corporation requires in order to keep operating during restructuring proceedings, as well as to the financing to pay the costs of the workout process" (*Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 197). Interim financing used in this way — sometimes referred to as "debtor-in-possession" financing — protects the going-concern value of the debtor company while it develops a workable solution to its insolvency issues (p. 197; *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at paras. 7, 9 and 24; *Boutiques San Francisco inc., Re* [2003 CarswellQue 13882 (C.S. Que.)], 2003 CanLII 36955, at para. 32). That said, interim financing is not limited to providing debtor companies with immediate operating capital. Consistent with the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, interim financing at its core enables the preservation and realization of the value of a debtor's assets.

Since 2009, s. 11.2(1) of the *CCAA* has codified a supervising judge's discretion to approve interim financing, and to grant a corresponding security or charge in favour of the lender in the amount the judge considers appropriate:

#### **Interim financing**

**11.2 (1)** On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

87 The breadth of a supervising judge's discretion to approve interim financing is apparent from the wording of s. 11.2(1).

Aside from the protections regarding notice and pre-filing security, s. 11.2(1) does not mandate any standard form or terms.<sup>5</sup> It simply provides that the financing must be in an amount that is "appropriate" and "required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement".

The supervising judge may also grant the lender a "super-priority charge" that will rank in priority over the claims of any secured creditors, pursuant to s. 11.2(2):

#### **Priority** — secured creditors

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

Such charges, also known as "priming liens", reduce lenders' risks, thereby incentivizing them to assist insolvent companies (Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, *Archived* — *Bill C-55: clause by clause analysis*, last updated December 29, 2016 (online), cl. 128, s. 11.2; Wood, at p. 387). As a practical matter, these charges are often the only way to encourage this lending. Normally, a lender protects itself against lending risk by taking a security interest in the borrower's assets. However, debtor companies under *CCAA* protection will often have pledged all or substantially all of their

assets to other creditors. Accordingly, without the benefit of a super-priority charge, an interim financing lender would rank behind those other creditors (McElcheran, at pp. 298-99). Although super-priority charges do subordinate secured creditors' security positions to the interim financing lender's — a result that was controversial at common law — Parliament has indicated its general acceptance of the trade-offs associated with these charges by enacting s. 11.2(2) (see M. B. Rotsztain and A. Dostal, "Debtor-In-Possession Financing", in S. Ben-Ishai and A. Duggan, eds., *Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Bill C-55, Statute c. 47 and Beyond* (2007), 227, at pp. 228-229 and 240-50). Indeed, this balance was expressly considered by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce that recommended codifying interim financing in the *CCAA* (pp. 100-4).

90 Ultimately, whether proposed interim financing should be approved is a question that the supervising judge is best-placed to answer. The *CCAA* sets out a number of factors that help guide the exercise of this discretion. The inclusion of these factors in s. 11.2 was informed by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce's view that they would help meet the "fundamental principles" that have guided the development of Canadian insolvency law, including "fairness, predictability and efficiency" (p. 103; see also Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, cl. 128, s. 11.2). In deciding whether to grant interim financing, the supervising judge is to consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors:

#### Factors to be considered

(4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
- (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
- (e) the nature and value of the company's property;
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

(CCAA, s. 11.2(4))

Prior to the coming into force of the above provisions in 2009, courts had been using the general discretion conferred by s. 11 to authorize interim financing and associated super-priority charges (*Century Services*, at para. 62). Section 11.2 largely codifies the approaches those courts have taken (Wood, at p. 388; McElcheran, at p. 301). As a result, where appropriate, guidance may be drawn from the pre-codification interim financing jurisprudence.

As with other measures available under the *CCAA*, interim financing is a flexible tool that may take different forms or attract different considerations in each case. Below, we explain that third party litigation funding may, in appropriate cases, be one such form.

#### (2) Supervising Judges May Approve Third Party Litigation Funding as Interim Financing

Third party litigation funding generally involves "a third party, otherwise unconnected to the litigation, agree[ing] to pay some or all of a party's litigation costs, in exchange for a portion of that party's recovery in damages or costs" (R. K. Agarwal and D. Fenton, "Beyond Access to Justice: Litigation Funding Agreements Outside the Class Actions Context" (2017), 59 *Can. Bus. L. J.* 65, at p. 65). Third party litigation funding can take various forms. A common model involves the litigation funder agreeing to pay a plaintiff's disbursements and indemnify the plaintiff in the event of an adverse cost award in exchange for a share of the proceeds of any successful litigation or settlement (see *Dugal v. Manulife Financial Corp.*, 2011 ONSC 1785, 105 O.R. (3d) 364 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Musicians' Pension Fund of Canada (Trustee of)*).

Outside of the *CCAA* context, the approval of third party litigation funding agreements has been somewhat controversial. Part of that controversy arises from the potential of these agreements to offend the common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance.<sup>6</sup> The tort of maintenance prohibits "officious intermeddling with a lawsuit which in no way belongs to one" (L. N. Klar et al., *Remedies in Tort* (loose-leaf), vol. 1, by L. Berry, ed., at p. 14-11, citing *Langtry v. Dumoulin* (1885), 7 O.R. 644 (Ont. Div. Ct.), at p. 661). Champerty is a species of maintenance that involves an agreement to share in the proceeds or otherwise profit from a successful suit (*McIntyre Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General)* (2002), 218 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 26).

Building on jurisprudence holding that *contingency fee* arrangements are not champertous where they are not motivated by an improper purpose (e.g., *McIntyre Estate*), lower courts have increasingly come to recognize that *litigation funding* agreements are also not *per se* champertous. This development has been focussed within class action proceedings, where it arose as a response to barriers like adverse cost awards, which were stymieing litigants' access to justice (see *Dugal*, at para. 33; *Marcotte c. Banque de Montréal*, 2015 QCCS 1915 (C.S. Que.), at paras. 43-44 (CanLII); *Houle v. St. Jude Medical Inc.*, 2017 ONSC 5129, 9 C.P.C. (8th) 321 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 52, aff'd 2018 ONSC 6352, 429 D.L.R. (4th) 739 (Ont. Div. Ct.); see also *Stanway v. Wyeth Canada Inc.*, 2013 BCSC 1585, 56 B.C.L.R. (5th) 192 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 13). The jurisprudence on the approval of third party litigation funding agreements in the class action context — and indeed, the parameters of their legality generally is still evolving, and no party before this Court has invited us to evaluate it.

<sup>96</sup> That said, insofar as third party litigation funding agreements are not *per se* illegal, there is no principled basis upon which to restrict supervising judges from approving such agreements as interim financing in appropriate cases. We acknowledge that this funding differs from more common forms of interim financing that are simply designed to help the debtor "keep the lights on" (see *Royal Oak*, at paras. 7 and 24). However, in circumstances like the case at bar, where there is a single litigation asset that could be monetized for the benefit of creditors, the objective of maximizing creditor recovery has taken centre stage. In those circumstances, litigation funding furthers the basic purpose of interim financing: allowing the debtor to realize on the value of its assets.

97 We conclude that third party litigation funding agreements may be approved as interim financing in *CCAA* proceedings when the supervising judge determines that doing so would be fair and appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances and the objectives of the Act. This requires consideration of the specific factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of the *CCAA*. That said, these factors need not be mechanically applied or individually reviewed by the supervising judge. Indeed, not all of them will be significant in every case, nor are they exhaustive. Further guidance may be drawn from other areas in which third party litigation funding agreements have been approved.

The foregoing is consistent with the practice that is already occurring in lower courts. Most notably, in *Crystallex*, the Ontario Court of Appeal approved a third party litigation funding agreement in circumstances substantially similar to the case at bar. *Crystallex* involved a mining company that had the right to develop a large gold deposit in Venezuela. Crystallex eventually became insolvent and (similar to Bluberi) was left with only a single significant asset: a US\$3.4 billion arbitration claim against Venezuela. After entering *CCAA* protection, Crystallex sought the approval of a third party litigation funding agreement. The agreement contemplated that the lender would advance substantial funds to finance the arbitration in exchange for, among other things, a percentage of the net proceeds of any award or settlement. The supervising judge approved the agreement as interim financing pursuant to s. 11.2. The Court of Appeal unanimously found no error in the supervising judge's exercise of discretion. It concluded that s. 11.2 "does not restrict the ability of the supervising judge, where appropriate, to approve the grant of a charge securing financing before a plan is approved that may continue after the company emerges from CCAA protection" (para. 68).

A key argument raised by the creditors in *Crystallex* — and one that Callidus and the Creditors' Group have put before us now — was that the litigation funding agreement at issue was a plan of arrangement and not interim financing. This was significant because, if the agreement was in fact a plan, it would have had to be put to a creditors' vote pursuant to ss. 4 and 5 of the *CCAA* prior to receiving court approval. The court in *Crystallex* rejected this argument, as do we. 100 There is no definition of plan of arrangement in the *CCAA*. In fact, the *CCAA* does not refer to plans at all — it only refers to an "arrangement" or "compromise" (see ss. 4 and 5). The authors of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada* offer the following general definition of these terms, relying on early English case law:

A "compromise" presupposes some dispute about the rights compromised and a settling of that dispute on terms that are satisfactory to the debtor and the creditor. An agreement to accept less than 100¢ on the dollar would be a compromise where the debtor disputes the debt or lacks the means to pay it. "Arrangement" is a broader word than "compromise" and is not limited to something analogous to a compromise. It would include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: *Re Guardian Assur. Co.*, [1917] 1 Ch. 431, 61 Sol. Jo 232, [1917] H.B.R. 113 (C.A.); *Re Refund of Dues under Timber Regulations*, [1935] A.C. 185 (P.C.).

(Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra, at N§33)

101 The apparent breadth of these terms notwithstanding, they do have some limits. More recent jurisprudence suggests that they require, at minimum, some compromise of creditors' rights. For example, in *Crystallex* the litigation funding agreement at issue (known as the Tenor DIP facility) was held not to be a plan of arrangement because it did not "compromise the terms of [the creditors'] indebtedness or take away ... their legal rights" (para. 93). The Court of Appeal adopted the following reasoning from the lower court's decision, with which we substantially agree:

A "plan of arrangement" or a "compromise" is not defined in the CCAA. It is, however, to be an arrangement or compromise between a debtor and its creditors. The Tenor DIP facility is not on its face such an arrangement or compromise between Crystallex and its creditors. Importantly the rights of the noteholders are not taken away from them by the Tenor DIP facility. The noteholders are unsecured creditors. Their rights are to sue to judgment and enforce the judgment. If not paid, they have a right to apply for a bankruptcy order under the BIA. Under the CCAA, they have the right to vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise. None of these rights are taken away by the Tenor DIP.

(Crystallex International Corp., Re, 2012 ONSC 2125, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 50)

102 Setting out an exhaustive definition of plan of arrangement or compromise is unnecessary to resolve these appeals. For our purposes, it is sufficient to conclude that plans of arrangement require at least some compromise of creditors' rights. It follows that a third party litigation funding agreement aimed at extending financing to a debtor company to realize on the value of a litigation asset does not necessarily constitute a plan of arrangement. We would leave it to supervising judges to determine whether, in the particular circumstances of the case before them, a particular third party litigation funding agreement contains terms that effectively convert it into a plan of arrangement. So long as the agreement does not contain such terms, it may be approved as interim financing pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*.

103 We add that there may be circumstances in which a third party litigation funding agreement may contain or incorporate a plan of arrangement (e.g., if it contemplates a plan for distribution of litigation proceeds among creditors). Alternatively, a supervising judge may determine that, despite an agreement itself not being a plan of arrangement, it should be packaged with a plan and submitted to a creditors' vote. That said, we repeat that third party litigation funding agreements are not necessarily, or even generally, plans of arrangement.

104 None of the foregoing is seriously contested before us. The parties essentially agree that third party litigation funding agreements *can* be approved as interim financing. The dispute between them focusses on whether the supervising judge erred in exercising his discretion to approve the LFA in the absence of a vote of the creditors, either because it was a plan of arrangement or because it should have been accompanied by a plan of arrangement. We turn to these issues now.

#### (3) The Supervising Judge Did Not Err in Approving the LFA

105 In our view, there is no basis upon which to interfere with the supervising judge's exercise of his discretion to approve the LFA as interim financing. The supervising judge considered the LFA to be fair and reasonable, drawing guidance from the

principles relevant to approving similar agreements in the class action context (para. 74, citing *Musicians' Pension Fund of Canada (Trustee of)*, at para. 41; *Hayes*, at para. 4). In particular, he canvassed the terms upon which Bentham and Bluberi's lawyers would be paid in the event the litigation was successful, the risks they were taking by investing in the litigation, and the extent of Bentham's control over the litigation going forward (paras. 79 and 81). The supervising judge also considered the unique objectives of *CCAA* proceedings in distinguishing the LFA from ostensibly similar agreements that had not received approval in the class action context (paras. 81-82, distinguishing *Houle*). His consideration of those objectives is also apparent from his reliance on *Crystallex*, which, as we have explained, involved the approval of interim financing in circumstances substantially similar to the case at bar (see paras. 67 and 71). We see no error in principle or unreasonableness to this approach.

While the supervising judge did not canvass each of the factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of the *CCAA* individually before reaching his conclusion, this was not itself an error. A review of the supervising judge's reasons as a whole, combined with a recognition of his manifest experience with Bluberi's *CCAA* proceedings, leads us to conclude that the factors listed in s. 11.2(4) concern matters that could not have escaped his attention and due consideration. It bears repeating that, at the time of his decision, the supervising judge had been seized of these proceedings for well over two years and had the benefit of the Monitor's assistance. With respect to each of the s. 11.2(4) factors, we note that:

• the judge's supervisory role would have made him aware of the potential length of Bluberi's *CCAA* proceedings and the extent of creditor support for Bluberi's management (s. 11.2(4)(a) and (c)), though we observe that these factors appear to be less significant than the others in the context of this particular case (see para. 96);

• the LFA itself explains "how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings" (s. 11.2(4)(b));

• the supervising judge was of the view that the LFA would enhance the prospect of a viable plan, as he accepted (1) that Bluberi intended to submit a plan and (2) Bluberi's submission that approval of the LFA would assist it in finalizing a plan "with a view towards achieving maximum realization" of its assets (at para. 68, citing 9354-9186 Québec inc. and 9354-9178 Québec inc.'s application, at para. 99; s. 11.2(4)(d));

• the supervising judge was apprised of the "nature and value" of Bluberi's property, which was clearly limited to the Retained Claims (s. 11.2(4)(e));

• the supervising judge implicitly concluded that the creditors would not be materially prejudiced by the Litigation Financing Charge, as he stated that "[c]onsidering the results of the vote [on the First Plan], and given the particular circumstances of this matter, *the only potential recovery* lies with the lawsuit that the Debtors will launch" (at para. 91 (emphasis added); s. 11.2(4)(f)); and

• the supervising judge was also well aware of the Monitor's reports, and drew from the most recent report at various points in his reasons (see, e.g., paras. 64-65 and fn. 1; s. 11.2(4)(g)). It is worth noting that the Monitor supported approving the LFA as interim financing.

107 In our view, it is apparent that the supervising judge was focussed on the fairness at stake to all parties, the specific objectives of the *CCAA*, and the particular circumstances of this case when he approved the LFA as interim financing. We cannot say that he erred in the exercise of his discretion. Although we are unsure whether the LFA was as favourable to Bluberi's creditors as it might have been — to some extent, it does prioritize Bentham's recovery over theirs — we nonetheless defer to the supervising judge's exercise of discretion.

108 To the extent the Court of Appeal held otherwise, we respectfully do not agree. Generally speaking, our view is that the Court of Appeal again failed to afford the supervising judge the necessary deference. More specifically, we wish to comment on three of the purported errors in the supervising judge's decision that the Court of Appeal identified.

109 First, it follows from our conclusion that LFAs can constitute interim financing that the Court of Appeal was incorrect to hold that approving the LFA as interim financing "transcended the nature of such financing" (para. 78).

110 Second, in our view, the Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude that the LFA was a plan of arrangement, and that *Crystallex* was distinguishable on its facts. The Court of Appeal held that the LFA and associated super-priority Litigation Financing Charge formed a plan because they subordinated the rights of Bluberi's creditors to those of Bentham.

111 We agree with the supervising judge that the LFA is not a plan of arrangement because it does not propose any compromise of the creditors' rights. To borrow from the Court of Appeal in *Crystallex*, Bluberi's litigation claim is akin to a "pot of gold" (para. 4). Plans of arrangement determine how to distribute that pot. They do not generally determine what a debtor company should do to fill it. The fact that the creditors may walk away with more or less money at the end of the day does not change the nature or existence of their rights to access the pot once it is filled, nor can it be said to "compromise" those rights. When the "pot of gold" is secure — that is, in the event of any litigation or settlement — the net funds will be distributed to the creditors. Here, if the Retained Claims generate funds in excess of Bluberi's total liabilities, the creditors will be paid in full; if there is a shortfall, a plan of arrangement or compromise will determine how the funds are distributed. Bluberi has committed to proposing such a plan (see supervising judge's reasons, at para. 68, distinguishing *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.*, 2008 BCCA 327, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (B.C. C.A.)).

112 This is the very same conclusion that was reached in *Crystallex* in similar circumstances:

The facts of this case are unusual: there is a single "pot of gold" asset which, if realized, will provide significantly more than required to repay the creditors. The supervising judge was in the best position to balance the interests of all stakeholders. I am of the view that the supervising judge's exercise of discretion in approving the Tenor DIP Loan was reasonable and appropriate, despite having the effect of constraining the negotiating position of the creditors.

. . . . .

... While the approval of the Tenor DIP Loan affected the Noteholders' leverage in negotiating a plan, and has made the negotiation of a plan more complex, it did not compromise the terms of their indebtedness or take away any of their legal rights. It is accordingly not an arrangement, and a creditor vote was not required. [paras. 82 and 93]

113 We disagree with the Court of Appeal that *Crystallex* should be distinguished on the basis that it involved a single option for creditor recovery (i.e., the arbitration) while this case involves two (i.e., litigation of the Retained Claims and Callidus's New Plan). Given the supervising judge's conclusion that Callidus could not vote on the New Plan, that plan was not a viable alternative to the LFA. This left the LFA and litigation of the Retained Claims as the "only potential recovery" for Bluberi's creditors (supervising judge's reasons, at para. 91). Perhaps more significantly, even if there were multiple options for creditor recovery in either *Crystallex* or this case, the mere presence of those options would not necessarily have changed the character of the third party litigation funding agreements at issue or converted them into plans of arrangement. The question for the supervising judge in each case is whether the agreement before them ought to be approved as interim financing. While other options for creditor recovery may be relevant to that discretionary decision, they are not determinative.

We add that the Litigation Financing Charge does not convert the LFA into a plan of arrangement by "subordinat[ing]" creditors' rights (C.A. reasons, at para. 90). We accept that this charge would have the effect of placing secured creditors like Callidus behind in priority to Bentham. However, this result is expressly provided for in s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*. This "subordination" does not convert statutorily authorized interim financing into a plan of arrangement. Accepting this interpretation would effectively extinguish the supervising judge's authority to approve these charges without a creditors' vote pursuant to s. 11.2(2).

115 Third, we are of the view that the Court of Appeal was wrong to decide that the supervising judge should have submitted the LFA together with a plan to the creditors for their approval (para. 89). As we have indicated, whether to insist that a debtor package their third party litigation funding agreement with a plan is a discretionary decision for the supervising judge to make.

Finally, at the appellants' insistence, we point out that the Court of Appeal's suggestion that the LFA is somehow "akin to an equity investment" was unhelpful and potentially confusing (para. 90). That said, this characterization was clearly *obiter*  *dictum.* To the extent that the Court of Appeal relied on it as support for the conclusion that the LFA was a plan of arrangement, we have already explained why we believe the Court of Appeal was mistaken on this point.

#### **VI.** Conclusion

117 For these reasons, at the conclusion of the hearing we allowed these appeals and reinstated the supervising judge's order. Costs were awarded to the appellants in this Court and the Court of Appeal.

Appeal allowed.

Pourvoi accueilli.

#### Footnotes

- 1 Bluberi does not appear to have filed this claim yet (see 2018 QCCS 1040 (C.S. Que.), at para. 10 (CanLII)).
- 2 Notably, the Creditors' Group advised Callidus that it would lend its support to the New Plan. It also asked Callidus to reimburse any legal fees incurred in association with that support. At the same time, the Creditors' Group did not undertake to vote in any particular way, and confirmed that each of its members would assess all available alternatives individually.
- We note that while s. 36 now codifies the jurisdiction of a supervising court to grant a sale and vesting order, and enumerates factors to guide the court's discretion to grant such an order, it is silent on when courts ought to approve a liquidation under the *CCAA* as opposed to requiring the parties to proceed to liquidation under a receivership or the *BIA* regime (see Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp. 167-68; A. Nocilla, "Asset Sales Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Failure of Section 36" (2012) 52 *Can. Bus. L.J.* 226, at pp. 243-44 and 247). This issue remains an open question and was not put to this Court in either *Indalex* or these appeals.
- 4 It bears noting that the Monitor's statement in this regard did not decide whether Callidus would ultimately have been entitled to vote on the First Plan. Because Callidus did not even attempt to vote on the First Plan, this question was never put to the supervising judge.
- A further exception has been codified in the 2019 amendments to the *CCAA*, which create s. 11.2(5) (see *Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1*, s. 138). This section provides that at the time an initial order is sought, "no order shall be made under subsection [11.2](1) unless the court is also satisfied that the terms of the loan are limited to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period". This provision does not apply in this case, and the parties have not relied on it. However, it may be that it restricts the ability of supervising judges to approve LFAs as interim financing at the time of granting an Initial Order.
- 6 The extent of this controversy varies by province. In Ontario, champertous agreements are forbidden by statute (see *An Act respecting Champerty*, R.S.O. 1897, c. 327). In Quebec, concerns associated with champerty and maintenance do not arise as acutely because champerty and maintenance are not part of the law as such (see *Pole Lite Itée c. Banque Nationale du Canada*, 2006 QCCA 557, [2006] R.J.Q. 1009 (C.A. Que.); G. Michaud, "New Frontier: The Emergence of Litigation Funding in the Canadian Insolvency Landscape" in J. P. Sarra et al., eds., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2018* (2019), 221, at p. 231).

# **TAB** 12

#### 2021 ONSC 7997 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Boreal Capital Partners Ltd (Re)

2021 CarswellOnt 18881, 2021 ONSC 7997

### IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF BOREAL CAPITAL PARTNERS LTD., JRB-331 SHEDDON HOLDINGS LTD., 2123068 ONTARIO LIMITED, JRB-109 REYNOLDS HOLDINGS

Penny J.

Heard: December 3, 2021 Judgment: December 6, 2021 Docket: Toronto CV-21-00672654-00CL

Counsel: Rebecca L. Kennedy, Rachel Nicholson, Puya Fesharaki, for Applicants Peter J. Osborne, Sarah Bittman, for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc. Daniel Shapira, Jessica Sorbara, for DIP Lender, Halmont Properties Corporation Bevan Brooksbank, for Trisura Guarantee Insurance Company John Adair, for JRB Capital Group Ltd. and Mr. Bowman

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.1 General principles XIX.1.c Application of Act XIX.1.c.iv Miscellaneous Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.g Monitor

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — General principles — Application of Act — Miscellaneous

Interests of stakeholders not party to proceeding. Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Monitor Order conferring investigative powers.

#### Penny J.:

#### Background

1 This is the "come-back" hearing from an initial order granted on November 25, 2021. The specific relief sought was contemplated and explained at the original hearing but was deferred to the comeback date to allow for notice to all affected parties. The relief sought is supported by the Monitor and the secured creditors.

2 Mr. Adair appeared for JRB Capital and Mr. Bowman. He sought an adjournment with respect to two issues deal with in the proposed order. This was the only form of opposition to any of the relief sought. At the conclusion of submissions on these points, I indicated I was not granting an adjournment and that the amended and restated initial order, as submitted, would issue with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

3 The relief sought includes the conferral of investigative powers on the Monitor. Mr. Adair acts for the identified "investigatees" in relation to these powers, JRB Capital and Mr. Bowman. The requested adjournment concerned two discrete issues:

(1) the Court's "ratification" of the appointment of Kesmark as the general partner of each of the partnerships in para 17 of the proposed order; and

(2) the grant of the investigative powers in paras 28 to 31 of the proposed order.

4 Mr. Adair sought an adjournment of these two issues to allow Mr. Bowman to file evidence and make further submissions.

5 As to the first issue, Mr. Adair submits that Mr. Bowman may well, in future litigation with Mr. Price, challenge the corporate meetings and procedures which removed his company as general partner of the Boreal entities and replaced it with Kesmark. He does not want Mr. Bowman's future position (for example, in possible litigation with Mr. Price) to be prejudiced by the Court's "ratification" of Kesmark's original appointment.

6 As to the second point, Mr. Adair says he was just retained. The investigative powers are very broad and directed specifically at his client. He says such broad powers ought not to be granted without giving Mr. Bowman a full opportunity to be heard.

#### Analysis

7 It is extremely important that there be no question about Kesmark's ability to make reliable commitments as general partner of the Boreal entities in the course of the restructuring, both pre-filing and post-filing. The ratification of Kesmark's status as general partner of the Boreal entities is for the purpose of its both its pre-filing and post-filing activities and actions for the purposes of the restructuring. Mr. Adair's concern seems to me to be more about JRB Capital's removal that Kesmark's appointment. In any event, I do not see the Court's ratification of Kesmark's status as general partner of the Boreal entities for the purpose of its role in the restructuring as necessarily dispositive of any potential future dispute, as between Mr. Bowman and Mr. Price, about the conduct of the affairs of Boreal Capital or the legality of removing JRB Capital from that role prior to Kesmark's appointment.

8 As to the investigative powers, there are several reasons why I do not believe an adjournment is appropriate or necessary. First, The DIP lender, whose participation is absolutely critical to the restructuring, will not advance further funds unless the investigative powers are conferred and acted upon. Thus, without the investigative powers, there will be no restructuring, and there will follow a bankruptcy or some other form of liquidation. This will have an extremely negative impact on many stakeholders, beyond the applicants and the secured creditors, including service providers to the building projects and purchasers of housing units.

9 Second, this situation (that is, a CCAA proceeding with a Court appointed monitor and CRO) is not like a private shareholder dispute such as an oppression application. Here, we are dealing with Court appointed supervising officers who have advised the Court that there are *prima facie* indications of questionable transactions which, in their professional opinion, ought to be investigated. Again, there is more at stake than the interests of Mr. Price and Mr. Bowman. There are dozens of people and entities who have in good faith advanced money and services to the applicants; their interests must be taken into account as well.

10 Third, Mr. Bowman will have all the protections afforded by the law, and recourse to the Court, during the course of any investigation. Authorizing an investigation is not making any rulings or findings, reaching any conclusions, or otherwise materially affecting Mr. Bowman's interests. And when the time comes for drawing conclusions from and making decisions based on the investigation, Mr. Bowman will have every opportunity to be heard.

11 Fourth, while I appreciate the initial order was only made last week, there is no motion or affidavit before the Court from Mr. Bowman. Mr. Adair says he was only retained on Wednesday in this matter, but he has been acting for Mr. Bowman in connection with Boreal Capital matters and disagreements with Mr. Price since September 2020. Mr. Adair is concerned about prejudice to Mr. Bowman in potential litigation with Mr. Price, but there is no such litigation at the moment and under the stay, proceedings against directors of the Boreal entities is prohibited without leave of the Court.

12 Finally, para 51 of the proposed order stipulates that any interested party may apply to the Court to vary or amend the order on not less than seven days notice. This of course applies to Mr. Bowman and JRB Capital.

#### Conclusion

13 In conclusion, I am satisfied that the relief sought is warranted.

14 The stay is extended to February 18, 2022.

15 The amount the applicants can borrow is increased to \$10 million, secured by the DIP charge. This amount is consistent with the anticipated total funding requirements to February 2022 to finance working capital requirements, capital expenditures and the like.

16 The administrative charge is increased to \$300,000. Now that the stay has been extended, the increased charge is reasonable in the circumstances.

17 The Monitor is authorized to conduct investigations into potentially improper, undervalue, fraudulent or reviewable transactions as recommended by the Monitor and the CRO.

Application granted.

# TAB 13

Court File No.: CV-20-00643158-00CL

## ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST)

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THE HONOURABLE MADAM

JUSTICE DIETRICH

WEDNESDAY, THE 8<sup>TH</sup>

DAY OF JULY, 2020

The COURT OF HISTICE SUPERIEURE OF JUST

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ROBERTS COMPANY CANADA LIMITED

(the "Applicant")

## AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER (Amending Initial Order dated June 29, 2020)

THIS MOTION, made by the Applicant, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors* Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA") for an order amending and restating the Initial Order (the "Initial Order") issued on June 29, 2020 (the "Initial Filing Date") and extending the stay of proceedings provided for therein, was heard this day by way of videoconference due to the COVID-19 crisis.

**ON READING** the affidavit of Ravi Williams-Singh sworn June 26, 2020 (the "**Williams-Singh Affidavit**"), the affidavit of Ravi Williams-Singh sworn July 6, 2020 (the "**Second Williams-Singh Affidavit**") and the Exhibits thereto, the first report of Richter Advisory Services Inc. ("**Richter**") in its capacity as monitor (the "**Monitor**") dated July 6, 2020 (the "**First Report**"), and on being advised that the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the charges created herein were given notice, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicant, counsel for the Monitor, counsel for Bank of America, N.A., as Agent under the Fourth Amended and Restated Loan Agreement, dated as of January 31, 2017 (as amended, supplemented and otherwise modified from time to time, the "**ABL Credit Agreement**") and those other parties

listed on the counsel slip, no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service of Danish Afroz sworn July 6, 2020,

## INITIAL ORDER AND THE INITIAL FILING DATE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Initial Order, reflecting the Initial Filing Date, shall be amended and restated as provided for herein.

#### SERVICE

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service and filing of the Notice of Application and the Application Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

#### APPLICATION

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies.

#### PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "**Plan**").

## POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall remain in possession and control of its current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "**Property**"). Subject to the provisions of this Order and further Order of this Court, the Applicant shall continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its business (the "**Business**") and Property. The Applicant is authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, contractors, consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively "Assistants") currently retained or employed by it, with liberty to retain such

further Assistants as it deems reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order.

THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant shall be entitled to continue to utilise the 6. central cash management system currently in place, in accordance with the ABL Forbearance Agreement dated as of June 26, 2020 (as amended, restated or otherwise modified from time to time, the "ABL Forbearance Agreement"), as described in the Williams-Singh Affidavit, or replace it with another substantially similar central cash management system (the "Cash Management System") and that any present or future bank providing the Cash Management System shall not be under any obligation whatsoever to inquire into the propriety, validity or legality of any transfer, payment, collection or other action taken under the Cash Management System, or as to the use or application by the Applicant of funds transferred, paid, collected or otherwise dealt with in the Cash Management System, shall be entitled to provide the Cash Management System without any liability in respect thereof to any Person (as hereinafter defined) other than the Applicant, pursuant to the terms of the documentation applicable to the Cash Management System, and shall be, in its capacity as provider of the Cash Management System, an unaffected creditor under the Plan with regard to any claims or expenses it may suffer or incur in connection with the provision of the Cash Management System.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, subject to the terms of the ABL Forbearance Agreement, including the terms therein that refer to the Approved CCAA Cash Flow (as defined in the ABL Forbearance Agreement), the Applicant shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses whether incurred prior to, on or after the Initial Filing Date:

- (a) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, commissions, compensation, employee benefits, pension benefits, vacation pay and expenses (including, without limitation, payroll and benefits processing and servicing expenses) payable on or after the Initial Filing Date, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements;
- (b) the fees and disbursements of any Assistants retained or employed by the Applicant in respect of these proceedings, at their standard rates and charges; and

(c) in consultation with the Agent and the Lenders (as defined in the ABL Forbearance Agreement) (collectively, the "ABL Lender"), and with the consent of the Monitor, amounts owing for goods and services actually supplied to the Applicant prior to the Initial Filing Date by third party suppliers, up to a maximum aggregate amount of \$700,000, if in the opinion of the Applicant the supplier is critical to the Business, ongoing operations of the Applicant, or preservation of the Property, and the payment is required to ensure ongoing supply.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein and subject to the terms of the ABL Forbearance Agreement, including the terms therein that refer to the Approved CCAA Cash Flow, the Applicant shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Applicant in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course after the Initial Filing Date, and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, which expenses shall include (subject to the terms of the ABL Forbearance Agreement), without limitation:

- (a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors and officers' insurance), maintenance and security services; and
- (b) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Applicant following the Initial Filing Date.

9. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:

- (a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of (i) employment insurance, (ii) Canada Pension Plan, (iii) Quebec Pension Plan, and (iv) income taxes;
- (b) all goods and services or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "Sales Taxes") required to be remitted by the Applicant in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Applicant, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the Initial Filing Date, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior

to the Initial Filing Date but not required to be remitted until on or after the Initial Filing Date, and

(c) any amount payable to the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority in respect of municipal realty, municipal business or other taxes, assessments or levies of any nature or kind which are entitled at law to be paid in priority to claims of secured creditors and which are attributable to or in respect of the carrying on of the Business by the Applicant.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until a real property lease is disclaimed or resiliated in accordance with the CCAA, the Applicant shall pay all amounts constituting rent or payable as rent under real property leases (including, for greater certainty, common area maintenance charges, utilities and realty taxes and any other amounts payable to the landlord under the lease) or as otherwise may be negotiated between the Applicant and the landlord from time to time ("**Rent**"), for the period commencing from and including the Initial Filing Date, twice-monthly in equal payments on the first and fifteenth day of each month, in advance (but not in arrears). On the date of the first of such payments, any Rent relating to the period commencing from and including the Initial Filing Date shall also be paid.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as specifically permitted herein, the Applicant is hereby directed, until further Order of this Court: (a) to make no payments of principal, interest thereon or otherwise on account of amounts owing by the Applicant to any of its creditors as of the Initial Filing Date; (b) to grant no security interests, trust, liens, charges or encumbrances upon or in respect of any of its Property; and (c) to not grant credit or incur liabilities except in the ordinary course of the Business.

### RESTRUCTURING

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall, subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA and such covenants as may be contained in the ABL Forbearance Agreement, or as otherwise ordered by this Court, have the right to:

 (a) in consultation with the ABL Lender and with the consent of the Monitor, permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of its business or operations, and to dispose of redundant or non-material assets;

- (b) terminate the employment of such of its employees or temporarily lay off such of its employees as it deems appropriate; and
- (c) pursue all avenues of refinancing or restructuring of its Business or Property, in whole or in part, subject to prior approval of this Court being obtained before any material refinancing,

all of the foregoing to permit the Applicant to proceed with an orderly restructuring of the Business (the "**Restructuring**").

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall provide each of the relevant landlords with notice of the Applicant's intention to remove any fixtures from any leased premises at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the intended removal. The relevant landlord shall be entitled to have a representative present in the leased premises to observe such removal and, if the landlord disputes the Applicant's entitlement to remove any such fixture under the provisions of the lease, such fixture shall remain on the premises and shall be dealt with as agreed between any applicable secured creditors, such landlord and the Applicant, or by further Order of this Court upon application by the Applicant disclaims or resiliates the lease governing such leased premises in accordance with Section 32 of the CCAA, it shall not be required to pay Rent under such lease pending resolution of any such dispute (other than Rent payable for the notice period provided for in Section 32(5) of the CCAA), and the disclaimer or resiliation of the lease shall be without prejudice to the Applicant's claim to the fixtures in dispute.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if a notice of disclaimer or resiliation is delivered pursuant to Section 32 of the CCAA, then (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours, on giving the Applicant and the Monitor 24 hours' prior written notice, and (b) at the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the relevant landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such leased premises without waiver of or prejudice to any claims or rights such landlord may have against the Applicant in respect of such lease or leased premises, provided that nothing herein shall relieve such landlord of its obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith.

# NO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT OR THE PROPERTY

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that subject to paragraph 16(v) hereof, from the Initial Filing Date until and including August 31, 2020, or such later date as this Court may order (the "Stay **Period**"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal (each, a "**Proceeding**") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Applicant or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or with leave of this Court, and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Applicant or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further Order of this Court.

## NO EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OR REMEDIES

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency, or any other entities (all of the foregoing, collectively being "**Persons**" and each being a "**Person**") against or in respect of the Applicant or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall (i) empower the Applicant to carry on any business which the Applicant is not lawfully entitled to carry on, (ii) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by Section 11.1 of the CCAA, (iii) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest, (iv) prevent the registration of a claim for lien, or (v) prevent the ABL Lender from exercising any rights or remedies in accordance with the ABL Forbearance Agreement.

## NO INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, lease, sublease, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Applicant, except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or leave of this Court.

#### CONTINUATION OF SERVICES

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all Persons having oral or written agreements with the Applicant or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation services, utility or other services to the Business or the Applicant, are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Applicant, and that the Applicant shall be entitled to the continued use of its current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the normal prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the Initial Filing Date are paid by the Applicant in accordance with normal payment practices of the Applicant or such other practices as may be ordered by this Court.

## NON-DEROGATION OF RIGHTS

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else in this Order or the Initial Order, no Person shall be prohibited from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided on or after the Initial Filing Date, nor shall any Person be under any obligation on or after the Initial Filing Date to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Applicant. Nothing in this Order or the Initial Order shall derogate from the rights conferred and obligations imposed by the CCAA.

# PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors or officers of the Applicant with respect to any claim against the directors or officers that arose before the Initial Filing Date and that relates to any obligations of the Applicant whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment or performance of such

obligations, until a compromise or arrangement in respect of the Applicant, if one is filed, is sanctioned by this Court or is refused by the creditors of the Applicant or this Court.

# DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION AND CHARGE

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall indemnify its current and future directors and officers against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors or officers of the Applicant after the Initial Filing Date, except to the extent that, with respect to any officer or director, the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

22. THIS COURT ORDERS that the current and future directors and officers of the Applicant shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "Directors' Charge") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of \$250,000 as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 21 of this Order. The Directors' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 38 and 40 herein.

23. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding any language in any applicable insurance policy to the contrary, (a) no insurer shall be entitled to be subrogated to or claim the benefit of the Directors' Charge, and (b) the Applicant's directors and officers shall only be entitled to the benefit of the Directors' Charge to the extent that they do not have coverage under any directors' and officers' insurance policy, or to the extent that such coverage is insufficient to pay amounts indemnified in accordance with paragraph 21 of this Order.

#### APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Richter is, as of the Initial Filing Date, appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor, an officer of this Court, to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Applicant with the powers and obligations set out in the CCAA or set forth herein and that the Applicant and its shareholders, officers, directors, and Assistants shall advise the Monitor of all material steps taken by the Applicant pursuant to this Order, and shall co-operate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations and provide the Monitor with the assistance that is necessary to enable the Monitor to adequately carry out the Monitor's functions.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:

- (a) monitor the Applicant's receipts and disbursements;
- (b) report to this Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to the Property, the Business, and such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein;
- (c) assist the Applicant, to the extent required by the Applicant, in its dissemination to the ABL Lender and their counsel of financial and other information as agreed between the Applicant and the ABL Lender;
- (d) advise the Applicant in its preparation of the Applicant's cash flow statements and reporting required by the ABL Forbearance Agreement;
- (e) advise the Applicant in its development of the Plan and any amendments to the Plan;
- (f) assist the Applicant, to the extent required by the Applicant, with the holding and administering of creditors' or shareholders' meetings for voting on the Plan;
- (g) have full and complete access to the Property, including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and other financial documents of the Applicant, to the extent that is necessary to adequately assess the Applicant's business and financial affairs or to perform its duties arising under this Order or the Initial Order;
- (h) be at liberty to engage independent legal counsel or such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order or the Initial Order; and
- (i) perform such other duties as are required by this Order, the Initial Order or by this Court from time to time.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and shall take no part whatsoever in the management or supervision of the management of the

Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, be deemed to have taken or maintained possession or control of the Business or Property, or any part thereof.

THIS COURT ORDERS that nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to 27. occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management (separately and/or collectively, "Possession") of any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, might be a pollutant or a contaminant, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation, enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal of waste or other contamination including, without limitation, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, the Ontario Water Resources Act, or the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act and regulations thereunder (the "Environmental Legislation"), provided however that nothing herein shall exempt the Monitor from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable Environmental Legislation. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order or the Initial Order or anything done in pursuance of the Monitor's duties and powers under this Order or the Initial Order, be deemed to be in Possession of any of the Property within the meaning of any Environmental Legislation, unless it is actually in possession.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall provide any creditor of the Applicant with information provided by the Applicant in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Applicant is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Applicant may agree.

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the rights and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order or the Initial Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part. Nothing in this Order or the Initial Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA or any applicable legislation.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, and counsel to the Applicant shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, whether incurred prior to, on or subsequent to, the date of the Initial Order, by the Applicant as part of the costs of these proceedings. The Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicant and, in addition, the Applicant is hereby authorized to pay to the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, and counsel to the Applicant such reasonable retainers as may be requested to be held by them as security for payment of their respective fees and disbursements outstanding from time to time.

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time, and for this purpose the accounts of the Monitor and its legal counsel are hereby referred to a judge of the Commercial List of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicant shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "Administration **Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of \$500,000, as security for their professional fees and disbursements, incurred at their standard rates and charges, both before and after the making of the Initial Order in respect of these proceedings. The Administration Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 38 and 40 hereof.

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the ABL Lender shall be treated as unaffected in any plan of arrangement or compromise filed by the Applicant under the CCAA, or any proposal filed by the Applicant under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) with respect to any obligations outstanding as of the date of the Initial Order or arising thereafter under the ABL Credit Agreement or the ABL Forbearance Agreement and the Applicant is authorized to continue to obtain and borrow, repay (including repayment of amounts owing as of the Initial Filing Date) and re-borrow additional monies under the credit facility established in the ABL Credit Agreement pursuant to the terms of the ABL Credit Agreement and the ABL Forbearance Agreement, in order to finance the Applicant's working capital requirements and expenses.

#### FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in addition to the existing liens, charges, mortgages and encumbrances in favour of the ABL Lender, as security for all of the obligations of the Applicant to the ABL Lender relating to advances made to the Applicant under the ABL Credit Agreement from and after

the date of this Order, the ABL Lender shall be entitled to the benefit of and is hereby granted a charge (the "ABL Lender's DIP Charge") on the Property. The ABL Lender's DIP Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 38 and 40 hereof.

# KERP, KERP CHARGE AND SEALING THE KERP SUMMARY

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Key Employee Retention Plan (the "**KERP**"), as described in the Second Williams-Singh Affidavit, is hereby approved and the Applicant is authorized to make payments contemplated thereunder in accordance with the terms and conditions of the KERP.

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the key employees referred to in the KERP shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**KERP Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of \$200,000 to secure amounts owing to such key employees under the KERP. The KERP Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 38 and 40 hereof.

37. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the summary of the KERP (the "**KERP Summary**"), a copy of which is attached as Confidential Exhibit "A" to the Second Williams-Singh Affidavit, shall be and is hereby sealed, kept confidential, and shall not form part of the public record unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

# VALIDITY AND PRIORITY OF CHARGES CREATED BY THIS ORDER

38. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Directors' Charge, the KERP Charge, the ABL Lender's DIP Charge and the Administration Charge, as among them, shall be as follows:

First - Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of \$500,000);

Second - Directors' Charge (to the maximum amount of \$250,000);

Third - KERP Charge (to the maximum amount of \$200,000); and

Fourth - ABL Lender's DIP Charge.

39. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the filing, registration or perfection of the Directors' Charge, the Administration Charge, the ABL Lender's DIP Charge or the KERP Charge (collectively, the "**Charges**") shall not be required, and that the Charges shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Charges coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.

40. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Charges shall constitute a charge on the Property and such Charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (collectively, "Encumbrances") in favour of any Person.

41. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicant shall not grant any Encumbrances over any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, any of the Charges, unless the Applicant also obtains the prior written consent of the Monitor and the beneficiaries of the Charges, and the ABL Lender, or further Order of this Court.

42. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Charges and the ABL Forbearance Agreement shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the chargees entitled to the benefit of the Charges (collectively, the "**Chargees**") thereunder shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (b) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) (the "**BIA**"), or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications; (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA; (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "**Agreement**") which binds the Applicant, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:

 (a) the creation of the Charges and the execution and performance of the ABL Forbearance Agreement by the Applicant are hereby approved and shall not create or be deemed to constitute a breach by the Applicant of any Agreement to which it is a party;

- (b) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the Charges or the entry into the ABL Forbearance Agreement; and
- (c) the payments made by the Applicant pursuant to this Order and the granting of the Charges, do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct, or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

43. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Charge created by this Order or the Initial Order over leases of real property in Canada shall only be a Charge in the Applicant's interest in such real property leases.

#### SERVICE AND NOTICE

44. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall (i) without delay from the Initial Filing Date, publish in *The Globe & Mail* (National Edition) a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA in respect of the Initial Order, (ii) within five days after the Initial Filing Date (A) make the Initial Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, or cause to be sent, in the prescribed manner (including by electronic message to the e-mail addresses as last shown in the Applicants' books and records), a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the Applicant of more than \$1,000, and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder.

45. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the E-Service Protocol of the Commercial List (the "**Protocol**") is approved and adopted by reference herein and, in this proceeding, the service of documents made in accordance with the Protocol (which can be found on the Commercial List website at <u>http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/toronto/eservice-commercial</u>) shall be valid and effective service. Subject to Rule 17.05 this Order shall constitute an order for substituted service pursuant to Rule 16.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Subject to Rule 3.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and paragraph 21 of the Protocol, service of documents in accordance with the Protocol will be effective on transmission. This Court further

orders that a Case Website shall be established in accordance with the Protocol with the following URL <u>https://www.richter.ca/insolvencycase/roberts-company-canada-limited/</u>.

46. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if the service or distribution of documents in accordance with the Protocol or the CCAA and the regulations thereunder is not practicable (including as a result of COVID-19), the Applicant and the Monitor are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or facsimile transmission or electronic message to the Applicant's creditors or other interested parties at their respective addresses (including email addresses) as last shown on the records of the Applicant and that any such service or distribution shall be deemed to be received: (a) if sent by courier, on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, (b) if delivered by personal delivery or facsimile or other electronic transmission, on the day so delivered, and (c) if sent by ordinary mail, on the third business day after mailing.

47. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant and the Monitor and their respective counsel are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, the Initial Order, and other materials and orders as may be reasonably required in these proceedings, including any notices, or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by electronic message to the Applicant's creditors or other interested parties and their advisors. For greater certainty, any such distribution or service shall be deemed to be in satisfaction of a legal or judicial obligation, and notice requirements within the meaning of clause 3(c) of the *Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations*, Reg. 81000-2-175 (SOR/DORS).

#### GENERAL

48. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court to amend, vary or supplement this Order or for advice and directions in the discharge of their respective powers and duties hereunder or the interpretation or the application of this Order.

49. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order or the Initial Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicant, the Business or the Property.

50. THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicant, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicant and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicant and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

51. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicant and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and that the Monitor is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.

52. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party (including the Applicant and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order; provided, however, that the ABL Lender shall be entitled to rely on this Order as issued for all advances made and payments received under the ABL Credit Agreement or the ABL Forbearance Agreement up to and including the date this Order may be varied or amended.

53. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time on the date of this Order.

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PER/PAR: RW

Court File No.: CV-20-00643158-00CL	ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST) Proceeding commenced at Toronto	AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER	BENNETT JONES LLP One First Canadian Place Suite 3400, P.O. Box 130 Toronto, Ontario	M5X 1A4 Raj Sahni (LSO #42942U)	Tel: 416-777-4804 Email: SahniR@bennettjones.com	DANISH AFROZ (LSO #65786B) Tel: 416-777-6124 Email: AfrozD@bennettjones.com	3-1716	Lawyers for the Applicant		
Court File D	SUPERIOR ( (COMN Proceeding of	AMENDED AN	BENNETT JONES LLP One First Canadian Place Suite 3400, P.O. Box 130 Toronto, Ontario	M5X 1A4 Raj Sahni ()	Tel: 416-777-4804 Email: SahniR@b	DANISH AFROZ (L' Tel: 416-777-6124 Email: AfrozD@b	Fax: 416-863-1716	Lawyers for	N	
IN THE MATTER OF THE <i>COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT</i> , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ROBERTS COMPANY CANADA LIMITED										
IN THE MATTER OF THE 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED ARRANGEMENT OF ROBE			n H K S					-		

# TAB 14

## 2019 ONSC 6966 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Clover Leaf Holdings Company, Re

#### 2019 CarswellOnt 20001, 2019 ONSC 6966, 312 A.C.W.S. (3d) 691, 75 C.B.R. (6th) 124

# IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CLOVER LEAF HOLDINGS COMPANY, CONNORS BROS. CLOVER LEAF SEAFOODS COMPANY, K.C.R. FISHERIES LTD., 6162410 CANADA LIMITED, CONNORS BROS. HOLDINGS COMPANY AND CONNORS BROS. SEAFOODS COMPANY

Hainey J.

Heard: November 25, 2019 Judgment: December 4, 2019 Docket: CV-19-631523-00CL

Counsel: Kevin Zych, Sean Zweig, Mike Shakra, for Applicants Marc Wasserman, Martino Calvaruso, for Monitor Natasha MacParland, for FCF Co. Ltd. Peter Rubin, for Wells Forgo Jeremy Opolsky, for Lion Capital Robert Chadwick, Christopher Armstrong, for Terms Lenders

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Initial application -- Miscellaneous

Applicants were Canadian affiliates of BBF, which was international seafood supplier based in United States — Applicants operated CL group of companies in Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and had 650 employees — While CL business in Canada was cash flow positive and profitable, balance sheet of BBF, including applicants, had suffered extreme financial pressures primarily due to extensive litigation against BBF in United States — BBF filed voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of United States Code and U.S. Bankruptcy Court granted certain First Day Orders in those proceedings — Applicants sought similar relief to stabilize and protect business in order to complete comprehensive and coordinated restructuring of CL in Canada and BBF in United States — Applicants obtained initial order pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for appointment of Monitor and staying all proceedings against applicants and Monitor until December 2, 2019 — Applicants brought application for amended and restated order to supplement limited relief obtained pursuant to initial order — Applicants had acted in good faith and with due diligence and required extra time to restore solvency — Proposed debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing was approved — Proposed DIP financing would preserve value and going concern operations of applicants' business, which was in best interests of applicants and stakeholders — Monitor supported proposed DIP financing and confirmed that applicants had sufficient liquidity to operate business in ordinary course — It was appropriate to amend initial order to allow for payment of pre-filing obligations — KERP and KEIP charge were approved — Terms and scope of KEIP were limited to what was

reasonably necessary — Intercompany charge, administrative charge and directors' charge were all granted to protect interests of creditors, secure professional fees and disbursements of Monitor and provide indemnification to directors.

# Table of Authorities

# Statutes considered:

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.001 [en. 2019, c. 29, s. 136] - considered

s. 11.2(5) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 s. 137(2) — considered

# Hainey J.:

# Overview

1 On November 22, 2019, the applicants ("Clover Leaf"), obtained an initial order pursuant to the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended ("*CCAA*") which appointed Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. as Monitor and stayed all proceedings against the applicants, their officers, directors and the Monitor until December 2, 2019.

2 On November 25, 2019 the applicants sought an amended and restated order to supplement the limited relief obtained pursuant to the initial order. I granted the order and indicated that I would provide a more detailed endorsement. This is my endorsement.

# Facts

3 The applicants are the Canadian affiliates of Bumble Bee Foods, an international seafood supplier based in the United States ("Bumble Bee").

4 The applicants operate the Clover Leaf business in Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. They have approximately 650 employees in Canada. The Clover Leaf business has long been associated with well-known brands of canned seafood products in Canada.

5 While the Clover Leaf business in Canada is cash flow positive and profitable, the balance sheet of the Bumble Bee group, including the applicants, has suffered extreme financial pressures primarily due to extensive litigation against Bumble Bee in the United States.

6 As a result, the Bumble Bee group has filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code ("Chapter 11 proceedings") and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has granted certain First Day Orders in those proceedings.

7 The applicants are seeking similar relief in these proceedings to stabilize and protect their business in order to complete a comprehensive and coordinated restructuring of Clover Leaf in Canada and Bumble Bee in the United States. This will include an asset sale of each of their respective businesses ("Sale Transaction"). This outcome is the result of extensive consideration of various options and consultations with Bumble Bee's secured lenders in an attempt to restructure the business.

# **Applicants' Position**

8 The applicants submit that this *CCAA* proceeding is in the best interests of their stakeholders and will result in their business being conveyed on a going concern basis with minimal disruption. The breathing room afforded by the *CCAA* and Chapter 11 proceedings, and the other relief sought, will allow the applicants to continue operations in the ordinary course, maintaining the stability of their business and operations, and preserving the value of their business while the Sale Transaction is implemented.

9 Although the applicants are party to a stalking horse asset purchase agreement, they are not seeking any relief in connection with it or the Sale Transaction at this stage. The applicants will return to court for that relief at a later date. They are, instead, only seeking the limited relief required at this time.

#### Issues

10 I must determine the following issues:

a) Is the relief sought on this application consistent with the amendments to the *CCAA* which came into effect on November 1, 2019?

b) Should I extend the stay of proceedings to December 31, 2019?

c) Should I approve the proposed DIP financing and grant the DIP charge?

d) Should I grant the administration charge and the directors' charge?

e) Should I approve the KEIP and the KEIP charge, and grant a sealing order?

f) Should I authorize the applicants to pay their ordinary course pre-filing debts? and

g) Should I grant the intercompany charge?

### Analysis

# The New CCAA Amendments

11 In determining this application I must consider the amendments made to the *CCAA* that came into force on November 1, 2019.

12 Section 11.001 of the CCAA provides as follows:

An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

13 The purpose of this new section of the *CCAA* is to make the insolvency process fairer, more transparent and more accessible by limiting the decisions made at the outset of the proceedings to measures that are reasonably necessary to avoid the immediate liquidation of an insolvent company and to allow for broader participation in the restructuring process.

14 The applicants submit that the relief sought on this application is limited to what is reasonably necessary in the circumstances for the continued operation of their business. Further relief, including approval of the Sale Transactions and related bidding procedures, will not be sought until a later date on reasonable notice to a broader group of stakeholders.

15 I am satisfied that the relief sought on this motion is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the applicants for the period covered by the order sought to allow them to take the next steps toward a smooth transition of their business to a new owner for the following reasons:

(a) Prior to initiating insolvency proceedings here and in the United States the applicants conducted a thorough assessment of their options and consulted with all their major creditors before arriving at the proposed Sale Transaction;

(b) The applicants' stakeholder such as employees, customers and suppliers who have not yet been consulted about these CCAA proceedings will not be prejudiced by the order sought. In fact, in my view, they will suffer prejudice if the order is not granted;

(c) The applicants have the support of their secured creditors who are expected to suffer a shortfall if the Sale Transaction closes;

(d) The applicants are not the cause of these insolvency proceedings; and

(e) The applicants are only seeking relief that is reasonably necessary to take the next steps toward a smooth transition to a new owner.

- 16 For these reasons, I have concluded that the relief sought is consistent with the new amendments to the *CCAA*.
- 17 I will now consider whether it is appropriate to grant certain of the specific terms of the amended and restated initial order.

#### Stay of Proceedings

- 18 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings to December 31, 2019.
- 19 I am satisfied that the stay of proceedings should be extended as requested for the following reasons:

(a) The applicants have acted and are acting in good faith with due diligence;

(b) The stay of proceedings requested is appropriate to provide the applicants with breathing room while they seek to restore their solvency and emerge from these *CCAA* proceedings on a going-concern basis;

(c) Without continued protection under the *CCAA* and the support of their lenders the stability and value of the applicants' business will quickly deteriorate and will be unable to continue to operate as a going-concern;

(d) If existing or new proceedings are permitted to continue against the applicants, they will be destructive to the overall value of their business and jeopardize the proposed Sale Transaction; and

(e) The Monitor supports the requested extension of the stay of proceedings.

#### **DIP** Financing

20 The applicants submit that the proposed DIP financing should be approved for the following reasons:

(a) The proposed DIP financing is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of Clover Leaf in the ordinary course of business during the period covered by the order sought within the meaning of s. 11.2(5) of the *CCAA*. It is also consistent with the existing jurisprudence that DIP financing should be granted "to keep the lights on" and should be limited to terms that are reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the company; and

(b) The proposed DIP financing is reasonably necessary to allow the applicants to maintain liquidity and preserve the enterprise value of their business while the Sale Transaction is being pursued. The proposed DIP financing will be used to honour commitments to employees, customers and trade creditors.

21 I am satisfied for these reasons that the requirements of s. 11.2(5) of the CCAA are satisfied.

In this case, the applicants are not borrowers under the proposed DIP financing but they are proposed to be guarantors. The applicable jurisprudence has established the following factors which should be considered to determine the appropriateness of authorizing a Canadian debtor to guarantee a foreign affiliate's DIP financing:

(a) The need for additional financing by the Canadian debtor to support a going concern restructuring;

(b) The benefit of the breathing space afforded by CCAA protection;

(c) The lack of any financing alternatives to those proposed by the DIP lender;

(d) The practicality of establishing a stand-alone solution for the Canadian debtor;

(e) The contingent nature of the liability of the proposed guarantee and the likelihood that it will be called upon;

(f) Any potential prejudice to the creditors of the Canadian entity if the request is approved; and

(g) The benefits that may accrue to the stakeholders if the request is approved and the prejudice to those stakeholders if the request is denied.

23 I have concluded that I should approve the proposed DIP financing and the proposed DIP charge for the following reasons:

(a) Because of its current financial circumstances, the Bumble Bee Group cannot obtain alternative financing outside of the Chapter 11 and *CCAA* proceedings;

(b) The applicants' liquidity is dependent on the secured lenders providing the proposed DIP financing;

(c) The proposed DIP financing is necessary to maintain the ongoing business and operations of the Bumble Bee Group, including the applicants;

(d) While the proposed DIP financing is being provided by the applicants' existing secured lenders rather than new third-party lenders, eleven third-party lenders were solicited with no viable proposal being received. In my view, this demonstrates that the proposed DIP financing represents the best available DIP financing option in the circumstances;

(e) The proposed DIP financing will preserve the value and going concern operations of the applicant's business, which is in the best interests of the applicants and their stakeholders;

(f) Because the DIP lenders are the existing secured lenders, they are familiar with the applicants' business and operations which will reduce administrative costs that would otherwise arise with a new-third party DIP lender;

(g) Protections have been included in the amended and restated initial order to minimize any prejudice to the applicants and their stakeholders;

(h) The amount of the proposed DIP Financing is appropriate having regard to the applicants' cash-flow statement; and

(i) The Monitor supports the proposed DIP financing and its report confirms that the applicants will have sufficient liquidity to operate their business in the ordinary course.

# Payment of Pre-Filing Obligations

To preserve normal course business operations, the applicants seek authorization to continue to pay their suppliers of goods and services, honour rebate, discount and refund programs with their customers and pay employees in the ordinary course consistent with existing compensation arrangements.

The court has broad jurisdiction to permit the payment of pre-filing obligations in a *CCAA* proceeding. In granting authority to pay certain pre-filing obligations, courts have considered the following factors:

(a) Whether the goods and services are integral to the applicants' business;

(b) The applicants' need for the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

(c) The fact that no payments will be made without the consent of the Monitor;

(d) The Monitors' support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments in respect of pre-filing liabilities are appropriate;

(e) Whether the applicants have sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet their needs; and

(f) The effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they are unable to make pre-filing payments.

I am satisfied that it is critical to the operation of their business that the applicants preserve key relationships. Any disruption in the services proposed to be paid could jeopardize the value of their business and the viability of the Sale Transaction. The authority in the proposed amended and restated initial order to pay pre-filing obligations is appropriately tailored and responsive to the needs of the applicants and is specifically provided for in the applicants' cash flows and in the DIP budget. In particular, the payments are limited to those necessary to preserve critical relationships with employees, suppliers, and customers, to ensure the stability and continued operation of the applicants' business and will only be made with the consent of the Monitor. The relief sought is consistent with orders in other *CCAA* cases.

Further, in keeping with the requirements in s. 11.001 of the *CCAA* the contemplated payments are all reasonably necessary to the continued operation of the applicants' business so that there will be no disruption in services provided to the applicants and no deterioration in their relationships with their suppliers, customers and employees.

# **KEIP** and **KEIP** Charge

28 I have also concluded that the KEIP and KEIP charge should be approved because of the following:

(a) The KEIP was developed in consultation with AlixPartners, Bennett Jones LLP and with the involvement of the Monitor. The Monitor is supportive of the KEIP. The secured creditors also support the KEIP charge;

(b) The KEIP is reasonably necessary to retain key employees who are necessary to guide the applicants through the *CCAA* proceedings and the Sale Transaction;

(c) The KEIP is incentive-based and will only be earned if certain conditions are met; and

(d) The amount of the KEIP, and corresponding KEIP charge, is reasonable in the circumstance.

In approving the KEIP and KEIP charge pursuant to s. 11 of the *CCAA* I have determined that the terms and scope of the KEIP have been limited to what is reasonably necessary at this time in accordance with s. 11.001 of the *CCAA*.

30 As the KEIP contains personal confidential information about the applicants' employees, including their salaries, I am granting a sealing order pursuant to s. 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, RSO 1990, c. C. 43. This will prevent the risk of disclosure of this personal and confidential information.

# Intercompany Charge

I am also granting the requested Intercompany Charge to preserve the status quo between all entities within the Bumble Bee group to protect the interest of creditors against individual entities within the group. The Monitor supports the charge which ranks behind all the other court-ordered charges.

# Administrative Charge

32 I am also granting an administration charge in the amount of \$1.25 million to secure the professional fees and disbursements of the Monitor, its counsel and the applicants' counsel for the following reasons:

(a) The beneficiaries of the administration charge have, and will continue to, contribute to these *CCAA* proceedings and assist the applicants with their business;

(b) Each beneficiary of the administration charge is performing distinct functions and there is no duplication of roles;

(c) The quantum of the proposed charge is reasonable having regard to administration charges granted in other similar *CCAA* proceedings;

(d) The secured creditors support the administrative charge; and

(e) The Monitor supports the administrative charge.

### **Directors'** Charge

Finally, I am granting a directors' charge in the amount of \$2.3 million to secure the indemnity of the applicants' directors and officers for liabilities they may incur during these *CCAA* proceedings for the following reasons:

(a) The directors and officers may be subject to potential liabilities in connection with the *CCAA* proceedings and have expressed their desire for certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities;

(b) The applicants' liability insurance policies provide insufficient coverage for their officers and directors;

(c) The directors' charge applies only to the extent that the directors and officers do not have coverage under another directors and officers' insurance policy;

(d) The directors' charge would only cover obligations and liabilities that the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of the *CCAA* proceedings and does not cover willful misconduct or gross negligence;

(e) The applicants will require the active and committed involvement of its directors and officers, and their continued participation is necessary to complete the Sale Transaction;

(f) The amount of the directors' charge has been calculated based on the estimated potential exposure of the directors and officers and is appropriate given the size, nature and employment levels of the applicants; and

(g) The calculation of the directors' charge has been reviewed with the Monitor and the Monitor supports it.

# Conclusion

34 For these reasons the amended and restated initial order is granted.

35 I thank counsel for their helpful submissions.

Application granted.

# TAB 15

# 2017 ONSC 4944 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Index Energy Mills Road Corporation (Re)

2017 CarswellOnt 13040, 2017 ONSC 4944, 283 A.C.W.S. (3d) 694, 51 C.B.R. (6th) 216

# IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT INDEX ENERGY MILLS ROAD CORPORATION

G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: August 16, 2017 Judgment: August 23, 2017 Docket: CV-17-580840-00CL

Counsel: Shane Kukulowicz, for Index Energy Mills Road Corporation Brian Empey, Melaney Wagner, for Grant Thornton Ltd., Proposed Monitor Grant Moffat, for National Bank of Canada, as Agent for Syndicate of Lenders David Bish, for DIP Lender (Index Equity US LLC), Index Equity Sweden AB and Index Residence AB

# G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.:

#### Overview

1 This application is brought by Index Energy Mills Road Corporation ("Index Energy Ajax" or the "Applicant") for an order (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA").

In addition to requesting a stay of proceedings and authorization to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its property, the Applicant also requests that Grant Thornton Ltd. ("GTL") be appointed as monitor (the "Monitor"); authorization for the Applicant to borrow \$5 million pursuant to a credit facility (the "DIP Facility") as interim financing from Index Equity US LLC ("Index US"), in such capacity, (the "DIP Lender") with a maximum amount of \$1.6 million being advanced by the DIP Lender prior to the CCAA comeback hearing (the "Comeback Hearing"); and a sealing order with respect to certain confidential information described in the pre-filing report of the Monitor (the "Pre-Filing Report").

3 Index Energy Ajax owns and operates an electrical co-generation facility located in Ajax, Ontario that generates electricity by burning wood waste from the construction industry to produce steam to drive turbine generators (the "Biomass Facility").

4 Index Energy Ajax has encountered difficulties in retrofitting the Biomass Facility and energy output has been lower and operational costs higher than anticipated. Index Energy Ajax has also been engaged in litigation with its former engineering, procurement and construction contractor, HMI Construction Inc. ("HMI"), and has also been forced to deal with numerous liens arising from the construction associated with the Biomass Facility, including a lien claim of approximately \$31.3 million registered by HMI (the "HMI Lien Claim"). The sum of \$7,053,890 plus HST has been paid into court as an agreed upon holdback (the "Holdback Funds").

5 Index Energy Ajax is in default on various obligations to a syndicate of lenders comprised of National Bank of Canada, Canadian Western Bank, Laurentian Bank of Canada and Business Development Bank of Canada (collectively, the "Syndicate"). National Bank of Canada is the agent of the Syndicate (in that capacity, the "Agent"). The Syndicate has made demand for payment of amounts in excess of \$45 million. Mr. Rickard Haraldsson, a Director of Index Energy Ajax has stated in his affidavit that Index Energy Ajax is insolvent.

6 The Applicant is of the view that its underlying business remains strong, but that it ultimately requires a restructuring to inject new funds into its operations to address the various deficiencies in the Biomass Facility. Accordingly, Index Energy Ajax states that it requires protection under the CCAA to allow it a period of time to develop and implement a sales and investment solicitation process ("SISP") and to access interim financing on a priority basis to preserve value for all stakeholders and ensure its viability as a going concern.

7 The Applicant has advised that it is currently in negotiations with Index US and the Syndicate to reach agreement on terms of a mutually acceptable SISP, which would include a stalking-horse bid, and to allow further advances under the DIP Facility beyond the initial permitted draw amount.

# The Facts

8 The facts have been set out in detail in the affidavit of Rickard Haraldsson (the "Haraldsson Affidavit").

9 Index Energy Ajax was incorporated pursuant to the laws of Ontario on November 7, 2006. Its registered office is located at 170 Mills Road, Ajax, Ontario.

10 Index Energy Ajax is owned by three shareholders. Index Energy Sweden is the owner of 70% of the common shares, R. Andrews Investment Company, LLC ("R. Andrews") is the owner of 10% of the common shares and Jacqueline Kerr ("J. Kerr") is the owner of 20% of the common shares.

11 Index Energy Ajax was incorporated to retrofit the existing energy plant located in Ajax (the "Property") to become the Biomass Facility.

12 Index Energy Ajax entered into a feed-in-tariff with the Ontario Power Authority in 2010 (the "FIT Contract"). In order to retrofit the Biomass Facility, Index Energy Ajax entered into a construction contract with HMI in 2012 (the "EPC Contract"). Since 2015, there has been substantial litigation between Index Energy Ajax and HMI with regard to the HMI Lien Claim.

13 In March 2017 Index Energy Ajax paid an agreed holdback amount of \$7,053,890 plus HST (the "Holdback Funds") into court and all subcontractor lien claims were vacated from title to the Property

# Index Energy Ajax's Creditors

In 2013, Index Energy Ajax entered into a credit agreement (the "Syndicate Credit Agreement") with the Syndicate. Pursuant to the Syndicate Credit Agreement, the Syndicate agreed to provide a non-revolving construction facility in the maximum sum of \$60 million and a non-revolving term facility once the retrofit was satisfactorily completed (collectively, the "Syndicate Facilities").

15 Index Energy Ajax has been in default of the Syndicate Agreement since at least May 2015.

16 On January 18, 2017, the Agent sent Index Energy Ajax a demand letter (the "Demand Letter") demanding full payment of all amounts owing to the Syndicate under the Syndicate Facilities, which at that date totaled \$49,427,871.94, with interest.

17 Other creditors include Index Residence for an amount in excess of \$102 million and trade creditors for an amount in excess of \$4 million.

18 The proposed monitor has filed a pre-filing report which details the efforts Index Energy Ajax has taken, with the assistance of the Monitor, to solicit an appropriate DIP financier. After consulting with Index Sweden and Index Residence, one party was selected as a potential DIP lender, however, after protracted negotiations, the parties were not able to come to terms. As an alternative, Index US has agreed to act as DIP Lender with the consent of the Syndicate, on terms more favourable to Index Energy Ajax than those offered by this potential lender. Details are provided in the Pre-Filing Report at paragraphs 46-53 and in the Haraldsson Affidavit at paragraph 94.

19 The DIP Lender has agreed to provide Index Energy Ajax with a DIP Facility in order for Index Energy Ajax to meet its immediate funding requirements.

20 The DIP Facility, extended by the DIP Lender is the maximum amount of \$5 million (the "Principal Amount") with a maximum amount of \$1.6 million being advanced by the DIP Lender prior to the CCAA Comeback Hearing pursuant to the DIP Credit Agreement.

21 The DIP Facility requires that the DIP Lender receive a court ordered priority charge over the assets of Index Energy Ajax (the "DIP Lender's Charge") which Charge will attach to all of the Index Energy Ajax Property other than the Holdback Funds, to rank ahead of all secured and unsecured creditors of Index Energy Ajax other than Caterpillar Financial Services Limited, who has a specific security interest over a construction loader (the "Loader").

# The Law

The CCAA applies to a "debtor company" with total claims against it for more than \$5 million. I am satisfied that Index Energy Ajax is such a "debtor company" and is entitled to relief under the CCAA.

I am also satisfied that Index Energy Ajax is insolvent. Index Energy Ajax's liabilities exceed the current value of its assets and Index Energy Ajax has insufficient funds to pay its debts and has ceased to meet its obligations as they become due.

I am also satisfied that Index Energy Ajax has met the other threshold requirements include the filing of cash-flow statements required by Section 10 of the CCAA. Further, since the chief place of business of Index Energy Ajax is Ajax, Ontario, this court has jurisdiction to hear this application.

I am also satisfied that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant a stay of proceedings to Index Energy Ajax. The stay is crucial as it preserves the status quo among the stakeholders while Index Energy Ajax stabilizes operations and considers its alternatives. Index Energy Ajax has indicated that it wishes to embark on a SISP and a stay is necessary to allow the time for the SISP to unfold.

Index Energy Ajax also seeks authorization to pay pre-filing expenses up to the amount of \$450,000 if it is determined, in consultation with the Monitor, to be necessary for the continued operation of the business or preservation of the Property.

27 Index Energy Ajax takes the position that the continued availability of supplies is necessary to ensure a successful SISP and ultimate emergence of a restructured business in some form. Mr. Haraldsson states that a number of the suppliers to Index Energy Ajax are vital to its ongoing operations and it may be necessary for them to be paid all or a portion of the obligations arising prior to the date of the Initial Oder to ensure their survival and their continued ability to provide supplies to Index Energy Ajax.

28 Mr. Haraldsson states that the operation of the Biomass Facility, and the maximizing of value for the stakeholders would be materially prejudiced if the required suppliers ceased to carry on business and ceased to supply.

Accordingly, Index Energy Ajax seeks authority to pay such amounts as they are required, including amounts owing prior to the date of the Initial Order, to ensure continued supply and successful restructuring.

There is authority to authorize an applicant to pay certain amounts, including pre-filing amounts to suppliers where the applicant is not seeking a charge in respect of critical suppliers (see: *Cinram International Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 68 of Schedule "C", ("Cinram") and *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re* [2009 CarswellOnt 391 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], 2009 CanLII 2493 (at para. 21 ("Smufit-Stone")).

31 In granting this authority, the courts have considered a number of factors, including:

(a) whether the goods and services are integral to the business of the applicants;

(b) the applicants dependency on the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

(c) the fact that no payments would be made with the consent of the monitor;

(d) the monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicant to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of prefiling liabilities are minimized;

(e) whether the applicant has sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet its needs; and

(f) the effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if it were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

32 In these circumstances, I have been persuaded that it is both necessary and appropriate to provide the requested authorization to Index Energy Ajax.

<sup>33</sup> Pursuant to section 11.7 of the CCAA, the court is required to appoint a monitor. GTL has consented to its appointment as Monitor in this case and I am satisfied that it is appropriate to appoint GTL as Monitor.

34 The proposed Initial Order provides for the following charges, in the following priority:

(a) First - the Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of \$1 million);

(b) Second — the DIP Lender's Charge; and

(c) Third — the Director's Charge (to the maximum amount of \$250,000).

35 The Applicant proposes that the Administration Charge rank in priority to the DIP Lender's Charge. The Applicant proposes that the Charge attach to all of its Property, other than the Holdback Funds, to the extent they are valid claims to rank in priority to all secured and unsecured creditors of the Applicant, other than Caterpillar in relation to the Loader or the proceeds thereof.

With respect to the DIP Facility, Index Energy Ajax is seeking approval of a \$5 million DIP Facility. The DIP Facility would be secured by a DIP Lender's Charge, which would attach to all of the Applicant's Property, other than the Holdback Funds, to rank ahead of all secured and unsecured creditors of the Applicant, other than Caterpillar in relation to the Loader or the proceeds thereof and subject only to the Administration Charge.

37 As previously noted, the granting of the DIP Lender's Charge is condition precedent under the DIP Credit Agreement and I am satisfied that it is an integral part of the negotiating consideration of the DIP Facility.

38 The court has jurisdiction to grant a priority DIP financing charge pursuant to section 11.2 of the CCAA.

39 Subsection 11.2(4) of the CCAA sets out the factors to be considered by the court in determining whether to grant a priority DIP financing charge. The factors are not exhaustive and in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("Canwest"), Pepall J. (as she then was) stressed the importance of meeting the following three criteria:

(a) whether notice has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security of the charge;

(b) whether the amount to be granted under the DIP financing is appropriate and required having regard to the debtor's cash-flow statement; and

(c) whether the DIP charge secures an obligation that existed before the order was made (which it should not).

40 In this case, I have concluded that the proposed DIP Lender's Charge satisfies the relevant criteria and should be granted. In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered the following:

(i) The secured creditors who would be primed by the proposed DIP Lender's Charge, namely the Syndicate, Index Residence and HMI were given notice of the proposed DIP Lender's Charge. Caterpillar, the secured creditor who will not be primed, was not given notice;

(ii) The maximum amount of the DIP Facility is appropriate based on the anticipated cash requirements, as reflected in the cash-flow projections prepared with the assistance of GTL. The amount advanced under the DIP Facility is limited to \$1.6 million until the Comeback Hearing, when more comprehensive service will have occurred;

(iii) Management of Index Energy Ajax's business and affairs will have the benefit of additional oversight and consultation provided by the Monitor;

(iv) It is conceivable that the DIP Facility will enhance the value expected to be available for all stakeholders.

The Proposed Initial Order, contemplates the indemnification of the Applicant's directors and officers, the creation of a Directors' Charge and a related stay of proceedings in respect of claims against the directors and officers. The statutory authority for the granting of this relief is found in sections 11.03 and 11.51 of the CCAA.

I am satisfied that it is appropriate to extend coverage to the directors and officers and that it is necessary to grant the requested Charge as Index Energy Ajax does not have any directors' and officers' insurance. This relief is accordingly granted.

The Pre-Filing Report contains certain appendices which the Applicant regards as sensitive commercial information relating to the process undertaken to obtain DIP financing and the optimization plan of the Applicant. The Applicant is of the view that if publically available, this information could have a material detrimental effect on the Applicant's restructuring. Having considered the guidance provided by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I am satisfied that it is appropriate, in order to protect the integrity and fairness of the process, to grant an order sealing the confidential appendices.

# Summary

In the result, the Initial Order is granted in the form requested by Index Energy Ajax. The Comeback Hearing has been scheduled before me on Monday, September 11, 2017 at 8:30 a.m.

Application granted.

# TAB 16

# 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 6184, [2009] O.J. No. 4286, 181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

# IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36. AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Pepall J.

Judgment: October 13, 2009 Docket: CV-09-8241-OOCL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Edward Sellers, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants Alan Merskey for Special Committee of the Board of Directors David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. Benjamin Zarnett, Robert Chadwick for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders Edmond Lamek for Asper Family Peter H. Griffin, Peter J. Osborne for Management Directors, Royal Bank of Canada Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia Steve Weisz for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

# Pepall J.:

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global"), its principal operating subsidiary, Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A" of the Notice of Application apply for relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.<sup>1</sup> The applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to the following partnerships: Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP"), Fox Sports World Canada Partnership and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post ("The National Post Company"). The businesses operated by the applicants and the aforementioned partnerships include (i) Canwest's free-to-air television broadcast business (ie. the Global Television Network stations); (ii) certain subscription-based specialty television channels that are wholly owned and operated by CTLP; and (iii) the National Post.

2 The Canwest Global enterprise as a whole includes the applicants, the partnerships and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries that are not applicants. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise. The term CMI Entities will be used to refer to the applicants and the three aforementioned partnerships. The following entities are not applicants nor is a stay sought in respect of any of them: the entities in Canwest's newspaper publishing and digital media business in Canada (other than the National Post Company) namely the Canwest Limited Partnership, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc.; the Canadian subscription based specialty television channels acquired from Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc. in August, 2007 which are held jointly with Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and operated by CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries; and subscription-based specialty television channels which are not wholly owned by CTLP.

3 No one appearing opposed the relief requested.

# **Backround Facts**

4 Canwest is a leading Canadian media company with interests in twelve free-to-air television stations comprising the Global Television Network, subscription-based specialty television channels and newspaper publishing and digital media operations.

5 As of October 1, 2009, Canwest employed the full time equivalent of approximately 7,400 employees around the world. Of that number, the full time equivalent of approximately 1,700 are employed by the CMI Entities, the vast majority of whom work in Canada and 850 of whom work in Ontario.

6 Canwest Global owns 100% of CMI. CMI has direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. Ontario is the chief place of business of the CMI Entities.

7 Canwest Global is a public company continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*<sup>2</sup>. It has authorized capital consisting of an unlimited number of preference shares, multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares, and non-voting shares. It is a "constrained-share company" which means that at least 66 2/3% of its voting shares must be beneficially owned by Canadians. The Asper family built the Canwest enterprise and family members hold various classes of shares. In April and May, 2009, corporate decision making was consolidated and streamlined.

8 The CMI Entities generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising (approximately 77% on a consolidated basis). Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment in Canada and elsewhere, in 2008 and 2009, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. In response to these conditions, the CMI Entities took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets. They commenced workforce reductions and cost saving measures, sold certain interests and assets, and engaged in discussions with the CRTC and the Federal government on issues of concern.

9 Economic conditions did not improve nor did the financial circumstances of the CMI Entities. They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, a further reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees.

In February, 2009, CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. It subsequently received waivers of the borrowing conditions on six occasions. On March 15, 2009, it failed to make an interest payment of US\$30.4 million due on 8% senior subordinated notes. CMI entered into negotiations with an ad hoc committee of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders holding approximately 72% of the notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee"). An agreement was reached wherein CMI and its subsidiary CTLP agreed to issue US\$105 million in 12% secured notes to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At the same time, CMI entered into an agreement with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT") in which CIT agreed to provide a senior secured revolving asset based loan facility of up to \$75 million. CMI used the funds generated for operations and to repay amounts owing on the senior credit facility with a syndicate of lenders of which the Bank of Nova Scotia was the administrative agent. These funds were also used to settle related swap obligations.

11 Canwest Global reports its financial results on a consolidated basis. As at May 31, 2009, it had total consolidated assets with a net book value of \$4.855 billion and total consolidated liabilities of \$5.846 billion. The subsidiaries of Canwest Global that are not applicants or partnerships in this proceeding had short and long term debt totalling \$2.742 billion as at May 31, 2009 and the CMI Entities had indebtedness of approximately \$954 million. For the 9 months ended May 31, 2009, Canwest Global's consolidated revenues decreased by \$272 million or 11% compared to the same period in 2008. In addition, operating income before amortization decreased by \$253 million or 47%. It reported a consolidated net loss of \$1.578 billion compared to \$22 million for the same period in 2008. CMI reported that revenues for the Canadian television operations decreased by \$8 million or 4% in the third quarter of 2009 and operating profit was \$21 million compared to \$39 million in the same period in 2008.

12 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of the board ("the Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives in order to maximize value. That committee appointed Thomas Strike, who is the President, Corporate Development and Strategy Implementation of Canwest Global, as Recapitalization Officer and retained Hap Stephen, who is the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., as a Restructuring Advisor ("CRA").

13 On September 15, 2009, CMI failed to pay US\$30.4 million in interest payments due on the 8% senior subordinated notes.

On September 22, 2009, the board of directors of Canwest Global authorized the sale of all of the shares of Ten Network Holdings Limited (Australia) ("Ten Holdings") held by its subsidiary, Canwest Mediaworks Ireland Holdings ("CMIH"). Prior to the sale, the CMI Entities had consolidated indebtedness totalling US\$939.9 million pursuant to three facilities. CMI had issued 8% unsecured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$761,054,211. They were guaranteed by all of the CMI Entities except Canwest Global, and 30109, LLC. CMI had also issued 12% secured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$94 million. They were guaranteed by the CMI Entities. Amongst others, Canwest's subsidiary, CMIH, was a guarantor of both of these facilities. The 12% notes were secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP and the guarantors. In addition, pursuant to a credit agreement dated May 22, 2009 and subsequently amended, CMI has a senior secured revolving asset-based loan facility in the maximum amount of \$75 million with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT"). Prior to the sale, the debt amounted to \$23.4 million not including certain letters of credit. The facility is guaranteed by CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges against all of the proposed Monitor's report. Upon a CCAA filing by CMI and commencement of proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CIT facility converts into a DIP financing arrangement and increases to a maximum of \$100 million.

15 Consents from a majority of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders were necessary to allow the sale of the Ten Holdings shares. A Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement was entered into by CMI, CMIH, certain consenting noteholders and others wherein CMIH was allowed to lend the proceeds of sale to CMI.

16 The sale of CMIH's interest in Ten Holdings was settled on October 1, 2009. Gross proceeds of approximately \$634 million were realized. The proceeds were applied to fund general liquidity and operating costs of CMI, pay all amounts owing under the 12% secured notes and all amounts outstanding under the CIT facility except for certain letters of credit in an aggregate face amount of \$10.7 million. In addition, a portion of the proceeds was used to reduce the amount outstanding with respect to the 8% senior subordinated notes leaving an outstanding indebtedness thereunder of US\$393.25 million.

17 In consideration for the loan provided by CMIH to CMI, CMI issued a secured intercompany note in favour of CMIH in the principal amount of \$187.3 million and an unsecured promissory note in the principal amount of \$430.6 million. The secured note is subordinated to the CIT facility and is secured by a first ranking charge on the property of CMI and the guarantors. The payment of all amounts owing under the unsecured promissory note are subordinated and postponed in favour of amounts owing under the CIT facility. Canwest Global, CTLP and others have guaranteed the notes. It is contemplated that the debt that is the subject matter of the unsecured note will be compromised.

18 Without the funds advanced under the intercompany notes, the CMI Entities would be unable to meet their liabilities as they come due. The consent of the noteholders to the use of the Ten Holdings proceeds was predicated on the CMI Entities making this application for an Initial Order under the CCAA. Failure to do so and to take certain other steps constitute an event of default under the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement, the CIT facility and other agreements. The CMI Entities have insufficient funds to satisfy their obligations including those under the intercompany notes and the 8% senior subordinated notes.

19 The stay of proceedings under the CCAA is sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual "pre-packaged" recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders have agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which is intended to form the basis of the plan. The terms are reflected in a support agreement and term sheet. The recapitalization transaction contemplates amongst other things, a significant reduction of debt and a debt for equity restructuring. The applicants anticipate that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities will continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. As mentioned, certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction have already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings. 20 CMI has agreed to maintain not more than \$2.5 million as cash collateral in a deposit account with the Bank of Nova Scotia to secure cash management obligations owed to BNS. BNS holds first ranking security against those funds and no court ordered charge attaches to the funds in the account.

The CMI Entities maintain eleven defined benefit pension plans and four defined contribution pension plans. There is an aggregate solvency deficiency of \$13.3 million as at the last valuation date and a wind up deficiency of \$32.8 million. There are twelve television collective agreements eleven of which are negotiated with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The Canadian Union of Public Employees negotiated the twelfth television collective agreement. It expires on December 31, 2010. The other collective agreements are in expired status. None of the approximately 250 employees of the National Post Company are unionized. The CMI Entities propose to honour their payroll obligations to their employees, including all pre-filing wages and employee benefits outstanding as at the date of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and payments in connection with their pension obligations.

# **Proposed Monitor**

22 The applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor in these proceedings. It is clearly qualified to act and has provided the Court with its consent to act. Neither FTI nor any of its representatives have served in any of the capacities prohibited by section of the amendments to the CCAA.

# **Proposed Order**

I have reviewed in some detail the history that preceded this application. It culminated in the presentation of the within application and proposed order. Having reviewed the materials and heard submissions, I was satisfied that the relief requested should be granted.

This case involves a consideration of the amendments to the CCAA that were proclaimed in force on September 18, 2009. While these were long awaited, in many instances they reflect practices and principles that have been adopted by insolvency practitioners and developed in the jurisprudence and academic writings on the subject of the CCAA. In no way do the amendments change or detract from the underlying purpose of the CCAA, namely to provide debtor companies with the opportunity to extract themselves from financial difficulties notwithstanding insolvency and to reorganize their affairs for the benefit of stakeholders. In my view, the amendments should be interpreted and applied with that objective in mind.

# (a) Threshhold Issues

Firstly, the applicants qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. Their chief place of business is in Ontario. The applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding \$5 million. The CMI Entities are in default of their obligations. CMI does not have the necessary liquidity to make an interest payment in the amount of US\$30.4 million that was due on September 15, 2009 and none of the other CMI Entities who are all guarantors are able to make such a payment either. The assets of the CMI Entities are insufficient to discharge all of the liabilities. The CMI Entities are unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and they are insolvent. They are insolvent both under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*<sup>3</sup> definition and under the more expansive definition of insolvency used in *Stelco Inc., Re*<sup>4</sup>. Absent these CCAA proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. The CMI Entities have acknowledged their insolvency in the affidavit filed in support of the application.

26 Secondly, the required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under section 11(2) of the CCAA have been filed.

# (b) Stay of Proceedings

27 Under section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has broad jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings and to give a debtor company a chance to develop a plan of compromise or arrangement. In my view, given the facts outlined, a stay is necessary to create stability and to allow the CMI Entities to pursue their restructuring.

### (b) Partnerships and Foreign Subsidiaries

28 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and other relief to the aforementioned partnerships. The partnerships are intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. They own the National Post daily newspaper and Canadian free-to-air television assets and certain of its specialty television channels and some other television assets. These businesses constitute a significant portion of the overall enterprise value of the CMI Entities. The partnerships are also guarantors of the 8% senior subordinated notes.

29 While the CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or limited partnership, courts have repeatedly exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the scope of CCAA proceedings to encompass them. See for example *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re*<sup>5</sup>; *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re*<sup>6</sup>; and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re*<sup>7</sup>. In this case, the partnerships carry on operations that are integral and closely interrelated to the business of the applicants. The operations and obligations of the partnerships are so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. In my view, it is just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships.

30 Certain applicants are foreign subsidiaries of CMI. Each is a guarantor under the 8% senior subordinated notes, the CIT credit agreement (and therefore the DIP facility), the intercompany notes and is party to the support agreement and the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement. If the stay of proceedings was not extended to these entities, creditors could seek to enforce their guarantees. I am persuaded that the foreign subsidiary applicants as that term is defined in the affidavit filed are debtor companies within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA and that I have jurisdiction and ought to grant the order requested as it relates to them. In this regard, I note that they are insolvent and each holds assets in Ontario in that they each maintain funds on deposit at the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. See in this regard *Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re*<sup>8</sup> and *Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re*<sup>9</sup>

# (C) DIP Financing

Turning to the DIP financing, the premise underlying approval of DIP financing is that it is a benefit to all stakeholders as it allows the debtors to protect going-concern value while they attempt to devise a plan acceptable to creditors. While in the past, courts relied on inherent jurisdiction to approve the terms of a DIP financing charge, the September 18, 2009 amendments to the CCAA now expressly provide jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge. Section 11.2 of the Act states:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

- (4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,
  - (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
  - (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

32 In light of the language of section 11.2(1), the first issue to consider is whether notice has been given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Paragraph 57 of the proposed order affords priority to the DIP charge, the administration charge, the Directors' and Officers' charge and the KERP charge with the following exception: "any validly perfected purchase money security interest in favour of a secured creditor or any statutory encumbrance existing on the date of this order in favour of any person which is a "secured creditor" as defined in the CCAA in respect of any of source deductions from wages, employer health tax, workers compensation, GST/QST, PST payables, vacation pay and banked overtime for employees, and amounts under the Wage Earners' Protection Program that are subject to a super priority claim under the BIA". This provision coupled with the notice that was provided satisfied me that secured creditors either were served or are unaffected by the DIP charge. This approach is both consistent with the legislation and practical.

33 Secondly, the Court must determine that the amount of the DIP is appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The DIP charge is for up to \$100 million. Prior to entering into the CIT facility, the CMI Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a credit facility that would convert to a DIP facility should the CMI Entities be required to file for protection under the CCAA. The CIT facility was the best proposal submitted. In this case, it is contemplated that implementation of the plan will occur no later than April 15, 2010. The total amount of cash on hand is expected to be down to approximately \$10 million by late December, 2009 based on the cash flow forecast. The applicants state that this is an insufficient cushion for an enterprise of this magnitude. The cash-flow statements project the need for the liquidity requirements during the CCAA proceedings. It will enable the CMI Entities to operate as going concerns while pursuing the implementation and completion of a viable plan and will provide creditors with assurances of same. I also note that the proposed facility is simply a conversion of the pre-existing CIT facility and as such, it is expected that there would be no material prejudice to any of the creditors of the CMI Entities that arises from the granting of the DIP charge. I am persuaded that the amount is appropriate and required.

Thirdly, the DIP charge must not and does not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The only amount outstanding on the CIT facility is \$10.7 in outstanding letters of credit. These letters of credit are secured by existing security and it is proposed that that security rank ahead of the DIP charge.

Lastly, I must consider amongst others, the enumerated factors in paragraph 11.2(4) of the Act. I have already addressed some of them. The Management Directors of the applicants as that term is used in the materials filed will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. It would appear that management has the confidence of its major creditors. The CMI Entities have appointed a CRA and a Restructuring Officer to negotiate and implement the recapitalization transaction and the aforementioned directors will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. The DIP facility will enhance the prospects of a completed restructuring. CIT has stated that it will not convert the CIT facility into a DIP facility if the DIP charge is not approved. In its report, the proposed Monitor observes that the ability to borrow funds from a court approved DIP facility secured by the DIP charge is crucial to retain the confidence of the CMI Entities' creditors, employees and suppliers and would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made. The proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP facility and charge.

36 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and charge.

## (d) Administration Charge

While an administration charge was customarily granted by courts to secure the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guided a debtor company through the CCAA process, as a result of the amendments to the CCAA, there is now statutory authority to grant such a charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA states:

(1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

I must therefore be convinced that (1) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; (2) the amount is appropriate; and (3) the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

As with the DIP charge, the issue relating to notice to affected secured creditors has been addressed appropriately by the applicants. The amount requested is up to \$15 million. The beneficiaries of the charge are: the Monitor and its counsel; counsel to the CMI Entities; the financial advisor to the Special Committee and its counsel; counsel to the Management Directors; the CRA; the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee; and RBC Capital Markets and its counsel. The proposed Monitor supports the aforementioned charge and considers it to be required and reasonable in the circumstances in order to preserve the going concern operations of the CMI Entities. The applicants submit that the above-note professionals who have played a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities to date are necessary to implement the recapitalization transaction.

40 Estimating quantum is an inexact exercise but I am prepared to accept the amount as being appropriate. There has obviously been extensive negotiation by stakeholders and the restructuring is of considerable magnitude and complexity. I was prepared to accept the submissions relating to the administration charge. I have not included any requirement that all of these professionals be required to have their accounts scrutinized and approved by the Court but they should not preclude this possibility.

# (e) Critical Suppliers

41 The next issue to consider is the applicants' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. In recognition that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to permit an insolvent corporation to remain in business, typically courts exercised their inherent jurisdiction to grant such authorization and a charge with respect to the provision of essential goods and services. In the recent amendments, Parliament codified the practice of permitting the payment of pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers and the provision of a charge. Specifically, section 11.4 provides:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

(2) If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied under the terms of the order.

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

42 Under these provisions, the Court must be satisfied that there has been notice to creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company, and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation. While one might interpret section 11.4 (3) as requiring a charge any time a person is declared to be a critical supplier, in my view, this provision only applies when a court is compelling a person to supply. The charge then provides protection to the unwilling supplier.

43 In this case, no charge is requested and no additional notice is therefore required. Indeed, there is an issue as to whether in the absence of a request for a charge, section 11.4 is even applicable and the Court is left to rely on inherent jurisdiction. The section seems to be primarily directed to the conditions surrounding the granting of a charge to secure critical suppliers. That said, even if it is applicable, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the requirements. The CMI Entities seek authorization to make certain payments to third parties that provide goods and services integral to their business. These include television programming suppliers given the need for continuous and undisturbed flow of programming, newsprint suppliers given the dependency of the National Post on a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint to enable it to publish and on newspaper distributors, and the American Express Corporate Card Program and Central Billed Accounts that are required for CMI Entity employees to perform their job functions. No payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. I accept that these suppliers are critical in nature. The CMI Entities also seek more general authorization allowing them to pay other suppliers if in the opinion of the CMI Entities, the supplier is critical. Again, no payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. In addition, again no charge securing any payments is sought. This is not contrary to the language of section 11.4 (1) or to its purpose. The CMI Entities seek the ability to pay other suppliers if in their opinion the supplier is critical to their business and ongoing operations. The order requested is facilitative and practical in nature. The proposed Monitor supports the applicants' request and states that it will work to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized. The Monitor is of course an officer of the Court and is always able to seek direction from the Court if necessary. In addition, it will report on any such additional payments when it files its reports for Court approval. In the circumstances outlined, I am prepared to grant the relief requested in this regard.

# (f) Directors' and Officers' Charge

The applicants also seek a directors' and officers' ("D &O") charge in the amount of \$20 million. The proposed charge would rank after the administration charge, the existing CIT security, and the DIP charge. It would rank pari passu with the KERP charge discussed subsequently in this endorsement but postponed in right of payment to the extent of the first \$85 million payable under the secured intercompany note.

45 Again, the recent amendments to the CCAA allow for such a charge. Section 11.51 provides that:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

(4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

47 The proposed Monitor reports that the amount of \$20 million was estimated taking into consideration the existing D&O insurance and the potential liabilities which may attach including certain employee related and tax related obligations. The amount was negotiated with the DIP lender and the Ad Hoc Committee. The order proposed speaks of indemnification relating to the failure of any of the CMI Entities, after the date of the order, to make certain payments. It also excludes gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The D&O insurance provides for \$30 million in coverage and \$10 million in excess coverage for a total of \$40 million. It will expire in a matter of weeks and Canwest Global has been unable to obtain additional or replacement coverage. I am advised that it also extends to others in the Canwest enterprise and not just to the CMI Entities. The directors and senior management are described as highly experienced, fully functional and qualified. The directors have indicated that they cannot continue in the restructuring effort unless the order includes the requested directors' charge.

48 The purpose of such a charge is to keep the directors and officers in place during the restructuring by providing them with protection against liabilities they could incur during the restructuring: *General Publishing Co., Re*<sup>10</sup> Retaining the current directors and officers of the applicants would avoid destabilization and would assist in the restructuring. The proposed charge would enable the applicants to keep the experienced board of directors supported by experienced senior management. The proposed Monitor believes that the charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances and also observes that it will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in the worst case scenario. In all of these circumstances, I approved the request.

# (g) Key Employee Retention Plans

49 Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters of discretion. In this case, the CMI Entities have developed KERPs that are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain of the CMI Entities' senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the CMI Entities through a successful restructuring with a view to preserving enterprise value. There are 20 KERP participants all of whom are described by the applicants as being critical to the successful restructuring of the CMI Entities. Details of the KERPs are outlined in the materials and the proposed Monitor's report. A charge of \$5.9 million is requested. The three Management Directors are seasoned executives with extensive experience in the broadcasting and publishing industries. They have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date. The applicants state that it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities if the KERPs were not secured by a KERP charge. The other proposed participants are also described as being crucial to the restructuring and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for them

Significantly in my view, the Monitor who has scrutinized the proposed KERPs and charge is supportive. Furthermore, they have been approved by the Board, the Special Committee, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Ad Hoc Committee. The factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*<sup>11</sup> have all been met and I am persuaded that the relief in this regard should be granted.

51 The applicants ask that the Confidential Supplement containing unredacted copies of the KERPs that reveal individually identifiable information and compensation information be sealed. Generally speaking, judges are most reluctant to grant sealing orders. An open court and public access are fundamental to our system of justice. Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides authority to grant a sealing order and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada* (*Minister of Finance*)<sup>12</sup> provides guidance on the appropriate legal principles to be applied. Firstly, the Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the

context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk. Secondly, the salutary effects of the order should outweigh its deleterious effects including the effects on the right to free expression which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

# **Annual Meeting**

The CMI Entities seek an order postponing the annual general meeting of shareholders of Canwest Global. Pursuant to section 133 (1)(b) of the CBCA, a corporation is required to call an annual meeting by no later than February 28, 2010, being six months after the end of its preceding financial year which ended on August 31, 2009. Pursuant to section 133 (3), despite subsection (1), the corporation may apply to the court for an order extending the time for calling an annual meeting.

54 CCAA courts have commonly granted extensions of time for the calling of an annual general meeting. In this case, the CMI Entities including Canwest Global are devoting their time to stabilizing business and implementing a plan. Time and resources would be diverted if the time was not extended as requested and the preparation for and the holding of the annual meeting would likely impede the timely and desirable restructuring of the CMI Entities. Under section 106(6) of the CBCA, if directors of a corporation are not elected, the incumbent directors continue. Financial and other information will be available on the proposed Monitor's website. An extension is properly granted.

# Other

55 The applicants request authorization to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the U.S. Continued timely supply of U.S. network and other programming is necessary to preserve going concern value. Commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" is a prerequisite to the conversion of the CIT facility into the DIP facility. Authorization is granted.

56 Canwest's various corporate and other entities share certain business services. They are seeking to continue to provide and receive inter-company services in the ordinary course during the CCAA proceedings. This is supported by the proposed Monitor and FTI will monitor and report to the Court on matters pertaining to the provision of inter-company services.

57 Section 23 of the amended CCAA now addresses certain duties and functions of the Monitor including the provision of notice of an Initial Order although the Court may order otherwise. Here the financial threshold for notice to creditors has been increased from \$1000 to \$5000 so as to reduce the burden and cost of such a process. The proceedings will be widely published in the media and the Initial Order is to be posted on the Monitor's website. Other meritorious adjustments were also made to the notice provisions.

58 This is a "pre-packaged" restructuring and as such, stakeholders have negotiated and agreed on the terms of the requested order. That said, not every stakeholder was before me. For this reason, interested parties are reminded that the order includes the usual come back provision. The return date of any motion to vary, rescind or affect the provisions relating to the CIT credit agreement or the CMI DIP must be no later than November 5, 2009.

59 I have obviously not addressed every provision in the order but have attempted to address some key provisions. In support of the requested relief, the applicants filed a factum and the proposed Monitor filed a report. These were most helpful. A factum is required under Rule 38.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Both a factum and a proposed Monitor's report should customarily be filed with a request for an Initial Order under the CCAA.

### Conclusion

60 Weak economic conditions and a high debt load do not a happy couple make but clearly many of the stakeholders have been working hard to produce as desirable an outcome as possible in the circumstances. Hopefully the cooperation will persist. *Application granted.* 

#### Footnotes

- 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended
- 2 R.S.C. 1985, c.C.44.
- 3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended.
- 4 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.).
- 5 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 6 [2009] O.J. No. 349 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 7 (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.).
- 8 (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 9 (2004), 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.).
- 10 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216 (Ont. S.C.J.).
- 11 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). That said, given the nature of the relationship between a board of directors and senior management, it may not always be appropriate to give undue consideration to the principle of business judgment.
- 12 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).

# TAB 17

# 2012 ONSC 3767 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Cinram International Inc., Re

#### 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 2012 ONSC 3767, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 11, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46

# In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Cinram International Inc., Cinram International Income Fund, CII Trust and The Companies Listed in Schedule "A" (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 25, 2012 Judgment: June 26, 2012 Docket: CV-12-9767-00CL

Counsel: Robert J. Chadwick, Melaney Wagner, Caroline Descours for Applicants Steven Golick for Warner Electra-Atlantic Corp. Steven Weisz for Pre-Petition First Lien Agent, Pre-Petition Second Lien Agent and DIP Agent Tracy Sandler for Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation David Byers for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Inc.

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.a Procedure XIX.2.a.iv Miscellaneous Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.b Grant of stay XIX.2.b.viii Miscellaneous Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

AIA Companies Cleanors Arrangement A

XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Initial application -- Miscellaneous

C group of companies was replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs with operational footprint across North America and Europe — C group experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, and had insufficient funds to meet their immediate cash requirements as result of liquidity challenges — C group sought protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — C group brought application seeking initial order under Act, and relief including stay of proceedings against third party non-applicant; authorization to make pre-filing payments; and approval of certain Court-ordered charges over their assets relating to their DIP Financing, administrative costs, indemnification of their trustees, directors and officers, Key Employee Retention Plan, and consent consideration — Application granted — Applicants met all qualifications established for relief under Act — C harges referenced in initial order were approved — Relief requested in initial order was extensive and went beyond what court usually considers on initial hearing; however, in circumstances, requested relief was appropriate — Applicants spent

considerable time reviewing their alternatives and did so in consultative manner with their senior secured lenders — Senior secured lenders supported application, notwithstanding that it was clear that they would suffer significant shortfall on their positions.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Procedure — Miscellaneous C group of companies was replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs with operational footprint across North America and Europe — C group experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, and had insufficient funds to meet their immediate cash requirements as result of liquidity challenges — C group brought application seeking initial order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and other relief, including authorization for C International to act as foreign representative in within proceedings to seek recognition order under Chapter 15 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code on basis that Ontario, Canada was Centre of Main Interest (COMI) of applicants — Application granted on other grounds — It is function of receiving court, in this case, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for District of Delaware, to make determination on location of COMI and to determine whether present proceeding is foreign main proceeding for purposes of Chapter 15.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Grant of stay — Miscellaneous Stay against third party non-applicant — C group of companies was replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs with operational footprint across North America and Europe — C group experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, and had insufficient funds to meet their immediate cash requirements as result of liquidity challenges — C group sought protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — C LP was not applicant in proceedings; however, C LP formed part of C group's income trust structure with C Fund, ultimate parent of C group — C group brought application seeking initial order under Act, including stay of proceedings against C LP — Application granted — Applicants met all qualifications established for relief under Act — C harges referenced in initial order were approved — Relief requested in initial order was extensive and went beyond what court usually considers on initial hearing; however, in circumstances, requested relief was appropriate. Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J*.:

Brainhunter Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 7627 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - referred to

*Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re* (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Fraser Papers Inc., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3658, 56 C.B.R. (5th) 194 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to *Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 1990 CarswellBC 394, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, (sub nom. *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada*) [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Sino-Forest Corp., Re* (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) - referred to Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) - referred to Sulphur Corp. of Canada Ltd., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellAlta 896, 2002 ABQB 682, [2002] 10 W.W.R. 491, 5 Alta. L.R. (4th) 251, 319 A.R. 152, 35 C.B.R. (4th) 304 (Alta. Q.B.) - referred to T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 1914, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 1466, 2012 ONSC 948, 95 C.C.P.B. 222, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 171 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - referred to Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 106, 2012 CarswellOnt 1059, 89 C.B.R. (5th) 127 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 506, 95 C.C.P.B. 48, 2012 CarswellOnt 1263, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236, 79 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257, 1993 CarswellBC 530 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to **Statutes considered:** Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 Generally - referred to s. 2 "insolvent person" - considered Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982 Chapter 15 — referred to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally - referred to s. 2(1) "company" — considered s. 2(1) "debtor company" — considered s. 3(1) — considered s. 3(2) — considered s. 11 - considered s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered s. 11.2(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered Morawetz J.:

1 Cinram International Inc. ("CII"), Cinram International Income Fund ("Cinram Fund"), CII Trust and the Companies listed in Schedule "A" (collectively, the "Applicants") brought this application seeking an initial order (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"). The Applicants also request that the court exercise its jurisdiction to extend a stay of proceedings and other benefits under the Initial Order to Cinram International Limited Partnership ("Cinram LP", collectively with the Applicants, the "CCAA Parties"). 2 Cinram Fund, together with its direct and indirect subsidiaries (collectively, "Cinram" or the "Cinram Group") is a replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs. Cinram has a diversified operational footprint across North America and Europe that enables it to meet the replication and logistics demands of its customers.

3 The evidentiary record establishes that Cinram has experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, which, according to Cinram, are a result of the economic downturn in Cinram's primary markets of North America and Europe, which impacted consumers' discretionary spending and adversely affected the entire industry.

4 Cinram advises that over the past several years it has continued to evaluate its strategic alternatives and rationalize its operating footprint in order to attempt to balance its ongoing operations and financial challenges with its existing debt levels. However, despite cost reductions and recapitalized initiatives and the implementation of a variety of restructuring alternatives, the Cinram Group has experienced a number of challenges that has led to it seeking protection under the CCAA.

5 Counsel to Cinram outlined the principal objectives of these CCAA proceedings as:

(i) to ensure the ongoing operations of the Cinram Group;

(ii) to ensure the CCAA Parties have the necessary availability of working capital funds to maximize the ongoing business of the Cinram Group for the benefit of its stakeholders; and

(iii) to complete the sale and transfer of substantially all of the Cinram Group's business as a going concern (the "Proposed Transaction").

6 Cinram contemplates that these CCAA proceedings will be the primary court supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. Cinram has operations in the United States and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States. Cinram, however, takes the position that Canada is the nerve centre of the Cinram Group.

7 The Applicants also seek authorization for Cinram International ULC ("Cinram ULC") to act as "foreign representative" in the within proceedings to seek a recognition order under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code ("Chapter 15"). Cinram advises that the proceedings under Chapter 15 are intended to ensure that the CCAA Parties are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction to be undertaken pursuant to these CCAA proceedings.

8 Counsel to the Applicants submits that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Cinram is one of the world's largest providers of pre-recorded multi-media products and related logistics services. It has facilities in North America and Europe, and it:

(i) manufactures DVDs, blue ray disks and CDs, and provides distribution services for motion picture studios, music labels, video game publishers, computer software companies, telecommunication companies and retailers around the world;

(ii) provides various digital media services through One K Studios, LLC; and

(iii) provides retail inventory control and forecasting services through Cinram Retail Services LLC (collectively, the "Cinram Business").

9 Cinram contemplates that the Proposed Transaction could allow it to restore itself as a market leader in the industry. Cinram takes the position that it requires CCAA protection to provide stability to its operations and to complete the Proposed Transaction.

10 The Proposed Transaction has the support of the lenders forming the steering committee with respect to Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Steering Committee"), the members of which have been subject to confidentiality agreements and represent 40% of the loans under Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Initial Consenting Lenders"). Cinram also anticipates further support of the Proposed Transaction from additional lenders under its credit facilities following the public announcement of the Proposed Transaction.

11 Cinram Fund is the direct or indirect parent and sole shareholder of all of the subsidiaries in Cinram's corporate structure. A simplified corporate structure of the Cinram Group showing all of the CCAA Parties, including the designation of the CCAA Parties' business segments and certain non-filing entities, is set out in the Pre-Filing Report of FTI Consulting Inc. (the "Monitor") at paragraph 13. A copy is attached as Schedule "B".

12 Cinram Fund, CII, Cinram International General Partner Inc. ("Cinram GP"), CII Trust, Cinram ULC and 1362806 Ontario Limited are the Canadian entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "Canadian Applicants"). Cinram Fund and CII Trust are both open-ended limited purpose trusts, established under the laws of Ontario, and each of the remaining Canadian Applicants is incorporated pursuant to Federal or Provincial legislation.

13 Cinram (US) Holdings Inc. ("CUSH"), Cinram Inc., IHC Corporation ("IHC"), Cinram Manufacturing, LLC ("Cinram Manufacturing"), Cinram Distribution, LLC ("Cinram Distribution"), Cinram Wireless, LLC ("Cinram Wireless"), Cinram Retail Services, LLC ("Cinram Retail") and One K Studios, LLC ("One K") are the U.S. entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "U.S. Applicants"). Each of the U.S. Applicants is incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with the exception of One K, which is incorporated under the laws of California. On May 25, 2012, each of the U.S. Applicants opened a new Canadian-based bank account with J.P. Morgan.

14 Cinram LP is not an Applicant in these proceedings. However, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other relief under the CCAA extended to Cinram LP as it forms part of Cinram's income trust structure with Cinram Fund, the ultimate parent of the Cinram Group.

15 Cinram's European entities are not part of these proceedings and it is not intended that any insolvency proceedings will be commenced with respect to Cinram's European entities, except for Cinram Optical Discs SAC, which has commenced insolvency proceedings in France.

16 The Cinram Group's principal source of long-term debt is the senior secured credit facilities provided under credit agreements known as the "First-Lien Credit Agreement" and the "Second-Lien Credit Agreement" (together with the First-Lien Credit Agreement, the "Credit Agreements").

17 All of the CCAA Parties, with the exception of Cinram Fund, Cinram GP, CII Trust and Cinram LP (collectively, the "Fund Entities"), are borrowers and/or guarantors under the Credit Agreements. The obligations under the Credit Agreements are secured by substantially all of the assets of the Applicants and certain of their European subsidiaries.

18 As at March 31, 2012, there was approximately \$233 million outstanding under the First-Lien Term Loan Facility; \$19 million outstanding under the First-Lien Revolving Credit Facilities; approximately \$12 million of letter of credit exposure under the First-Lien Credit Agreement; and approximately \$12 million outstanding under the Second-Lien Credit Agreement.

19 Cinram advises that in light of the financial circumstances of the Cinram Group, it is not possible to obtain additional financing that could be used to repay the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

Mr. John Bell, Chief Financial Officer of CII, stated in his affidavit that in connection with certain defaults under the Credit Agreements, a series of waivers was extended from December 2011 to June 30, 2012 and that upon expiry of the waivers, the lenders have the ability to demand immediate repayment of the outstanding amounts under the Credit Agreements and the borrowers and the other Applicants that are guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Mr. Bell further stated that there is no reasonable expectation that Cinram would be able to service its debt load in

the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012, fiscal 2013, and fiscal 2014. The cash flow forecast attached to his affidavit indicates that, without additional funding, the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

21 The Applicants request a stay of proceedings. They take the position that in light of their financial circumstances, there could be a vast and significant erosion of value to the detriment of all stakeholders. In particular, the Applicants are concerned about the following risks, which, because of the integration of the Cinram business, also apply to the Applicants' subsidiaries, including Cinram LP:

- (a) the lenders demanding payment in full for money owing under the Credit Agreements;
- (b) potential termination of contracts by key suppliers; and
- (c) potential termination of contracts by customers.

As indicated in the cash flow forecast, the Applicants do not have sufficient funds available to meet their immediate cash requirements as a result of their current liquidity challenges. Mr. Bell states in his affidavit that the Applicants require access to Debtor-In-Possession ("DIP") Financing in the amount of \$15 millions to continue operations while they implement their restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction. Cinram has negotiated a DIP Credit Agreement with the lenders forming the Steering Committee (the "DIP Lenders") through J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA as Administrative Agent (the "DIP Agent") whereby the DIP Lenders agree to provide the DIP Financing in the form of a term loan in the amount of \$15 million.

23 The Applicants also indicate that during the course of the CCAA proceedings, the CCAA Parties intend to generally make payments to ensure their ongoing business operations for the benefit of their stakeholders, including obligations incurred prior to, on, or after the commencement of these proceedings relating to:

(a) the active employment of employees in the ordinary course;

(b) suppliers and service providers the CCAA Parties and the Monitor have determined to be critical to the continued operation of the Cinram business;

(c) certain customer programs in place pursuant to existing contracts or arrangements with customers; and

(d) inter-company payments among the CCAA Parties in respect of, among other things, shared services.

Mr. Bell states that the ability to make these payments relating to critical suppliers and customer programs is subject to a consultation and approval process agreed to among the Monitor, the DIP Agent and the CCAA Parties.

The Applicants also request an Administration Charge for the benefit of the Monitor and Moelis and Company, LLC ("Moelis"), an investment bank engaged to assist Cinram in a comprehensive and thorough review of its strategic alternatives.

In addition, the directors (and in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, the Trustees, referred to collectively with the directors as the "Directors/Trustees") requested a Director's Charge to provide certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities. Mr. Bell states that in order to complete a successful restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction, the Applicants require the active and committed involvement of their Directors/Trustees and officers. Further, Cinram's insurers have advised that if Cinram was to file for CCAA protection, and the insurers agreed to renew the existing D&O policies, there would be a significant increase in the premium for that insurance.

27 Cinram has also developed a key employee retention program (the "KERP") with the principal purpose of providing an incentive for eligible employees, including eligible officers, to remain with the Cinram Group despite its financial difficulties. The KERP has been reviewed and approved by the Board of Trustees of the Cinram Fund. The KERP includes retention payments (the "KERP Retention Payments") to certain existing employees, including certain officers employed at Canadian and U.S. Entities, who are critical to the preservation of Cinram's enterprise value.

28 Cinram also advises that on June 22, 2012, Cinram Fund, the borrowers under the Credit Agreements, and the Initial Consenting Lenders entered into a support agreement pursuant to which the Initial Consenting Lenders agreed to support the Proposed Transaction to be pursued through these CCAA proceedings (the "Support Agreement").

29 Pursuant to the Support Agreement, lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement or Consent Agreement prior to July 10, 2012 (the "Consent Date") are entitled to receive consent consideration (the "Early Consent Consideration") equal to 4% of the principal amount of loans under the First-Lien Credit Agreement held by such consenting lenders as of the Consent Date, payable in cash from the net sale proceeds of the Proposed Transaction upon distribution of such proceeds in the CCAA proceedings.

30 Mr. Bell states that it is contemplated that the CCAA proceedings will be the primary court-supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. He states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Mr. Bell further states that although Cinram has operations in the United States, and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States, it is Ontario that is Cinram's home jurisdiction and the nerve centre of the CCAA Parties' management, business and operations.

The CCAA Parties have advised that they will be seeking a recognition order under Chapter 15 to ensure that they are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction. Thus, the Applicants seek authorization in the Proposed Initial Order for:

Cinram ULC to seek recognition of these proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" and to seek such additional relief required in connection with the prosecution of any sale transaction, including the Proposed Transaction, as well as authorization for the Monitor, as a court-appointed officer, to assist the CCAA Parties with any matters relating to any of the CCAA Parties' subsidiaries and any foreign proceedings commenced in relation thereto.

32 Mr. Bell further states that the Monitor will be actively involved in assisting Cinram ULC as the foreign representative of the Applicants in the Chapter 15 proceedings and will assist in keeping this court informed of developments in the Chapter 15 proceedings.

33 The facts relating to the CCAA Parties, the Cinram business, and the requested relief are fully set out in Mr. Bell's affidavit.

34 Counsel to the Applicants filed a comprehensive factum in support of the requested relief in the Initial Order. Part III of the factum sets out the issues and the law.

The relief requested in the form of the Initial Order is extensive. It goes beyond what this court usually considers on an initial hearing. However, in the circumstances of this case, I have been persuaded that the requested relief is appropriate.

In making this determination, I have taken into account that the Applicants have spent a considerable period of time reviewing their alternatives and have done so in a consultative manner with their senior secured lenders. The senior secured lenders support this application, notwithstanding that it is clear that they will suffer a significant shortfall on their positions. It is also noted that the Early Consent Consideration will be available to lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement prior to July 10, 2012. Thus, all of these lenders will have the opportunity to participate in this arrangement.

As previously indicated, the Applicants' factum is comprehensive. The submissions on the law are extensive and cover all of the outstanding issues. It provides a fulsome review of the jurisprudence in the area, which for purposes of this application, I accept. For this reason, paragraphs 41-96 of the factum are attached as Schedule "C" for reference purposes.

38 The Applicants have also requested that the confidential supplement — which contains the KERP summary listing the individual KERP Payments and certain DIP Schedules — be sealed. I am satisfied that the KERP summary contains individually identifiable information and compensation information, including sensitive salary information, about the individuals who are

covered by the KERP and that the DIP schedules contain sensitive competitive information of the CCAA Parties which should also be treated as being confidential. Having considered the principals of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I accept the Applicants' submission on this issue and grant the requested sealing order in respect of the confidential supplement.

39 Finally, the Applicants have advised that they intend to proceed with a Chapter 15 application on June 26, 2012 before the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of Delaware. I am given to understand that Cinram ULC, as proposed foreign representative, will be seeking recognition of the CCAA proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" on the basis that Ontario, Canada is the Centre of Main Interest or "COMI" of the CCAA Applicants.

40 In his affidavit at paragraph 195, Mr. Bell states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects and that, as a result of the following factors, the Applicants submit the COMI of the CCAA Parties is Ontario, Canada:

(a) the Cinram Group is managed on a consolidated basis out of the corporate headquarters in Toronto, Ontario, where corporate-level decision-making and corporate administrative functions are centralized;

(b) key contracts, including, among others, major customer service agreements, are negotiated at the corporate level and created in Canada;

(c) the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of CII, who are also directors, trustees and/or officers of other entities in the Cinram Group, are based in Canada;

(d) meetings of the board of trustees and board of directors typically take place in Canada;

(e) pricing decisions for entities in the Cinram Group are ultimately made by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer in Toronto, Ontario;

(f) cash management functions for Cinram's North American entities, including the administration of Cinram's accounts receivable and accounts payable, are managed from Cinram's head office in Toronto, Ontario;

(g) although certain bookkeeping, invoicing and accounting functions are performed locally, corporate accounting, treasury, financial reporting, financial planning, tax planning and compliance, insurance procurement services and internal audits are managed at a consolidated level in Toronto, Ontario;

(h) information technology, marketing, and real estate services are provided by CII at the head office in Toronto, Ontario;

(i) with the exception of routine maintenance expenditures, all capital expenditure decisions affecting the Cinram Group are managed in Toronto, Ontario;

(j) new business development initiatives are centralized and managed from Toronto, Ontario; and

(k) research and development functions for the Cinram Group are corporate-level activities centralized at Toronto, Ontario, including the Cinram Group's corporate-level research and development budget and strategy.

41 Counsel submits that the CCAA Parties are highly dependent upon the critical business functions performed on their behalf from Cinram's head office in Toronto and would not be able to function independently without significant disruptions to their operations.

42 The above comments with respect to the COMI are provided for informational purposes only. This court clearly recognizes that it is the function of the receiving court — in this case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware —

to make the determination on the location of the COMI and to determine whether this CCAA proceeding is a "foreign main proceeding" for the purposes of Chapter 15.

43 In the result, I am satisfied that the Applicants meet all of the qualifications established for relief under the CCAA and I have signed the Initial Order in the form submitted, which includes approvals of the Charges referenced in the Initial Order.

#### Schedule "A"

#### **Additional Applicants**

Cinram International General Partner Inc.

Cinram International ULC

1362806 Ontario Limited

Cinram (U.S.) Holdings Inc.

Cinram, Inc.

**IHC Corporation** 

Cinram Manufacturing LLC


Cinram Distribution LLC

Cinram Wireless LLC

Cinram Retail Services, LLC

One K Studios, LLC

#### Schedule "B"



**Graphic 1** 

#### Schedule "C"

#### A. The Applicants Are "Debtor Companies" to Which the CCAA Applies

41. The CCAA applies in respect of a "debtor company" (including a foreign company having assets or doing business in Canada) or "affiliated debtor companies" where the total of claims against such company or companies exceeds \$5 million.

CCAA, Section 3(1).

42. The Applicants are eligible for protection under the CCAA because each is a "debtor company" and the total of the claims against the Applicants exceeds \$5 million.

#### (1) The Applicants are Debtor Companies

43. The terms "company" and "debtor company" are defined in Section 2 of the CCAA as follows:

"company" means any company, corporation or legal person incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province and any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, and any income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies.

"debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent;

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;

(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or

(d) is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act because the company is insolvent.

CCAA, Section 2 ("company" and "debtor company").

44. The Applicants are debtor companies within the meaning of these definitions.

#### (2) The Applicants are "companies"

45. The Applicants are "companies" because:

a. with respect to the Canadian Applicants, each is incorporated pursuant to federal or provincial legislation or, in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, is an income trust; and

b. with respect to the U.S. Applicants, each is an incorporated company with certain funds in bank accounts in Canada opened in May 2012 and therefore each is a company having assets or doing business in Canada.

Bell Affidavit at paras. 4, 80, 84, 86, 91, 94, 98, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 212; Application Record, Tab 2.

46. The test for "having assets or doing business in Canada" is disjunctive, such that either "having assets" in Canada or "doing business in Canada" is sufficient to qualify an incorporated company as a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA.

47. Having only nominal assets in Canada, such as funds on deposit in a Canadian bank account, brings a foreign corporation within the definition of "company". In order to meet the threshold statutory requirements of the CCAA, an applicant need only be in technical compliance with the plain words of the CCAA.

*Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 30 [*Canwest Global*]; Book of Authorities of the Applicants ("*Book of Authorities*"), Tab 1.

*Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 17 [*Global Light*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

48. The Courts do not engage in a quantitative or qualitative analysis of the assets or the circumstances in which the assets were created. Accordingly, the use of "instant" transactions immediately preceding a CCAA application, such as the creation of "instant debts" or "instant assets" for the purposes of bringing an entity within the scope of the CCAA, has received judicial approval as a legitimate device to bring a debtor within technical requirements of the CCAA.

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re, supra at para. 17; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

*Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paras. 5-6; Book of Authorities, Tab 3.

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 74, 83; Book of Authorities, Tab 4.

#### (3) The Applicants are insolvent

49. The Applicants are "debtor companies" as defined in the CCAA because they are companies (as set out above) and they are insolvent.

50. The insolvency of the debtor is assessed as of the time of filing the CCAA application. The CCAA does not define insolvency. Accordingly, in interpreting the meaning of "insolvent", courts have taken guidance from the definition of "insolvent person" in Section 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA"), which defines an "insolvent person" as a person (i) who is not bankrupt; and (ii) who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada; (iii) whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under the BIA amount to one thousand dollars; and (iv) who is "insolvent" under one of the following tests:

a. is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due;

b. has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due; or

c. the aggregate of his property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

BIA, Section 2 ("insolvent person").

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal to C.A. refused [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.), at para.4 [Stelco]; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

51. These tests for insolvency are disjunctive. A company satisfying any one of these tests is considered insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA.

Stelco Inc., Re, supra at paras. 26 and 28; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

52. A company is also insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA if, at the time of filing, there is a reasonably foreseeable expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis that would result in the company being unable to pay its debts as they generally become due if a stay of proceedings and ancillary protection are not granted by the court.

Stelco Inc., Re, supra at para. 40; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

53. The Applicants meet both the traditional test for insolvency under the BIA and the expanded test for insolvency based on a looming liquidity condition as a result of the following:

a. The Applicants are unable to comply with certain financial covenants under the Credit Agreements and have entered into a series of waivers with their lenders from December 2011 to June 30, 2012.

b. Were the Lenders to accelerate the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements, the Borrowers and the other Applicants that are Guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Cinram Fund would be the ultimate parent of an insolvent business.

d. The Applicants have been unable to repay or refinance the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements or find an outof-court transaction for the sale of the Cinram Business with proceeds that equal or exceed the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

e. Reduced revenues and EBITDA and increased borrowing costs have significantly impaired Cinram's ability to service its debt obligations. There is no reasonable expectation that Cinram will be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012 and for fiscal 2013 and 2014.

f. The decline in revenues and EBITDA generated by the Cinram Business has caused the value of the Cinram Business to decline. As a result, the aggregate value of the Property, taken at fair value, is not sufficient to allow for payment of all of the Applicants' obligations due and accruing due.

g. The Cash Flow Forecast indicates that without additional funding the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 23, 179-181, 183, 197-199; Application Record, Tab 2.

#### (4) The Applicants are affiliated companies with claims outstanding in excess of \$5 million

54. The Applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims exceeding 5 million dollars. Therefore, the CCAA applies to the Applicants in accordance with Section 3(1).

55. Affiliated companies are defined in Section 3(2) of the CCAA as follows:

a. companies are affiliated companies if one of them is the subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same company or each is controlled by the same person; and

b. two companies are affiliated with the same company at the same time are deemed to be affiliated with each other.

CCAA, Section 3(2).

56. CII, CII Trust and all of the entities listed in Schedule "A" hereto are indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of Cinram Fund; thus, the Applicants are "affiliated companies" for the purpose of the CCAA.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 3, 71; Application Record, Tab 2.

57. All of the CCAA Parties (except for the Fund Entities) are each a Borrower and/or Guarantor under the Credit Agreements. As at March 31, 2012 there was approximately \$252 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the First Lien Credit Agreement (plus approximately \$12 million in letter of credit exposure) and approximately \$12 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the Second Lien Credit Agreement. The total claims against the Applicants far exceed \$5 million.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 75; Application Record, Tab 2.

#### B. The Relief is Available under The CCAA and Consistent with the Purpose and Policy of the CCAA

#### (1) The CCAA is Flexible, Remedial Legislation

58. The CCAA is remedial legislation, intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy. In particular during periods of financial hardship, debtors turn to the Court so that the Court may apply the CCAA in a flexible manner in order to accomplish the statute's goals. The Court should give the CCAA a broad and liberal interpretation so as to encourage and facilitate successful restructurings whenever possible.

*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of), supra* at paras. 22 and 56-60; Book of Authorities, Tab 4. *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 5; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 4 and 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 7.

59. On numerous occasions, courts have held that Section 11 of the CCAA provides the courts with a broad and liberal power, which is at their disposal in order to achieve the overall objective of the CCAA. Accordingly, an interpretation of the CCAA that facilitates restructurings accords with its purpose.

Sulphur Corp. of Canada Ltd., Re (2002), 35 C.B.R. (4th) 304 (Alta. Q.B.) ("Sulphur") at para. 26; Book of Authorities, Tab 8.

60. Given the nature and purpose of the CCAA, this Honourable Court has the authority and jurisdiction to depart from the Model Order as is reasonable and necessary in order to achieve a successful restructuring.

#### (2) The Stay of Proceedings Against Non-Applicants is Appropriate

61. The relief sought in this application includes a stay of proceedings in favour of Cinram LP and the Applicants' direct and indirect subsidiaries that are also party to an agreement with an Applicant (whether as surety, guarantor or otherwise) (each, a "Subsidiary Counterparty"), including any contract or credit agreement. It is just and reasonable to grant the requested stay of proceedings because:

a. the Cinram Business is integrated among the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties;

b. if any proceedings were commenced against Cinram LP, or if any of the third parties to such agreements were to commence proceedings or exercise rights and remedies against the Subsidiary Counterparties, this would have a detrimental effect on the Applicants' ability to restructure and implement the Proposed Transaction and would lead to an erosion of value of the Cinram Business; and

c. a stay of proceedings that extends to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties is necessary in order to maintain stability with respect to the Cinram Business and maintain value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 185-186; Application Record, Tab 2.

62. The purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the *status quo* to enable a plan of compromise to be prepared, filed and considered by the creditors:

In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors.

*Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, supra* at para. 5; Book of Authorities, Tab 6. *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, supra* at para. 27; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

CCAA, Section 11.

63. The Court has broad inherent jurisdiction to impose stays of proceedings that supplement the statutory provisions of Section 11 of the CCAA, providing the Court with the power to grant a stay of proceedings where it is just and reasonable to do so, including with respect to non-applicant parties.

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, supra at paras. 5 and 16; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.

T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 6; Book of Authorities, Tab 9.

64. The Courts have found it just and reasonable to grant a stay of proceedings against third party non-applicants in a number of circumstances, including:

a. where it is important to the reorganization process;

b. where the business operations of the Applicants and the third party non-applicants are intertwined and the third parties are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CCAA, such as partnerships that do not qualify as "companies" within the meaning of the CCAA;

c. against non-applicant subsidiaries of a debtor company where such subsidiaries were guarantors under the note indentures issued by the debtor company; and

d. against non-applicant subsidiaries relating to any guarantee, contribution or indemnity obligation, liability or claim in respect of obligations and claims against the debtor companies.

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 10. Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, supra at para. 21; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, supra at paras. 28 and 29; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Sino-Forest Corp., Re, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 5, 18, and 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 11.

*Re MAAX Corp*, Initial Order granted June 12, 2008, Montreal 500-11-033561-081, (Que. Sup. Ct. [Commercial Division]) at para. 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 12.

65. The Applicants submit the balance of convenience favours extending the relief in the proposed Initial Order to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties. The business operations of the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties are intertwined and the stay of proceedings is necessary to maintain stability and value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders, as well as allow an orderly, going-concern sale of the Cinram Business as an important component of its reorganization process.

#### (3) Entitlement to Make Pre-Filing Payments

66. To ensure the continued operation of the CCAA Parties' business and maximization of value in the interests of Cinram's stakeholders, the Applicants seek authorization (but not a requirement) for the CCAA Parties to make certain pre-filing payments, including: (a) payments to employees in respect of wages, benefits, and related amounts; (b) payments to suppliers and service providers critical to the ongoing operation of the business; (c) payments and the application of credits in connection with certain existing customer programs; and (d) intercompany payments among the Applicants related to intercompany loans and shared services. Payments will be made with the consent of the Monitor and, in certain circumstances, with the consent of the Agent.

67. There is ample authority supporting the Court's general jurisdiction to permit payment of pre-filing obligations to persons whose services are critical to the ongoing operations of the debtor companies. This jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted by Section 11.4 of the CCAA, which became effective as part of the 2009 amendments to the CCAA and codified the Court's practice of declaring a person to be a critical supplier and granting a charge on the debtor's property in favour of such critical supplier. As noted by Pepall J. in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, the recent amendments, including Section 11.4, do not detract from the inherently flexible nature of the CCAA or the Court's broad and inherent jurisdiction to make such orders that will facilitate the debtor's restructuring of its business as a going concern.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at paras. 41 and 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

68. There are many cases since the 2009 amendments where the Courts have authorized the applicants to pay certain pre-filing amounts where the applicants were not seeking a charge in respect of critical suppliers. In granting this authority, the Courts considered a number of factors, including:

a. whether the goods and services were integral to the business of the applicants;

b. the applicants' dependency on the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

c. the fact that no payments would be made without the consent of the Monitor;

d. the Monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of prefiling liabilities are minimized;

e. whether the applicants had sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet their needs; and

f. the effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at para. 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

*Brainhunter Inc., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 5207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 21 [*Brainhunter*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 13.

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 29-34; Book of Authorities, Tab 14.

69. The CCAA Parties rely on the efficient and expedited supply of products and services from their suppliers and service providers in order to ensure that their operations continue in an efficient manner so that they can satisfy customer requirements. The CCAA Parties operate in a highly competitive environment where the timely provision of their products and services is essential in order for the company to remain a successful player in the industry and to ensure the continuance of the Cinram Business. The CCAA Parties require flexibility to ensure adequate and timely supply of required products and to attempt to obtain and negotiate credit terms with its suppliers and service providers. In order to accomplish this, the CCAA Parties require the ability to pay certain pre-filing amounts and post-filing payables to those suppliers they consider essential to the Cinram Business, as approved by the Monitor. The Monitor, in determining whether to approve pre-filing payments as critical to the ongoing business operations, will consider various factors, including the above factors derived from the caselaw.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 226, 228, 230; Application Record, Tab 2.

70. In addition, the CCAA Parties' continued compliance with their existing customer programs, as described in the Bell Affidavit, including the payment of certain pre-filing amounts owing under certain customer programs and the application of certain credits granted to customers pre-filing to post-filing receivables, is essential in order for the CCAA Parties to maintain their customer relationships as part of the CCAA Parties' going concern business.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 234; Application Record, Tab 2.

71. Further, due to the operational integration of the businesses of the CCAA Parties, as described above, there is a significant volume of financial transactions between and among the Applicants, including, among others, charges by an Applicant providing shared services to another Applicant of intercompany accounts due from the recipients of those services, and charges by a Applicant that manufactures and furnishes products to another Applicant of inter-company accounts due from the receiving entity.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 225; Application Record, Tab 2.

72. Accordingly, the Applicants submit that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the CCAA Parties the authority to make the pre-filing payments described in the proposed Initial Order subject to the terms therein.

## (4) The Charges Are Appropriate

73. The Applicants seek approval of certain Court-ordered charges over their assets relating to their DIP Financing (defined below), administrative costs, indemnification of their trustees, directors and officers, KERP and Support Agreement. The Lenders and the Administrative Agent under the Credit Agreements, the senior secured facilities that will be primed by the charges, have been provided with notice of the within Application. The proposed Initial Order does not purport to give the Court-ordered charges priority over any other validly perfected security interests.

## (A) DIP Lenders' Charge

74. In the proposed Initial Order, the Applicants seek approval of the DIP Credit Agreement providing a debtor-in-possession term facility in the principal amount of \$15 million (the "DIP Financing"), to be secured by a charge over all of the assets and property of the Applicants that are Borrowers and/or Guarantors under the Credit Agreements (the "Charged Property") ranking ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge.

75. Section 11.2 of the CCAA expressly provides the Court the statutory jurisdiction to grant a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing charge:

11.2(1) *Interim financing* - On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

11.2(2) *Priority* — secured creditors — The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

*Timminco Ltd., Re*, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 881 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [2012 CarswellOnt 1466] at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 15. CCAA, Section 11.2(1) and (2).

76. Section 11.2 of the CCAA sets out the following factors to be considered by the Court in deciding whether to grant a DIP financing charge:

11.2(4) Factors to be considered — In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

- (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

CCAA, Section 11.2(4).

77. The above list of factors is not exhaustive, and it may be appropriate for the Court to consider additional factors in determining whether to grant a DIP financing charge. For example, in circumstances where funds to be borrowed pursuant to a DIP facility were not expected to be immediately necessary, but applicants' cash flow statements projected the need for additional liquidity, the Court in granting the requested DIP charge considered the fact that the applicants' ability to borrows funds that would be secured by a charge would help retain the confidence of their trade creditors, employees and suppliers.

*Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 42-43 [*Canwest Publishing*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

78. Courts in recent cross-border cases have exercised their broad power to grant charges to DIP lenders over the assets of foreign applicants. In many of these cases, the debtors have commenced recognition proceedings under Chapter 15.

*Re Catalyst Paper Corporation*, Initial Order granted on January 31, 2012, Court File No. S-120712 (B.C.S.C.) [*Catalyst Paper*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 17.

Angiotech, supra, Initial Order granted on January 28, 2011, Court File No. S-110587; Book of Authorities, Tab 18

*Fraser Papers Inc., Re* [2009 CarswellOnt 3658 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], Initial Order granted on June 18, 2009, Court File No. CV-09-8241-00CL; Book of Authorities, Tab 19.

79. As noted above, pursuant to Section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, a DIP financing charge may not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The requested DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations.

80. The following factors support the granting of the DIP Lenders' Charge, many of which incorporate the considerations enumerated in Section 11.2(4) listed above:

a. the Cash Flow Forecast indicates the Applicants will need additional liquidity afforded by the DIP Financing in order to continue operations through the duration of these proposed CCAA Proceedings;

b. the Cinram Business is intended to continue to operate on a going concern basis during these CCAA Proceedings under the direction of the current management with the assistance of the Applicants' advisors and the Monitor;

c. the DIP Financing is expected to provide the Applicants with sufficient liquidity to implement the Proposed Transaction through these CCAA Proceedings and implement certain operational restructuring initiatives, which will materially enhance the likelihood of a going concern outcome for the Cinram Business;

d. the nature and the value of the Applicants' assets as set out in their consolidated financial statements can support the requested DIP Lenders' Charge;

e. members of the Steering Committee under the First Lien Credit Agreement, who are senior secured creditors of the Applicants, have agreed to provide the DIP Financing;

f. the proposed DIP Lenders have indicated that they will not provide the DIP Financing if the DIP Lenders' Charge is not approved;

g. the DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations;

h. the senior secured lenders under the Credit Agreements affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings;and

i. the proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP Facility, including the DIP Lenders' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 199-202, 205-208; Application Record, Tab 2.

#### (B) Administration Charge

81. The Applicants seek a charge over the Charged Property in the amount of CAD\$3.5 million to secure the fees of the Monitor and its counsel, the Applicants' Canadian and U.S. counsel, the Applicants' Investment Banker, the Canadian and U.S. Counsel to the DIP Agent, the DIP Lenders, the Administrative Agent and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements, and the financial advisor to the DIP Lenders and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements (the "Administration Charge"). This charge is to rank in priority to all of the other charges set out in the proposed Initial Order.

82. Prior to the 2009 amendments, administration charges were granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Section 11.52 of the CCAA now expressly provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant an administration charge:

#### 11.52(1) Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

11.52(2) Priority

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

CCAA, Section 11.52(1) and (2).

82. Administration charges were granted pursuant to Section 11.52 in, among other cases, *Timminco Ltd., Re, Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* and *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re.* 

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, supra; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Canwest Publishing, supra; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco Ltd., Re, 2012 ONSC 106 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [Timminco]; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

84. In *Canwest Publishing*, the Court noted Section 11.52 does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in granting an administration charge and provided a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in making such an assessment. These factors were also considered by the Court in *Timminco*. The list of factors to consider in approving an administration charge include:

a. the size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;

- d. whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- e. the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and

f. the position of the Monitor.

Canwest Publishing supra, at para. 54; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco, supra, at paras. 26-29; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

85. The Applicants submit that the Administration Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Administration Charge, given:

a. the proposed restructuring of the Cinram Business is large and complex, spanning several jurisdictions across North America and Europe, and will require the extensive involvement of professional advisors;

b. the professionals that are to be beneficiaries of the Administration Charge have each played a critical role in the CCAA Parties' restructuring efforts to date and will continue to be pivotal to the CCAA Parties' ability to pursue a successful restructuring going forward, including the Investment Banker's involvement in the completion of the Proposed Transaction;

c. there is no unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings; and

e. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Administration Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 188, 190; Application Record, Tab 2.

(C) Directors' Charge

86. The Applicants seek a Directors' Charge in an amount of CAD\$13 over the Charged Property to secure their respective indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed on the Applicants' trustees, directors and officers (the "Directors and Officers"). The Directors' Charge is to be subordinate to the Administration Charge and the DIP Lenders' Charge but in priority to the KERP Charge and the Consent Consideration Charge.

87. Section 11.51 of the CCAA affords the Court the jurisdiction to grant a charge relating to directors' and officers' indemnification on a priority basis:

#### 11.51(1) Security or charge relating to director's indemnification

On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.

#### 11.51(2) Priority

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditors of the company

#### 11.51(3) Restriction — indemnification insurance

The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

#### 11.51(4) Negligence, misconduct or fault

The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

#### CCAA, Section 11.51.

88. The Court has granted director and officer charges pursuant to Section 11.51 in a number of cases. In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, the Court outlined the test for granting such a charge:

I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, supra at paras 46-48; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Canwest Publishing, supra at paras. 56-57; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco, supra at paras. 30-36; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

89. The Applicants submit that the D&O Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the D&O Charge in the amount of CAD\$13 million, given:

a. the Directors and Officers of the Applicants may be subject to potential liabilities in connection with these CCAA proceedings with respect to which the Directors and Officers have expressed their desire for certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities;

b. renewal of coverage to protect the Directors and Officers is at a significantly increased cost due to the imminent commencement of these CCAA proceedings;

c. the Directors' Charge would cover obligations and liabilities that the Directors and Officers, as applicable, may incur after the commencement of these CCAA Proceedings and is not intended to cover wilful misconduct or gross negligence;

d. the Applicants require the continued support and involvement of their Directors and Officers who have been instrumental in the restructuring efforts of the CCAA Parties to date;

e. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and

f. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Directors' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 249, 250, 254-257; Application Record, Tab 2.

(D) KERP Charge

90. The Applicants seek a KERP Charge in an amount of CAD\$3 million over the Charged Property to secure the KERP Retention Payments, KERP Transaction Payments and Aurora KERP Payments payable to certain key employees of the CCAA Parties crucial for the CCAA Parties' successful restructuring.

91. The CCAA is silent with respect to the granting of KERP charges. Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters within the discretion of the Court. The Court in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re* [2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] considered a number of factors in determining whether to grant a KERP and a KERP charge, including:

a. whether the Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge (to which great weight was attributed);

b. whether the employees to which the KERP applies would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge;

c. whether the continued employment of the employees to which the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process;

d. the employees' history with and knowledge of the debtor;

e. the difficulty in finding a replacement to fulfill the responsibilities of the employees to which the KERP applies;

f. whether the KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors, including the independent directors, as the business judgment of the board should not be ignored;

g. whether the KERP agreement and charge are supported or consented to by secured creditors of the debtor; and

h. whether the payments under the KERP are payable upon the completion of the restructuring process.

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 8-24 [Grant Forest]; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re supra, at paras 59; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at para. 49; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 95 C.C.P.B. 48 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 72-75; Book of Authorities, Tab 22.

92. The purpose of a KERP arrangement is to retain key personnel for the duration of the debtor's restructuring process and it is logical for compensation under a KERP arrangement to be deferred until after the restructuring process has been completed, with "staged bonuses" being acceptable. KERP arrangements that do not defer retention payments to completion of the restructuring may also be just and fair in the circumstances.

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re, supra at para. 22-23; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.

93. The Applicants submit that the KERP Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the KERP Charge in the amount of CAD\$3 million, given:

a. the KERP was developed by Cinram with the principal purpose of providing an incentive to the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers, and the Aurora Employees to remain with the Cinram Group while the company pursued its restructuring efforts;

b. the Eligible Employees and the Eligible Officers are essential for a restructuring of the Cinram Group and the preservation of Cinram's value during the restructuring process;

c. the Aurora Employees are essential for an orderly transition of Cinram Distribution's business operations from the Aurora facility to its Nashville facility;

d. it would be detrimental to the restructuring process if Cinram were required to find replacements for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and/or the Aurora Employees during this critical period;

e. the KERP, including the KERP Retention Payments, the KERP Transaction Payments and the Aurora KERP Payments payable thereunder, not only provides appropriate incentives for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and the Aurora Employees to remain in their current positions, but also ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in Cinram's restructuring process;

f. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and

g. the KERP has been reviewed and approved by the board of trustees of Cinram Fund and is supported by the Monitor.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 236-239, 245-247; Application Record, Tab 2.

#### (E) Consent Consideration Charge

94. The Applicants request the Consent Consideration Charge over the Charged Property to secure the Early Consent Consideration. The Consent Consideration Charge is to be subordinate in priority to the Administration Charge, the DIP Lenders' Charge, the Directors' Charge and the KERP Charge.

95. The Courts have permitted the opportunity to receive consideration for early consent to a restructuring transaction in the context of CCAA proceedings payable upon implementation of such restructuring transaction. In *Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, the Court ordered that any noteholder wishing to become a consenting noteholder under the support agreement and entitled to early consent consideration was required to execute a joinder agreement to the support agreement prior to the applicable consent deadline. Similarly, in these proceedings, lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement (or a joinder thereto) and thereby agree to support the Proposed Transaction on or before July 10, 2012, are entitled to Early Consent Consideration earned on consummation of the Proposed Transaction to be paid from the net sale proceeds.

*Sino-Forest Corp., Re, supra*, Initial Order granted on March 30, 2012, Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL at para. 15; Book of Authorities, Tab 23. Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

96. The Applicants submit it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Consent Consideration Charge, given:

a. the Proposed Transaction will enable the Cinram Business to continue as a going concern and return to a market leader in the industry;

b. Consenting Lenders are only entitled to the Early Consent Consideration if the Proposed Transaction is consummated; and

c. the Early Consent Consideration is to be paid from the net sale proceeds upon distribution of same in these proceedings.

Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

Application granted.

# TAB 18

## 2012 ONSC 6403 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Futura Loyalty Group Inc., Re

#### 2012 CarswellOnt 14263, 2012 ONSC 6403, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 14, 99 C.B.R. (5th) 128

# In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of The Futura Loyalty Group Inc. Applicant

D.M. Brown J.

Heard: November 13, 2012 Judgment: November 13, 2012 Docket: CV-12-9882-00CL

Counsel: S. Reid for Applicant G. Azeff, A. Iqbal for Monitor, Harris & Partners Limited J. Desjardins for DirectCash Payments Inc. D. Pearlman for Aimia Canada Inc.

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.a Procedure XIX.2.a.iii Notice Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Initial application -- Miscellaneous

Debtor's main source of revenues was from selling Aeroplan Miles to merchants as customer reward programme — Some merchants purchased discounted Miles by prepaying debtor — Court made initial order for protection — Debtor applied for order permitting it to honour merchant prepayments made prior to initial order — Application granted — Order was consistent with and fostered objectives of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Ongoing resale of Miles was essential to debtor's viability as going concern — Honouring prepayments would assist debtor's reorganization efforts to maintain merchants as customers — Order was not opposed by monitor or secured creditors.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Initial application -- Procedure --- Notice

Debtor's main source of revenues was from selling Aeroplan Miles to merchants as customer reward programme — Some merchants purchased discounted Miles by prepaying debtor — Court made initial order for protection — Debtor applied to vary order by deferring notice to prepaying merchants — Application dismissed — Transparency was foundation upon which Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act rested — Initial order had already been posted on monitor's website and notice was published in newspaper — There was no principled basis upon which to exclude one group of creditors — Risk that some merchants would cancel their participation in reward programme was inherent in proceedings under Act — It was up to debtor to persuade its customers that it was in their long-term interests not to abandon it.

**Table of Authorities** 

Cases considered by D.M. Brown J.:

*EarthFirst Canada Inc., Re* (2009), 1 Alta. L.R. (5th) 311, 2009 ABQB 78, 2009 CarswellAlta 142 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed *Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3657, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed *Futura Loyalty Group Inc., Re* (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 12842, 2012 ONSC 5896 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

#### Statutes considered:

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

- s. 11 considered
- s. 11.02(2) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] referred to
- s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 23 considered

s. 23(1)(a)(ii)(B) — considered

#### D.M. Brown J.:

#### I. Overview of orders sought under the CCAA

By Initial Order made October 16, 2012 [2012 CarswellOnt 12842 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], the applicant, The Futura Loyalty Group Inc., obtained the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. By order made October 26, 2012, another judge of this Court approved a proposed Sale and Investor Solicitation Process and granted other relief. Futura now moves for orders (i) extending the Stay Period until January 18, 2013, (ii) increasing the DIP Facility from \$175,000 to \$300,000, (iii) permitting it to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by Prepaying Merchant Customers, and (iv) varying the Initial Order to defer giving notice under section 23 of the *CCAA* to Prepaying Merchant Customers.

#### II. Extending the Stay Period and increasing the DIP Facility

2 Futura seeks an extension of the Stay Period in order to enable it to work on the SISP which, it hopes, will result in either a going-concern sale or new investment implemented through a plan of compromise or arrangement. The Monitor supports the request and, in its Second Report dated November 9, 2012, expressed the view that Futura has acted and continues to act in good faith and with due diligence. DirectCash Payments Inc., which holds first ranking secured debt of about \$300,000, also supported the extension, as did Aimia Canada. I am satisfied that the evidence disclosed that Futura has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence and the requested extension is necessary to implement the SISP. The updated cash flow forecast filed by Futura shows that with the increase in the DIP Facility, the applicant has sufficient cash to carry on its operations until January 18, 2013. Pursuant to *CCAA* s. 11.02(2) I grant the extension of the Stay Period until January 18, 2013.

3 As to the proposed increased in the DIP Facility, Futura has demonstrated the need for such an increase in order to maintain its operations until the end of the Stay Period. The parties present, including the secured creditor, supported the proposed increase. The evidence filed by the applicant and the Monitor satisfies the requirements of *CCAA* s. 11.2, and I approve the requested increase in the DIP Facility.

#### III. Prepaying Merchant Customers: request to honour prepayments made prior to the Initial Order

4 As described by David Campbell, Futura's CEO, in his affidavit sworn November 9, 2012, Futura provides "loyalty solutions" for its customers. Its major customer reward program involves selling Aeroplan Miles to merchants under an Aeroplan

Coalition Program. Over 75% of the applicant's revenues are generated by the resale of Aeroplan Miles pursuant to the Aeroplan Coalition Program.

5 Under that Program, Merchant Customers of Futura typically pay the applicant monthly, in arrears, for Aeroplan Miles they have issued to their customers in that month. However, prior to the filing of its application under the *CCAA*, Futura on occasion offered Merchant Customers the opportunity of buying Aeroplan Miles at volume discounts. The Merchant Customers would purchase those discounted Aeroplan Miles by pre-paying Futura.

6 Mr. Campbell deposed that as of the date of the Initial Order ten (10) Prepaying Merchant Customers had prepaid to Futura approximately \$108,000 for 2.5 million Aeroplan Miles. Futura has calculated that it pays out approximately \$20,000 a month to Aeroplan on account of those pre-paid Miles.

7 Futura seeks an order of this Court permitting it to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by those Prepaying Merchant Customers. Mr. Campbell deposed:

Although payment to Aeroplan on behalf of Prepaying Merchant Customers for prepayments made prior to the date of the Initial Order could be considered to be payment for the benefit of the Prepaying Merchant Customers as unsecured creditors of the Applicant, such payments are necessary in order to maintain the *status quo* and to ensure the continuous ongoing operations of the Applicant's business and the preservation of the Applicant's brand in the marketplace. This would enhance the likelihood of a going-concern sale by the Applicant that would maximize value for the benefit of all creditors.

Mr. Campbell also pointed out that Futura had made a similar request in its October 26 motion to allow the continuous payment of Futura Reward Payments; the court approved that request in its October 26 Order.

8 In its Second Report the Monitor supported Futura's request for an authorization order:

Futura and the Monitor share the view that such payments are necessary in order to maintain the *status quo*, ensure the continuous ongoing operations of Futura's business and preserve its brand in the marketplace.

9 DirectCash and Aimia Canada supported the relief sought by Futura.

10 Section 11 of the *CCAA* authorizes a court to "make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances", "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act". As Morawetz J. observed in *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, the "*CCAA* is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives..." <sup>1</sup> Although counsel could not point me to a case in which a court had permitted an applicant to satisfy a pre-filing credit or claim enjoyed by a customer outside of the *CCAA* claims process, some precedent exists for permitting the payment of pre-filing obligations in the case of non-critical suppliers.

In both *Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re* [2009 CarswellOnt 3657 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])]<sup>2</sup> and *EarthFirst Canada Inc., Re*<sup>3</sup> the courts considered requests to approve payments to creditors in respect of pre-filing obligations. In the *Eddie Bauer* case Morawetz J. granted the approval writing:

[22] The proposed order also provides that the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay amounts owing for goods and services actually supplied to the Applicants prior to the date of the Order. The RSM Report comments on this point. *The Eddie Bauer Group is of the view that operations could be disrupted and its vendor relationships adversely impacted if it does not have the ability to pay pre-filing obligations to certain vendors and it further believes that the value of its business will be maximized if it can pay its pre-filing creditors. RSM has reviewed this issue and is supportive of this provision as the Eddie Bauer Group believes it is a necessary provision and the DIP Lenders are supportive of the Restructuring Proceedings. The relief requested in these proceedings is consistent with the relief sought in the Chapter 11 Proceedings. This provision is unusual but, in the circumstances of this case, appears to be reasonable.* 

(emphasis added)

12 In *EarthFirst Canada* Romaine J. approved the creation of a "hardship fund" to pay prefiling obligations owed to certain suppliers and contractors of the applicant. The evidence in that case revealed that some suppliers and contractors in a remote community had become quite dependent upon the applicant's wind farm project and, if they were not paid, they would "face immediate financial difficulty". Romaine J. wrote:

[7] While the nature of payments from the hardship fund is different from the issue that was before Farley, J. in *Re Air Canada*, 2003 CarswellOnt. 5296 (at para. 4), and while EarthFirst is not suggesting that recipients of the fund are "critical suppliers" in the usual sense of the term, it appears to be the case that, as in *Air Canada*, the potential future benefit to the company of these relatively modest payments of pre-filing debt is considerable and of value to the estate as a whole. The decision to allow the hardship fund thus outweighs the prejudice to other creditors, justifying a departure from the usual rule.

13 In those two cases the courts were prepared to countenance the payment of pre-filing obligations to suppliers in order to prevent disruption to the operations of the applicant and to maximize the value of the business for purposes of the re-organization or realization process. In the *EarthFirst Canada* case the court engaged in a form of proportionality or cost-benefit analysis, weighing the cost of the pre-payments against the benefit to the estate as a whole.

14 The present case does not involve a request to make payments to suppliers for pre-filing obligations, but concerns a somewhat analogous request to make payments which would satisfy pre-filing credits enjoyed by some important customers. The kind of cost-benefit reasoning undertaken in the *Eddie Bauer* and *EarthFirst* cases offers some guidance. My Reasons granting the Initial Order stated that the book value of Futura's assets was approximately \$1.35 million. The most recent cash-flow projection filed by the applicant made allowance for "payments to loyalty currency providers", which included the payments in respect of the Prepaying Merchant Customers. When compared against projected inflows from the collection of receivables through to January 18, 2013 of approximately \$440,000 (the only source of cash apart from the increased DIP Financing), the honouring of \$108,000 in pre-paid Aeroplan Miles for the Prepaying Merchant Customers is not an insignificant amount. However, on the other side of the scale is the evidence from Futura that 75% of its revenue comes from the resale of Aeroplan Miles and under its SISP it is seeking to secure a going-concern sale of the company's business.

15 Given the importance of the ongoing resale of Aeroplan Miles to the viability of Futura as a going-concern, the benefit to the company's re-organization efforts of trying to maintain the Prepaying Merchant customers as continuing customers, and the absence of any opposition to the order sought, I conclude that it is appropriate in the circumstances to grant an order "permitting the Applicant to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by Prepaying Merchant Customers" prior to the making of the Initial Order, as requested in paragraph 5 of Futura's notice of motion. Such authorization, in my view, is consistent with and fosters the objectives of the *CCAA*.

16 Futura submitted a draft order which contained different language of authorization. I informed counsel that the revised language was vague and imprecise, and I would not approve it. Paragraph 5 of Futura's notice of motion was short, sweet and to the point, so the language of the draft order Futura submits for my consideration must reflect that precision.

## IV. Dispensing with notice to Prepaying Merchant Customers

17 The Prepaying Merchant Customers were not given notice of this motion. I have made the order authorizing the honouring of their prepayments in any event because it is to their benefit. Futura requests that I vary the *CCAA* s. 23 notice provision in my Initial Order in order to "defer notice to Prepaying Merchant Customers". Again, the Monitor, DirectCash Payments and Aimia Canada support the applicant's request.

18 Section 23(1)(a)(ii)(B) of the *CCAA* requires a monitor, within five days after the making of an initial order, to send, in the prescribed manner, "a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the company of more than \$1,000 advising them that the order is publicly available". In this case the Monitor has not sent such notice to the Prepaying Merchant Customers.

19 Why is that so? No explanation was offered by the Monitor in its Second Report. I am disappointed that none was. In oral submissions Monitor's counsel stated that the Monitor only learned from the applicant on October 27, 2012 that the Prepaying Merchant Customers were creditors of the applicant. Mr. Campbell, in his affidavit, did not explain why it took the applicant almost two weeks after the Initial Order to recognize the Prepaying Merchant Customers as creditors and to so inform the Monitor.

20 Why does the applicant not want the Monitor to give *CCAA* s. 23 notices to the creditor Prepaying Merchant Customers? In his affidavit Mr. Campbell deposed:

Direct notification of the *CCAA* Proceedings to the Prepaying Merchant Customers could cause them to cancel their participation in the Aeroplan Coalition Program, which would have a detrimental effect on the ongoing operation and value of the Applicant's business.

Since the Applicant is seeking an order allowing it to continue to honour prepayments made under the Aeroplan Coalition Program in the ordinary course, and since a going concern sale of this business may be achieved, it is not currently necessary, and could be detrimental to the Applicant's business, to provide such merchants with direct notice of the CCAA Proceedings at this time. If a going concern sale of its Aeroplan Coalition Program cannot be achieved, such that the Prepaying Merchant Customers may be affected by this proceeding, the Applicant will give notice to such merchants at the relevant time.

In its Second Report the Monitor echoed the position of Futura.

I recognize that the October 26 Order contained a variation of the paragraph 43 Initial Order notice provision to exempt, from the Monitor's statutory duty to give notice of this proceeding, "claimants under the Futura Rewards Program". No reasons accompanied that order, so I am unable to understand the basis for the granting of that variation.

I am not prepared to vary the Initial Order to excuse the Monitor from providing the requisite creditor notice to the Prepaying Merchant Customers under section 23(1)(a)(ii)(B) of the *CCAA*. Transparency is the foundation upon which *CCAA* proceedings rest - a debtor company encounters financial difficulties; it seeks the protection of the *CCAA* to give it breathing space to fashion a compromise or arrangement for its creditors to consider; in order to secure that breathing space, the *CCAA* requires the debtor to provide its creditors, in a court proceeding, with the information they require in order to make informed decisions about the compromises or arrangements of *their rights* which the debtor may propose. As a general proposition, open windows, not closed doors, characterize *CCAA* proceedings.

In the present case the Monitor published, as ordered, a notice in the Globe and Mail shortly after the Initial Order was made and, as ordered, established a website to which the Initial Order was posted. Given that the Monitor has given general public notice of these proceedings as ordered by this Court, I cannot see any principled basis upon which to excuse the Monitor from giving specific notice to one group of creditors — the Prepaying Merchant Customers.

Mr. Campbell deposed that giving notice to the Prepaying Merchant Customers "could cause them to cancel their participation in the Aeroplan Coalition Program". Initiating *CCAA* proceedings always carries some risk that the applicant's suppliers or customers may re-think doing business with the debtor. One of the tasks of a debtor's management is to persuade suppliers or customers that in the long-run it would be better to hang in with the debtor than to abandon it. Such persuasion must be done in every *CCAA* proceeding; this one is no different.

25 For those reasons I decline to grant the applicant's request to vary the notice provisions of the Initial Order.

## V. Summary

By way of summary, I grant the applicant an extension of the Stay Period until January 18, 2013, an increase in the DIP Facility to \$300,000, and permission to honour prepayments made for Aeroplan Miles by Prepaying Merchant Customers. I also approve the First and Second Reports of the Monitor and the actions and activities of the Monitor described therein.

#### 2019 BCSC 1234 British Columbia Supreme Court

Miniso International Hong Kong Limited v. Migu Investments Inc.

2019 CarswellBC 2208, 2019 BCSC 1234, 308 A.C.W.S. (3d) 465, 71 C.B.R. (6th) 250

MINISO INTERNATIONAL HONG KONG LIMITED, MINISO INTERNATIONAL (GUANGZHOU) CO. LIMITED, MINISO LIFESTYLE CANADA INC., MIHK MANAGEMENT INC., MINISO TRADING CANADA INC., MINISO CORPORATION and GUANGDONG SAIMAN INVESTMENT CO. LIMITED (Petitioners) and MIGU **INVESTMENTS INC., MINISO CANADA INVESTMENTS INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE** INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE ONE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE TWO INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE THREE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE FOUR INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE FIVE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE SIX INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE SEVEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE EIGHT INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE NINE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE TEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE ELEVEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE TWELVE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE THIRTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE FOURTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE FIFTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE SIXTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE SEVENTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE EIGHTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE NINETEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE TWENTY INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE **TWENTY-ONE INC. and MINISO (CANADA) STORE TWENTY-TWO INC. (Respondents)** 

Fitzpatrick J.

Heard: July 12, 2019 Judgment: July 12, 2019 Written reasons: July 29, 2019 Docket: Vancouver S197744

Counsel: K.M. Jackson, G.P. Nesbitt, for Petitioners V.L. Tickle, D.R. Shouldice, for Respondents

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Initial application -- Miscellaneous

Petitioners, secured creditors, were owners of "M" Japanese lifestyle product brand — Respondent debtor companies were Canadian owners and operators who has licensed to use of M brand in Canada, and they also purchased products from creditors for resale in Canada — Creditors advanced US\$2.4 million demand loan to debtors, and debtors received substantial amount of M products valued at approximately \$17.5 million which were not paid for — Creditors demanded payment of amounts owing under demand loan, earlier account receivable and amounts owing for further supply of M products — Total indebtedness owing by debtors to creditors was approximately \$35.5 million, creditors terminated debtors' right to sell and market M brand in Canada and it would not deliver further products — Creditors brought proceedings pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Petition granted — Debtor companies were each "company" existing under laws of Canada or province, claims against them exceeded \$5 million, and debtors were unable to meet their liabilities as they came due and were insolvent and

"debtor company" within meaning of CCAA — CCAA expressly granted standing to creditors to commence proceedings in respect of debtor company — Debtors could not proceed with their business operations without ongoing support of creditors — Stakeholders required relief sought in initial order on urgent basis in order to allow debtors to continue operating their business, and initial order was best option toward preserving debtors' enterprise value for benefit of stakeholders — It was appropriate to grant stay that temporarily enjoyed debtors' creditors from proceeding with claims against them — Proposed monitor was appropriate and was appointed — Factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of CCAA supported approval of \$2 million interim financing and granting of charge to secure amounts advanced — Intention was to develop and prepare restructuring transaction, and it was clear that financing was required to continue operations which would allow debtors to maintain value of enterprise while they pursued restructuring — Interim financing would be used only by debtors in accordance with direct supervision of monitor — Restructuring charges including maximum \$1 million administration charge and maximum \$1 million directors' and officers' charge last Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s 11.2.

#### Table of Authorities

#### Cases considered by *Fitzpatrick J*.:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 2652, 42 C.B.R. (5th) 90, 45 B.L.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Cinram International Inc., Re* (2012), 2012 ONSC 3767, 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3d) 165, 2 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 21, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 147, 1991 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 625, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314, 96 O.T.C. 272 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1211, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) - referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201, 338 N.R. 196 (note) (S.C.C.) - referred to

*Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2010), 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.))* [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Timminco Ltd., Re* (2012), 2012 ONSC 506, 2012 CarswellOnt 1263, 95 C.C.P.B. 48, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

#### Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 2 "debtor" — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "debtor company" — considered

s. 3(1) — referred to

ss. 4-5 — referred to

- s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.02(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] referred to
- s. 11.51(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.51(3) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] referred to
- s. 11.51(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] referred to
- s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered

## Fitzpatrick J.:

## INTRODUCTION

1 The petitioners bring these proceedings pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "*CCAA*"). Unlike the usual circumstance where the debtor companies commence the proceedings, the petitioners are the secured creditors of the respondent debtor companies, resulting in a creditor-driven *CCAA* proceeding.

2 The petitioners, collectively described as the "Miniso Group", are the owners of the "Miniso" Japanese lifestyle product brand. The Miniso Group manufactures products and operates a number of Miniso stores in Asia where those products are sold. The Miniso Group licenses the "Miniso" name for use in other parts of the world and sells products to those entities.

3 The respondent debtor companies, collectively described as the "Migu Group", are the Canadian owners and operators who have licensed the use of the "Miniso" brand in Canada. The Migu Group also purchases products from the Miniso Group for resale here in Canada.

4 On July 12, 2019, I granted an initial order in this matter (the "Initial Order") with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

## **BACKGROUND FACTS**

5 The evidence at the hearing consisted of the Affidavit #1 of Qihua Chen, an employee of one entity within the Miniso Group, sworn July 11, 2019.

6 The Miniso Group manufacture lifestyle products under the "Miniso" brand name and distribute those products, under licence, to retail outlets selling "Miniso" branded inventory to the public.

7 The Miniso Group, through a related entity, Miniso Hong Kong Limited, holds all applicable trademarks related to the "Miniso" brand (respectively, the "Miniso Trademarks" and the "Miniso Brand"), including in Canada.

8 The Migu Group are a group of corporations formed primarily to sell "Miniso" branded products in Canada under a licensing agreement with the Miniso Group.

9 The respondent Migu Investments Inc. ("Migu") is the parent company. It owns 100% of the respondents Miniso Canada Investments Inc. ("MC Investments") and Miniso (Canada) Store Inc. ("MC Store").

10 The controlling mind of the Migu Group is Tao Xu, a resident of Toronto, Ontario. Mr. Xu owns the only issued and outstanding common voting share of Migu. The only other shares of Migu are non-voting and non-participating preferred shares.

In 2017, the Migu Group acquired the right to use the Miniso Brand in Canada pursuant to various licensing and cooperation agreements with members of the Miniso Group. In addition, on October 7, 2016, various entities entered into a framework cooperation agreement. That agreement provided that the Miniso Group would contribute Miniso Brand products including, without limitation, inventory and standardized Miniso store fixtures (the "Miniso Products") equivalent in value to 20,000,000 RMB and that certain investments would be made to set up a company or companies to operate under the Miniso Brand in Canada.

12 The terms of these agreements, as later amended, included that:

a) The Miniso Group agreed to supply Miniso Products to the Canadian operations for sale in various stores in exchange for payment; and

b) The Canadian operations were to be conducted under the Miniso Group's standard master license agreement, which would allow the Miniso Group to control the use of the Miniso Brand (of which the Miniso Products are a part), throughout the Canadian operations.

13 Starting in 2017, the Migu Group (through MC Investments) began incorporating various subsidiaries. MC Investments owns and controls each of the other named respondent subsidiaries (the "Subsidiaries"). Although the corporate structure is somewhat unclear at this time, these Subsidiaries, either alone or through partnerships or joint ventures, have opened or are in the process of opening retail stores throughout Canada that sell Miniso Brand products (the "Outlet Stores"). Some of the Subsidiaries own more than one Outlet Store and some were incorporated in anticipation of opening additional Outlet Stores.

14 As part of the arrangements, an entity related to the Miniso Group granted to Migu (on behalf of the Migu Group) the right to use and sell Miniso Products and display the Miniso Trademarks in Canada pursuant to a trademark licence agreement dated June 1, 2018 (the "Licence Agreement"). The Licence Agreement contained the following material terms, among others:

a) The Migu Group was only permitted to sell Miniso Products via the Outlet Stores, unless otherwise agreed to by the Miniso Group;

b) The Migu Group was permitted to grant sub-licenses to sub-licensees at its discretion subject to, among others, the condition that each sub-license would require each sub-licensee to be bound by the terms of the Licence Agreement; and

c) The Miniso Group could terminate the Licence Agreement in the event that Migu became insolvent or committed an act of bankruptcy.

15 The Migu Group, through the Subsidiaries, have opened, or are in the process of opening a number of Outlet Stores across Canada (78 estimated at the time of the hearing). The Outlet Stores are located in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec. All Outlet Stores operate out of leased premises. There are two Miniso branded retail locations operating in Nova Scotia in which the Migu Group has an interest, but which are not operated by the Migu Group. The Migu Group also leases several warehouses, distribution centres and offices in various locations. The Migu Group's head office is located in Richmond, B.C.

16 In some cases, the Migu Group contracted with individual investors (the "Investors") to open Outlet Stores partnered with one of the Subsidiaries. It is believed that, in most instances, MC Investments (on behalf of the Migu Group) and an Investor would enter into two agreements to document their arrangement, as follows:

a) An "Investment and Cooperation Agreement", whereby MC Investments and the Investor would agree that, in exchange for the Investor's investment, MC Investments would incorporate a company (one of the Subsidiaries) to operate and manage an Outlet Store selling Miniso branded products. As part of this, MC Investments would grant to the Subsidiary a sublicense permitting it to sell Miniso branded products and to use the Miniso Trademarks under the Miniso Brand; and

b) A "Limited Partnership Agreement", whereby the Investor and MC Investments would act as limited partners and the Subsidiary (through which the Outlet Store would operate) would act as general partner.

17 The parties refer to these arrangements together as the "Joint Venture Store Agreements".

18 In cases where MC Investments entered into a Limited Partnership Agreement with respect to an Outlet Store, the Subsidiary which operated such Outlet Store either acted as general partner to the partnership formed by the Limited Partnership Agreement, or incorporated a general partner in which it held a 51% ownership interest (the "JV Store Affiliates"), with the remaining 49% being owned by the applicable Investors.

19 The Miniso Group understands that each of the Outlet Stores holds a separate bank account through the applicable Subsidiary that operates that Store (collectively, the "Deposit Accounts"), the majority of which are held at TD Canada Trust, which are used for the receipt of cash sales and credit card sales at the Outlet Stores. In addition, the Miniso Group understand that MC Investments holds a master Canadian-dollar account (the "Master Account") and that, historically, the Deposit Accounts were manually swept on a regular basis, at the Migu Group's discretion, into the Master Account.

20 The employees are all employed by MC Investments. The Migu Group currently directly employ approximately 700 people on a part-time or full-time basis. There is no union and collective bargaining agreement in place.

# EVENTS LEADING TO INSOLVENCY

For some years now, the Miniso Group has shipped and delivered a substantial amount of Miniso Products to the Migu Group. The Miniso Group is the primary supplier of product and inventory to the Migu Group, such that it is estimated that Miniso Product accounts for 80-90% of all merchandise sold in the Outlet Stores. During that time period and until 2018, the Miniso Group shipped and sold approximately \$30 million of Miniso Products to the Migu Group, which was then distributed to the Subsidiaries for sale in the Outlet Stores.

In December 2017, Miniso International Hong Kong Limited, on behalf of the Miniso Group, advanced a US\$2.4 million demand loan to MC Investments (on behalf of the Migu Group) to fund the Migu Group's working capital requirements.

In October 2018, the Migu Group also received a substantial amount of Miniso Products valued at approximately \$17.5 million. The Miniso Group was not paid for this shipment.

In the fall of 2018, the Miniso Group and the Migu Group had a dispute about the demand loan and account receivable. This led to the Miniso Group making demand on the Migu Group for payment. Later still, in mid-December 2018, the Miniso Group filed an application in this Court for a bankruptcy order against the Migu Group.

In January 2019, the dispute was resolved when the parties entered into a forbearance agreement. The forbearance agreement provided that:

a) The Migu Group acknowledged and agreed that the demand loan and inventory receivable was due and owing to the Miniso Group;

b) By January 21, 2019, or as otherwise agreed, the parties agreed to negotiate an agreement by which the Miniso Group would acquire all of the assets of the Migu Group relating to its Canadian operations; and

c) The Miniso Group agreed to forbear for a period of time from taking steps to collect the demand loan and the account receivable. In addition, in the meantime, the Miniso Group agreed to continue to supply Miniso Products to the Migu Group, with the purchase price to be added to the outstanding indebtedness. Title to the Miniso Products remained with the Miniso Group until payment in full was made for them.

26 On January 4, 2019, as a condition to the Miniso Group's forbearance:

a) The Migu Group granted to the Miniso Group a general security agreement securing the past and future obligations owing to the Miniso Group;

b) Mr. Xu postponed the security held by him against the Migu Group to the security in favour of the Miniso Group; and

c) The Migu Group entered into a temporary licence agreement for the use of the Miniso Brand during the period of the forbearance.

On March 5, 2019, the Migu Group provided a further general security agreement to the Miniso Group as security for its obligations to the Miniso Group. Mr. Xu, MC Store and MC Investments also executed priority agreements in favour of the Miniso Group.

On February 23, 2019, various entities entered into an asset purchase agreement by which the Migu Group agreed to sell its Canadian operations Miniso Lifestyle Canada Inc. ("Miniso Lifestyle") or a designated purchaser (the "APA"). The APA provided that:

a) The Migu Group appointed Miniso Lifestyle to operate and manage the Canadian operations until the earlier of the closing of the sale under the APA or termination of the APA;

b) The Miniso Group would continue to supply the Miniso Products to MC Investments; and

c) Grant Thornton LLP would be engaged as auditor to conduct an audit of the Canadian operations of the Migu Group to determine the amount of net capital invested by the Migu Group, including Mr. Xu, for the purpose of determining the purchase price payable under the APA.

In addition, on March 5, 2019, the Miniso Group provided financial support to the Migu Group pending a closing or termination of the APA. Miniso Lifestyle advanced \$1.5 million to the Migu Group to be used to fund its Canadian operations. In addition, Miniso Lifestyle deposited \$1.5 million in escrow pending the closing of the transaction contemplated in the APA or the termination of the APA.

30 After completing its due diligence, the Miniso Group did not waive the conditions in the APA. Accordingly, effective June 30, 2019, the APA expired.

On June 25, 2019, the Miniso Group's counsel demanded payment of the amounts owing under the demand loan, the earlier account receivable and the amounts owing for the further supply of Miniso Products after January 2019. On July 3, 2019, the Miniso Group's counsel demanded the return of the deposit that had been placed in escrow and payment of the March 2019 loan.

## CURRENT STATUS

As of July 3, 2019, the total indebtedness owing from the Migu Group to the Miniso Group was approximately \$35.5 million.

33 The Miniso Group is the primary secured creditor of the Migu Group's assets, under two general security agreements (except in Quebec where no security is held). There are other minor secured interests registered by certain equipment financiers and landlords. Mr. Xu still holds security against the assets, which is subordinated to the Miniso Group.

34 The Migu Group is current in respect of its obligations to pay employee wages and related remittances. However, it is possible that some or all employees are owed accrued and unused vacation pay. The Migu Group does not have a pension plan for their employees.

35 It is uncertain if the Migu Group's provincial sales tax remittances are current.

As noted, all of the premises from which the Migu Group operates across Canada are leased. The Migu Group currently remits monthly rents of approximately \$1.79 million. Some of the July rental payments (for 20 stores) have been paid; however, rent for the remainder of the premises, totalling approximately \$1.16 million, has not been paid.

The Migu Group owes approximately \$2 million in other accrued and unpaid unsecured liabilities, including to suppliers and service providers. It is anticipated that the Migu Group will honour outstanding gift card and credit notes during these *CCAA* proceedings and honour existing warranty and return policies.

38 The Migu Group's consolidated assets, as at May 31, 2019, had a book value of approximately \$53.3 million.

39 The Migu Group's value is almost entirely derived from their ability to sell and market Miniso Products under the Miniso Brand in Canada through the various agreements with the Miniso Group and importantly, their licence agreements with the Miniso Group. As of this date, the Miniso Group has terminated the Migu Group's right to sell and market the Miniso Brand in Canada and the Miniso Group will not deliver further product, save on terms acceptable to the Miniso Group. As such, the Migu Group is no longer able to market and sell the Miniso Brand. In addition, the Miniso Product in the possession of the Migu Group is the property of the Miniso Group until it is paid for.

40 The result is obvious - the Migu Group cannot operate their business and generate revenue without the cooperation and support of the Miniso Group.

# **CCAA ISSUES**

41 I will briefly discuss the various issues that arose on this application for the Initial Order.

## Statutory Requirements

42 The *CCAA* applies in respect of a "debtor company" or "affiliated debtor companies" where the total amount of claims against the debtor or its affiliates exceeds 5 million: CCAA, s. 3(1). "Debtor company" is defined in s. 2 of the CCAA to include any company that is bankrupt or insolvent.

I am satisfied that each of the companies within the Migu Group is a "company" existing under the laws of Canada or one of the provinces and that the claims against them exceed \$5 million.

Further, I am satisfied that the Migu Group, either individually or collectively, are unable to meet their liabilities as they come due and are therefore insolvent, and thus each is a "debtor company" within the meaning of the *CCAA*: see Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 2; *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 21-22; leave to appeal refd, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refd [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.).

The *CCAA* expressly grants standing to creditors, such as the Miniso Group, to commence proceedings in respect of a debtor company: CCAA, ss. 4-5; *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, [2008] O.J. No. 1818 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 34.

## **Objectives of the CCAA**

In *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.), the Court provided a detailed analysis of the purpose and policy behind the *CCAA*. Of particular note were the Court's comments that:

a) the purpose of the *CCAA* is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets (para. 15); and

b) the *CCAA*'s distinguishing feature is a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to use its discretion to make the order necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the *CCAA*'s objectives. The courts have used its *CCAA* jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways (para. 19).

47 The commencement of *CCAA* proceedings is a proper exercise of creditors' rights where, ideally, the *CCAA* will preserve the going-concern value of the business and allow it to continue for the benefit of the "whole economic community", including the many stakeholders here. This is intended to allow stakeholders to avoid losses that would be suffered in an enforcement and liquidation scenario: *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada*, [1991] O.J. No. 944 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 49; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 33 and 40.

48 The imperatives facing both the Miniso Group and the Migu Group here are stark.

49 Without the cooperation of the Miniso Group, including access to immediate interim financing from the Miniso Group, the Migu Group will be unable to meet their liabilities as they become due and it will not be able to continue their operations and preserve their assets. The Migu Group is facing numerous claims from creditors other than the Miniso Group.

50 In addition, the Migu Group's ability to repay the indebtedness owed to the Miniso Group will be severely compromised in the event of a receivership and liquidation.

51 Simply put, the Migu Group cannot proceed with its business operations without the ongoing support of the Miniso Group.

52 There is no doubt that the Miniso Group has dictated the course forward, for the most part. The Miniso Group holds first ranking security over all of the Migu Group's assets. The Miniso Group has determined that a *CCAA* process is the best means to ensure the preservation and sale of the Migu Group's business as a going concern and maintain enterprise value for the benefit of all stakeholders, including the Miniso Group. In addition, as discussed below, the Miniso Group has agreed to provide interim financing during the course of the restructuring in order to allow that process to unfold.

53 I have no doubt that the Migu Group has asserted its wishes and wants within the context of the past and ongoing negotiations between the two Groups. However, the Migu Group now grudgingly accepted its fate and did not oppose the relief sought here.

In addition, I was satisfied that the stakeholders require the relief sought in the Initial Order on an urgent basis in order to allow the Migu Group to continue operating their business. The need for cash was immediate and without access to interim financing and the stay of proceedings, the Migu Group was not be able to preserve the value of their business or even ensure the coordinated realization of their assets. As such, the Initial Order was the best option toward preserving the Migu Group's enterprise value for the benefit of their stakeholders.

55 After considering all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that these *CCAA* proceedings can assist in preserving value for the stakeholders, until a longer term solution is found.

## The Stay of Proceedings

<sup>56</sup> In addressing the granting of a stay of proceeding in an initial order under the *CCAA*, Justice Farley in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*, *Re*, [1993] O.J. No. 14 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) stated:

[5] ... a judge has the discretion under the CCAA to make [an] order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. ...

[6] ... It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain the approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed ...

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors ...

I was satisfied that it was appropriate to exercise my discretion under s. 11.02(1) of the CCAA to grant a stay that temporarily enjoins the Migu Group's creditors from proceeding with claims against the debtor companies. This stay of proceedings will prevent any creditor from gaining any advantage that might otherwise be obtained. It will also facilitate the ongoing operations of the Migu Group's business to preserve value and provide the Group with the necessary breathing room to carry out a restructuring or organized sales process.

58 The Miniso Group sought a stay not only against the Migu Group, but also with respect to other entities that are not parties to this proceeding, namely the JV Store Affiliates. The JV Store Affiliates are the general partner companies or partnerships formed to operate the Outlet Stores.

59 The Court has broad jurisdiction under s. 11.02(1) of the CCAA to impose stays of proceedings where it is just and reasonable to do so, including with respect to third party non-applicants.

60 In *Cinram International Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), the court discussed circumstances that could justify extending the stay to third party non-applicants:

[64] The Courts have found it just and reasonable to grant a stay of proceedings against third party non-applicants in a number of circumstances, including:

a. where it is important to the reorganization process;

b. where the business operations of the Applicants and the third party non-applicants are intertwined and the third parties are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CCAA (such as partnerships that are not "companies" under the CCAA);

c. against non-applicant subsidiaries of a debtor company where such subsidiaries were guarantors under the note indentures issued by the debtor company; and

d. against non-applicant subsidiaries relating to any guarantee, contribution or indemnity obligation, liability or claim in respect of obligations and claims against the debtor companies.

As noted in *Cinram International Inc.*, there is specific authority to grant a stay of proceedings against entities within a limited partnership context, where the business operations of the debtor companies are intertwined within that corporate/ partnership structure: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* at paras. 12, 16-21; *Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 33-34.

I found that it was just and appropriate to extend the stay in these proceedings to include the JV Store Affiliates in the circumstances. The business operations of the Outlet Stores are intertwined with the JV Store Affiliates. There is also some intertwining of the financial obligations of the Migu Group and that of the JV Store Affiliates.

The draft Initial Order sought a stay for 10 days until July 22, 2019. It appears that the length of the stay was set at 10 days in light of the uncertainty with respect to amendments proposed to the *CCAA* by the Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1 Part 4 ("Bill C-97") tabled in Parliament in March 2019.

64 With respect to initial applications under the CCAA, ss. 136-138 of Division 5 (Enhancing Retirement Security) of Bill C-97 contains an important amendment. Section 137 includes an amendment to s. 11.02(1), as follows:

## Stays, etc. — initial application

**11.02 (1)** A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than <u>10</u> days,

[Emphasis added.]

65 Bill C-97 received Royal Assent on June 21, 2019. However, s. 152 of Bill C-97 provides that the amendments to the *CCAA* come into force on a day to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council. As best the parties have discerned, no such order in Council has yet been pronounced.

The intent behind the new s. 11.02(1) is clear. It limits the exercise of discretion by the Court in determining the length of any stay such that the maximum amount of any stay will be 10 days, as opposed to the previous 30-day limit.

In any regard, I was satisfied that the relief sought here for a 10-day stay was appropriate. At this time, only the Miniso Group has been involved in this process. All parties recognize that many other stakeholders' interests are at play here. Those persons are entitled to notice as soon as possible so that they can appear and be heard in respect of the relief granted in the Initial Order and in terms of any relief that might be granted in this proceeding in the future.

68 I therefore exercised my discretion and concluded that the 10-day stay was appropriate in the circumstances.

# The Monitor

The Miniso Group proposed that Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. ("A&M") act as the monitor. As I will discuss below, the relief sought would vest A&M with powers greater than is usually found in a *CCAA* proceeding, giving the monitor more oversight and power to direct the business operations of the Migu Group over the course of the restructuring.

70 In the usual fashion, A&M filed a Pre-Filing Report as the proposed monitor dated July 12, 2019.

A&M indicated that it has no conflicts that would prevent it from acting as a monitor in this proceeding: *CCAA* s. 11.7(2). A&M have consented to act as monitor and to provide supervision and monitoring during the proceedings. In addition, in accordance with the Initial Order, A&M agreed to manage the Migu Group's business during these proceedings, including by engaging Miniso Lifestyle under a management services agreement, until the implementation of a restructuring transaction.

72 I was satisfied that A&M is an appropriate entity to be appointed as monitor in these proceedings (the "Monitor").

# Interim Financing

The Miniso Group sought an order to approve interim financing for the Migu Group in order to allow the Migu Group to meet its obligations over the stay period granted under the Initial Order. In consultation with the Monitor, the Miniso Group agreed to advance up to \$2 million to the Migu Group under an interim credit facility agreement to allow the Migu Group to pay their ongoing business and restructuring expenses.

As is typically the case, it was a condition of any advance under the interim financing that the lender be granted a priority Court-ordered charge on all the assets, rights, undertakings and properties of the Migu Group as security for amounts advanced, to rank after the proposed administration charge discussed below.

Section 11.2(1) of the CCAA vests the Court with jurisdiction to grant an interim debtor-in-possession a financing charge in priority to the claim of any secured creditor of the debtor company, on notice to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Section 11.2(4) of the CCAA sets out the non-exhaustive factors that the Court may consider before granting such a charge:

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under the CCAA;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report, if any.

76 Bill C-97 is also relevant to this aspect of the relief sought in respect of the interim financing.

577 Section 136 of Bill C-97 provides for a new s. 11.001. This new section introduces, within the context of s. 11 orders generally, a restriction on the Court's discretion to not only order what is "appropriate" under s. 11, but also only what is "reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course" during the relevant stay period:

#### **Relief reasonably necessary**

**11.001** An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be <u>limited to relief that is</u> reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that <u>period</u>.

[Emphasis added.]

78 Specific amendments in respect of interim financing are also found in Bill C-97 and dovetail the above restriction in s. 11.001 as to what is "reasonably necessary". Section 138 of Bill C-97 provides for the addition of a new s. 11.2(5) of the CCAA, as follows:

#### Additional factor — initial application

(5) When an application is made under subsection (1) at the same time as an initial application referred to in subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection, <u>no order shall be made under subsection</u> (1) unless the court is also satisfied that the terms of the loan are limited to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

[Emphasis added.]

Accordingly, the intent of Parliament under the new s. 11.2(5) is to curtail the discretion of the Court to grant interim financing in the stay period under an initial order (i.e. up to 10 days) to only what is "reasonably necessary" during that stay period.

This provision is not inconsistent with the current approach of Canadian courts when exercising its discretion under s. 11.2 of the CCAA. Indeed, the provisions of the new s. 11.2(5) are echoed in Justice Farley's comments in Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re19996 C.B.R. (4th) 314(Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]):

[24] It follows from what I have said that, in my opinion, extraordinary relief such as DIP financing with super priority status should be kept, in Initial Orders, to what is reasonably necessary to meet the debtor company's urgent needs over the sorting-out period. Such measures involve what may be a significant re-ordering of priorities from those in place before the application is made, not in the sense of altering the existing priorities as between the various secured creditors but in the sense of placing encumbrances ahead of those presently in existence. Such changes should not be imported lightly, if at all, into the creditors mix; and affected parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to think about their potential

impact, and to consider such things as whether or not the CCAA approach to the insolvency is the appropriate one in the circumstances — as opposed, for instance, to a receivership or bankruptcy — and whether or not, or to what extent, they are prepared to have their positions affected by DIP or super priority financing. As Mr. Dunphy noted, in the context of this case, the object should be to "keep the lights [of the company] on" and enable it to keep up with appropriate preventative maintenance measures, but the Initial Order itself should approach that objective in a judicious and cautious matter.

[Emphasis added.]

81 A consideration of the proposal for interim financing here is very much informed by the considerable uncertainty about what financial resources are available to the Migu Group at this time.

The Monitor reports that the opening cash position of the Migu Group is approximately \$1.4 million as of July 12, 2019. However, certain creditors have recently filed an action against the Migu Group and, on July 9, 2019, obtained a garnishing order for \$1,040,772.50 as against MC Investments' Master Account at TD Canada Trust. It is therefore possible that TD Canada Trust has paid that amount or some of that amount into court or, at least, frozen the balance in Master Account. If that has happened, then the balance on hand is no longer available for the Migu Group's needs.

83 The cash flow indicates that payroll of approximately \$700,000 was to be due the week after the Initial Order was granted. In addition, rental payments of approximately \$800,000 were necessary in the immediate future. The cash flow projections assume ongoing sales, but that amount is also uncertain.

84 The Monitor supported the granting of the interim financing, in light of the needs of the Migu Group required during the restructuring and in light of the uncertainty about current financial resources.

I was satisfied that the s. 11.2(4) factors supported the approval of the \$2 million interim financing and the granting of a charge to secure the amounts advanced.

I accepted the submissions of the Miniso Group, supported by the Monitor, that the intention is to develop and prepare a restructuring transaction, including a restructuring and a sale of some part of the Migu Group's Canadian operations, as soon as practicable. It is obvious that financing is required to continue operations. With this financing, the Migu Group is able to continue to operate the Outlet Stores, with continued employment of their store-level employees and ongoing payment of rents, while they work with the Monitor and the Miniso Group to formulate a plan. The interim financing is therefore necessary to permit the Migu Group to maintain the value of the enterprise while they pursue a restructuring.

In addition, I was provided some assurance that the interim financing will be used only by the Migu Group in accordance with the direct supervision of the Monitor. The Monitor's powers include the monitoring, review and direction regarding the Migu Group's receipts and disbursements.

I also approached the matter of interim financing in the spirit of the new s. 11.2(5) of the CCAA. I was satisfied that, in these unique and uncertain circumstances, the \$2 million of interim financing was potentially reasonably necessary to address the needs of the Migu Group until the comeback hearing 10 days later on July 22, 2019.

89 In addition, in order to reflect the Court's clear intention in that respect, the Initial Order was amended to limit the Migu Group's use of the \$2 million interim financing by provided that:

50. ... until the Comeback Hearing, borrowings are limited to the minimum amount required to cover all expenses reasonably incurred by the Debtors in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course.

I also concluded that the interim financing was on commercially reasonable terms: allowing for draws of \$250,000; no standby fee; interest rate of 10% per annum; and, no prepayment penalty.

## **Restructuring Charges**

91 The Miniso Group sought an administration charge over the Migu Group's assets, properties, and undertakings up to the maximum amount of \$1 million to secure payment of the fees and disbursements of the Monitor, and its and the Migu Group's legal counsel, incurred in connection with services rendered both before and after the commencement of these *CCAA* proceedings. The administration charge sought is to rank in priority to all other encumbrances, including all other court-ordered charges.

92 Section 11.52 of the CCAA expressly provides the Court with the power to grant a charge in respect of professional fees and disbursements on notice to affected secured creditors.

Administration charges are a usual feature of *CCAA* initial orders. As stated in *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 506 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 66, unless professional advisor fees are protected by way of a charge, the objectives of the *CCAA* would be frustrated as professionals would be unlikely to risk offering services without any assurance of ultimately being paid. Failing to provide protection for professional fees will "result in the overwhelming likelihood that the *CCAA* proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings".

<sup>94</sup> The basis for an administration charge is well made out here, particularly given the Miniso Group's substantial and first ranking charge over the Migu Group's assets.

95 In *Canwest Publishing Inc.* at para. 54, the court refers to certain factors that could be considered in determining the amount of an administration charge:

- (a) the size and complexity of the business being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

I was satisfied that a \$1 million limit for the administration charge was appropriate. The amount of the administration charge was determined in consultation with the Monitor. I concluded that this amount was fair and reasonable in light of the number of stakeholders, the size and complexity of the Migu Group's business and the scope and complexity of the proposed restructuring.

97 The Miniso Group was also seeking a directors' and officers' charge (the "D&O Charge") over the Migu Group's assets, properties and undertakings to indemnify the directors and officers in respect of liabilities they may incur as directors and officers during these proceedings, up to a maximum of \$1 million.

Pursuant to s. 11.51(1) of the CCAA, the Court has jurisdiction to grant a charge to secure a directors' and officers' indemnification on a priority basis on notice to the affected secured creditors. The charge must relate to any obligations or liabilities that may be incurred after the commencement of proceedings. The court must be satisfied with the amount of the charge, that insurance is not otherwise available (s. 11.51(3)) and that the charge will not provide coverage for wilful misconduct or gross negligence (s. 11.51(4)): *Canwest Publishing Inc.* at paras. 56-57.

Here, the extent to which the directors and officers of the Migu Group may be exposed is unknown to a large degree. The Miniso Group has been advised that the directors and officers of the Migu Group do not have any directors' and officers' liability insurance in place. In consultation with the Migu Group, the Monitor has recommended that the D&O Charge be limited to \$1 million.

100 I concluded that the D&O Charge was necessary and appropriate in the circumstances. The D&O Charge will ensure that the directors and officers of the Migu Group continue in their current capacities in the context of these *CCAA* proceedings. I am advised that the directors and officers of the Migu Group are prepared to continue in their roles during these proceedings.

101 I also accepted the Miniso Group's proposal that the various restructuring charges granted rank in priority, as follows:

a) Firstly, the administration charge (maximum \$1 million);

b) Secondly, the interim financing charge (maximum \$2 million, plus interest, costs, fees and disbursements); and

c) Thirdly, the D&O Charge (maximum \$1 million).

#### Restructuring

102 At this preliminary stage, the germ of the restructuring plan has been formulated by the Miniso Group and generally provides:

a) There will be a consensual realization process toward ensuring the preservation of the Migu Group's Canadian operations;

b) Miniso Lifestyle will manage the Canadian operations on behalf of the Migu Group during the *CCAA* proceedings in accordance with the management services agreement;

c) The Migu Group will not have any further communications with landlords, creditors or other stakeholders, except as approved by the Miniso Group;

d) The Monitor will consult with the Miniso Group and, with respect to certain premises, the Migu Group, regarding which real property leases are to be terminated. Some leases are personally guaranteed by entities who want to be consulted before any disclaimer. Sales at Outlet Stores would continue during the 30-day disclaimer period and retail employees would be incentivized to continue their employment during that time;

e) A&M will have enhanced powers as Monitor to manage the Canadian operations and negotiate and implement a transaction, in consultation with the Migu Group; and

f) By that anticipated transaction, the Miniso Group would acquire certain assets of the Migu Group comprising some or all of the Canadian operations so as to allow continued operation of certain of the Outlet Stores.

103 The stay under the Initial Order will remain in place until July 22, 2019. By that time, the numerous other stakeholders will have been served and they will have time to enable them to consider the impact of these *CCAA* proceedings and their position, if any, in response to it.

104 At the comeback hearing, the Court and all other stakeholders will have updated information as to the status of the Migu Group. In the meantime, the stay will be in place to allow the Monitor to operate the business and maintain the *status quo* while it works with the Miniso Group and Migu Group to develop a restructuring plan. The best estimate at the time of the hearing was that such a plan may be ready to present to the creditors within a few months.

## CONCLUSION

105 At the conclusion of the hearing, I granted the Initial Order, as proposed, with certain amendments that arose from a consideration of certain issues during the course of the hearing.

Petition granted.

# Footnotes

- 1 (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), para. 47.
- 2 2009 CanLII 32699
- 3 2009 ABQB 78 (Alta. Q.B.)

# TAB 19

#### 2010 ONSC 222 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222, [2010] O.J. No. 188, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115

# IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

Pepall J.

Judgment: January 18, 2010 Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb, Duncan Ault for Applicant, LP Entities Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders' Syndicate Peter Griffin for Management Directors Robin B. Schwill, Natalie Renner for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.3 Arrangements

XIX.3.a Approval by creditors Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.5 Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Miscellaneous

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business. Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by creditors CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business — In circumstances, it was appropriate to allow CPI to file and present plan only to secured creditors.

#### **Table of Authorities**

#### Cases considered by Pepall J.:

*Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — considered *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (2003), 310 N.R. 200 (note), 2003 CarswellOnt 730, 2003 CarswellOnt 731, 180 O.A.C. 399 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54, 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Philip Services Corp., Re (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 159, 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

#### Statutes considered:

*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

- s. 4 considered
- s. 5 considered
- s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.4(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] referred to
- s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 s. 137(2) — considered

Pepall J.:

**Reasons for Decision** 

#### Introduction

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global") is a leading Canadian media company with interests in (i) newspaper publishing and digital media; and (ii) free-to-air television stations and subscription based specialty television channels. Canwest Global, the entities in its Canadian television business (excluding CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries) and the National Post Company (which prior to October 30, 2009 owned and published the National Post) (collectively, the "CMI Entities"), obtained protection from their creditors in a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*<sup>1</sup> ("CCAA") proceeding on October 6, 2009.<sup>2</sup> Now, the Canwest Global Canadian newspaper entities with the exception of National Post Inc. seek similar protection. Specifically, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. ("CPI"), Canwest Books Inc. ("CBI"), and Canwest (Canada) Inc. ("CCI") apply for an order pursuant to the CCAA. They also seek to have the stay of proceedings and the other benefits of the order extend to Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Société en Commandite (the "Limited Partnership"). The Applicants and the Limited Partnership are referred to as the "LP Entities" throughout these reasons. The term "Canwest" will be used to refer to the Canwest enterprise as a whole. It includes the LP Entities and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries which are not applicants in this proceeding.

2 All appearing on this application supported the relief requested with the exception of the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders. That Committee represents certain unsecured creditors whom I will discuss more fully later.

3 I granted the order requested with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

I start with three observations. Firstly, Canwest Global, through its ownership interests in the LP Entities, is the largest publisher of daily English language newspapers in Canada. The LP Entities own and operate 12 daily newspapers across Canada. These newspapers are part of the Canadian heritage and landscape. The oldest, The Gazette, was established in Montreal in 1778. The others are the Vancouver Sun, The Province, the Ottawa Citizen, the Edmonton Journal, the Calgary Herald, The Windsor Star, the Times Colonist, The Star Phoenix, the Leader-Post, the Nanaimo Daily News and the Alberni Valley Times. These newspapers have an estimated average weekly readership that exceeds 4 million. The LP Entities also publish 23 non-daily newspapers and own and operate a number of digital media and online operations. The community served by the LP Entities is huge. In addition, based on August 31, 2009 figures, the LP Entities employ approximately 5,300 employees in Canada with approximately 1,300 of those employees working in Ontario. The granting of the order requested is premised on an anticipated going concern sale of the newspaper business of the LP Entities. This serves not just the interests of the LP Entities and their stakeholders but the Canadian community at large.

5 Secondly, the order requested may contain some shortcomings; it may not be perfect. That said, insolvency proceedings typically involve what is feasible, not what is flawless.

6 Lastly, although the builders of this insolvent business are no doubt unhappy with its fate, gratitude is not misplaced by acknowledging their role in its construction.

## **Background Facts**

#### (i) Financial Difficulties

7 The LP Entities generate the majority of their revenues through the sale of advertising. In the fiscal year ended August 31, 2009, approximately 72% of the LP Entities' consolidated revenue derived from advertising. The LP Entities have been seriously affected by the economic downturn in Canada and their consolidated advertising revenues declined substantially in the latter half of 2008 and in 2009. In addition, they experienced increases in certain of their operating costs.

8 On May 29, 2009 the Limited Partnership failed, for the first time, to make certain interest and principal reduction payments and related interest and cross currency swap payments totaling approximately \$10 million in respect of its senior secured credit facilities. On the same day, the Limited Partnership announced that, as of May 31, 2009, it would be in breach of certain financial covenants set out in the credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007 between its predecessor, Canwest Media Works Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent, a syndicate of secured lenders ("the LP Secured Lenders"), and the predecessors of CCI, CPI and CBI as guarantors. The Limited Partnership also failed to make principal, interest and fee payments due pursuant to this credit agreement on June 21, June 22, July 21, July 22 and August 21, 2009.

9 The May 29, 2009, defaults under the senior secured credit facilities triggered defaults in respect of related foreign currency and interest rate swaps. The swap counterparties (the "Hedging Secured Creditors") demanded payment of \$68.9 million. These unpaid amounts rank pari passu with amounts owing under the LP Secured Lenders' credit facilities.

10 On or around August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership and certain of the LP Secured Lenders entered into a forbearance agreement in order to allow the LP Entities and the LP Secured Lenders the opportunity to negotiate a pre-packaged restructuring or reorganization of the affairs of the LP Entities. On November 9, 2009, the forbearance agreement expired and since then, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to demand payment of approximately \$953.4 million, the amount outstanding as at August 31, 2009. Nonetheless, they continued negotiations with the LP Entities. The culmination of this process is that the LP Entities are now seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to provide them with the necessary "breathing space" to restructure and reorganize their businesses and to preserve their enterprise value for the ultimate benefit of their broader stakeholder community.

The Limited Partnership released its annual consolidated financial statements for the twelve months ended August 31, 2009 and 2008 on November 26, 2009. As at August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated assets with a net book value of approximately \$644.9 million. This included consolidated current assets of \$182.7 million and consolidated non-current assets of approximately \$462.2 million. As at that date, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.719 billion (increased from \$1.656 billion as at August 31, 2008). These liabilities consisted of consolidated current liabilities of \$1.612 billion and consolidated non-current liabilities of \$107 million.

12 The Limited Partnership had been experiencing deteriorating financial results over the past year. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership's consolidated revenues decreased by \$181.7 million or 15% to \$1.021 billion as compared to \$1.203 billion for the year ended August 31, 2008. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership reported a consolidated net loss of \$66 million compared to consolidated net earnings of \$143.5 million for fiscal 2008.

## (ii) Indebtedness under the Credit Facilities

13 The indebtedness under the credit facilities of the LP Entities consists of the following.

(a) The LP senior secured credit facilities are the subject matter of the July 10, 2007 credit agreement already mentioned. They are guaranteed by CCI, CPI and CBI. The security held by the LP Secured Lenders has been reviewed by the solicitors for the proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. and considered to be valid and enforceable.<sup>3</sup> As at August 31, 2009, the amounts owing by the LP Entities totaled \$953.4 million exclusive of interest.<sup>4</sup>

(b) The Limited Partnership is a party to the aforementioned foreign currency and interest rate swaps with the Hedging Secured Creditors. Defaults under the LP senior secured credit facilities have triggered defaults in respect of these swap arrangements. Demand for repayment of amounts totaling \$68.9 million (exclusive of unpaid interest) has been made. These obligations are secured.

(c) Pursuant to a senior subordinated credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007, between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders, and others, certain subordinated lenders agreed to provide the Limited Partnership with access to a term credit facility of up to \$75 million. CCI, CPI, and CBI are guarantors. This facility is unsecured, guaranteed on an unsecured basis and currently fully drawn. On June 20, 2009, the Limited Partnership failed to make an interest payment resulting in an event of default under the credit agreement. In addition, the defaults under the senior secured credit facilities resulted in a default under this facility. The senior subordinated lenders are in a position to take steps to demand payment.

(d) Pursuant to a note indenture between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of New York Trust Company of Canada as trustee, and others, the Limited Partnership issued 9.5% per annum senior subordinated unsecured notes due 2015 in the aggregate principal amount of US \$400 million. CPI and CBI are guarantors. The notes are unsecured and guaranteed on an unsecured basis. The noteholders are in a position to take steps to demand immediate payment of all amounts outstanding under the notes as a result of events of default.

14 The LP Entities use a centralized cash management system at the Bank of Nova Scotia which they propose to continue. Obligations owed pursuant to the existing cash management arrangements are secured (the "Cash Management Creditor").

## (iii) LP Entities' Response to Financial Difficulties

15 The LP Entities took a number of steps to address their circumstances with a view to improving cash flow and strengthening their balance sheet. Nonetheless, they began to experience significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and other trade creditors. The LP Entities' debt totals approximately \$1.45 billion and they do not have the liquidity required to make payment in respect of this indebtedness. They are clearly insolvent.

16 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of directors (the "Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives. The Special Committee has appointed Thomas Strike, the President, Corporate Development & Strategy Implementation, as Recapitalization Officer and has retained Gary Colter of CRS Inc. as Restructuring Advisor for the LP Entities (the "CRA"). The President of CPI, Dennis Skulsky, will report directly to the Special Committee.

17 Given their problems, throughout the summer and fall of 2009, the LP Entities have participated in difficult and complex negotiations with their lenders and other stakeholders to obtain forbearance and to work towards a consensual restructuring or recapitalization.

An ad hoc committee of the holders of the senior subordinated unsecured notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee") was formed in July, 2009 and retained Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg as counsel. Among other things, the Limited Partnership agreed to pay the Committee's legal fees up to a maximum of \$250,000. Representatives of the Limited Partnership and their advisors have had ongoing discussions with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee and their counsel was granted access to certain confidential information following execution of a confidentiality agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee has also engaged a financial advisor who has been granted access to the LP Entities' virtual data room which contains confidential information regarding the business and affairs of the LP Entities. There is no evidence of any satisfactory proposal having been made by the noteholders. They have been in a position to demand payment since August, 2009, but they have not done so.

19 In the meantime and in order to permit the businesses of the LP Entities to continue to operate as going concerns and in an effort to preserve the greatest number of jobs and maximize value for the stakeholders of the LP Entities, the LP Entities have been engaged in negotiations with the LP Senior Lenders, the result of which is this CCAA application.

## (iv) The Support Agreement, the Secured Creditors' Plan and the Solicitation Process

20 Since August 31, 2009, the LP Entities and the LP administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders have worked together to negotiate terms for a consensual, prearranged restructuring, recapitalization or reorganization of the business and affairs of the LP Entities as a going concern. This is referred to by the parties as the Support Transaction.

As part of this Support Transaction, the LP Entities are seeking approval of a Support Agreement entered into by them and the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders. 48% of the LP Secured Lenders, the Hedging Secured Creditors, and the Cash Management Creditor (the "Secured Creditors") are party to the Support Agreement.

22 Three interrelated elements are contemplated by the Support Agreement and the Support Transaction: the credit acquisition, the Secured Creditors' plan (the "Plan"), and the sale and investor solicitation process which the parties refer to as SISP.

The Support Agreement contains various milestones with which the LP Entities are to comply and, subject to a successful 23 bid arising from the solicitation process (an important caveat in my view), commits them to support a credit acquisition. The credit acquisition involves an acquisition by an entity capitalized by the Secured Creditors and described as AcquireCo. AcquireCo. would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities (including the shares in National Post Inc.) and assume certain of the liabilities of the LP Entities. It is contemplated that AcquireCo. would offer employment to all or substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and would assume all of the LP Entities' existing pension plans and existing post-retirement and post-employment benefit plans subject to a right by AcquireCo., acting commercially reasonably and after consultation with the operational management of the LP Entities, to exclude certain specified liabilities. The credit acquisition would be the subject matter of a Plan to be voted on by the Secured Creditors on or before January 31, 2010. There would only be one class. The Plan would only compromise the LP Entities' secured claims and would not affect or compromise any other claims against any of the LP Entities ("unaffected claims"). No holders of the unaffected claims would be entitled to vote on or receive any distributions of their claims. The Secured Creditors would exchange their outstanding secured claims against the LP Entities under the LP credit agreement and the swap obligations respectively for their pro rata shares of the debt and equity to be issued by AcquireCo. All of the LP Entities' obligations under the LP secured claims calculated as of the date of closing less \$25 million would be deemed to be satisfied following the closing of the Acquisition Agreement. LP secured claims in the amount of \$25 million would continue to be held by AcquireCo. and constitute an outstanding unsecured claim against the LP Entities.

The Support Agreement contemplates that the Financial Advisor, namely RBC Dominion Securities Inc., under the supervision of the Monitor, will conduct the solicitation process. Completion of the credit acquisition process is subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process. In general terms, the objective of the solicitation process is to obtain a better offer (with some limitations described below) than that reflected in the credit acquisition. If none is obtained in that process, the LP Entities intend for the credit acquisition to proceed assuming approval of the Plan. Court sanction would also be required.

In more detailed terms, Phase I of the solicitation process is expected to last approximately 7 weeks and qualified interested parties may submit non-binding proposals to the Financial Advisor on or before February 26, 2010. Thereafter, the Monitor will assess the proposals to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a Superior Offer. This is in essence a cash offer that is equal to or higher than that represented by the credit acquisition. If there is such a prospect, the Monitor will recommend that the process continue into Phase II. If there is no such prospect, the Monitor will then determine whether there is a Superior Alternative Offer, that is, an offer that is not a Superior Offer but which might nonetheless receive approval from the Secured Creditors. If so, to proceed into Phase II, the Superior Alternative Offer must be supported by Secured Creditors holding more than at least 33.3% of the secured claims. If it is not so supported, the process would be terminated and the LP Entities would then apply for court sanction of the Plan.

26 Phase II is expected to last approximately 7 weeks as well. This period allows for due diligence and the submission of final binding proposals. The Monitor will then conduct an assessment akin to the Phase 1 process with somewhat similar attendant outcomes if there are no Superior Offers and no acceptable Alternative Superior Offers. If there were a Superior Offer or an acceptable Alternative Superior Offer, an agreement would be negotiated and the requisite approvals sought.

27 The solicitation process is designed to allow the LP Entities to test the market. One concern is that a Superior Offer that benefits the secured lenders might operate to preclude a Superior Alternative Offer that could provide a better result for the unsecured creditors. That said, the LP Entities are of the view that the solicitation process and the support transaction present the best opportunity for the businesses of the LP Entities to continue as going concerns, thereby preserving jobs as well as the economic and social benefits of their continued operation. At this stage, the alternative is a bankruptcy or liquidation which would result in significant detriment not only to the creditors and employees of the LP Entities but to the broader community that benefits from the continued operation of the LP Entities' business. I also take some comfort from the position of the Monitor which is best captured in an excerpt from its preliminary Report:

The terms of the Support Agreement and SISP were the subject of lengthy and intense arm's length negotiations between the LP Entities and the LP Administrative Agent. The Proposed Monitor supports approval of the process contemplated

therein and of the approval of those documents, but without in any way fettering the various powers and discretions of the Monitor.

It goes without saying that the Monitor, being a court appointed officer, may apply to the court for advice and directions and also owes reporting obligations to the court.

As to the objection of the Ad Hoc Committee, I make the following observations. Firstly, they represent unsecured subordinated debt. They have been in a position to take action since August, 2009. Furthermore, the LP Entities have provided up to \$250,000 for them to retain legal counsel. Meanwhile, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to enforce their rights through a non-consensual court proceeding and have advised the LP Entities of their abilities in that regard in the event that the LP Entities did not move forward as contemplated by the Support Agreement. With the Support Agreement and the solicitation process, there is an enhanced likelihood of the continuation of going concern operations, the preservation of jobs and the maximization of value for stakeholders of the LP Entities. It seemed to me that in the face of these facts and given that the Support Agreement expired on January 8, 2010, adjourning the proceeding was not merited in the circumstances. The Committee did receive very short notice. Without being taken as encouraging or discouraging the use of the comeback clause in the order, I disagree with the submission of counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee to the effect that it is very difficult if not impossible to stop a process relying on that provision. That provision in the order is a meaningful one as is clear from the decision in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*<sup>5</sup>. On a come back motion, although the positions of parties who have relied bona fide on an Initial Order should not be prejudiced, the onus is on the applicants for an Initial Order to satisfy the court that the existing terms should be upheld.

## **Proposed Monitor**

30 The Applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor. It currently serves as the Monitor in the CMI Entities' CCAA proceeding. It is desirable for FTI to act; it is qualified to act; and it has consented to act. It has not served in any of the incompatible capacities described in section 11.7(2) of the CCAA. The proposed Monitor has an enhanced role that is reflected in the order and which is acceptable.

## **Proposed Order**

As mentioned, I granted the order requested. It is clear that the LP Entities need protection under the CCAA. The order requested will provide stability and enable the LP Entities to pursue their restructuring and preserve enterprise value for their stakeholders. Without the benefit of a stay, the LP Entities would be required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would be unable to continue operating their businesses.

## (a) Threshold Issues

32 The chief place of business of the Applicants is Ontario. They qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. They are affiliated companies with total claims against them that far exceed \$5 million. Demand for payment of the swap indebtedness has been made and the Applicants are in default under all of the other facilities outlined in these reasons. They do not have sufficient liquidity to satisfy their obligations. They are clearly insolvent.

# (b) Limited Partnership

The Applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and the other relief requested to the Limited Partnership. The CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or a limited partnership but courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the protections of an Initial CCAA Order to partnerships when it was just and convenient to do so. The relief has been held to be appropriate where the operations of the partnership are so intertwined with those of the debtor companies that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted: *Canwest Global Communications Corp.*,  $Re^{6}$  and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*,  $Re^{7}$ .

In this case, the Limited Partnership is the administrative backbone of the LP Entities and is integral to and intertwined with the Applicants' ongoing operations. It owns all shared information technology assets; it provides hosting services for all Canwest properties; it holds all software licences used by the LP Entities; it is party to many of the shared services agreements involving other Canwest entities; and employs approximately 390 full-time equivalent employees who work in Canwest's shared services area. The Applicants state that failure to extend the stay to the Limited Partnership would have a profoundly negative impact on the value of the Applicants, the Limited Partnership and the Canwest Global enterprise as a whole. In addition, exposing the assets of the Limited Partnership to the demands of creditors would make it impossible for the LP Entities to successfully restructure. I am persuaded that under these circumstances it is just and convenient to grant the request.

#### (c) Filing of the Secured Creditors' Plan

The LP Entities propose to present the Plan only to the Secured Creditors. Claims of unsecured creditors will not be addressed.

36 The CCAA seems to contemplate a single creditor-class plan. Sections 4 and 5 state:

s.4 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, it the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

s.5 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

37 Case law has interpreted these provisions as authorizing a single creditor-class plan. For instance, Blair J. (as he then was) stated in *Philip Services Corp., Re*<sup>8</sup> : " There is no doubt that a debtor is at liberty, under the terms of sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA, to make a proposal to secured creditors or to unsecured creditors or to both groups." <sup>9</sup> Similarly, in *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*<sup>10</sup>, the Court of Appeal stated: "It may also be noted that s. 5 of the CCAA contemplates a plan which is a compromise between a debtor company and its secured creditors and that by the terms of s. 6 of the Act, applied to the facts of this case, the plan is binding only on the secured creditors and the company and not on the unsecured creditors." <sup>11</sup>

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a debtor has the statutory authority to present a plan to a single class of creditors. In *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*, the issue was raised in the context of the plan's sanction by the court and a consideration of whether the plan was fair and reasonable as it eliminated the opportunity for unsecured creditors to realize anything. The basis of the argument was that the motions judge had erred in not requiring a more complete and in depth valuation of the company's assets relative to the claims of the secured creditors.

In this case, I am not being asked to sanction the Plan at this stage. Furthermore, the Monitor will supervise a vigorous and lengthy solicitation process to thoroughly canvass the market for alternative transactions. The solicitation should provide a good indication of market value. In addition, as counsel for the LP Entities observed, the noteholders and the LP Entities never had any forbearance agreement. The noteholders have been in a position to take action since last summer but chose not to do so. One would expect some action on their part if they themselves believed that they "were in the money". While the process is not perfect, it is subject to the supervision of the court and the Monitor is obliged to report on its results to the court.

40 In my view it is appropriate in the circumstances to authorize the LP Entities to file and present a Plan only to the Secured Creditors.

## (D) DIP Financing

41 The Applicants seek approval of a DIP facility in the amount of \$25 million which would be secured by a charge over all of the assets of the LP Entities and rank ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge, and ahead of all other existing security interests except validly perfected purchase money security interests and certain specific statutory encumbrances.

42 Section 11.2 of the CCAA provides the statutory jurisdiction to grant a DIP charge. In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*<sup>12</sup>, I addressed this provision. Firstly, an applicant should address the requirements contained in section 11.2 (1) and then address the enumerated factors found in section 11.2(4) of the CCAA. As that list is not exhaustive, it may be appropriate to consider other factors as well.

43 Applying these principles to this case and dealing firstly with section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, notice either has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security or charge or alternatively they are not affected by the DIP charge. While funds are not anticipated to be immediately necessary, the cash flow statements project a good likelihood that the LP Entities will require the additional liquidity afforded by the \$25 million. The ability to borrow funds that are secured by a charge will help retain the confidence of the LP Entities' trade creditors, employees and suppliers. It is expected that the DIP facility will permit the LP Entities to conduct the solicitation process and consummate a recapitalization transaction of a sale of all or some of its assets. The charge does not secure any amounts that were owing prior to the filing. As such, there has been compliance with the provisions of section 11.2 (1).

Turning then to a consideration of the factors found in section 11.2(4) of the Act, the LP Entities are expected to be subject to these CCAA proceedings until July 31, 2010. Their business and financial affairs will be amply managed during the proceedings. This is a consensual filing which is reflective of the confidence of the major creditors in the current management configuration. All of these factors favour the granting of the charge. The DIP loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement and would ensure the necessary stability during the CCAA process. I have already touched upon the issue of value. That said, in relative terms, the quantum of the DIP financing is not large and there is no readily apparent material prejudice to any creditor arising from the granting of the charge and approval of the financing. I also note that it is endorsed by the proposed Monitor in its report.

45 Other factors to consider in assessing whether to approve a DIP charge include the reasonableness of the financing terms and more particularly the associated fees. Ideally there should be some evidence on this issue. Prior to entering into the forbearance agreement, the LP Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a DIP facility. In this case, some but not all of the Secured Creditors are participating in the financing of the DIP loan. Therefore, only some would benefit from the DIP while others could bear the burden of it. While they may have opted not to participate in the DIP financing for various reasons, the concurrence of the non participating Secured Creditors is some market indicator of the appropriateness of the terms of the DIP financing.

Lastly, I note that the DIP lenders have indicated that they would not provide a DIP facility if the charge was not approved. In all of these circumstances, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and grant the DIP charge.

# (e) Critical Suppliers

47 The LP Entities ask that they be authorized but not required to pay pre-filing amounts owing in arrears to certain suppliers if the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the LP Entities or the potential future benefit of the payments is considerable and of value to the LP Entities as a whole. Such payments could only be made with the consent of the proposed Monitor. At present, it is contemplated that such suppliers would consist of certain newspaper suppliers, newspaper distributors, logistic suppliers and the Amex Bank of Canada. The LP Entities do not seek a charge to secure payments to any of its critical suppliers.

48 Section 11.4 of the CCAA addresses critical suppliers. It states:

11.4(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is

satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods and services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

(2) If the court declares the person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied upon the terms of the order.

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

49 Mr. Byers, who is counsel for the Monitor, submits that the court has always had discretion to authorize the payment of critical suppliers and that section 11.4 is not intended to address that issue. Rather, it is intended to respond to a post-filing situation where a debtor company wishes to compel a supplier to supply. In those circumstances, the court may declare a person to be a critical supplier and require the person to supply. If the court chooses to compel a person to supply, it must authorize a charge as security for the supplier. Mr. Barnes, who is counsel for the LP Entities, submits that section 11.4 is not so limited. Section 11.4 (1) gives the court general jurisdiction to declare a supplier to be a "critical supplier" where the supplier provides goods or services that are essential to the ongoing business of the debtor company. The permissive as opposed to mandatory language of section 11.4 (2) supports this interpretation.

Section 11.4 is not very clear. As a matter of principle, one would expect the purpose of section 11.4 to be twofold: (i) to codify the authority to permit suppliers who are critical to the continued operation of the company to be paid and (ii) to require the granting of a charge in circumstances where the court is compelling a person to supply. If no charge is proposed to be granted, there is no need to give notice to the secured creditors. I am not certain that the distinction between Mr. Byers and Mr. Barnes' interpretation is of any real significance for the purposes of this case. Either section 11.4(1) does not oust the court's inherent jurisdiction to make provision for the payment of critical suppliers where no charge is requested or it provides authority to the court to declare persons to be critical suppliers. Section 11.4(1) requires the person to be a supplier of goods and services that are critical to the companies' operation but does not impose any additional conditions or limitations.

The LP Entities do not seek a charge but ask that they be authorized but not required to make payments for the pre-filing provision of goods and services to certain third parties who are critical and integral to their businesses. This includes newsprint and ink suppliers. The LP Entities are dependent upon a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint and ink and they have insufficient inventory on hand to meet their needs. It also includes newspaper distributors who are required to distribute the newspapers of the LP Entities; American Express whose corporate card programme and accounts are used by LP Entities employees for business related expenses; and royalty fees accrued and owing to content providers for the subscription-based online service provided by FPinfomart.ca, one of the businesses of the LP Entities. The LP Entities believe that it would be damaging to both their ongoing operations and their ability to restructure if they are unable to pay their critical suppliers. I am satisfied that the LP Entities may treat these parties and those described in Mr. Strike's affidavit as critical suppliers but none will be paid without the consent of the Monitor.

## (f) Administration Charge and Financial Advisor Charge

52 The Applicants also seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure the fees of the Monitor, its counsel, the LP Entities' counsel, the Special Committee's financial advisor and counsel to the Special Committee, the CRA and counsel to the CRA. These are professionals whose services are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities' business. This charge is to rank in priority to all other security interests in the LP Entities' assets, with the exception of purchase money security interests and specific statutory encumbrances as provided for in the proposed order. <sup>13</sup> The LP Entities also request a \$10 million charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. The Financial Advisor is providing investment banking

services to the LP Entities and is essential to the solicitation process. This charge would rank in third place, subsequent to the administration charge and the DIP charge.

53 In the past, an administration charge was granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Section 11.52 of the amended CCAA now provides statutory jurisdiction to grant an administration charge. Section 11.52 states:

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the debtor company is subject to a security or charge - in an amount that the court considers appropriate - in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

I am satisfied that the issue of notice has been appropriately addressed by the LP Entities. As to whether the amounts are appropriate and whether the charges should extend to the proposed beneficiaries, the section does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in its assessment. It seems to me that factors that might be considered would include:

- (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

This is not an exhaustive list and no doubt other relevant factors will be developed in the jurisprudence.

There is no question that the restructuring of the LP Entities is large and highly complex and it is reasonable to expect extensive involvement by professional advisors. Each of the professionals whose fees are to be secured has played a critical role in the LP Entities restructuring activities to date and each will continue to be integral to the solicitation and restructuring process. Furthermore, there is no unwarranted duplication of roles. As to quantum of both proposed charges, I accept the Applicants' submissions that the business of the LP Entities and the tasks associated with their restructuring are of a magnitude and complexity that justify the amounts. I also take some comfort from the fact that the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders has agreed to them. In addition, the Monitor supports the charges requested. The quantum of the administration charge appears to be fair and reasonable. As to the quantum of the charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, it is more unusual as it involves an incentive payment but I note that the Monitor conducted its own due diligence and, as mentioned, is supportive of the request. The quantum reflects an appropriate incentive to secure a desirable alternative offer. Based on all of these factors, I concluded that the two charges should be approved.

#### (g) Directors and Officers

56 The Applicants also seek a directors and officers charge ("D & O charge") in the amount of \$35 million as security for their indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed upon the Applicants' directors and officers. The D & O charge will rank

after the Financial Advisor charge and will rank pari passu with the MIP charge discussed subsequently. Section 11.51 of the CCAA addresses a D & O charge. I have already discussed section 11.51 in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*<sup>14</sup> as it related to the request by the CMI Entities for a D & O charge. Firstly, the charge is essential to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. The continued participation of the experienced Boards of Directors, management and employees of the LP Entities is critical to the restructuring. Retaining the current officers and directors will also avoid destabilization. Furthermore, a CCAA restructuring creates new risks and potential liabilities for the directors and officers. The amount of the charge appears to be appropriate in light of the obligations and liabilities that may be incurred by the directors and officers. The charge will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in a worse case scenario. While Canwest Global maintains D & O liability insurance, it has only been extended to February 28, 2009 and further extensions are unavailable. As of the date of the Initial Order, Canwest Global had been unable to obtain additional or replacement insurance coverage.

57 Understandably in my view, the directors have indicated that due to the potential for significant personal liability, they cannot continue their service and involvement in the restructuring absent a D & O charge. The charge also provides assurances to the employees of the LP Entities that obligations for accrued wages and termination and severance pay will be satisfied. All secured creditors have either been given notice or are unaffected by the D & O charge. Lastly, the Monitor supports the charge and I was satisfied that the charge should be granted as requested.

## (h) Management Incentive Plan and Special Arrangements

The LP Entities have made amendments to employment agreements with 2 key employees and have developed certain Management Incentive Plans for 24 participants (collectively the "MIPs"). They seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure these obligations. It would be subsequent to the D & O charge.

59 The CCAA is silent on charges in support of Key Employee Retention Plans ("KERPs") but they have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings. Most recently, in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*<sup>15</sup>, I approved the KERP requested on the basis of the factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*<sup>16</sup> and given that the Monitor had carefully reviewed the charge and was supportive of the request as were the Board of Directors, the Special Committee of the Board of Directors, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Adhoc Committee of Noteholders.

60 The MIPs in this case are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the LP Entities through a successful restructuring. The participants are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. They are experienced executives and have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives to date. They are integral to the continued operation of the business during the restructuring and the successful completion of a plan of restructuring, reorganization, compromise or arrangement.

In addition, it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities in the absence of a charge securing their payments. The departure of senior management would distract from and undermine the restructuring process that is underway and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for these employees. The MIPs provide appropriate incentives for the participants to remain in their current positions and ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in the reorganization process.

62 In this case, the MIPs and the MIP charge have been approved in form and substance by the Board of Directors and the Special Committee of Canwest Global. The proposed Monitor has also expressed its support for the MIPs and the MIP charge in its pre-filing report. In my view, the charge should be granted as requested.

# (i) Confidential Information

63 The LP Entities request that the court seal the confidential supplement which contains individually identifiable information and compensation information including sensitive salary information about the individuals who are covered by the MIPs. It also contains an unredacted copy of the Financial Advisor's agreement. I have discretion pursuant to Section 137(2) of the *Courts*  *of Justice Act*<sup>17</sup> to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. That said, public access in an important tenet of our system of justice.

<sup>64</sup> The threshold test for sealing orders is found in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*<sup>18</sup>. In that case, Iacobucci J. stated that an order should only be granted when: (i) it is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (ii) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

In Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re<sup>19</sup> I applied the Sierra Club test and approved a similar request by the 65 Applicants for the sealing of a confidential supplement containing unredacted copies of KERPs for the employees of the CMI Entities. Here, with respect to the first branch of the Sierra Club test, the confidential supplement contains unredacted copies of the MIPs. Protecting the disclosure of sensitive personal and compensation information of this nature, the disclosure of which would cause harm to both the LP Entities and the MIP participants, is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The information would be of obvious strategic advantage to competitors. Moreover, there are legitimate personal privacy concerns in issue. The MIP participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and their salary information will be kept confidential. With respect to the second branch of the Sierra Club test, keeping the information confidential will not have any deleterious effects. As in the Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re case, the aggregate amount of the MIP charge has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. The salutary effects of sealing the confidential supplement outweigh any conceivable deleterious effects. In the normal course, outside of the context of a CCAA proceeding, confidential personal and salary information would be kept confidential by an employer and would not find its way into the public domain. With respect to the unredacted Financial Advisor agreement, it contains commercially sensitive information the disclosure of which could be harmful to the solicitation process and the salutary effects of sealing it outweigh any deleterious effects. The confidential supplements should be sealed and not form part of the public record at least at this stage of the proceedings.

#### Conclusion

66 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to grant the order requested.

Application granted.

#### Footnotes

- 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended.
- 2 On October 30, 2009, substantially all of the assets and business of the National Post Company were transferred to the company now known as National Post Inc.
- 3 Subject to certain assumptions and qualifications.
- 4 Although not formally in evidence before the court, counsel for the LP Secured Lenders advised the court that currently \$382,889,000 in principal in Canadian dollars is outstanding along with \$458,042,000 in principal in American dollars.
- 5 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 6 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 29.
- 7 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 8 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 9 Ibid at para. 16.

- 10 (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (March 6,2003) [2003 CarswellOnt 730 (S.C.C.)].
- 11 Ibid at para. 34.
- 12 Supra, note 7 at paras. 31-35.
- 13 This exception also applies to the other charges granted.
- 14 Supra note 7 at paras. 44-48.
- 15 Supra note 7.
- 16 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 17 R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended.
- 18 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).
- 19 Supra, note 7 at para. 52.

# TAB 20

#### 2019 BCSC 1234 British Columbia Supreme Court

Miniso International Hong Kong Limited v. Migu Investments Inc.

2019 CarswellBC 2208, 2019 BCSC 1234, 308 A.C.W.S. (3d) 465, 71 C.B.R. (6th) 250

MINISO INTERNATIONAL HONG KONG LIMITED, MINISO INTERNATIONAL (GUANGZHOU) CO. LIMITED, MINISO LIFESTYLE CANADA INC., MIHK MANAGEMENT INC., MINISO TRADING CANADA INC., MINISO CORPORATION and GUANGDONG SAIMAN INVESTMENT CO. LIMITED (Petitioners) and MIGU **INVESTMENTS INC., MINISO CANADA INVESTMENTS INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE** INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE ONE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE TWO INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE THREE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE FOUR INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE FIVE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE SIX INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE SEVEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE EIGHT INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE NINE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE TEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE ELEVEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE TWELVE INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE THIRTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE FOURTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE FIFTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE SIXTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE SEVENTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE EIGHTEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE NINETEEN INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE TWENTY INC., MINISO (CANADA) STORE **TWENTY-ONE INC. and MINISO (CANADA) STORE TWENTY-TWO INC. (Respondents)** 

Fitzpatrick J.

Heard: July 12, 2019 Judgment: July 12, 2019 Written reasons: July 29, 2019 Docket: Vancouver S197744

Counsel: K.M. Jackson, G.P. Nesbitt, for Petitioners V.L. Tickle, D.R. Shouldice, for Respondents

#### **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Bankruptcy and insolvency XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act XIX.2 Initial application XIX.2.h Miscellaneous

#### Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Initial application -- Miscellaneous

Petitioners, secured creditors, were owners of "M" Japanese lifestyle product brand — Respondent debtor companies were Canadian owners and operators who has licensed to use of M brand in Canada, and they also purchased products from creditors for resale in Canada — Creditors advanced US\$2.4 million demand loan to debtors, and debtors received substantial amount of M products valued at approximately \$17.5 million which were not paid for — Creditors demanded payment of amounts owing under demand loan, earlier account receivable and amounts owing for further supply of M products — Total indebtedness owing by debtors to creditors was approximately \$35.5 million, creditors terminated debtors' right to sell and market M brand in Canada and it would not deliver further products — Creditors brought proceedings pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Petition granted — Debtor companies were each "company" existing under laws of Canada or province, claims against them exceeded \$5 million, and debtors were unable to meet their liabilities as they came due and were insolvent and

"debtor company" within meaning of CCAA — CCAA expressly granted standing to creditors to commence proceedings in respect of debtor company — Debtors could not proceed with their business operations without ongoing support of creditors — Stakeholders required relief sought in initial order on urgent basis in order to allow debtors to continue operating their business, and initial order was best option toward preserving debtors' enterprise value for benefit of stakeholders — It was appropriate to grant stay that temporarily enjoyed debtors' creditors from proceeding with claims against them — Proposed monitor was appropriate and was appointed — Factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of CCAA supported approval of \$2 million interim financing and granting of charge to secure amounts advanced — Intention was to develop and prepare restructuring transaction, and it was clear that financing was required to continue operations which would allow debtors to maintain value of enterprise while they pursued restructuring — Interim financing would be used only by debtors in accordance with direct supervision of monitor — Restructuring charges including maximum \$1 million administration charge and maximum \$1 million directors' and officers' charge last Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s 11.2.

#### Table of Authorities

#### Cases considered by *Fitzpatrick J*.:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 2652, 42 C.B.R. (5th) 90, 45 B.L.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Cinram International Inc., Re* (2012), 2012 ONSC 3767, 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3d) 165, 2 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 21, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 147, 1991 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

*Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 625, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314, 96 O.T.C. 272 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

*Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1211, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, [2004] O.T.C. 284 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) - referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201, 338 N.R. 196 (note) (S.C.C.) - referred to

*Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2010), 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.))* [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

*Timminco Ltd., Re* (2012), 2012 ONSC 506, 2012 CarswellOnt 1263, 95 C.C.P.B. 48, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

#### Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 2 "debtor" — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "debtor company" — considered

s. 3(1) — referred to

ss. 4-5 — referred to

- s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.02(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] referred to
- s. 11.51(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.51(3) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] referred to
- s. 11.51(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] referred to
- s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered

## Fitzpatrick J.:

## INTRODUCTION

1 The petitioners bring these proceedings pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "*CCAA*"). Unlike the usual circumstance where the debtor companies commence the proceedings, the petitioners are the secured creditors of the respondent debtor companies, resulting in a creditor-driven *CCAA* proceeding.

2 The petitioners, collectively described as the "Miniso Group", are the owners of the "Miniso" Japanese lifestyle product brand. The Miniso Group manufactures products and operates a number of Miniso stores in Asia where those products are sold. The Miniso Group licenses the "Miniso" name for use in other parts of the world and sells products to those entities.

3 The respondent debtor companies, collectively described as the "Migu Group", are the Canadian owners and operators who have licensed the use of the "Miniso" brand in Canada. The Migu Group also purchases products from the Miniso Group for resale here in Canada.

4 On July 12, 2019, I granted an initial order in this matter (the "Initial Order") with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

## **BACKGROUND FACTS**

5 The evidence at the hearing consisted of the Affidavit #1 of Qihua Chen, an employee of one entity within the Miniso Group, sworn July 11, 2019.

6 The Miniso Group manufacture lifestyle products under the "Miniso" brand name and distribute those products, under licence, to retail outlets selling "Miniso" branded inventory to the public.

7 The Miniso Group, through a related entity, Miniso Hong Kong Limited, holds all applicable trademarks related to the "Miniso" brand (respectively, the "Miniso Trademarks" and the "Miniso Brand"), including in Canada.

8 The Migu Group are a group of corporations formed primarily to sell "Miniso" branded products in Canada under a licensing agreement with the Miniso Group.

9 The respondent Migu Investments Inc. ("Migu") is the parent company. It owns 100% of the respondents Miniso Canada Investments Inc. ("MC Investments") and Miniso (Canada) Store Inc. ("MC Store").

10 The controlling mind of the Migu Group is Tao Xu, a resident of Toronto, Ontario. Mr. Xu owns the only issued and outstanding common voting share of Migu. The only other shares of Migu are non-voting and non-participating preferred shares.

In 2017, the Migu Group acquired the right to use the Miniso Brand in Canada pursuant to various licensing and cooperation agreements with members of the Miniso Group. In addition, on October 7, 2016, various entities entered into a framework cooperation agreement. That agreement provided that the Miniso Group would contribute Miniso Brand products including, without limitation, inventory and standardized Miniso store fixtures (the "Miniso Products") equivalent in value to 20,000,000 RMB and that certain investments would be made to set up a company or companies to operate under the Miniso Brand in Canada.

12 The terms of these agreements, as later amended, included that:

a) The Miniso Group agreed to supply Miniso Products to the Canadian operations for sale in various stores in exchange for payment; and

b) The Canadian operations were to be conducted under the Miniso Group's standard master license agreement, which would allow the Miniso Group to control the use of the Miniso Brand (of which the Miniso Products are a part), throughout the Canadian operations.

13 Starting in 2017, the Migu Group (through MC Investments) began incorporating various subsidiaries. MC Investments owns and controls each of the other named respondent subsidiaries (the "Subsidiaries"). Although the corporate structure is somewhat unclear at this time, these Subsidiaries, either alone or through partnerships or joint ventures, have opened or are in the process of opening retail stores throughout Canada that sell Miniso Brand products (the "Outlet Stores"). Some of the Subsidiaries own more than one Outlet Store and some were incorporated in anticipation of opening additional Outlet Stores.

14 As part of the arrangements, an entity related to the Miniso Group granted to Migu (on behalf of the Migu Group) the right to use and sell Miniso Products and display the Miniso Trademarks in Canada pursuant to a trademark licence agreement dated June 1, 2018 (the "Licence Agreement"). The Licence Agreement contained the following material terms, among others:

a) The Migu Group was only permitted to sell Miniso Products via the Outlet Stores, unless otherwise agreed to by the Miniso Group;

b) The Migu Group was permitted to grant sub-licenses to sub-licensees at its discretion subject to, among others, the condition that each sub-license would require each sub-licensee to be bound by the terms of the Licence Agreement; and

c) The Miniso Group could terminate the Licence Agreement in the event that Migu became insolvent or committed an act of bankruptcy.

15 The Migu Group, through the Subsidiaries, have opened, or are in the process of opening a number of Outlet Stores across Canada (78 estimated at the time of the hearing). The Outlet Stores are located in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec. All Outlet Stores operate out of leased premises. There are two Miniso branded retail locations operating in Nova Scotia in which the Migu Group has an interest, but which are not operated by the Migu Group. The Migu Group also leases several warehouses, distribution centres and offices in various locations. The Migu Group's head office is located in Richmond, B.C.

16 In some cases, the Migu Group contracted with individual investors (the "Investors") to open Outlet Stores partnered with one of the Subsidiaries. It is believed that, in most instances, MC Investments (on behalf of the Migu Group) and an Investor would enter into two agreements to document their arrangement, as follows:

a) An "Investment and Cooperation Agreement", whereby MC Investments and the Investor would agree that, in exchange for the Investor's investment, MC Investments would incorporate a company (one of the Subsidiaries) to operate and manage an Outlet Store selling Miniso branded products. As part of this, MC Investments would grant to the Subsidiary a sublicense permitting it to sell Miniso branded products and to use the Miniso Trademarks under the Miniso Brand; and b) A "Limited Partnership Agreement", whereby the Investor and MC Investments would act as limited partners and the Subsidiary (through which the Outlet Store would operate) would act as general partner.

17 The parties refer to these arrangements together as the "Joint Venture Store Agreements".

18 In cases where MC Investments entered into a Limited Partnership Agreement with respect to an Outlet Store, the Subsidiary which operated such Outlet Store either acted as general partner to the partnership formed by the Limited Partnership Agreement, or incorporated a general partner in which it held a 51% ownership interest (the "JV Store Affiliates"), with the remaining 49% being owned by the applicable Investors.

19 The Miniso Group understands that each of the Outlet Stores holds a separate bank account through the applicable Subsidiary that operates that Store (collectively, the "Deposit Accounts"), the majority of which are held at TD Canada Trust, which are used for the receipt of cash sales and credit card sales at the Outlet Stores. In addition, the Miniso Group understand that MC Investments holds a master Canadian-dollar account (the "Master Account") and that, historically, the Deposit Accounts were manually swept on a regular basis, at the Migu Group's discretion, into the Master Account.

20 The employees are all employed by MC Investments. The Migu Group currently directly employ approximately 700 people on a part-time or full-time basis. There is no union and collective bargaining agreement in place.

## EVENTS LEADING TO INSOLVENCY

For some years now, the Miniso Group has shipped and delivered a substantial amount of Miniso Products to the Migu Group. The Miniso Group is the primary supplier of product and inventory to the Migu Group, such that it is estimated that Miniso Product accounts for 80-90% of all merchandise sold in the Outlet Stores. During that time period and until 2018, the Miniso Group shipped and sold approximately \$30 million of Miniso Products to the Migu Group, which was then distributed to the Subsidiaries for sale in the Outlet Stores.

In December 2017, Miniso International Hong Kong Limited, on behalf of the Miniso Group, advanced a US\$2.4 million demand loan to MC Investments (on behalf of the Migu Group) to fund the Migu Group's working capital requirements.

In October 2018, the Migu Group also received a substantial amount of Miniso Products valued at approximately \$17.5 million. The Miniso Group was not paid for this shipment.

In the fall of 2018, the Miniso Group and the Migu Group had a dispute about the demand loan and account receivable. This led to the Miniso Group making demand on the Migu Group for payment. Later still, in mid-December 2018, the Miniso Group filed an application in this Court for a bankruptcy order against the Migu Group.

In January 2019, the dispute was resolved when the parties entered into a forbearance agreement. The forbearance agreement provided that:

a) The Migu Group acknowledged and agreed that the demand loan and inventory receivable was due and owing to the Miniso Group;

b) By January 21, 2019, or as otherwise agreed, the parties agreed to negotiate an agreement by which the Miniso Group would acquire all of the assets of the Migu Group relating to its Canadian operations; and

c) The Miniso Group agreed to forbear for a period of time from taking steps to collect the demand loan and the account receivable. In addition, in the meantime, the Miniso Group agreed to continue to supply Miniso Products to the Migu Group, with the purchase price to be added to the outstanding indebtedness. Title to the Miniso Products remained with the Miniso Group until payment in full was made for them.

26 On January 4, 2019, as a condition to the Miniso Group's forbearance:

a) The Migu Group granted to the Miniso Group a general security agreement securing the past and future obligations owing to the Miniso Group;

b) Mr. Xu postponed the security held by him against the Migu Group to the security in favour of the Miniso Group; and

c) The Migu Group entered into a temporary licence agreement for the use of the Miniso Brand during the period of the forbearance.

On March 5, 2019, the Migu Group provided a further general security agreement to the Miniso Group as security for its obligations to the Miniso Group. Mr. Xu, MC Store and MC Investments also executed priority agreements in favour of the Miniso Group.

On February 23, 2019, various entities entered into an asset purchase agreement by which the Migu Group agreed to sell its Canadian operations Miniso Lifestyle Canada Inc. ("Miniso Lifestyle") or a designated purchaser (the "APA"). The APA provided that:

a) The Migu Group appointed Miniso Lifestyle to operate and manage the Canadian operations until the earlier of the closing of the sale under the APA or termination of the APA;

b) The Miniso Group would continue to supply the Miniso Products to MC Investments; and

c) Grant Thornton LLP would be engaged as auditor to conduct an audit of the Canadian operations of the Migu Group to determine the amount of net capital invested by the Migu Group, including Mr. Xu, for the purpose of determining the purchase price payable under the APA.

In addition, on March 5, 2019, the Miniso Group provided financial support to the Migu Group pending a closing or termination of the APA. Miniso Lifestyle advanced \$1.5 million to the Migu Group to be used to fund its Canadian operations. In addition, Miniso Lifestyle deposited \$1.5 million in escrow pending the closing of the transaction contemplated in the APA or the termination of the APA.

30 After completing its due diligence, the Miniso Group did not waive the conditions in the APA. Accordingly, effective June 30, 2019, the APA expired.

On June 25, 2019, the Miniso Group's counsel demanded payment of the amounts owing under the demand loan, the earlier account receivable and the amounts owing for the further supply of Miniso Products after January 2019. On July 3, 2019, the Miniso Group's counsel demanded the return of the deposit that had been placed in escrow and payment of the March 2019 loan.

## **CURRENT STATUS**

As of July 3, 2019, the total indebtedness owing from the Migu Group to the Miniso Group was approximately \$35.5 million.

33 The Miniso Group is the primary secured creditor of the Migu Group's assets, under two general security agreements (except in Quebec where no security is held). There are other minor secured interests registered by certain equipment financiers and landlords. Mr. Xu still holds security against the assets, which is subordinated to the Miniso Group.

34 The Migu Group is current in respect of its obligations to pay employee wages and related remittances. However, it is possible that some or all employees are owed accrued and unused vacation pay. The Migu Group does not have a pension plan for their employees.

35 It is uncertain if the Migu Group's provincial sales tax remittances are current.

As noted, all of the premises from which the Migu Group operates across Canada are leased. The Migu Group currently remits monthly rents of approximately \$1.79 million. Some of the July rental payments (for 20 stores) have been paid; however, rent for the remainder of the premises, totalling approximately \$1.16 million, has not been paid.

The Migu Group owes approximately \$2 million in other accrued and unpaid unsecured liabilities, including to suppliers and service providers. It is anticipated that the Migu Group will honour outstanding gift card and credit notes during these *CCAA* proceedings and honour existing warranty and return policies.

38 The Migu Group's consolidated assets, as at May 31, 2019, had a book value of approximately \$53.3 million.

39 The Migu Group's value is almost entirely derived from their ability to sell and market Miniso Products under the Miniso Brand in Canada through the various agreements with the Miniso Group and importantly, their licence agreements with the Miniso Group. As of this date, the Miniso Group has terminated the Migu Group's right to sell and market the Miniso Brand in Canada and the Miniso Group will not deliver further product, save on terms acceptable to the Miniso Group. As such, the Migu Group is no longer able to market and sell the Miniso Brand. In addition, the Miniso Product in the possession of the Migu Group is the property of the Miniso Group until it is paid for.

40 The result is obvious - the Migu Group cannot operate their business and generate revenue without the cooperation and support of the Miniso Group.

# **CCAA ISSUES**

41 I will briefly discuss the various issues that arose on this application for the Initial Order.

## Statutory Requirements

42 The *CCAA* applies in respect of a "debtor company" or "affiliated debtor companies" where the total amount of claims against the debtor or its affiliates exceeds \$5 million: CCAA, s. 3(1). "Debtor company" is defined in s. 2 of the CCAA to include any company that is bankrupt or insolvent.

I am satisfied that each of the companies within the Migu Group is a "company" existing under the laws of Canada or one of the provinces and that the claims against them exceed \$5 million.

Further, I am satisfied that the Migu Group, either individually or collectively, are unable to meet their liabilities as they come due and are therefore insolvent, and thus each is a "debtor company" within the meaning of the *CCAA*: see Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 2; *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 21-22; leave to appeal refd, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refd [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.).

The *CCAA* expressly grants standing to creditors, such as the Miniso Group, to commence proceedings in respect of a debtor company: CCAA, ss. 4-5; *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, [2008] O.J. No. 1818 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 34.

## **Objectives of the CCAA**

In *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.), the Court provided a detailed analysis of the purpose and policy behind the *CCAA*. Of particular note were the Court's comments that:

a) the purpose of the *CCAA* is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets (para. 15); and

b) the *CCAA*'s distinguishing feature is a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to use its discretion to make the order necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the *CCAA*'s objectives. The courts have used its *CCAA* jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways (para. 19).

47 The commencement of *CCAA* proceedings is a proper exercise of creditors' rights where, ideally, the *CCAA* will preserve the going-concern value of the business and allow it to continue for the benefit of the "whole economic community", including the many stakeholders here. This is intended to allow stakeholders to avoid losses that would be suffered in an enforcement and liquidation scenario: *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada*, [1991] O.J. No. 944 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 49; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 33 and 40.

48 The imperatives facing both the Miniso Group and the Migu Group here are stark.

49 Without the cooperation of the Miniso Group, including access to immediate interim financing from the Miniso Group, the Migu Group will be unable to meet their liabilities as they become due and it will not be able to continue their operations and preserve their assets. The Migu Group is facing numerous claims from creditors other than the Miniso Group.

50 In addition, the Migu Group's ability to repay the indebtedness owed to the Miniso Group will be severely compromised in the event of a receivership and liquidation.

51 Simply put, the Migu Group cannot proceed with its business operations without the ongoing support of the Miniso Group.

52 There is no doubt that the Miniso Group has dictated the course forward, for the most part. The Miniso Group holds first ranking security over all of the Migu Group's assets. The Miniso Group has determined that a *CCAA* process is the best means to ensure the preservation and sale of the Migu Group's business as a going concern and maintain enterprise value for the benefit of all stakeholders, including the Miniso Group. In addition, as discussed below, the Miniso Group has agreed to provide interim financing during the course of the restructuring in order to allow that process to unfold.

53 I have no doubt that the Migu Group has asserted its wishes and wants within the context of the past and ongoing negotiations between the two Groups. However, the Migu Group now grudgingly accepted its fate and did not oppose the relief sought here.

In addition, I was satisfied that the stakeholders require the relief sought in the Initial Order on an urgent basis in order to allow the Migu Group to continue operating their business. The need for cash was immediate and without access to interim financing and the stay of proceedings, the Migu Group was not be able to preserve the value of their business or even ensure the coordinated realization of their assets. As such, the Initial Order was the best option toward preserving the Migu Group's enterprise value for the benefit of their stakeholders.

55 After considering all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that these *CCAA* proceedings can assist in preserving value for the stakeholders, until a longer term solution is found.

## The Stay of Proceedings

<sup>56</sup> In addressing the granting of a stay of proceeding in an initial order under the *CCAA*, Justice Farley in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*, *Re*, [1993] O.J. No. 14 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) stated:

[5] ... a judge has the discretion under the CCAA to make [an] order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. ...

[6] ... It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain the approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed ...

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors ...

I was satisfied that it was appropriate to exercise my discretion under s. 11.02(1) of the CCAA to grant a stay that temporarily enjoins the Migu Group's creditors from proceeding with claims against the debtor companies. This stay of proceedings will prevent any creditor from gaining any advantage that might otherwise be obtained. It will also facilitate the ongoing operations of the Migu Group's business to preserve value and provide the Group with the necessary breathing room to carry out a restructuring or organized sales process.

58 The Miniso Group sought a stay not only against the Migu Group, but also with respect to other entities that are not parties to this proceeding, namely the JV Store Affiliates. The JV Store Affiliates are the general partner companies or partnerships formed to operate the Outlet Stores.

59 The Court has broad jurisdiction under s. 11.02(1) of the CCAA to impose stays of proceedings where it is just and reasonable to do so, including with respect to third party non-applicants.

60 In *Cinram International Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), the court discussed circumstances that could justify extending the stay to third party non-applicants:

[64] The Courts have found it just and reasonable to grant a stay of proceedings against third party non-applicants in a number of circumstances, including:

a. where it is important to the reorganization process;

b. where the business operations of the Applicants and the third party non-applicants are intertwined and the third parties are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CCAA (such as partnerships that are not "companies" under the CCAA);

c. against non-applicant subsidiaries of a debtor company where such subsidiaries were guarantors under the note indentures issued by the debtor company; and

d. against non-applicant subsidiaries relating to any guarantee, contribution or indemnity obligation, liability or claim in respect of obligations and claims against the debtor companies.

As noted in *Cinram International Inc.*, there is specific authority to grant a stay of proceedings against entities within a limited partnership context, where the business operations of the debtor companies are intertwined within that corporate/ partnership structure: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* at paras. 12, 16-21; *Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 33-34.

I found that it was just and appropriate to extend the stay in these proceedings to include the JV Store Affiliates in the circumstances. The business operations of the Outlet Stores are intertwined with the JV Store Affiliates. There is also some intertwining of the financial obligations of the Migu Group and that of the JV Store Affiliates.

The draft Initial Order sought a stay for 10 days until July 22, 2019. It appears that the length of the stay was set at 10 days in light of the uncertainty with respect to amendments proposed to the *CCAA* by the Budget Implementation Act, 2019, No. 1 Part 4 ("Bill C-97") tabled in Parliament in March 2019.

64 With respect to initial applications under the CCAA, ss. 136-138 of Division 5 (Enhancing Retirement Security) of Bill C-97 contains an important amendment. Section 137 includes an amendment to s. 11.02(1), as follows:

## Stays, etc. — initial application

**11.02 (1)** A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than <u>10</u> days,

[Emphasis added.]

65 Bill C-97 received Royal Assent on June 21, 2019. However, s. 152 of Bill C-97 provides that the amendments to the *CCAA* come into force on a day to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council. As best the parties have discerned, no such order in Council has yet been pronounced.

The intent behind the new s. 11.02(1) is clear. It limits the exercise of discretion by the Court in determining the length of any stay such that the maximum amount of any stay will be 10 days, as opposed to the previous 30-day limit.

In any regard, I was satisfied that the relief sought here for a 10-day stay was appropriate. At this time, only the Miniso Group has been involved in this process. All parties recognize that many other stakeholders' interests are at play here. Those persons are entitled to notice as soon as possible so that they can appear and be heard in respect of the relief granted in the Initial Order and in terms of any relief that might be granted in this proceeding in the future.

68 I therefore exercised my discretion and concluded that the 10-day stay was appropriate in the circumstances.

## The Monitor

The Miniso Group proposed that Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. ("A&M") act as the monitor. As I will discuss below, the relief sought would vest A&M with powers greater than is usually found in a *CCAA* proceeding, giving the monitor more oversight and power to direct the business operations of the Migu Group over the course of the restructuring.

70 In the usual fashion, A&M filed a Pre-Filing Report as the proposed monitor dated July 12, 2019.

A&M indicated that it has no conflicts that would prevent it from acting as a monitor in this proceeding: *CCAA* s. 11.7(2). A&M have consented to act as monitor and to provide supervision and monitoring during the proceedings. In addition, in accordance with the Initial Order, A&M agreed to manage the Migu Group's business during these proceedings, including by engaging Miniso Lifestyle under a management services agreement, until the implementation of a restructuring transaction.

72 I was satisfied that A&M is an appropriate entity to be appointed as monitor in these proceedings (the "Monitor").

# Interim Financing

The Miniso Group sought an order to approve interim financing for the Migu Group in order to allow the Migu Group to meet its obligations over the stay period granted under the Initial Order. In consultation with the Monitor, the Miniso Group agreed to advance up to \$2 million to the Migu Group under an interim credit facility agreement to allow the Migu Group to pay their ongoing business and restructuring expenses.

As is typically the case, it was a condition of any advance under the interim financing that the lender be granted a priority Court-ordered charge on all the assets, rights, undertakings and properties of the Migu Group as security for amounts advanced, to rank after the proposed administration charge discussed below.

Section 11.2(1) of the CCAA vests the Court with jurisdiction to grant an interim debtor-in-possession a financing charge in priority to the claim of any secured creditor of the debtor company, on notice to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Section 11.2(4) of the CCAA sets out the non-exhaustive factors that the Court may consider before granting such a charge:

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under the CCAA;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report, if any.

76 Bill C-97 is also relevant to this aspect of the relief sought in respect of the interim financing.

577 Section 136 of Bill C-97 provides for a new s. 11.001. This new section introduces, within the context of s. 11 orders generally, a restriction on the Court's discretion to not only order what is "appropriate" under s. 11, but also only what is "reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course" during the relevant stay period:

#### **Relief reasonably necessary**

**11.001** An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be <u>limited to relief that is</u> reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that <u>period</u>.

[Emphasis added.]

78 Specific amendments in respect of interim financing are also found in Bill C-97 and dovetail the above restriction in s. 11.001 as to what is "reasonably necessary". Section 138 of Bill C-97 provides for the addition of a new s. 11.2(5) of the CCAA, as follows:

#### Additional factor — initial application

(5) When an application is made under subsection (1) at the same time as an initial application referred to in subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection, <u>no order shall be made under subsection</u> (1) unless the court is also satisfied that the terms of the loan are limited to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

[Emphasis added.]

Accordingly, the intent of Parliament under the new s. 11.2(5) is to curtail the discretion of the Court to grant interim financing in the stay period under an initial order (i.e. up to 10 days) to only what is "reasonably necessary" during that stay period.

This provision is not inconsistent with the current approach of Canadian courts when exercising its discretion under s. 11.2 of the CCAA. Indeed, the provisions of the new s. 11.2(5) are echoed in Justice Farley's comments in Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re19996 C.B.R. (4th) 314(Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]):

[24] It follows from what I have said that, in my opinion, extraordinary relief such as DIP financing with super priority status should be kept, in Initial Orders, to what is reasonably necessary to meet the debtor company's urgent needs over the sorting-out period. Such measures involve what may be a significant re-ordering of priorities from those in place before the application is made, not in the sense of altering the existing priorities as between the various secured creditors but in the sense of placing encumbrances ahead of those presently in existence. Such changes should not be imported lightly, if at all, into the creditors mix; and affected parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to think about their potential

impact, and to consider such things as whether or not the CCAA approach to the insolvency is the appropriate one in the circumstances — as opposed, for instance, to a receivership or bankruptcy — and whether or not, or to what extent, they are prepared to have their positions affected by DIP or super priority financing. As Mr. Dunphy noted, in the context of this case, the object should be to "keep the lights [of the company] on" and enable it to keep up with appropriate preventative maintenance measures, but the Initial Order itself should approach that objective in a judicious and cautious matter.

[Emphasis added.]

81 A consideration of the proposal for interim financing here is very much informed by the considerable uncertainty about what financial resources are available to the Migu Group at this time.

The Monitor reports that the opening cash position of the Migu Group is approximately \$1.4 million as of July 12, 2019. However, certain creditors have recently filed an action against the Migu Group and, on July 9, 2019, obtained a garnishing order for \$1,040,772.50 as against MC Investments' Master Account at TD Canada Trust. It is therefore possible that TD Canada Trust has paid that amount or some of that amount into court or, at least, frozen the balance in Master Account. If that has happened, then the balance on hand is no longer available for the Migu Group's needs.

83 The cash flow indicates that payroll of approximately \$700,000 was to be due the week after the Initial Order was granted. In addition, rental payments of approximately \$800,000 were necessary in the immediate future. The cash flow projections assume ongoing sales, but that amount is also uncertain.

84 The Monitor supported the granting of the interim financing, in light of the needs of the Migu Group required during the restructuring and in light of the uncertainty about current financial resources.

I was satisfied that the s. 11.2(4) factors supported the approval of the \$2 million interim financing and the granting of a charge to secure the amounts advanced.

I accepted the submissions of the Miniso Group, supported by the Monitor, that the intention is to develop and prepare a restructuring transaction, including a restructuring and a sale of some part of the Migu Group's Canadian operations, as soon as practicable. It is obvious that financing is required to continue operations. With this financing, the Migu Group is able to continue to operate the Outlet Stores, with continued employment of their store-level employees and ongoing payment of rents, while they work with the Monitor and the Miniso Group to formulate a plan. The interim financing is therefore necessary to permit the Migu Group to maintain the value of the enterprise while they pursue a restructuring.

In addition, I was provided some assurance that the interim financing will be used only by the Migu Group in accordance with the direct supervision of the Monitor. The Monitor's powers include the monitoring, review and direction regarding the Migu Group's receipts and disbursements.

I also approached the matter of interim financing in the spirit of the new s. 11.2(5) of the CCAA. I was satisfied that, in these unique and uncertain circumstances, the \$2 million of interim financing was potentially reasonably necessary to address the needs of the Migu Group until the comeback hearing 10 days later on July 22, 2019.

89 In addition, in order to reflect the Court's clear intention in that respect, the Initial Order was amended to limit the Migu Group's use of the \$2 million interim financing by provided that:

50. ... until the Comeback Hearing, borrowings are limited to the minimum amount required to cover all expenses reasonably incurred by the Debtors in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course.

I also concluded that the interim financing was on commercially reasonable terms: allowing for draws of \$250,000; no standby fee; interest rate of 10% per annum; and, no prepayment penalty.

## **Restructuring Charges**

91 The Miniso Group sought an administration charge over the Migu Group's assets, properties, and undertakings up to the maximum amount of \$1 million to secure payment of the fees and disbursements of the Monitor, and its and the Migu Group's legal counsel, incurred in connection with services rendered both before and after the commencement of these *CCAA* proceedings. The administration charge sought is to rank in priority to all other encumbrances, including all other court-ordered charges.

92 Section 11.52 of the CCAA expressly provides the Court with the power to grant a charge in respect of professional fees and disbursements on notice to affected secured creditors.

Administration charges are a usual feature of *CCAA* initial orders. As stated in *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 506 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 66, unless professional advisor fees are protected by way of a charge, the objectives of the *CCAA* would be frustrated as professionals would be unlikely to risk offering services without any assurance of ultimately being paid. Failing to provide protection for professional fees will "result in the overwhelming likelihood that the *CCAA* proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings".

<sup>94</sup> The basis for an administration charge is well made out here, particularly given the Miniso Group's substantial and first ranking charge over the Migu Group's assets.

95 In *Canwest Publishing Inc.* at para. 54, the court refers to certain factors that could be considered in determining the amount of an administration charge:

- (a) the size and complexity of the business being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

I was satisfied that a \$1 million limit for the administration charge was appropriate. The amount of the administration charge was determined in consultation with the Monitor. I concluded that this amount was fair and reasonable in light of the number of stakeholders, the size and complexity of the Migu Group's business and the scope and complexity of the proposed restructuring.

97 The Miniso Group was also seeking a directors' and officers' charge (the "D&O Charge") over the Migu Group's assets, properties and undertakings to indemnify the directors and officers in respect of liabilities they may incur as directors and officers during these proceedings, up to a maximum of \$1 million.

Pursuant to s. 11.51(1) of the CCAA, the Court has jurisdiction to grant a charge to secure a directors' and officers' indemnification on a priority basis on notice to the affected secured creditors. The charge must relate to any obligations or liabilities that may be incurred after the commencement of proceedings. The court must be satisfied with the amount of the charge, that insurance is not otherwise available (s. 11.51(3)) and that the charge will not provide coverage for wilful misconduct or gross negligence (s. 11.51(4)): *Canwest Publishing Inc.* at paras. 56-57.

Here, the extent to which the directors and officers of the Migu Group may be exposed is unknown to a large degree. The Miniso Group has been advised that the directors and officers of the Migu Group do not have any directors' and officers' liability insurance in place. In consultation with the Migu Group, the Monitor has recommended that the D&O Charge be limited to \$1 million.

100 I concluded that the D&O Charge was necessary and appropriate in the circumstances. The D&O Charge will ensure that the directors and officers of the Migu Group continue in their current capacities in the context of these *CCAA* proceedings. I am advised that the directors and officers of the Migu Group are prepared to continue in their roles during these proceedings.

101 I also accepted the Miniso Group's proposal that the various restructuring charges granted rank in priority, as follows:

a) Firstly, the administration charge (maximum \$1 million);

b) Secondly, the interim financing charge (maximum \$2 million, plus interest, costs, fees and disbursements); and

c) Thirdly, the D&O Charge (maximum \$1 million).

#### Restructuring

102 At this preliminary stage, the germ of the restructuring plan has been formulated by the Miniso Group and generally provides:

a) There will be a consensual realization process toward ensuring the preservation of the Migu Group's Canadian operations;

b) Miniso Lifestyle will manage the Canadian operations on behalf of the Migu Group during the *CCAA* proceedings in accordance with the management services agreement;

c) The Migu Group will not have any further communications with landlords, creditors or other stakeholders, except as approved by the Miniso Group;

d) The Monitor will consult with the Miniso Group and, with respect to certain premises, the Migu Group, regarding which real property leases are to be terminated. Some leases are personally guaranteed by entities who want to be consulted before any disclaimer. Sales at Outlet Stores would continue during the 30-day disclaimer period and retail employees would be incentivized to continue their employment during that time;

e) A&M will have enhanced powers as Monitor to manage the Canadian operations and negotiate and implement a transaction, in consultation with the Migu Group; and

f) By that anticipated transaction, the Miniso Group would acquire certain assets of the Migu Group comprising some or all of the Canadian operations so as to allow continued operation of certain of the Outlet Stores.

103 The stay under the Initial Order will remain in place until July 22, 2019. By that time, the numerous other stakeholders will have been served and they will have time to enable them to consider the impact of these *CCAA* proceedings and their position, if any, in response to it.

104 At the comeback hearing, the Court and all other stakeholders will have updated information as to the status of the Migu Group. In the meantime, the stay will be in place to allow the Monitor to operate the business and maintain the *status quo* while it works with the Miniso Group and Migu Group to develop a restructuring plan. The best estimate at the time of the hearing was that such a plan may be ready to present to the creditors within a few months.

## CONCLUSION

105 At the conclusion of the hearing, I granted the Initial Order, as proposed, with certain amendments that arose from a consideration of certain issues during the course of the hearing.

Petition granted.

# TAB 21

## 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41 Supreme Court of Canada

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, 113 A.C.W.S. (3d) 36, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 287 N.R. 203, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, J.E. 2002-803, REJB 2002-30902

# Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Appellant v. Sierra Club of Canada, Respondent and The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada, Respondents

McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel JJ.

Heard: November 6, 2001 Judgment: April 26, 2002 Docket: 28020

Proceedings: reversing (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 970, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note), 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (Fed. C.A.); affirming (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (Fed. T.D.)

Counsel: J. Brett Ledger and Peter Chapin, for appellant

Timothy J. Howard and Franklin S. Gertler, for respondent Sierra Club of Canada Graham Garton, Q.C., and J. Sanderson Graham, for respondents Minister of Finance of Canada, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Minister of International Trade of Canada, and Attorney General of Canada

**Related Abridgment Classifications** Civil practice and procedure XII Discovery XII.2 Discovery of documents XII.2.h Privileged document XII.2.h.xiii Miscellaneous Civil practice and procedure XII Discovery XII.4 Examination for discovery XII.4.h Range of examination XII.4.h.ix Privilege XII.4.h.ix.F Miscellaneous Evidence **XIV** Privilege XIV.8 Public interest immunity XIV.8.a Crown privilege

#### Headnote

Evidence --- Documentary evidence --- Privilege as to documents --- Miscellaneous documents

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, R. 151, 312.

Practice --- Discovery -- Discovery of documents -- Privileged document -- Miscellaneous privileges

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, R. 151, 312.

Practice --- Discovery --- Examination for discovery --- Range of examination --- Privilege --- Miscellaneous privileges

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, R. 151, 312.

Preuve --- Preuve documentaire --- Confidentialité en ce qui concerne les documents --- Documents divers

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Communication des documents — Documents confidentiels — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Interrogatoire préalable — Étendue de l'interrogatoire — Confidentialité — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

The federal government provided a Crown corporation with a \$1.5 billion loan for the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China. An environmental organization sought judicial review of that decision, maintaining that the authorization of financial assistance triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*. The Crown corporation was an intervenor with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review. The Crown corporation filed an affidavit by a senior manager referring to and summarizing confidential documents. Before cross-examining the senior manager, the environmental organization applied for production of the documents. After receiving authorization from the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the Crown corporation sought to introduce the documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998* and requested a confidentiality order. The confidentiality order would make the documents available only to the parties and the court but would not restrict public access to the proceedings.

The trial judge refused to grant the order and ordered the Crown corporation to file the documents in their current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. The Crown corporation appealed under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998* and the environmental organization cross-appealed under R. 312. The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal. The confidentiality order would have been granted by the dissenting judge. The Crown corporation appealed. **Held:** The appeal was allowed.

Publication bans and confidentiality orders, in the context of judicial proceedings, are similar. The analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles set out in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). A confidentiality order under R. 151 should be granted in only two circumstances, when an order is needed to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and when the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

The alternatives to the confidentiality order suggested by the Trial Division and Court of Appeal were problematic. Expunging the documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution. Providing summaries was not a reasonable alternative measure to having the underlying documents available to the parties. The confidentiality order was necessary in that disclosure of the documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the Crown corporation, and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting the order.

The confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the Crown corporation's right to a fair trial and on freedom of expression. The deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal. If the order was not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the Crown corporation was not required to mount a defence under the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, it was possible that the Crown corporation would suffer the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. The salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects.

Le gouvernement fédéral a fait un prêt de l'ordre de 1,5 milliards de dollar en rapport avec la construction et la vente par une société d'État de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU à la Chine. Un organisme environnemental a sollicité le contrôle judiciaire de cette décision, soutenant que cette autorisation d'aide financière avait déclenché l'application de l'art. 5(1)b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*. La société d'État était intervenante au débat et elle avait reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire. Elle a déposé l'affidavit d'un cadre supérieur dans lequel ce dernier faisait référence à certains documents confidentiels et en faisait le résumé. L'organisme environnemental a demandé la production des documents avant de procéder au contre-interrogatoire du cadre supérieur. Après avoir obtenu l'autorisation des autorités chinoises de communiquer les documents à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, la société d'État a cherché à les introduire en invoquant la r. 312 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998*, et elle a aussi demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon les termes de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, les document mis à la disposition des parties et du tribunal, mais l'accès du public aux débats ne serait pas interdit.

Le juge de première instance a refusé l'ordonnance de confidentialité et a ordonné à la société d'État de déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une forme révisée, à son gré. La société d'État a interjeté appel en vertu de la r. 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998*, et l'organisme environnemental a formé un appel incident en vertu de la r. 312. Les juges majoritaires de la Cour d'appel ont rejeté le pourvoi et le pourvoi incident. Le juge dissident aurait accordé l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La société d'État a interjeté appel.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Il y a de grandes ressemblances entre l'ordonnance de non-publication et l'ordonnance de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la r. 151 devrait refléter les principes sous-jacents énoncés dans l'arrêt *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Une ordonnance de confidentialité rendue en vertu de la r. 151 ne devrait l'être que lorsque: 1) une telle ordonnance est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le cadre d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres solutions raisonnables pour écarter ce risque; et 2) les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris les effets sur les droits des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris les effets sur le droit à la liberté d'expression, lequel droit comprend l'intérêt du public à l'accès aux débats judiciaires.

Les solutions proposées par la Division de première instance et par la Cour d'appel comportaient toutes deux des problèmes. Épurer les documents serait virtuellement impraticable et inefficace. Fournir des résumés des documents ne constituait pas une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base. L'ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la communication des documents menacerait gravement un intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'existait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance.

L'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression. Elle n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression. Advenant que l'ordonnance ne soit pas accordée et que, dans le cadre de la demande de contrôle judiciaire, la société d'État n'ait pas l'obligation de présenter une défense en vertu de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, il se pouvait que la société d'État subisse un préjudice du fait d'avoir communiqué cette information confidentielle en violation de ses obligations, sans avoir pu profiter d'un avantage similaire à celui du droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables.

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*AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)*, 2000 CarswellNat 356, 5 C.P.R. (4th) 149, 253 N.R. 284, [2000] 3 F.C. 360, 2000 CarswellNat 3254 (Fed. C.A.) — considered

*Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, 2 C.R. (5th) 1, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 193, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 182 N.B.R. (2d) 81, 463 A.P.R. 81, 39 C.R.R. (2d) 189, 203 N.R. 169, 1996 CarswellNB 462, 1996 CarswellNB 463, 2 B.H.R.C. 210 (S.C.C.) — followed

*Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, 34 C.R. (4th) 269, 20 O.R. (3d) 816 (note), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12, 175 N.R. 1, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 76 O.A.C. 81, 25 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 1994 CarswellOnt 112, 1994 CarswellOnt 1168 (S.C.C.) — followed

*Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)* (1989), [1990] 1 W.W.R. 577, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 102 N.R. 321, 71 Alta. L.R. (2d) 273, 103 A.R. 321, 41 C.P.C. (2d) 109, 45 C.R.R. 1, 1989 CarswellAlta 198, 1989 CarswellAlta 623 (S.C.C.) — followed

*Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.*, 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437, 82 F.T.R. 147, 1994 CarswellNat 537 (Fed. T.D.) — referred to *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 1998 CarswellOnt 380, 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, 94 N.R. 167, (sub nom. *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 24 Q.A.C. 2, 25 C.P.R. (3d) 417, 39 C.R.R. 193, 1989 CarswellQue 115F, 1989 CarswellQue 115 (S.C.C.) — followed

*M. (A.) v. Ryan*, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 207 N.R. 81, 4 C.R. (5th) 220, 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 133, [1997] 4 W.W.R. 1, 85 B.C.A.C. 81, 138 W.A.C. 81, 34 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, 42 C.R.R. (2d) 37, 8 C.P.C. (4th) 1, 1997 CarswellBC 99, 1997 CarswellBC 100 (S.C.C.) — considered

*N. (F.), Re*, 2000 SCC 35, 2000 CarswellNfld 213, 2000 CarswellNfld 214, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 35 C.R. (5th) 1, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 191 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 577 A.P.R. 181 (S.C.C.) — considered

*R. v. E. (O.N.)*, 2001 SCC 77, 2001 CarswellBC 2479, 2001 CarswellBC 2480, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 478, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542, 47 C.R. (5th) 89, 279 N.R. 187, 97 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 3 W.W.R. 205, 160 B.C.A.C. 161, 261 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

*R. v. Keegstra*, 1 C.R. (4th) 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 77 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193, 117 N.R. 1, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1, 114 A.R.
81, 61 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 1990 CarswellAlta 192, 1990 CarswellAlta 661 (S.C.C.) — followed *R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76, 2001 CarswellMan 535, 2001 CarswellMan 536, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 512, 47 C.R. (5th) 63, 277 N.R. 160, [2002] 2 W.W.R. 409 (S.C.C.) — followed *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 65 N.R. 87, 14 O.A.C. 335, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 19 C.R.R. 308, 53 O.R. (2d) 719, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001 (S.C.C.) — referred to

## Statutes considered:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

Generally - referred to

s. 1 — referred to

s. 2(b) — referred to

s. 11(d) — referred to Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37 Generally — considered

s. 5(1)(b) — referred to

s. 8 — referred to

s. 54 - referred to

s. 54(2)(b) — referred to *Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s. 486(1) — referred to

**Rules considered:** 

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106 R. 151 — considered

R. 312 — referred to

#### The judgment of the court was delivered by *Iacobucci J*.:

#### I. Introduction

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

2 For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and, accordingly, would allow the appeal.

## II. Facts

3 The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervener with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada ("Sierra Club"). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a \$1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

4 The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 ("CEAA"), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

5 The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the CEAA does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(b) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the CEAA.

6 In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the "Confidential Documents"). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Dr. Feng, one of AECL's experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang's evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the "EIRs"), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the "PSAR"), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang, which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

9 As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order; otherwise, it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Dr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

10 The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

## **III. Relevant Statutory Provisions**

## 11 Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106

151.(1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

## **IV. Judgments below**

## A. Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400

12 Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to R. 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondents would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

17 In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

18 Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

19 Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

## B. Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426

## (1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)

At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under R. 312.

With respect to R. 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(b), which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(b) of the CEAA was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the CEAA. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under R. 312.

On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered R. 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (Fed. C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the CEAA, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus, the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

#### (2) Robertson J.A. (dissenting)

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.). There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

31 Robertson J.A. stated that, although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

32 He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns "trade secrets," this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner's proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

(1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is "necessary" to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site-plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a web-site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

## V. Issues

A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules*, 1998?

B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

#### VI. Analysis

#### A. The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order

### (1) The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles

The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *New Brunswick*], at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

38 Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais*, *supra*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

39 *Dagenais, supra*, dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accuseds' right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

35

(a) Such a ban is *necessary* in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In *New Brunswick, supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code* to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 33; however, he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

(a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;

(b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and

(c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

43 This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.), and its companion case *R. v. E. (O.N.)*, 2001 SCC 77 (S.C.C.). In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

44 The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve *any* important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well-grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

47 At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflect . . . the substance of the Oakes test", we cannot require that Charter rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the Charter be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another Charter right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

48 *Mentuck* is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais, New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles. However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

#### (2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial

generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

51 Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

52 In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the *Charter: New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is *seen* to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice," guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 22.

## (3) Adapting the Dagenais Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

53 Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under R. 151 should only be granted when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

As in *Mentuck*, *supra*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well-grounded in the evidence and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest," the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *Re N. (F.)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35 (S.C.C.), at para. 10, the open court rule only yields" where the *public* interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest." It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 439.

57 Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

## B. Application of the Test to this Appeal

## (1) Necessity

58 At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself or to its terms.

59 The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the confidential documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been" accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" (para. 14) as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the CEAA and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and, in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal in the sense that at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the Court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are *reasonably* alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits" may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

## (2) The Proportionality Stage

As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free expression, which, in turn, is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

## (a) Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order

As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan, supra,* at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck, supra,* at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the CEAA is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

## (b) Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order

Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(b) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick, supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a *general* principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the *particular* deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting selffulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.), at p. 976, *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.), *per* Dickson C.J., at pp. 762-764. *Charter* jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the *Charter*: *Keegstra*, *supra*, at pp. 760-761. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to *Charter* principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, *per* Wilson J., at pp. 1357-1358. Clearly, the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

<sup>77</sup> However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be *promoted* by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents, with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would, in turn, assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

<sup>79</sup> In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80 The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focuses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

81 The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at p. 1339:

It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

82 On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will *always* be engaged where the open court principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the *substance* of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below, where he stated, at para. 87:

While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84 This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the CEAA. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

85 However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish *public* interest from *media* interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public *nature* of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case. I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra*, *supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values," we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity."

Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application *as a whole* is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal, supra*, at pp. 1353-1354:

One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the CEAA, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the CEAA or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the CEAA are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the CEAA, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on *either* the public interest in freedom of expression *or* the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

## VII. Conclusion

In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the CEAA, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*.

Appeal allowed.

Pourvoi accueilli.

# TAB 22

## 2021 SCC 25, 2021 CSC 25 Supreme Court of Canada

Sherman Estate v. Donovan

2021 CarswellOnt 8339, 2021 CarswellOnt 8340, 2021 SCC 25, 2021 CSC 25, [2021] S.C.J. No. 25, 331 A.C.W.S. (3d) 489, 458 D.L.R. (4th) 361, 66 C.P.C. (8th) 1, 67 E.T.R. (4th) 163, 72 C.R. (7th) 223, EYB 2021-391973

Estate of Bernard Sherman and Trustees of the Estate and Estate of Honey Sherman and Trustees of the Estate (Appellants) and Kevin Donovan and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (Respondents) and Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Income Security Advocacy Centre, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc., Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc., British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, HIV Legal Network and Mental Health Legal Committee (Interveners)

Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer JJ.

Heard: October 6, 2020 Judgment: June 11, 2021 Docket: 38695

Proceedings: affirming *Donovan v. Sherman Estate* (2019), 56 C.P.C. (8th) 82, 47 E.T.R. (4th) 1, 2019 CarswellOnt 6867, 2019 ONCA 376, C.W. Hourigan J.A., Doherty J.A., Paul Rouleau J.A. (Ont. C.A.); reversing *Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Sherman Estate* (2018), 41 E.T.R. (4th) 126, 2018 CarswellOnt 13017, 2018 ONSC 4706, 28 C.P.C. (8th) 102, 417 C.R.R. (2d) 321, S.F. Dunphy J. (Ont. S.C.J.)

Counsel: Chantelle Cseh, Timothy Youdan, for Appellants Iris Fischer, Skye A. Sepp, for Respondents Peter Scrutton, for Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario Jacqueline Hughes, for Intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia Ryder Gilliland, for Intervener, Canadian Civil Liberties Association Ewa Krajewska, for Intervener, Income Security Advocacy Centre Robert S. Anderson, Q.C., for Interveners, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc. and Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc. Adam Goldenberg, for Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association

Khalid Janmohamed, for Interveners, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, the HIV Legal Network and the Mental Health Legal Committee

## **Related Abridgment Classifications**

Civil practice and procedure XXIII Practice on appeal XXIII.13 Powers and duties of appellate court XXIII.13.e Evidence on appeal XXIII.13.e.i New evidence

#### Judges and courts

XVI Jurisdiction

XVI.11 Jurisdiction of court over own process

XVI.11.c Sealing files

## Headnote

Judges and courts --- Jurisdiction --- Jurisdiction of court over own process --- Sealing files

Wealthy couple were found dead in their home and deaths generated intense public interest and press scrutiny — Estates and estate trustees sought to stem press scrutiny — When applications to obtain certificates of appointment of estate trustees were made, trustees sought sealing order — Application judge granted sealing order — Journalist and newspaper successfully appealed and sealing order was set aside — Trustees appealed — Appeal dismissed — Court of Appeal was right to set aside sealing order — Information in court files was not of highly sensitive character that it could be said to strike at core identity of affected persons — Trustees had failed to show how lifting of sealing orders engaged dignity of affected individuals — It could not be said that risk to privacy was sufficiently serious to overcome strong presumption of openness — Same was true of risk to physical safety.

Civil practice and procedure --- Practice on appeal — Powers and duties of appellate court — Evidence on appeal — New evidence

Juges et tribunaux --- Compétence — Compétence de la cour sur sa propre procédure — Mise sous scellés de dossiers

Couple riche et célèbre a été retrouvé sans vie dans sa résidence, et la mort du couple a suscité un vif intérêt dans le public et provoqué une attention médiatique intense — Successions ainsi que les fiduciaires des successions ont cherché à réfréner l'attention médiatique intense — Quand le temps est venu d'obtenir leurs certificats de nomination à titre de fiduciaires des successions, les fiduciaires ont sollicité une ordonnance de mise sous scellés — Juge de première instance a accordé l'ordonnance de mise sous scellés — Journaliste et journal ont eu gain de cause en appel et l'ordonnance a été annulée — Fiduciaires ont formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi rejeté — Cour d'appel a eu raison d'annuler l'ordonnance de mise sous scellés — Renseignements contenus dans les dossiers judiciaires ne revêtaient pas un caractère si sensible qu'on pourrait dire qu'ils touchaient à l'identité fondamentale des personnes concernées — Fiduciaires n'ont pas démontré en quoi la levée des ordonnances de mise sous scellés mettait en jeu la dignité des personnes touchées — On ne saurait affirmer que le risque pour la vie privée était suffisamment sérieux pour permettre de réfuter la forte présomption de publicité des débats judiciaires — Il en était de même du risque pour la sécurité physique.

Procédure civile --- Procédure en appel — Pouvoirs et obligations de la cour d'appel — Preuve en appel — Nouvelle preuve A wealthy and prominent husband and wife were found dead in their home. Their deaths generated intense public interest and press scrutiny, and the following year the police service announced that the deaths were being investigated as homicides. The couple's estates and the estate trustees sought to stem the intense press scrutiny. When the time came to obtain certificates of appointment of estate trustees, the trustees sought a sealing order so that the trustees and beneficiaries might be spared any further intrusions into their privacy and be protected from what was alleged to be a risk to their safety. These sealing orders were granted, with the application judge sealing the orders for an initial period of two years with the possibility of renewal.

The sealing orders were challenged by a journalist, who had written a series of articles on the couple's death, and the newspaper for which he wrote. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and the sealing orders were lifted. The Court of Appeal concluded that the privacy interest for which the trustees sought protection lacked the quality of public interest and that there was no evidence that could warrant a finding that disclosure of the content of the estate files posed a real risk to anyone's physical safety. The trustees had failed the first stage of the test for obtaining orders sealing the probate files.

The trustees appealed, seeking to restore the sealing orders. The newspaper brought a motion to adduce new evidence on the appeal.

Held: The appeal was dismissed; the motion was dismissed as moot.

Per Kasirer J. (Wagner C.J.C., Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin JJ. concurring): There is a strong presumption in favour of open courts. Notwithstanding this presumption, exceptional circumstances do arise where competing interests justified a restriction on the open court principle. Where a discretionary court order limiting constitutionally-protected openness was sought, the applicant must demonstrate as a threshold requirement that openness presents a serious risk to a competing interest of public importance. The applicant must show that the order was necessary to prevent the risk and that, as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of that order restricting openness outweighed its negative effects. For the purposes of the relevant test, an aspect of privacy was recognized as an important public interest. Proceedings in open court could lead to the dissemination of highly sensitive personal information that would result not just in discomfort or embarrassment, but in an affront to the affected person's dignity. Where this narrower dimension of privacy, rooted in what was seen as the public interest in protecting human dignity, was shown to be at serious risk, an exception to the open court principle may be justified. It could not be said that the risk to privacy was sufficiently serious to overcome the strong presumption of openness. The same was true of the risk to physical safety. The Court of Appeal was right to set aside the sealing orders.

The broad claims of the trustees failed to focus on the elements of privacy that were deserving of public protection in the open court context. Personal information disseminated in open court could be more than a source of discomfort and may result in an affront to a person's dignity. Insofar as privacy served to protect individuals from this affront, it was an important public interest relevant under the 2002 Supreme Court of Canada judgment that set out the relevant test. This public interest would only be seriously at risk where the information in question struck at what was the core identity of the individual concerned: information so sensitive that its dissemination could be an affront to dignity that the public would not tolerate, even in service of open proceedings. The information in the court files was not of this highly sensitive character that it could be said to strike at the core identity of the affected persons. The trustees had failed to show how the lifting of the sealing orders engaged the dignity of the affected individuals.

In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that: (1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest; (2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and (3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects. Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness properly be ordered. Contrary to what the trustees argue, the matters in a probate file are not quintessentially private or fundamentally administrative. The fundamental rationale for openness applies to probate proceedings and thus to the transfer of property under court authority and other matters affected by that court action. The emphasis that the Court of Appeal placed on personal concerns as a means of deciding that the sealing orders failed to meet the necessity requirement was mistaken. It was inappropriate to dismiss the public interest in protecting privacy as merely a personal concern. The important public interest in privacy, as understood in the context of the limits on court openness, is aimed at allowing individuals to preserve control over their core identity in the public sphere to the extent necessary to preserve their dignity. The public has a stake in openness, but it also has an interest in the preservation of dignity: the administration of justice requires that where dignity is threatened in this way, measures be taken to accommodate this privacy concern. The risk to this interest would be serious only where the information that would be disseminated as a result of court openness was sufficiently sensitive such that openness could be shown to meaningfully strike at the individual's biographical core in a manner that threatens their integrity.

The failure of the application judge to assess the sensitivity of the information constituted a failure to consider a required element of the legal test, and this warranted intervention on appeal. Applying the appropriate framework to the facts of this case, it was concluded that the risk to the important public interest in the affected individuals' privacy was not serious. The information that the trustees sought to protect was not highly sensitive and this alone was sufficient to conclude that there was no serious risk to the important public interest in privacy so defined. The relevant privacy interest bearing on the dignity of the affected persons had not been shown. Merely associating the beneficiaries or trustees with the couple's unexplained deaths was not enough to constitute a serious risk to the identified important public interest in privacy, defined in reference to dignity. The trustees did not advance any specific reason why the contents of these files were more sensitive than they may seem at first glance. While some of the material in the court files may well be broadly disseminated, the nature of the information had not been shown to give rise to a serious risk to the important public interest in privacy.

There was no controversy that there was an important public interest in protecting individuals from physical harm. Direct evidence was not necessarily required to establish a serious risk to an important interest. It was not just the probability of the feared harm but also the gravity of the harm itself that was relevant to the assessment of serious risk. There was no dispute that the feared physical harm was grave, but it was agreed that the probability of this harm was speculative. The bare assertion that such a risk exists failed to meet the threshold necessary to establish a serious risk of physical harm. The application judge's conclusion to the contrary was an error warranting intervention. Even if the trustees had succeeded in showing a serious risk to the privacy interest they asserted, a publication ban would likely have been sufficient as a reasonable alternative to prevent this risk. The trustees were not entitled to any discretionary order limiting the open court principle. The Court of Appeal rightly

concluded that there was no basis for asking for redactions because the trustees had failed at this stage of the test for discretionary limits on court openness.

Les cadavres d'un homme et de sa femme, un couple riche et célèbre, ont été retrouvés dans leur résidence. Leur mort a suscité un vif intérêt dans le public et provoqué une attention médiatique intense et, au cours de l'année qui a suivi, le service de police a annoncé que les morts faisaient l'objet d'une enquête pour homicides. La succession du couple ainsi que les fiduciaires des successions ont cherché à réfréner l'attention médiatique intense. Quand le temps est venu d'obtenir leurs certificats de nomination à titre de fiduciaires des successions, les fiduciaires ont sollicité une ordonnance de mise sous scellés dans le but d'épargner aux fiduciaires des successions et aux bénéficiaires de nouvelles atteintes à leur vie privée, et de les protéger contre ce qui, selon les allégations, aurait constitué un risque pour leur sécurité. Les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ont été accordées et le juge de première instance a fait placer sous scellés les dossiers pour une période initiale de deux ans avec possibilité de renouvellement.

Les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ont été contestées par un journaliste qui avait écrit une série d'articles sur la mort du couple et par le journal pour lequel il écrivait. La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel et les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ont été levées. La Cour d'appel a conclu que l'intérêt en matière de vie privée à l'égard duquel les fiduciaires sollicitaient une protection ne comportait pas la qualité d'intérêt public et qu'il n'y avait aucun élément de preuve permettant de conclure que la divulgation du contenu des dossiers de succession posait un risque réel pour la sécurité physique de quiconque. Les fiduciaires n'avaient pas franchi la première étape du test relatif à l'obtention d'ordonnances de mise sous scellés des dossiers d'homologation.

Les fiduciaires ont formé un pourvoi visant à faire rétablir les ordonnances de mise sous scellés. Le journal a déposé une requête visant à introduire une nouvelle preuve dans le cadre du pourvoi.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été rejeté; la requête, devenue théorique, a été rejetée.

Kasirer, J. (Wagner, J.C.C., Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin, JJ., souscrivant à son opinion) : Il existe une forte présomption en faveur de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Malgré cette présomption, il peut arriver des circonstances exceptionnelles où des intérêts opposés justifient de restreindre le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Lorsqu'un demandeur sollicite une ordonnance judiciaire discrétionnaire limitant le principe constitutionnalisé de la publicité des procédures judiciaires, il doit démontrer, comme condition préliminaire, que la publicité des débats en cause présente un risque sérieux pour un intérêt opposé qui revêt une importance pour le public. Le demandeur doit démontrer que l'ordonnance est nécessaire pour écarter le risque et que, du point de vue de la proportionnalité, les avantages de cette ordonnance restreignant la publicité l'emportent sur ses effets négatifs. On a reconnu qu'un aspect de la vie privée constituait un intérêt public important pour l'application du test pertinent. La tenue de procédures judiciaires publiques était susceptible de mener à la diffusion de renseignements personnels très sensibles, laquelle entraînerait non seulement un désagrément ou de l'embarras pour la personne touchée, mais aussi une atteinte à sa dignité. Dans les cas où il est démontré que cette dimension plus restreinte de la vie privée, qui semble tirer son origine de l'intérêt du public à la protection de la dignité humaine, était sérieusement menacée, une exception au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires peut être justifiée. On ne saurait affirmer que le risque pour la vie privée était suffisamment sérieux pour permettre de réfuter la forte présomption de publicité des débats judiciaires. Il en était de même du risque pour la sécurité physique. La Cour d'appel a eu raison d'annuler les ordonnances de mise sous scellés.

Les larges revendications des fiduciaires n'étaient pas axées sur les éléments de la vie privée qui méritaient une protection publique dans le contexte de la publicité des débats judiciaires. La diffusion de renseignements personnels dans le cadre de débats judiciaires publics peut être plus qu'une source de désagrément et peut aussi entraîner une atteinte à la dignité d'une personne. Dans la mesure où elle sert à protéger les personnes contre une telle atteinte, la vie privée constitue un intérêt public important qui est pertinent en vertu du critère établi par la Cour suprême du Canada dans une décision rendue en 2002. L'intérêt public ne serait sérieusement menacé que si les renseignements en question portaient atteinte à ce que l'on considère comme l'identité fondamentale de la personne concernée : des renseignements si sensibles que leur diffusion pourrait porter atteinte à la dignité des débats judiciaires. En l'espèce, les renseignements contenus dans les dossiers judiciaires ne revêtaient pas ce caractère si sensible qu'on pourrait dire qu'ils touchaient à l'identité fondamentale des personnes concernées. Les fiduciaires n'ont pas démontré en quoi la levée des ordonnances de mise sous scellés mettait en jeu la dignité des personnes touchées.

Pour obtenir gain de cause, la personne qui demande au tribunal d'exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire de façon à limiter la présomption de publicité doit établir que : 1) la publicité des débats judiciaires pose un risque sérieux pour un intérêt public important; 2) l'ordonnance sollicitée est nécessaire pour écarter ce risque sérieux pour l'intérêt mis en évidence, car d'autres mesures raisonnables ne permettront pas d'écarter ce risque; et 3) du point de vue de la proportionnalité, les avantages de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets négatifs. Ce n'est que lorsque ces trois conditions préalables sont remplies qu'une ordonnance discrétionnaire ayant pour effet de limiter la publicité des débats judiciaires pourra dûment être rendue. Contrairement à ce que les fiduciaires soutiennent, les questions soulevées dans un dossier d'homologation ne sont pas typiquement de nature privée ou fondamentalement de nature administrative. La raison d'être fondamentale de la publicité des débats s'applique aux procédures d'homologation et donc au transfert de biens sous l'autorité d'un tribunal ainsi qu'à d'autres questions touchées par ce recours judiciaire. La Cour d'appel a eu tort de mettre l'accent sur les préoccupations personnelles pour décider que les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ne satisfaisaient pas à l'exigence de la nécessité. Il est inapproprié de rejeter l'intérêt du public à la protection de la vie privée au motif qu'il s'agit d'une simple préoccupation personnelle. L'intérêt public important en matière de vie privée, tel qu'il est considéré dans le contexte des limites à la publicité des débats, vise à permettre aux personnes de garder un contrôle sur leur identité fondamentale dans la sphère publique dans la mesure nécessaire pour protéger leur dignité. Le public a un intérêt dans la publicité des débats, mais il a aussi un intérêt dans la protection de la dignité : l'administration de la justice exige que, lorsque la dignité est menacée de cette façon, des mesures puissent être prises pour tenir compte de cette préoccupation en matière de vie privée. Le risque pour cet intérêt ne sera sérieux que lorsque les renseignements qui seraient diffusés en raison de la publicité des débats judiciaires sont suffisamment sensibles pour que l'on puisse démontrer que la publicité porte atteinte de facon significative au coeur même des renseignements biographiques de la personne d'une manière qui menace son intégrité.

En n'examinant pas le caractère sensible des renseignements, le juge de première instance a omis de se pencher sur un élément nécessaire du test juridique, ce qui justifiait une intervention en appel. En appliquant le cadre approprié aux faits de la présente affaire, on a conclu que le risque pour l'intérêt public important à l'égard de la vie privée des personnes touchées n'était pas sérieux. Les renseignements que les fiduciaires cherchaient à protéger n'étaient pas très sensibles, ce qui suffisait en soi pour conclure qu'il n'y avait pas de risque sérieux pour l'intérêt public important en matière de vie privée tel que défini. L'intérêt pertinent en matière de vie privée se rapportant à la dignité des personnes touchées n'a pas été démontré. Le simple fait d'associer les bénéficiaires ou les fiduciaires à la mort inexpliquée du couple ne suffisait pas à constituer un risque sérieux pour l'intérêt public important en matière de dignité ayant été constaté, intérêt défini au regard de la dignité. Les fiduciaires n'ont pas fait valoir de raison précise pour laquelle le contenu de ces dossiers serait plus sensible qu'il n'y paraît à première vue. Même si certains des éléments contenus dans les dossiers judiciaires pouvaient fort bien être largement diffusés, il n'a pas été démontré que la nature des renseignements en cause entraînerait un risque sérieux pour l'intérêt public important en matière de vie privée. Nul n'a contesté l'existence d'un intérêt public important dans la protection des personnes contre un préjudice physique. Une preuve directe n'est pas nécessairement exigée pour démontrer qu'un intérêt important est sérieusement menacé. Ce n'est pas seulement la probabilité du préjudice appréhendé qui est pertinente lorsqu'il s'agit d'évaluer si un risque est sérieux, mais également la gravité du préjudice lui-même. Si nul ne contestait que le préjudice physique appréhendé fût grave, il fallait cependant reconnaître que la probabilité que ce préjudice se produise était conjecturale. Le simple fait d'affirmer qu'un tel risque existe ne permettait pas de franchir le seuil requis pour établir l'existence d'un risque sérieux de préjudice physique. La conclusion contraire tirée par le juge de première instance était une erreur justifiant l'intervention de la Cour d'appel. Même si les fiduciaires avaient réussi à démontrer l'existence d'un risque sérieux pour l'intérêt en matière de vie privée qu'ils invoquent, une interdiction de publication aurait probablement été suffisante en tant qu'autre option raisonnable pour écarter ce risque. Les fiduciaires n'ont droit à aucune ordonnance discrétionnaire limitant le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. La Cour d'appel a conclu à juste titre qu'il n'y avait aucune raison de demander un caviardage parce que les fiduciaires n'avaient pas franchi cette étape du test des limites discrétionnaires à la publicité des débats judiciaires. **Table of Authorities** 

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*Vancouver Sun, Re* (2004), 2004 SCC 43, 2004 CarswellBC 1376, 2004 CarswellBC 1377, (sub nom. *R. v. Bagri*) 184 C.C.C. (3d) 515, (sub nom. *R. v. Bagri*) 240 D.L.R. (4th) 147, (sub nom. *Application Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re*) 322 N.R. 161, 21 C.R. (6th) 142, (sub nom. *Application Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re*) 199 B.C.A.C. 1, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 261, 120 C.R.R. (2d) 203, [2005] 2 W.W.R. 671 (S.C.C.) — considered *Work Safe Twerk Safe v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario* (2021), 2021 ONSC 1100, 2021 CarswellOnt 1831 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to

*X. v. Y.* (2011), 2011 BCSC 943, 2011 CarswellBC 1874, 21 B.C.L.R. (5th) 410, [2011] 11 W.W.R. 514, 338 D.L.R. (4th) 156, 238 C.R.R. (2d) 219 (B.C. S.C.) — distinguished

## Statutes considered:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

Generally - referred to

s. 2(b) — referred to

s. 8 — considered Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, RLRQ, c. C-12 art. 5 — referred to Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64 art. 35-41 — referred to Code de procédure civile, RLRQ, c. C-25.01 art. 12 — considered Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 Generally — referred to Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 Generally — referred to Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 Generally — referred to

#### Kasirer J. (Wagner C.J.C. and Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ. concurring):

#### I. Overview

1 This Court has been resolute in recognizing that the open court principle is protected by the constitutionally-entrenched right of freedom of expression and, as such, it represents a central feature of a liberal democracy. As a general rule, the public can attend hearings and consult court files and the press — the eyes and ears of the public — is left free to inquire and comment on the workings of the courts, all of which helps make the justice system fair and accountable.

2 Accordingly, there is a strong presumption in favour of open courts. It is understood that this allows for public scrutiny which can be the source of inconvenience and even embarrassment to those who feel that their engagement in the justice system brings intrusion into their private lives. But this discomfort is not, as a general matter, enough to overturn the strong presumption that the public can attend hearings and that court files can be consulted and reported upon by the free press.

3 Notwithstanding this presumption, exceptional circumstances do arise where competing interests justify a restriction on the open court principle. Where a discretionary court order limiting constitutionally-protected openness is sought — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — the applicant must demonstrate, as a threshold requirement, that openness presents a serious risk to a competing interest of public importance. That this requirement is considered a high bar serves to maintain the strong presumption of open courts. Moreover, the protection of open courts does not stop there. The applicant must still show that the order is necessary to prevent the risk and that, as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of that order restricting openness outweigh its negative effects.

4 This appeal turns on whether concerns advanced by persons seeking an exception to the ordinarily open court file in probate proceedings — the concerns for privacy of the affected individuals and their physical safety — amount to important public interests that are at such serious risk that the files should be sealed. The parties to this appeal agree that physical safety is an important public interest that could justify a sealing order but disagree as to whether that interest would be at serious risk, in the circumstances of this case, should the files be unsealed. They further disagree whether privacy is in itself an important interest that could justify a sealing order. The appellants say that privacy is a public interest of sufficient import that can justify limits on openness, especially in light of the threats individuals face as technology facilitates widespread dissemination of personally sensitive information. They argue that the Court of Appeal was mistaken to say that personal concerns for privacy, without more, lack the public interest component that is properly the subject-matter of a sealing order.

5 This Court has, in different settings, consistently championed privacy as a fundamental consideration in a free society. Pointing to cases decided in other contexts, the appellants contend that privacy should be recognized here as a public interest that, on the facts of this case, substantiates their plea for orders sealing the probate files. The respondents resist, recalling that privacy has generally been seen as a poor justification for an exception to openness. After all, they say, virtually every court proceeding entails some disquiet for the lives of those concerned and these intrusions on privacy must be tolerated because open courts are essential to a healthy democracy.

6 This appeal offers, then, an occasion to decide whether privacy can amount to a public interest in the open court jurisprudence and, if so, whether openness puts privacy at serious risk here so as to justify the kind of orders sought by the appellants.

7 For the reasons that follow, I propose to recognize an aspect of privacy as an important public interest for the purposes of the relevant test from *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522. Proceedings in open court can lead to the dissemination of highly sensitive personal information that would result not just in discomfort or embarrassment, but in an affront to the affected person's dignity. Where this narrower dimension of privacy, rooted in what I see as the public interest in protecting human dignity, is shown to be at serious risk, an exception to the open court principle may be justified.

8 In this case, and with this interest in mind, it cannot be said that the risk to privacy is sufficiently serious to overcome the strong presumption of openness. The same is true of the risk to physical safety here. The Court of Appeal was right in the circumstances to set aside the sealing orders and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.

## II. Background

9 Prominent in business and philanthropic circles, Bernard Sherman and Honey Sherman were found dead in their Toronto home in December of 2017. Their deaths had no apparent explanation and generated intense public interest and press scrutiny. In January of the following year, the Toronto Police Service announced that the deaths were being investigated as homicides. As the present matter came before the courts, the identity and motive of those responsible remained unknown.

10 The couple's estates and estate trustees (collectively the "Trustees")  $^1$  sought to stem the intense press scrutiny prompted by the events. The Trustees hoped to see to the orderly transfer of the couple's property, at arm's length from what they saw as the public's morbid interest in the unexplained deaths and the curiosity around apparently great sums of money involved. 11 When the time came to obtain certificates of appointment of estate trustee from the Superior Court of Justice, the Trustees sought a sealing order so that the estate trustees and beneficiaries ("affected individuals") might be spared any further intrusions into their privacy and be protected from what was alleged to be a risk to their safety. The Trustees argued that if the information in the court files was revealed to the public, the safety of the affected individuals would be at risk and their privacy compromised as long as the deaths were unexplained and those responsible for the tragedy remained at large. In support of their request, they argued that there was a real and substantial risk that the affected individuals would suffer serious harm from the public exposure of the materials in the circumstances.

12 Initially granted, the sealing orders were challenged by Kevin Donovan, a journalist who had written a series of articles on the couple's deaths, and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., for which he wrote (collectively the "Toronto Star").<sup>2</sup> The Toronto Star said the orders violated its constitutional rights of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, as well as the attending principle that the workings of the courts should be open to the public as a means of guaranteeing the fair and transparent administration of justice.

## **III. Proceedings Below**

## A. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 2018 ONSC 4706, 41 E.T.R. (4th) 126 (Dunphy J.)

13 In addressing whether the circumstances warranted interference with the open court principle, the application judge relied on this Court's judgment in *Sierra Club*. He noted that a confidentiality order should only be granted when: "(1) such an order is necessary ... to prevent a serious risk to an important interest because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression and the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings" (para. 13(d)).

14 The application judge considered whether the Trustees' interests would be served by granting the sealing orders. In his view, the Trustees had correctly identified two legitimate interests in support of making an exception to the open court principle: "protecting the privacy and dignity of victims of crime and their loved ones" and "a reasonable apprehension of risk on behalf of those known to have an interest in receiving or administering the assets of the deceased" (paras. 22-25). With respect to the first interest, the application judge found that "[t]he degree of intrusion on that privacy and dignity has already been extreme and ... excruciating" (para. 23). For the second interest, although he noted that "it would have been preferable to include objective evidence of the gravity of that risk from, for example, the police responsible for the investigation", he concluded that "the lack of such evidence is not fatal" (para. 24). Rather, the necessary inferences could be drawn from the circumstances notably the "willingness of the perpetrator(s) of the crimes to resort to extreme violence to pursue whatever motive existed" (*ibid*.). He concluded that the "current uncertainty" was the source of a reasonable apprehension of the risk of harm and, further, that the foreseeable harm was "grave" (*ibid*.).

15 The application judge ultimately accepted the Trustees' submission that these interests "very strongly outweigh" what he called the proportionately narrow public interest in the "essentially administrative files" at issue (paras. 31 and 33). He therefore concluded that the harmful effects of the sealing orders were substantially outweighed by the salutary effects on the rights and interests of the affected individuals.

16 Finally, the application judge considered what order would protect the affected individuals while infringing upon the open court principle to the minimum extent possible. He decided no meaningful part of either file could be disclosed if one were to make the redactions necessary to protect the interests he had identified. Open-ended sealing orders did not, however, sit well with him. The application judge therefore sealed the files for an initial period of two years, with the possibility of renewal.

## B. Court of Appeal for Ontario, 2019 ONCA 376, 47 E.T.R. (4th) 1 (Doherty, Rouleau and Hourigan JJ.A.)

17 The Toronto Star's appeal was allowed, unanimously, and the sealing orders were lifted.

18 The Court of Appeal considered the two interests advanced before the application judge in support of the orders to seal the probate files. As to the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the victims of violent crime and their loved ones, it recalled that the kind of interest that is properly protected by a sealing order must have a public interest component. Citing *Sierra Club*, the Court of Appeal wrote that "[p]ersonal concerns cannot, without more, justify an order sealing material that would normally be available to the public under the open court principle" (para. 10). It concluded that the privacy interest for which the Trustees sought protection lacked this quality of public interest.

While it recognized the personal safety of individuals as an important public interest generally, the Court of Appeal wrote that there was no evidence in this case that could warrant a finding that disclosure of the contents of the estate files posed a real risk to anyone's physical safety. The application judge had erred on this point: "the suggestion that the beneficiaries and trustees are somehow at risk because the Shermans were murdered is not an inference, but is speculation. It provides no basis for a sealing order" (para. 16).

20 The Court of Appeal concluded that the Trustees had failed the first stage of the test for obtaining orders sealing the probate files. It therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the orders.

## C. Subsequent Proceedings

The Court of Appeal's order setting aside the sealing orders has been stayed pending the disposition of this appeal. The Toronto Star brought a motion to adduce new evidence on this appeal, comprised of land titles documents, transcripts of the cross-examination of a detective on the murder investigation, and various news articles. This evidence, it says, supports the conclusion that the sealing orders should be lifted. The motion was referred to this panel.

## **IV. Submissions**

22 The Trustees have appealed to this Court seeking to restore the sealing orders made by the application judge. In addition to contesting the motion for new evidence, they maintain that the orders are necessary to prevent a serious risk to the privacy and physical safety of the affected individuals and that the salutary effects of sealing the court probate files outweigh the harmful effects of limiting court openness. The Trustees argue that two legal errors led the Court of Appeal to conclude otherwise.

First, they submit the Court of Appeal erred in holding that privacy is a personal concern that cannot, without more, constitute an important interest under *Sierra Club*. The Trustees say the application judge was right to characterize privacy and dignity as an important public interest which, as it was subject to a serious risk, justified the orders. They ask this Court to recognize that privacy in itself is an important public interest for the purposes of the analysis.

Second, the Trustees submit that the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the application judge's conclusion that there was a serious risk of physical harm. They argue that the Court of Appeal failed to recognize that courts have the ability to draw reasonable inferences by applying reason and logic even in the absence of specific evidence of the alleged risk.

The Trustees say that these errors led the Court of Appeal to mistakenly set aside the sealing orders. In answer to questions at the hearing, the Trustees acknowledged that an order redacting certain documents in the file or a publication ban could assist in addressing some of their concerns, but maintained neither is a reasonable alternative to the sealing orders in the circumstances.

The Trustees submit further that the protection of these interests outweighs the deleterious effects of the orders. They argue that the importance of the open court principle is attenuated by the nature of these probate proceedings. Given that it is non-contentious and not strictly speaking necessary for the transfer of property at death, probate is a court proceeding of an "administrative" character, which diminishes the imperative of applying the open court principle here (paras. 113-14).

The Toronto Star takes the position that the Court of Appeal made no mistake in setting aside the sealing orders and that the appeal should be dismissed. In the Toronto Star's view, while privacy can be an important interest where it evinces a public component, the Trustees have only identified a subjective desire for the affected individuals in this case to avoid further publicity, which is not inherently harmful. According to the Toronto Star and some of the interveners, the Trustees' position would allow that measure of inconvenience and embarrassment that arises in every court proceeding to take precedence over the interest in court openness protected by the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in which all of society has a stake. The Toronto Star argues further that the information in the court files is not highly sensitive. On the issue of whether the sealing orders were necessary to protect the affected individuals from physical harm, the Toronto Star submits that the Court of Appeal was right to conclude that the Trustees had failed to establish a serious risk to this interest.

In the alternative, even if there were a serious risk to one or another important interest, the Toronto Star says the sealing orders are not necessary because the risk could be addressed by an alternative, less onerous order. Furthermore, it says the orders are not proportionate. In seeking to minimize the importance of openness in probate proceedings, the Trustees invite an inflexible approach to balancing the effects of the order that is incompatible with the principle that openness applies to all court proceedings. In any event, there is a public interest in openness specifically here, given that the certificates sought can affect the rights of third parties and that openness ensures the fairness of the proceedings, whether they are contested or not.

#### V. Analysis

29 The outcome of the appeal turns on whether the application judge should have made the sealing orders pursuant to the test for discretionary limits on court openness from this Court's decision in *Sierra Club*.

Court openness is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and is essential to the proper functioning of our democracy (Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23; Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, at paras. 23-26). Reporting on court proceedings by a free press is often said to be inseparable from the principle of open justice. "In reporting what has been said and done at a public trial, the media serve as the eyes and ears of a wider public which would be absolutely entitled to attend but for purely practical reasons cannot do so" (*Khuja v. Times Newspapers Ltd*, 2017 UKSC 49, [2019] A.C. 161 (U.K. S.C.), at para. 16, citing *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at pp. 1326-39, per Cory J.). Limits on openness in service of other public interests have been recognized, but sparingly and always with an eye to preserving a strong presumption that justice should proceed in public view (*Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at p. 878; R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, at paras. 32-39; *Sierra Club*, at para. 56). The test for discretionary limits on court openness is directed at maintaining this presumption while offering sufficient flexibility for courts to protect these other public interests where they arise (*Mentuck*, at para. 33). The parties agree that this is the appropriate framework of analysis for resolving this appeal.

31 The parties and the courts below disagree, however, about how this test applies to the facts of this case and this calls for clarification of certain points of the Sierra Club analysis. Most centrally, there is disagreement about how an important interest in the protection of privacy could be recognized such that it would justify limits on openness, and in particular when privacy can be a matter of public concern. The parties bring two settled principles of this Court's jurisprudence to bear in support of their respective positions. First, this Court has often observed that privacy is a fundamental value necessary to the preservation of a free and democratic society (Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, at para. 25; Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, at paras. 65-66, per La Forest J. (dissenting but not on this point); New Brunswick, at para. 40). Courts have invoked privacy, in some instances, as the basis for an exception to openness under the Sierra Club test (see, e.g., R. v. Henry, 2009 BCCA 86, 270 B.C.A.C. 5, at paras. 11 and 17). At the same time, the jurisprudence acknowledges that some degree of privacy loss - resulting in inconvenience, even in upset or embarrassment — is inherent in any court proceeding open to the public (New Brunswick, at para. 40). Accordingly, upholding the presumption of openness has meant recognizing that neither individual sensibilities nor mere personal discomfort associated with participating in judicial proceedings are likely to justify the exclusion of the public from court (Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, at p. 185; New Brunswick, at para. 41). Determining the role of privacy in the Sierra *Club* analysis requires reconciling these two ideas, which is the nub of the disagreement between the parties. The right of privacy is not absolute; the open court principle is not without exceptions.

32 For the reasons that follow, I disagree with the Trustees that the ostensibly unbounded privacy interest they invoke qualifies as an important public interest within the meaning of *Sierra Club*. Their broad claim fails to focus on the elements of privacy

that are deserving of public protection in the open court context. That is not to say, however, that privacy can never ground an exceptional measure such as the sealing orders sought in this case. While the mere embarrassment caused by the dissemination of personal information through the open court process does not rise to the level justifying a limit on court openness, circumstances do exist where an aspect of a person's private life has a plain public interest dimension.

<sup>33</sup> Personal information disseminated in open court can be more than a source of discomfort and may result in an affront to a person's dignity. Insofar as privacy serves to protect individuals from this affront, it is an important public interest relevant under *Sierra Club*. Dignity in this sense is a related but narrower concern than privacy generally; it transcends the interests of the individual and, like other important public interests, is a matter that concerns the society at large. A court can make an exception to the open court principle, notwithstanding the strong presumption in its favour, if the interest in protecting core aspects of individuals' personal lives that bear on their dignity is at serious risk by reason of the dissemination of sufficiently sensitive information. The question is not whether the information is "personal" to the individual concerned, but whether, because of its highly sensitive character, its dissemination would occasion an affront to their dignity that society as a whole has a stake in protecting.

This public interest in privacy appropriately focuses the analysis on the impact of the dissemination of sensitive personal information, rather than the mere fact of this dissemination, which is frequently risked in court proceedings and is necessary in a system that privileges court openness. It is a high bar — higher and more precise than the sweeping privacy interest relied upon here by the Trustees. This public interest will only be seriously at risk where the information in question strikes at what is sometimes said to be the core identity of the individual concerned: information so sensitive that its dissemination could be an affront to dignity that the public would not tolerate, even in service of open proceedings.

I hasten to say that applicants for an order making exception to the open court principle cannot content themselves with an unsubstantiated claim that this public interest in dignity is compromised any more than they could by an unsubstantiated claim that their physical integrity is endangered. Under *Sierra Club*, the applicant must show on the facts of the case that, as an important interest, this dignity dimension of their privacy is at "serious risk". For the purposes of the test for discretionary limits on court openness, this requires the applicant to show that the information in the court file is sufficiently sensitive such that it can be said to strike at the biographical core of the individual and, in the broader circumstances, that there is a serious risk that, without an exceptional order, the affected individual will suffer an affront to their dignity.

In the present case, the information in the court files was not of this highly sensitive character that it could be said to strike at the core identity of the affected persons; the Trustees have failed to show how the lifting of the sealing orders engages the dignity of the affected individuals. I am therefore not convinced that the intrusion on their privacy raises a serious risk to an important public interest as required by *Sierra Club*. Moreover, as I shall endeavour to explain, there was no serious risk of physical harm to the affected individuals by lifting the sealing orders. Accordingly, this is not an appropriate case in which to make sealing orders, or any order limiting access to these court files. In the circumstances, the admissibility of the Toronto Star's new evidence is moot. I propose to dismiss the appeal.

#### A. The Test for Discretionary Limits on Court Openness

Court proceedings are presumptively open to the public (*MacIntyre*, at p. 189; A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 11).

38 The test for discretionary limits on presumptive court openness has been expressed as a two-step inquiry involving the necessity and proportionality of the proposed order (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53). Upon examination, however, this test rests upon three core prerequisites that a person seeking such a limit must show. Recasting the test around these three prerequisites, without altering its essence, helps to clarify the burden on an applicant seeking an exception to the open court principle. In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that:

(1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

(2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and,

(3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — properly be ordered. This test applies to all discretionary limits on court openness, subject only to valid legislative enactments (Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188, at paras. 7 and 22).

The discretion is structured and controlled in this way to protect the open court principle, which is understood to be constitutionalized under the right to freedom of expression at s. 2(b) of the Charter (New Brunswick, at para. 23). Sustained by freedom of expression, the open court principle is one of the foundations of a free press given that access to courts is fundamental to newsgathering. This Court has often highlighted the importance of open judicial proceedings to maintaining the independence and impartiality of the courts, public confidence and understanding of their work and ultimately the legitimacy of the process (see, e.g., *Vancouver Sun*, at paras. 23-26). In *New Brunswick*, La Forest J. explained the presumption in favour of court openness had become "one of the hallmarks of a democratic society" (citing *Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1)*, (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.), at p. 119), that "acts as a guarantee that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the rule of law ... thereby fostering public confidence in the integrity of the court system and understanding of the administration of justice" (para. 22). The centrality of this principle to the court system underlies the strong presumption — albeit one that is rebuttable — in favour of court openness (para. 40; *Mentuck*, at para. 39).

40 The test ensures that discretionary orders are subject to no lower standard than a legislative enactment limiting court openness would be (*Mentuck*, at para. 27; *Sierra Club*, at para. 45). To that end, this Court developed a scheme of analysis by analogy to the *Oakes* test, which courts use to understand whether a legislative limit on a right guaranteed under the Charter is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (*Sierra Club*, at para. 40, citing *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; see also *Dagenais*, at p. 878; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 30).

The recognized scope of what interests might justify a discretionary exception to open courts has broadened over time. In *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. spoke of a requisite risk to the "fairness of the trial" (p. 878). In *Mentuck*, Iacobucci J. extended this to a risk affecting the "proper administration of justice" (para. 32). Finally, in *Sierra Club*, Iacobucci J., again writing for a unanimous Court, restated the test to capture any serious risk to an "important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation" (para. 53). He simultaneously clarified that the important interest must be expressed as a public interest. For example, on the facts of that case, a harm to a particular business interest would not have been sufficient, but the "general commercial interest of preserving confidential information" was an important interest because of its public character (para. 55). This is consistent with the fact that this test was developed in reference to the *Oakes* jurisprudence that focuses on the "pressing and substantial" objective of legislation of general application (*Oakes*, at pp. 138-39; see also Mentuck, at para. 31). The term "important interest" therefore captures a broad array of public objectives.

42 While there is no closed list of important public interests for the purposes of this test, I share Iacobucci J.'s sense, explained in *Sierra Club*, that courts must be "cautious" and "alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule" even at the earliest stage when they are identifying important public interests (para. 56). Determining what is an important public interest can be done in the abstract at the level of general principles that extend beyond the parties to the particular dispute (para. 55). By contrast, whether that interest is at "serious risk" is a fact-based finding that, for the judge considering the appropriateness of an order, is necessarily made in context. In this sense, the identification of, on the one hand, an important interest and, on the other, the seriousness of the risk to that interest are, theoretically at least, separate and qualitatively distinct operations. An order may therefore be refused simply because a valid important public interest is not at serious risk on the facts of a given case or, conversely, that the identified interests, regardless of whether they are at serious risk, do not have the requisite important public character as a matter of general principle. 43 The test laid out in *Sierra Club* continues to be an appropriate guide for judicial discretion in cases like this one. The breadth of the category of "important interest" transcends the interests of the parties to the dispute and provides significant flexibility to address harm to fundamental values in our society that unqualified openness could cause (see, e.g., P. M. Perell and J. W. Morden, *The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario* (4th ed. 2020), at para. 3.185; J. Bailey and J. Burkell, "Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties' and Witnesses' Personal Information" (2016), 48 Ottawa L. Rev. 143, at pp. 154-55). At the same time, however, the requirement that a serious risk to an important interest be demonstrated imposes a meaningful threshold necessary to maintain the presumption of openness. Were it merely a matter of weighing the benefits of the limit on court openness against its negative effects, decision-makers confronted with concrete impacts on the individuals appearing before them may struggle to put adequate weight on the less immediate negative effects on the open court principle. Such balancing could be evasive of effective appellate review. To my mind, the structure provided by *Dagenais, Mentuck*, and *Sierra Club* remains appropriate and should be affirmed.

Finally, I recall that the open court principle is engaged by all judicial proceedings, whatever their nature (*MacIntyre* at pp. 185-86; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 31). To the extent the Trustees suggested, in their arguments about the negative effects of the sealing orders, that probate in Ontario does not engage the open court principle or that the openness of these proceedings has no public value, I disagree. The certificates the Trustees sought from the court are issued under the seal of that court, thereby bearing the imprimatur of the court's authority. The court's decision, even if rendered in a non-contentious setting, will have an impact on third parties, for example by establishing the testamentary paper that constitutes a valid will (see *Otis v. Otis*, (2004), 7 E.T.R. (3d) 221 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 23-24). Contrary to what the Trustees argue, the matters in a probate file are not quintessentially private or fundamentally administrative. Obtaining a certificate of appointment of estate trustee in Ontario is a court proceeding and the fundamental rationale for openness — discouraging mischief and ensuring confidence in the administration of justice through transparency — applies to probate proceedings and thus to the transfer of property under court authority and other matters affected by that court action.

It is true that other non-probate estate planning mechanisms may allow for the transfer of wealth outside the ordinary avenues of testate or intestate succession — that is the case, for instance, for certain insurance and pension benefits, and for certain property held in co-ownership. But this does not change the necessarily open court character of probate proceedings. That non-probate transfers keep certain information related to the administration of an estate out of public view does not mean that the Trustees here, by seeking certificates from the court, somehow do not engage this principle. The Trustees seek the benefits that flow from the public judicial probate process: transparency ensures that the probate court's authority is administered fairly and efficiently (*Vancouver Sun*, at para. 25; *New Brunswick*, at para. 22). The strong presumption in favour of openness plainly applies to probate proceedings and the Trustees must satisfy the test for discretionary limits on court openness.

#### B. The Public Importance of Privacy

As mentioned, I disagree with the Trustees that an unbounded interest in privacy qualifies as an important public interest under the test for discretionary limits on court openness. Yet in some of its manifestations, privacy does have social importance beyond the person most immediately concerned. On that basis, it cannot be excluded as an interest that could justify, in the right circumstances, a limit to court openness. Indeed, the public importance of privacy has been recognized by this Court in various settings, and this sheds light on why the narrower aspect of privacy related to the protection of dignity is an important public interest.

I respectfully disagree with the manner in which the Court of Appeal disposed of the claim by the Trustees that there is a serious risk to the interest in protecting personal privacy in this case. For the appellate judges, the privacy concerns raised by the Trustees amounted to "[p]ersonal concerns" which cannot, "without more", satisfy the requirement from *Sierra Club* that an important interest be framed as a public interest (para. 10). The Court of Appeal in our case relied, at para. 10, on *H.* (*M.E.*) v. Williams, 2012 ONCA 35, 108 O.R. (3d) 321, in which it was held that "[p]urely personal interests cannot justify non-publication or sealing orders" (para. 25). Citing as authority judgments of this Court in *MacIntyre* and *Sierra Club*, the court continued by observing that "personal concerns of a litigant, including concerns about the very real emotional distress and embarrassment that can be occasioned to litigants when justice is done in public, will not, standing alone, satisfy the necessity branch of the test" (para. 25). Respectfully stated, the emphasis that the Court of Appeal placed on personal concerns as a means of deciding that the sealing orders failed to meet the necessity requirement in this case and in *Williams* is, I think, mistaken. Personal concerns that relate to aspects of the privacy of an individual who is before the courts can coincide with a public interest in confidentiality.

Like the Court of Appeal, I do agree with the view expressed particularly in the pre-*Charter* case of *MacIntyre*, that where court openness results in an intrusion on privacy which disturbs the "sensibilities of the individuals involved" (p. 185), that concern is generally insufficient to justify a sealing or like order and does not amount to an important public interest under *Sierra Club*. But I disagree with the Court of Appeal in this case and in *Williams* that this is because the intrusion only occasions "personal concerns". Certain personal concerns — even "without more" — can coincide with important public interests within the meaning of *Sierra Club*. To invoke the expression of Binnie J. in F.N. (Re), 2000 SCC 35, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, at para. 10, there is a "public interest in confidentiality" that is felt, first and foremost, by the person involved and is most certainly a personal concern. Even in *Williams*, the Court of Appeal was careful to note that where, without privacy protection, an individual would face "a substantial risk of serious debilitating emotional ... harm", an exception to openness should be available (paras. 29-30). The means of discerning whether a privacy interest reflects a "public interest in confidentiality" is therefore not whether the interest reflects or is rooted in "personal concerns" for the privacy of the individuals involved. Some personal concerns relating to privacy overlap with public interests in confidentiality. These interests in privacy can be, in my view, important public interests within the meaning of *Sierra Club*. It is true that an individual's privacy is pre-eminently important to that individual. But this Court has also long recognized that the protection of privacy is, in a variety of settings, in the interest of society as a whole.

49 The proposition that privacy is important, not only to the affected individual but to our society, has deep roots in the jurisprudence of this Court outside the context of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. This background helps explain why privacy cannot be rejected as a mere personal concern. However, the key differences in these contexts are such that the public importance of privacy cannot be transposed to open courts without adaptation. Only specific aspects of privacy interests can qualify as important public interests under *Sierra Club*.

In the context of s. 8 of the Charter and public sector privacy legislation, La Forest J. cited American privacy scholar Alan F. Westin for the proposition that privacy is a fundamental value of the modern state, first in *R. v. Dyment*, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at pp. 427-28 (concurring), and then in Dagg, at para. 65 (dissenting but not on this point). In the latter case, La Forest J. wrote: "The protection of privacy is a fundamental value in modern, democratic states. An expression of an individual's unique personality or personhood, privacy is grounded on physical and moral autonomy — the freedom to engage in one's own thoughts, actions and decisions" (para. 65 (citations omitted)). That statement was endorsed unanimously by this Court in Lavigne, at para. 25.

51 Further, in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 2013 SCC 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733 ("UFCW"), decided in the context of a statute regulating the use of information by organizations, the objective of providing an individual with some control over their information was recognized as "intimately connected to individual autonomy, dignity and privacy, self-evidently significant social values" (para. 24). The importance of privacy, its "quasi-constitutional status" and its role in protecting moral autonomy continues to find expression in our recent jurisprudence (see, e.g., Lavigne, at para. 24; *Bragg*, at para. 18, per Abella J., citing TorontoStar Newspaper Ltd. v. Ontario, 2012 ONCJ 27, 289 C.C.C. (3d) 549, at paras. 40-41 and 44; Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751, at para. 59). In *Douez*, Karakatsanis, Wagner (as he then was) and Gascon JJ. underscored this same point, adding that "the growth of the Internet, virtually timeless with pervasive reach, has exacerbated the potential harm that may flow from incursions to a person's privacy interests" (para. 59).

<sup>52</sup> Privacy as a public interest is underlined by specific aspects of privacy protection present in legislation at the federal and provincial levels (see, e.g., Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21; Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 ("PIPEDA"); Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31; Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12, s. 5; *Civil Code of Québec*, arts. 35 to 41).<sup>3</sup> Further, in assessing the constitutionality of a legislative exception to the open court principle, this Court has recognized that the protection of individual privacy can be a pressing and substantial objective (*Edmonton Journal*, at p. 1345, per Cory J.; see also the concurring reasons of Wilson J., at p. 1354, in which "the public interest in protecting the privacy of litigants generally in matrimonial cases against the public interest in an open court process" was explicitly noted). There is also continued support for the social and public importance of individual privacy in the academic literature (see, e.g., A. J. Cockfield, "Protecting the Social Value of Privacy in the Context of State Investigations Using New Technologies" (2007), 40 U.B.C. L. Rev. 41, at p. 41; K. Hughes, "A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law" (2012), 75 *Modern L. Rev.* 806, at p. 823; P. Gewirtz, "Privacy and Speech" (2001), *Sup. Ct. Rev.* 139, at p. 139). It is therefore inappropriate, in my respectful view, to dismiss the public interest in protecting privacy as merely a personal concern. This does not mean, however, that privacy generally is an important public interest in the context of limits on court openness.

53 The fact that the case before the application judge concerned individuals who were advancing their own privacy interests, which were undeniably important to them as individuals, does not mean that there is no public interest at stake. In *F.N. (Re)*, this was the personal interest that young offenders had in remaining anonymous in court proceedings as a means of encouraging their personal rehabilitation (para. 11). All of society had a stake, according to Binnie J., in the young person's personal prospect for rehabilitation. This same idea from *F.N. (Re)* was cited in support of finding the interest in *Sierra Club* to be a public interest. That interest, rooted first in an agreement of personal concern to the contracting parties involved, was a private matter that evinced, alongside its personal interest to the parties, a "public interest in confidentiality" (*Sierra Club*, at para. 55). Similarly, while the Trustees have a personal interest in preserving their privacy, this does not mean that the public has no stake in this same interest because — as this Court has made clear — it is related to moral autonomy and dignity which are pressing and substantial concerns.

54 In this appeal, the Toronto Star suggests that legitimate privacy concerns would be effectively protected by a discretionary order where there is "something more" to elevate them beyond personal concerns and sensibilities (R.F., at para. 73). The Income Security Advocacy Centre, by way of example, submits that privacy serves the public interests of preventing harm and of ensuring individuals are not dissuaded from accessing the courts. I agree that these concepts are related, but in my view care must be taken not to conflate the public importance of privacy with that of other interests; aspects of privacy, such as dignity, may constitute important public interests in and of themselves. A risk to personal privacy may be tied to a risk to psychological harm, as it was in Bragg (para. 14; see also J. Rossiter, Law of Publication Bans, Private Hearings and Sealing Orders (looseleaf), s. 2.4.1). But concerns for privacy may not always coincide with a desire to avoid psychological harm, and may focus instead, for example, on protecting one's professional standing (see, e.g., R. v. Paterson(1998), 102 B.C.A.C. 200, at paras. 76, 78 and 87-88). Similarly, there may be circumstances where the prospect of surrendering the personal information necessary to pursue a legal claim may deter an individual from bringing that claim (see S. v. Lamontagne, 2020 QCCA 663, at paras. 34-35 (CanLII)). In the same way, the prospect of surrendering sensitive commercial information would have impaired the conduct of the party's defence in *Sierra Club* (at para. 71), or could pressure an individual into settling a dispute prematurely (K. Eltis, Courts, Litigants and the Digital Age (2nd ed. 2016), at p. 86). But this does not necessarily mean that a public interest in privacy is wholly subsumed by such concerns. I note, for example, that access to justice concerns do not apply where the privacy interest to be protected is that of a third party to the litigation, such as a witness, whose access to the courts is not at stake and who has no choice available to terminate the litigation and avoid any privacy impacts (see, e.g., Himel v. Greenberg, 2010 ONSC 2325, 93 R.F.L. (6th) 357, at para. 58; see also Rossiter, s. 2.4.2(2)). In any event, the recognition of these related and valid important public interests does not answer the question as to whether aspects of privacy in and of themselves are important public interests and does not diminish the distinctive public character of privacy, considered above.

Indeed, the specific harms to privacy occasioned by open courts have not gone unnoticed nor been discounted as merely personal concerns. Courts have exercised their discretion to limit court openness in order to protect personal information from publicity, including to prevent the disclosure of sexual orientation (see, e.g., *Paterson*, at paras. 76, 78 and 87-88), HIV status (see, e.g., A.B. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 629, at para. 9 (CanLII)) and a history of substance abuse and criminality (see, e.g., R. v. Pickton, 2010 BCSC 1198, at paras. 11 and 20 (CanLII)). This need to reconcile the public interest in privacy with the open court principle has been highlighted by this Court (see, e.g., *Edmonton Journal*, at p. 1353, per Wilson J.). Writing extra-judicially, McLachlin C.J. explained that "[i]f we are serious about peoples' private lives, we must preserve a modicum of privacy. Equally, if we are serious about our justice system, we must have open courts. The question is how to reconcile these dual imperatives in a fair and principled way" ("Courts, Transparency and Public Confidence: To the Better Administration of Justice" (2003), 8 Deakin L. Rev. 1, at p. 4). In seeking that reconciliation, the question becomes whether the relevant dimension of privacy amounts to an important public interest that, when seriously at risk, would justify rebutting the strong presumption favouring open courts.

#### C. The Important Public Interest in Privacy Bears on the Protection of Individual Dignity

<sup>56</sup> While the public importance of privacy has clearly been recognized by this Court in various settings, caution is required in deploying this concept in the test for discretionary limits on court openness. It is a matter of settled law that open court proceedings by their nature can be a source of discomfort and embarrassment and these intrusions on privacy are generally seen as of insufficient importance to overcome the presumption of openness. The Toronto Star has raised the concern that recognizing privacy as an important public interest will lower the burden for applicants because the privacy of litigants will, in some respects, always be at risk in court proceedings. I agree that the requirement to show a serious risk to an important interest is a key threshold component of the analysis that must be preserved in order to protect the open court principle. The recognition of a public interest in privacy could threaten the strong presumption of openness if privacy is cast too broadly without a view to its public character.

<sup>57</sup> Privacy poses challenges in the test for discretionary limits on court openness because of the necessary dissemination of information that openness implies. It bears recalling that when Dickson J., as he then was, wrote in *MacIntyre* that "covertness is the exception and openness the rule", he was explicitly treating a privacy argument, returning to and dismissing the view, urged many times before, "that the 'privacy' of litigants *requires* that the public be excluded from court proceedings" (p. 185 (emphasis added)). Dickson J. rejected the view that personal privacy concerns require closed courtroom doors, explaining that "[a]s a general rule the sensibilities of the individuals involved are no basis for exclusion of the public from judicial proceedings" (p. 185).

Though writing before *Dagenais*, and therefore not commenting on the specific steps of the analysis as we now understand them, to my mind, Dickson J. was right to recognize that the open court principle brings necessary limits to the right to privacy. While individuals may have an expectation that information about them will not be revealed in judicial proceedings, the open court principle stands presumptively in opposition to that expectation. For example, in *Lac d'Amiante du Québec Ltée v. 2858-0702 Québec Inc.*, 2001 SCC 51, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 743, LeBel J. held that "a party who institutes a legal proceeding waives his or her right to privacy, at least in part" (para. 42). *MacIntyre* and cases like it recognize — in stating that openness is the rule and covertness the exception — that the right to privacy, however defined, in some measure gives way to the open court ideal. I share the view that the open court principle presumes that this limit on the right to privacy is justified.

59 The Toronto Star is therefore right to say that the privacy of individuals will very often be at some risk in court proceedings. Disputes between and concerning individuals that play out in open court necessarily reveal information that may have otherwise remained out of public view. Indeed, much like the Court of Appeal in this case, courts have explicitly adverted to this concern when concluding that mere inconvenience is insufficient to cross the initial threshold of the test (see, e.g., *3834310* Canada inc. v. Chamberland2004 CanLII 4122(Que. C.A.), at para. 30). Saying that any impact on individual privacy is sufficient to establish a serious risk to an important public interest for the purposes of the test for discretionary limits on court openness could render this initial requirement moot. Many cases would turn on the balancing at the proportionality stage. Such a development would amount to a departure from *Sierra Club*, which is the appropriate framework and one which must be preserved.

Further, recognizing an important interest in privacy generally could prove to be too open-ended and difficult to apply. Privacy is a complex and contextual concept (*Dagg*, at para. 67; see also B. McIsaac, K. Klein and S. Brown, *The Law of Privacy in Canada* (loose-leaf), vol. 1, at pp. 1-4; D. J. Solove, "Conceptualizing Privacy" (2002), 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1087, at p. 1090). Indeed, this Court has described the nature of limits of privacy as being in a state of "theoretical disarray" (R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, at para. 35). Much turns on the context in which privacy is invoked. I agree with the Toronto Star that a bald recognition of privacy as an important interest in the context of the test for discretionary limits on court openness, as the Trustees advance here, would invite considerable confusion. It would be difficult for courts to measure a serious risk to such an interest because of its multi-faceted nature. While I acknowledge these concerns have merit, I disagree that they require that privacy never be considered in determining whether there is a serious risk to an important public interest. I reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, the problem of privacy's complexity can be attenuated by focusing on the purpose underlying the public protection of privacy as it is relevant to the judicial process, in order to fix precisely on that aspect which transcends the interests of the parties in this context. That narrower dimension of privacy is the protection of dignity, an important public interest that can be threatened by open courts. Indeed, rather than attempting to apply a single unwieldy concept of privacy in all contexts, this Court has generally fixed on more specific privacy interests tailored to the particular situation (*Spencer*, at para. 35; *Edmonton Journal*, at p. 1362, per Wilson J.). That is what must be done here, with a view to identifying the public aspect of privacy that openness might inappropriately undermine.

62 Second, I recall that in order to pass the first stage of the analysis one must not simply invoke an important interest, but must also overcome the presumption of openness by showing a serious risk to this interest. The burden of showing a risk to such an interest on the facts of a given case constitutes the true initial threshold on the person seeking to restrict openness. It is never sufficient to plead a recognized important public interest on its own. The demonstration of a serious risk to this interest is still required. What is important is that the interest be accurately defined to capture only those aspects of privacy that engage legitimate public objectives such that showing a serious risk to that interest remains a high bar. In this way, courts can effectively maintain the guarantee of presumptive openness.

Specifically, in order to preserve the integrity of the open court principle, an important public interest concerned with the protection of dignity should be understood to be seriously at risk only in limited cases. Nothing here displaces the principle that covertness in court proceedings must be exceptional. Neither the sensibilities of individuals nor the fact that openness is disadvantageous, embarrassing or distressing to certain individuals will generally on their own warrant interference with court openness (*MacIntyre*, at p. 185; *New Brunswick*, at para. 40; *Williams*, at para. 30; Coltsfoot Publishing Ltd. v. Foster-Jacques, 2012 NSCA 83, 320 N.S.R. (2d) 166, at para. 97). These principles do not preclude recognizing the public character of a privacy interest as important when it is related to the protection of dignity. They merely require that a serious risk be shown to exist in respect of this interest in order to justify, exceptionally, a limit on openness, as is the case with any important public interest under *Sierra Club*. As Professors Sylvette Guillemard and Séverine Menétrey explain, [TRANSLATION] "[t]he confidentiality of the proceedings may be justified, in particular, in order to protect the parties' privacy .... However, the jurisprudence indicates that embarrassment or shame is not a sufficient reason to order that proceedings be held *in camera* or to impose a publication ban" (*Comprendre la procédure civile québécoise* (2nd ed. 2017), at p. 57).

64 How should the privacy interest at issue be understood as raising an important public interest relevant to the test for discretionary limits on court openness in this context? It is helpful to recall that the orders below were sought to limit access to documents and information in the court files. The Trustees' argument on this point focused squarely on the risk of immediate and widespread dissemination of the personally identifying and other sensitive information contained in the sealed materials by the Toronto Star. The Trustees submit that this dissemination would constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of the affected individuals beyond the upset they have already suffered as a result of the publicity associated with the death of the Shermans.

In my view, there is value in leaving individuals free to restrict when, how and to what extent highly sensitive information about them is communicated to others in the public sphere, because choosing how we present ourselves in public preserves our moral autonomy and dignity as individuals. This Court has had occasion to underscore the connection between the privacy interest engaged by open courts and the protection of dignity specifically. For example, in *Edmonton Journal*, Wilson J. noted that the impugned provision which would limit publication about matrimonial proceedings addressed "a somewhat different aspect of privacy, one more closely related to the protection of one's dignity ... namely the personal anguish and loss of dignity that may result from having embarrassing details of one's private life printed in the newspapers" (pp. 1363-64). In *Bragg*, as a further example, the protection of a young person's ability to control sensitive information was said to foster respect for "dignity, personal integrity and autonomy" (para. 18, citing Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd., at para. 44). 66 Consistent with this jurisprudence, I note by way of example that the Quebec legislature expressly highlighted the preservation of dignity when the *Sierra Club* test was codified in the Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C-25.01 ("C.C.P."), art. 12 (see also Ministère de la Justice, *Commentaires de la ministre de la Justice: Code de procédure civile, chapitre C-25.01* (2015), art. 12). Under art. 12 *C.C.P.*, a discretionary exception to the open court principle can be made by the court if "public order, in particular the preservation of the dignity of the persons involved or the protection of substantial and legitimate interests", requires it.

The concept of public order evidences flexibility analogous to the concept of an important public interest under *Sierra Club* yet it recalls that the interest invoked transcends, in importance and consequence, the purely subjective sensibilities of the persons affected. Like the "important public interest" that must be at serious risk to justify the sealing orders in the present appeal, public order encompasses a wide array of general principles and imperative norms identified by a legislature and the courts as fundamental to a given society (see Goulet v. Transamerica Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 2002 SCC 21, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 719, at paras. 42-44, citing *Godbout v. Longueuil (Ville de)*, [1995] R.J.Q. 2561 (C.A.), at p. 2570, aff'd [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844). As one Quebec judge wrote, referring to *Sierra Club* prior to the enactment of art. 12 *C.C.P.*, the interest must be understood as defined [TRANSLATION] "in terms of a public interest in confidentiality" (see *3834310 Canada inc.*, at para. 24, per Gendreau J.A. for the court of appeal). From among the various considerations that make up the concept of public order and other legitimate interests to which art. 12 *C.C.P.* alludes, it is significant that dignity, and not an untailored reference to either privacy, harm or access to justice, was given pride of place. Indeed, it is that narrow aspect of privacy considered to be a fundamental right that courts had fixed upon before the enactment of art. 12 *C.C.P.* — [TRANSLATION] "what is part of one's personal life, in short, what constitutes a minimum personal sphere" (*Godbout*, at p. 2569, per Baudouin J.A.; see also A. v. B.1990 CanLII 3132(Que. C.A.), at para. 20, per Rothman J.A.).

The "preservation of the dignity of the persons involved" is now consecrated as the archetypal public order interest in art. 12 *C.C.P.* It is the exemplar of the *Sierra Club* important public interest in confidentiality that stands as justification for an exception to openness (S. Rochette and J.-F. Côté, "Article 12", in L. Chamberland, ed., *Le grand collectif: Code de procédure civile — Commentaires et annotations* (5th ed. 2020), vol. 1, at p. 102; D. Ferland and B. Emery, *Précis de procédure civile du Québec* (6th ed. 2020), vol. 1, at para. 1-111). Dignity gives concrete expression to this public order interest because all of society has a stake in its preservation, notwithstanding its personal connections to the individuals concerned. This codification of *Sierra Club* 's notion of important public interest highlights the superordinate importance of human dignity and the appropriateness of limiting court openness on this basis as against an overbroad understanding of privacy that might be otherwise unsuitable to the open court context.

69 Consistent with this idea, understanding privacy as predicated on dignity has been advanced as useful in connection with challenges brought by digital communications (K. Eltis, "The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context" (2011), 56 McGill L.J. 289, at p. 314).

It is also significant, in my view, that the application judge in this case explicitly recognized, in response to the relevant arguments from the Trustees, an interest in "protecting the privacy *and dignity* of victims of crime and their loved ones" (para. 23 (emphasis added)). This elucidates that the central concern for the affected individuals on this point is not merely protecting their privacy for its own sake but privacy where it coincides with the public character of the dignity interests of these individuals.

Violations of privacy that cause a loss of control over fundamental personal information about oneself are damaging to dignity because they erode one's ability to present aspects of oneself to others in a selective manner (D. Matheson, "Dignity and Selective Self-Presentation", in I. Kerr, V. Steeves and C. Lucock, eds., *Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society* (2009), 319, at pp. 327-28; L. M. Austin, "Re-reading Westin" (2019), 20 *Theor. Inq. L.* 53, at pp. 66-68; Eltis (2016), at p. 13). Dignity, used in this context, is a social concept that involves presenting core aspects of oneself to others in a considered and controlled manner (see generally Matheson, at pp. 327-28; Austin, at pp. 66-68). Dignity is eroded where individuals lose control over this core identity-giving information about themselves, because a highly sensitive aspect of who they are that they did not consciously decide to share is now available to others and may shape how they are seen in public. This was even alluded to by La Forest J., dissenting but not on this point, in *Dagg*, where he referred to privacy as "[a]n expression of an individual's unique personality or personhood" (para. 65).

Where dignity is impaired, the impact on the individual is not theoretical but could engender real human consequences, including psychological distress (see generally Bragg, at para. 23). La Forest J., concurring, observed in *Dyment* that privacy is essential to the well-being of individuals (p. 427). Viewed in this way, a privacy interest, where it shields the core information associated with dignity necessary to individual well-being, begins to look much like the physical safety interest also raised in this case, the important and public nature of which is neither debated, nor, in my view, seriously debatable. The administration of justice suffers when the operation of courts threatens physical well-being because a responsible court system is attuned to the physical harm it inflicts on individuals and works to avoid such effects. Similarly, in my view, a responsible court must be attuned and responsive to the harm it causes to other core elements of individual well-being, including individual dignity. This parallel helps to understand dignity as a more limited dimension of privacy relevant as an important public interest in the open court context.

<sup>73</sup> I am accordingly of the view that protecting individuals from the threat to their dignity that arises when information revealing core aspects of their private lives is disseminated through open court proceedings is an important public interest for the purposes of the test.

Focusing on the underlying value of privacy in protecting individual dignity from the exposure of private information in open court overcomes the criticisms that privacy will always be at risk in open court proceedings and is theoretically complex. Openness brings intrusions on personal privacy in virtually all cases, but dignity as a public interest in protecting an individual's core sensibility is more rarely in play. Specifically, and consistent with the cautious approach to the recognition of important public interests, this privacy interest, while determined in reference to the broader factual setting, will be at serious risk only where the sensitivity of the information strikes at the subject's more intimate self.

If the interest is ultimately about safeguarding a person's dignity, that interest will be undermined when the information reveals something sensitive about them as an individual, as opposed to generic information that reveals little if anything about who they are as a person. Therefore the information that will be revealed by court openness must consist of intimate or personal details about an individual — what this Court has described in its jurisprudence on s. 8 of the Charter as the "biographical core" — if a serious risk to an important public interest is to be recognized in this context (*R. v. Plant*, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, at p. 293; R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 60; *R. v. Cole*, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at para. 46). Dignity transcends personal inconvenience by reason of the highly sensitive nature of the information that might be revealed. This Court in *Cole* drew a similar line between the sensitivity of personal information and the public interest in protecting that information in reference to the biographical core. It held that "reasonable and informed Canadians" would be more willing to recognize the existence of a privacy interest where the relevant information cuts to the "biographical core" or, "[p]ut another way, the more personal and confidential the information" (para. 46). The presumption of openness means that mere discomfort associated with lesser intrusions of privacy will generally be tolerated. But there is a public interest in ensuring that openness does not unduly entail the dissemination of this core information that threatens dignity — even if it is "personal" to the affected person.

The test for discretionary limits on court openness imposes on the applicant the burden to show that the important public interest is at serious risk. Recognizing that privacy, understood in reference to dignity, is only at serious risk where the information in the court file is sufficiently sensitive erects a threshold consistent with the presumption of openness. This threshold is fact specific. It addresses the concern, noted above, that personal information can frequently be found in court files and yet finding this sufficient to pass the serious risk threshold in every case would undermine the structure of the test. By requiring the applicant to demonstrate the sensitivity of the information as a necessary condition to the finding of a serious risk to this interest, the scope of the interest is limited to only those cases where the rationale for not revealing core aspects of a person's private life, namely protecting individual dignity, is most actively engaged.

There is no need here to provide an exhaustive catalogue of the range of sensitive personal information that, if exposed, could give rise to a serious risk. It is enough to say that courts have demonstrated a willingness to recognize the sensitivity of information related to stigmatized medical conditions (see, e.g., *A.B.*, at para. 9), stigmatized work (see, e.g., Work Safe

Twerk Safe v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 1100, at para. 28 (CanLII)), sexual orientation (see, e.g., *Paterson*, at paras. 76, 78 and 87-88), and subjection to sexual assault or harassment (see, e.g., Fedeli v. Brown, 2020 ONSC 994, at para. 9 (CanLII)). I would also note the submission of the intervener the Income Security Advocacy Centre, that detailed information about family structure and work history could in some circumstances constitute sensitive information. The question in every case is whether the information reveals something intimate and personal about the individual, their lifestyle or their experiences.

I pause here to note that I refer to cases on s. 8 of the Charter above for the limited purpose of providing insight into types of information that are more or less personal and therefore deserving of public protection. If the impact on dignity as a result of disclosure is to be accurately measured, it is critical that the analysis differentiate between information in this way. Helpfully, one factor in determining whether an applicant's subjective expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable in the s. 8 jurisprudence focuses on the degree to which information is private (see, e.g., *R. v.* Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, at para. 31; *Cole*, at paras. 44-46). But while these decisions may assist for this limited purpose, this is not to say that the remainder of the s. 8 analysis has any relevance to the application of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. For example, asking what the Trustees' reasonable expectation of privacy was here could invite a circular analysis of whether they reasonably expected their court files to be open to the public or whether they reasonably expected to be successful in having them sealed. Therefore, it is only for the limited purpose described above that the s. 8 jurisprudence is useful.

79 In cases where the information is sufficiently sensitive to strike at an individual's biographical core, a court must then ask whether a serious risk to the interest is made out in the full factual context of the case. While this is obviously a fact-specific determination, some general observations may be made here to guide this assessment.

I note that the seriousness of the risk may be affected by the extent to which information would be disseminated without an exception to the open court principle. If the applicant raises a risk that the personal information will come to be known by a large segment of the public in the absence of an order, this is a plainly more serious risk than if the result will be that a handful of people become aware of the same information, all else being equal. In the past, the requirement that one be physically present to acquire information in open court or from a court record meant that information was, to some extent, protected because it was "practically obscure" (D. S. Ardia, "Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of Practical Obscurity" (2017), 4 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1385, at p. 1396). However, today, courts should be sensitive to the information technology context, which has increased the ease with which information can be communicated and cross-referenced (see Bailey and Burkell, at pp. 169-70; Ardia, at pp. 1450-51). In this context, it may well be difficult for courts to be sure that information will not be broadly disseminated in the absence of an order.

It will be appropriate, of course, to consider the extent to which information is already in the public domain. If court openness will simply make available what is already broadly and easily accessible, it will be difficult to show that revealing the information in open court will actually result in a meaningful loss of that aspect of privacy relating to the dignity interest to which I refer here. However, just because information is already accessible to some segment of the public does not mean that making it available through the court process will not exacerbate the risk to privacy. Privacy is not a binary concept, that is, information is not simply either private or public, especially because, by reason of technology in particular, absolute confidentiality is best thought of as elusive (see generally *R. v.* Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 37; *UFCW*, at para. 27). The fact that certain information is already available somewhere in the public sphere does not preclude further harm to the privacy interest by additional dissemination, particularly if the feared dissemination of highly sensitive information is broader or more easily accessible (see generally Solove, at p. 1152; Ardia, at p. 1393-94; E. Paton-Simpson, "Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places" (2000), 50 U.T.L.J. 305, at p. 346).

Further, the seriousness of the risk is also affected by the probability that the dissemination the applicant suggests will occur actually occurs. I hasten to say that implicit in the notion of risk is that the applicant need not establish that the feared dissemination will certainly occur. However, the risk to the privacy interest related to the protection of dignity will be more serious the more likely it is that the information will be disseminated. While decided in a different context, this Court has held that the magnitude of risk is a product of both the gravity of the feared harm and its probability (R. v. Mabior, 2012 SCC 47, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, at para. 86).

That said, the likelihood that an individual's highly sensitive personal information will be disseminated in the absence of privacy protection will be difficult to quantify precisely. It is best to note as well that probability in this context need not be identified in mathematical or numerical terms. Rather, courts may merely discern probability in light of the totality of the circumstances and balance this one factor alongside other relevant factors.

Finally, and as discussed above, individual sensitivities alone, even if they can be notionally associated with "privacy", are generally insufficient to justify a restriction on court openness where they do not rise above those inconveniences and discomforts that are inherent to court openness (*MacIntyre*, at p. 185). An applicant will only be able to establish that the risk is sufficient to justify a limit on openness in exceptional cases, where the threatened loss of control over information about oneself is so fundamental that it strikes meaningfully at individual dignity. These circumstances engage "social values of superordinate importance" beyond the more ordinary intrusions inherent to participating in the judicial process that Dickson J. acknowledged could justify curtailing public openness (pp. 186-87).

To summarize, the important public interest in privacy, as understood in the context of the limits on court openness, is aimed at allowing individuals to preserve control over their core identity in the public sphere to the extent necessary to preserve their dignity. The public has a stake in openness, to be sure, but it also has an interest in the preservation of dignity: the administration of justice requires that where dignity is threatened in this way, measures be taken to accommodate this privacy concern. Although measured by reference to the facts of each case, the risk to this interest will be serious only where the information that would be disseminated as a result of court openness is sufficiently sensitive such that openness can be shown to meaningfully strike at the individual's biographical core in a manner that threatens their integrity. Recognizing this interest is consistent with this Court's emphasis on the importance of privacy and the underlying value of individual dignity, but is also tailored to preserve the strong presumption of openness.

## D. The Trustees Have Failed to Establish a Serious Risk to an Important Public Interest

As *Sierra Club* made plain, a discretionary order limiting court openness can only be made where there is a serious risk to an important public interest. The arguments on this appeal concerned whether privacy is an important public interest and whether the facts here disclose the existence of serious risks to privacy and safety. While the broad privacy interest invoked by the Trustees cannot be relied on to justify a limit on openness, the narrower concept of privacy understood in relation to dignity is an important public interest for the purposes of the test. I also recognize that a risk to physical safety is an important public interest, a point on which there is no dispute here. Accordingly, the relevant question at the first step is whether there is a serious risk to one or both of these interests. For reasons that follow, the Trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to either. This alone is sufficient to conclude that the sealing orders should not have been issued.

#### (1) The Risk to Privacy Alleged in this Case Is Not Serious

As I have said, the important public interest in privacy must be understood as one tailored to the protection of individual dignity and not the broadly defined interest the Trustees have asked this Court to recognize. In order to establish a serious risk to this interest, the information in the court files about which the Trustees are concerned must be sufficiently sensitive in that it strikes at the biographical core of the affected individuals. If it is not, there is no serious risk that would justify an exception to openness. If it is, the question becomes whether a serious risk is made out in light of the facts of this case.

The application judge never explicitly identified a serious risk to the privacy interest he identified but, to the extent he implicitly reached this conclusion, I respectfully do not share his view. His finding was limited to the observation that "[t]he degree of intrusion on that privacy and dignity [i.e., that of the victims and their loved ones] has already been extreme and, I am sure, excruciating" (para. 23). But the intense scrutiny faced by the Shermans up to the time of the application is only part of the equation. As the sealing orders can only protect against the disclosure of the information in these court files relating to probate, the application judge was required to consider the sensitivity of the specific information they contained. He made no such measure. His conclusion about the seriousness of the risk then focused entirely on the risk of physical harm, with no indication that he found that the Trustees met their burden as to the serious risk to the privacy interest. Said very respectfully and with the

knowledge that the application judge did not have the benefit of the above framework, the failure to assess the sensitivity of the information constituted a failure to consider a required element of the legal test. This warranted intervention on appeal.

Applying the appropriate framework to the facts of this case, I conclude that the risk to the important public interest in the affected individuals' privacy, as I have defined it above in reference to dignity, is not serious. The information the Trustees seek to protect is not highly sensitive and this alone is sufficient to conclude that there is no serious risk to the important public interest in privacy so defined.

90 There is little controversy in this case about the likelihood and extent of dissemination of the information contained in the estate files. There is near certainty that the Toronto Star will publish at least some aspects of the estate files if it is provided access. Given the breadth of the audience of its media organization, and the high-profile nature of the events surrounding the death of the Shermans, I have no difficulty in concluding that the affected individuals would lose control over this information to a significant extent should the files be open.

91 With regard to the sensitivity of the information, however, the information contained in these files does not reveal anything particularly private about the affected individuals. What would be revealed might well cause inconvenience and perhaps embarrassment, but it has not been shown that it would strike at their biographical core in a way that would undermine their control over the expression of their identities. Their privacy would be troubled, to be sure, but the relevant privacy interest bearing on the dignity of the affected persons has not been shown to be at serious risk. At its highest, the information in these files will reveal something about the relationship between the deceased and the affected individuals, in that it may reveal to whom the deceased entrusted the administration of their estates and those who they wished or were deemed to wish to be beneficiaries of their property at death. It may also reveal some basic personal information, such as addresses. Some of the beneficiaries might well, it may fairly be presumed, bear family names other than Sherman. I am mindful that the deaths are being investigated as homicides by the Toronto Police Service. However, even in this context, none of this information provides significant insight into who they are as individuals, nor would it provoke a fundamental change in their ability to control how they are perceived by others. The fact of being linked through estate documents to victims of an unsolved murder is not in itself highly sensitive. It may be the source of discomfort but has not been shown to constitute an affront to dignity in that it does not probe deeply into the biographical core of these individuals. As a result, the Trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest as required by Sierra Club.

92 The fact that some of the affected individuals may be minors is also insufficient to cross the seriousness threshold. While the law recognizes that minors are especially vulnerable to intrusions of privacy (see Bragg, at para. 17), the mere fact that information concerns minors does not displace the generally applicable analysis (see, e.g., Bragg, at para. 11). Even taking into account the increased vulnerability of minors who may be affected individuals in the probate files, there is no evidence that they would lose control of information about themselves that reveals something close to the core of their identities. Merely associating the beneficiaries or trustees with the Shermans' unexplained deaths is not enough to constitute a serious risk to the identified important public interest in privacy, defined in reference to dignity.

Further, while the intense media scrutiny on the family following the deaths suggests that the information would likely be widely disseminated, it is not in itself indicative of the sensitivity of the information contained in the probate files.

Showing that the information that would be revealed by court openness is sufficiently sensitive and private such that it goes to the biographical core of the affected individual is a necessary prerequisite to showing a serious risk to the relevant public interest aspect of privacy. The Trustees did not advance any specific reason why the contents of these files are more sensitive than they may seem at first glance. When asserting a privacy risk, it is essential to show not only that information about individuals will escape the control of the person concerned — which will be true in every case — but that this particular information concerns who the individuals are as people in a manner that undermines their dignity. This the Trustees have not done.

<sup>95</sup> Therefore, while some of the material in the court files may well be broadly disseminated, the nature of the information has not been shown to give rise to a serious risk to the important public interest in privacy, as appropriately defined in this context in reference to dignity. For that reason alone, I conclude that the Trustees have failed to show a serious risk to this interest.

### (2) The Risk to Physical Safety Alleged in this Case is Not Serious

<sup>96</sup> Unlike the privacy interest raised in this case, there was no controversy that there is an important public interest in protecting individuals from physical harm. It is worth underscoring that the application judge correctly treated the protection from physical harm as a distinct important interest from that of the protection of privacy and found that this risk of harm was "foreseeable" and "grave" (paras. 22-24). The issue is whether the Trustees have established a serious risk to this interest for the purpose of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. The application judge observed that it would have been preferable to include objective evidence of the seriousness of the risk from the police service conducting the homicide investigation. He nevertheless concluded there was sufficient proof of risk to the physical safety of the affected individuals to meet the test. The Court of Appeal says that was a misreading of the evidence, and the Toronto Star agrees that the application judge's conclusion as to the existence of a serious risk to safety was mere speculation.

97 At the outset, I note that direct evidence is not necessarily required to establish a serious risk to an important interest. This Court has held that it is possible to identify objectively discernable harm on the basis of logical inferences (*Bragg*, at paras. 15-16). But this process of inferential reasoning is not a licence to engage in impermissible speculation. An inference must still be grounded in objective circumstantial facts that reasonably allow the finding to be made inferentially. Where the inference cannot reasonably be drawn from the circumstances, it amounts to speculation (*R. v.* Chanmany, 2016 ONCA 576, 352 O.A.C. 121, at para. 45).

As the Trustees correctly argue, it is not just the probability of the feared harm, but also the gravity of the harm itself that is relevant to the assessment of serious risk. Where the feared harm is particularly serious, the probability that this harm materialize need not be shown to be likely, but must still be more than negligible, fanciful or speculative. The question is ultimately whether this record allowed the application judge to objectively discern a serious risk of physical harm.

99 This conclusion was not open to the application judge on this record. There is no dispute that the feared physical harm is grave. I agree with the Toronto Star, however, that the probability of this harm occurring was speculative. The application judge's conclusion as to the seriousness of the risk of physical harm was grounded on what he called "the degree of mystery that persists regarding both the perpetrator and the motives" associated with the deaths of the Shermans and his supposition that this motive might be "transported" to the trustees and beneficiaries (para. 5; see also paras. 19 and 23). The further step in reasoning that the unsealed estate files would lead to the perpetrator's next crime, to be visited upon someone mentioned in the files, is based on speculation, not the available affidavit evidence, and cannot be said to be a proper inference or some kind of objectively discerned harm or risk thereof. If that were the case, the estate files of every victim of an unsolved murder would pass the initial threshold of the test for a sealing order.

100 Further, I recall that what is at issue here is not whether the affected individuals face a safety risk in general, but rather whether they face such a risk as a result of the openness of these court files. In light of the contents of these files, the Trustees had to point to some further reason why the risk posed by this information becoming publicly available was more than negligible.

101 The speculative character of the chain of reasoning leading to the conclusion that a serious risk of physical harm exists in this case is underlined by differences between these facts and those cases relied on by the Trustees. In *X. v. Y.*, 2011 BCSC 943, 21 B.C.L.R. (5th) 410, the risk of physical harm was inferred on the basis that the plaintiff was a police officer who had investigated "cases involving gang violence and dangerous firearms" and wrote sentencing reports for such offenders which identified him by full name (para. 6). In *R. v. Esseghaier*, 2017 ONCA 970, 356 C.C.C. (3d) 455, Watt J.A. considered it "self-evident" that the disclosure of identifiers of an undercover operative working in counter-terrorism would compromise the safety of the operative (para. 41). In both cases, the danger flowed from facts establishing that the applicants were in antagonistic relationships with alleged criminal or terrorist organizations. But in this case, the Trustees asked the application judge to infer not only the fact that harm would befall the affected individuals, but also that a person or persons exist who wish to harm them. To infer all this on the basis of the Shermans' deaths and the association of the affected individuals with the deceased is not reasonably possible on this record. It is not a reasonable inference but, as the Court of Appeal noted, a conclusion resting on speculation.

102 Were the mere assertion of grave physical harm sufficient to show a serious risk to an important interest, there would be no meaningful threshold in the analysis. Instead, the test requires the serious risk asserted to be well grounded in the record or the circumstances of the particular case (*Sierra Club*, at para. 54; *Bragg*, at para. 15). This contributes to maintaining the strong presumption of openness.

Again, in other cases, circumstantial facts may allow a court to infer the existence of a serious risk of physical harm. Applicants do not necessarily need to retain experts who will attest to the physical or psychological risk related to the disclosure. But on this record, the bare assertion that such a risk exists fails to meet the threshold necessary to establish a serious risk of physical harm. The application judge's conclusion to the contrary was an error warranting the intervention of the Court of Appeal.

## E. There Would Be Additional Barriers to a Sealing Order on the Basis of the Alleged Risk to Privacy

104 While not necessary to dispose of the appeal, it bears mention that the Trustees would have faced additional barriers in seeking the sealing orders on the basis of the privacy interest they advanced. I recall that to meet the test for discretionary limits on court openness, a person must show, in addition to a serious risk to an important interest, that the particular order sought is necessary to address the risk and that the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects as a matter of proportionality (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53).

105 Even if the Trustees had succeeded in showing a serious risk to the privacy interest they assert, a publication ban — less constraining on openness than the sealing orders — would have likely been sufficient as a reasonable alternative to prevent this risk. The condition that the order be necessary requires the court to consider whether there are alternatives to the order sought and to restrict the order as much as reasonably possible to prevent the serious risk (*Sierra Club*, at para. 57). An order imposing a publication ban could restrict the dissemination of personal information to only those persons consulting the court record for themselves and prohibit those individuals from spreading the information any further. As I have noted, the likelihood and extent of dissemination may be relevant factors in determining the seriousness of a risk to privacy in this context. While the Toronto Star would be able to consult the files subject to a publication ban, for example, which may assist it in its investigations, it would not be able to publish and thereby broadly disseminate the contents of the files. A publication ban would seem to protect against this latter harm, which has been the focus of the Trustees' argument, while allowing some access to the file, which is not possible under the sealing orders. Therefore, even if a serious risk to the privacy interest had been made out, it would likely not have justified a sealing order, because a less onerous order would have likely been sufficient to mitigate this risk effectively. I hasten to add, however, that a publication ban is not available here since, as noted, the seriousness of the risk to the privacy interest at play has not been made out.

Further, the Trustees would have had to show that the benefits of any order necessary to protect from a serious risk to the important public interest outweighed the harmful effects of the order, including the negative impact on the open court principle (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53). In balancing the privacy interests against the open court principle, it is important to consider whether the information the order seeks to protect is peripheral or central to the judicial process (paras. 78 and 86; *Bragg*, at paras. 28-29). There will doubtless be cases where the information that poses a serious risk to privacy, bearing as it does on individual dignity, will be central to the case. But the interest in important and legally relevant information being aired in open court may well overcome any concern for the privacy interests in that same information. This contextual balancing, informed by the importance of the open court principle, presents a final barrier to those seeking a discretionary limit on court openness for the purposes of privacy protection.

## VI. Conclusion

107 The conclusion that the Trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest ends the analysis. In such circumstances, the Trustees are not entitled to any discretionary order limiting the open court principle, including the sealing orders they initially obtained. The Court of Appeal rightly concluded that there was no basis for asking for redactions because the Trustees had failed at this stage of the test for discretionary limits on court openness. This is dispositive of the appeal. The decision to set aside the sealing orders rendered by the application judge should be affirmed. Given that I propose to dismiss the appeal on the existing record, I would dismiss the Toronto Star's motion for new evidence as being moot.

108 For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal. The Toronto Star requests no costs given the important public issues in dispute. As such, there will be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.

Pourvoi rejeté.

#### Footnotes

- 1 As noted in the title of proceedings, the appellants in this matter have been referred to consistently as the "Estate of Bernard Sherman and Trustees of the Estate and Estate of Honey Sherman and Trustees of the Estate." In these reasons the appellants are referred to throughout as the "Trustees" for convenience.
- 2 The use of "Toronto Star" as a collective term referring to both respondents should not be taken to suggest that only Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. is participating in this appeal. Mr. Donovan is the only respondent to have been a party throughout. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. was a party in first instance, but was removed as a party on consent at the Court of Appeal. By order of Karakatsanis J. dated March 25, 2020, Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. was added as a respondent in this Court.
- 3 At the time of writing the House of Commons is considering a bill that would replace part one of *PIPEDA*: Bill C-11, *An Act to enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act and the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts*, 2nd Sess., 43rd Parl., 2020.

## IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ORIGINAL TRADERS ENERGY LTD. AND 2496750 ONTARIO INC.

Court File No.

# ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE COMMERCIAL LIST

Proceedings commenced at TORONTO

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