

# The OECD Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 6 (Prevent treaty abuse): A critical analysis

By Oliver R. HOOR and Pierre KREEMER\*

On 14 March 2014, the OECD released a discussion draft entitled "Preventing the granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances" (the "Discussion Draft") for public consultation. The Discussion Draft includes proposals in relation to BEPS Action 6 (Preventing Treaty Abuse) for counteracting perceived abuse of tax treaties. The OECD received more than 60 public comments in response to the Discussion Draft. This article explains the problem of treaty shopping, provides a critical analysis of the proposals in the Discussion Draft and considers limitations set by EU law.

## I. Introduction

Bilateral tax treaties are an important and well established feature of the international tax system. Their main purpose is the promotion of cross-border trade through the allocation of taxing rights between two Contracting States and the determination of mechanisms for the elimination of double taxation. Today there are more than 3,000 tax treaties in force around the globe. Though every tax treaty is subject to negotiations between the two Contracting States, the majority of tax treaties are fairly similar. This is because the treaty negotiations between the Contracting States are generally based on the OECD Model Tax Convention ("OECD-MC") and are then tailored to the particular economic interest of each Contracting State.<sup>(1)</sup>

On 19 July 2013, the OECD published its Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("BEPS") that provides for 15 actions. The BEPS Action Plan identifies treaty abuse and in particular treaty shopping as one of the most important sources for BEPS concerns. Action 6 of the BEPS Action Plan (Preventing Treaty Abuse) aims at the following three areas:

1. Development of model treaty provisions and recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances.
2. Clarification that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation.
3. Identification of the tax policy considerations that, in general, countries should consider before deciding to conclude a tax treaty with another country.

The present Discussion Draft proposes various anti-abuse provisions to be inserted into the OECD-MC including a Limitation-on-Benefits ("LOB") provision, a Main Purpose Test ("MPT") and a number of Specific Anti-Abuse Rules ("SAARs").



## II. What is treaty shopping and how is it tackled?

Broadly, "Treaty shopping" can be defined as the use of tax treaties by persons who are not themselves within the personal scope of the Convention<sup>(2)</sup>. Treaty shopping aims at the reduction of withholding tax in the source state through the application of a tax treaty. In general, this may be achieved through the interposition of a conduit company resident in a state which has concluded a beneficial tax treaty with the state in which the income is obtained.<sup>(3)</sup>

Tackling treaty shopping is not a new topic. The current version of the OECD-MC and the Commentary thereto provide for a number of anti-abuse provisions which may be included in bilateral treaties. While the current version of the OECD-MC does not contain any general anti-abuse rule ("GAAR"), the Commentary to Article 1 OECD-MC<sup>(4)</sup> provides for several provisions that may be included in tax treaties as a safeguard against conduit companies. These anti-abuse provisions include (i) the "look-through" approach<sup>(5)</sup>, (ii) the "exclusion" approach<sup>(6)</sup>, (iii) the "subject-to-tax" approach<sup>(7)</sup>, (iv) the "channel" approach<sup>(8)</sup> and (v) "bona fide" provisions<sup>(9)</sup>.

In addition to the provisions to combat conduit companies cited above the Commentary also offers a detailed LOB provision, the purpose of which is to prevent persons who are not resident of either Contracting States from accessing treaty benefits through the use of an entity that would otherwise qualify as a resident of one of these states.<sup>(10)</sup>

Article 10 (dividends), Article 11 (interest) and Article 12 (royalties) of the OECD-MC further provide for the beneficial ownership concept. This is an anti-abuse rule designed to avoid treaty shopping by agents, nominees or conduit companies for the benefit of a resident of a third state.



nomy which are more reliant on an international investor base, it will be unequally more difficult to be a qualifying person under the LOB provision. This is because such clauses automatically grant treaty access in case the majority of investors are resident in the same country whereas much more restrictive conditions are imposed on smaller economies which inevitably depend on foreign investment.

As an optional feature, the Discussion Draft considers the inclusion of a "derivative benefits" provision<sup>(11)</sup> in the LOB provision under which a company that is a resident of a Contracting State but fails to qualify under the LOB provision (due to its foreign shareholders) may nevertheless be entitled to treaty benefits if the foreign owner is an "equivalent beneficiary."

An equivalent beneficiary is a beneficial owner that is resident in a third country with which the other Contracting State also has a tax treaty. However, for certain items of income, a beneficial owner does not automatically qualify as an equivalent beneficiary simply because its country has a tax treaty with the other Contracting State. For those items of income (including dividends, interest and royalties), the third country's treaty must offer withholding rates "at least as low" as the rate available under the claimed treaty. While there is a consensus between commentators that it is imperative to include such a provision in the LOB provision, many commentators further consider that the "derivative benefits" provision is to narrowly drawn to be of assistance to safeguard treaty benefits for all situations where there is no treaty abuse concern.

A particular issue that has raised the attention of the commentators relates to the investment activities of collective investment vehicles ("CIVs")<sup>(12)</sup>. Under the proposed LOB provision, the making or managing of investments by a CIV (or a holding company controlled by a CIV) will be deemed as not satisfying the "active trade or business" test under the LOB provision (unless carried on by a bank, insurance company or securities dealer). This stands in stark contrast to the conclusion of a report adopted in 2010 by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled "The granting of treaty benefits with respect to the income of collective investment vehicles".

This Report concludes that it is entirely appropriate that CIVs should be granted treaty benefits (on their own behalf). Many commentators highlight that regulated investment vehicles designed to promote (cross-border) collective investments are good for the financial market and the stability and efficiency of the financial sector. Moreover, there are different kinds of commercial reasons for the structuring of investments via alternative investment funds (for example, real estate and private equity funds) and holding companies held by such funds; treaty shopping is not the purpose of CIVs. In light of the above, it is suggested to include CIVs in the definition of "qualifying person" under the LOB provision provided that certain conditions are met.<sup>(13)</sup>

## 3. Main purpose test (MPT)

In addition to the LOB provision, the Discussion Draft contains a MPT. Even if the requirements of the LOB provisions were satisfied, the MPT would deny a treaty benefit where it is reasonable to conclude that obtaining the treaty benefit was "one of the main purposes" (emphasis added) of any arrangement or transaction unless the taxpayer is able to establish that granting the benefit would be "in accordance with the object and purpose" of the relevant treaty provisions. However, are tax considerations not present in each and every genuine business activity? Moreover, should businesses be accused of aggressive tax planning if they respond to legislative tax incentives which have been voluntarily implemented for the purpose of attracting investment?

The contradictory message of the MPT is that treaty benefits are available to qualifying taxpayers unless taxpayers intend to gain from those benefits. In any case, the threshold to deny treaty benefits would be significantly reduced as compared to the existing guidance in the Commentary to the OECD-MC.<sup>(14)</sup>

While the LOB provision and the MPT are aimed at addressing treaty shopping there are fundamental differences between the two approaches. The LOB provision is technically complex but leaves limited room for subjective and arbitrary assessments. In stark contrast, the MPT opens the door for tax administrations to disqualify taxpayers from treaty benefits where "one of" the main purposes of an arrangement or a transaction is considered to be a given treaty benefit. Obviously, this injects a subjective element into every aspect of determining whether treaty benefits are available and not much guidance is provided with regard to when treaty benefits will be granted. Similarly to the proposed LOB provision,

the MPT imposes a significant burden on the taxpayer ("establish that the granting of tax benefit would be in accordance with the object and purpose of provision in the convention"), whereas the onus on the tax administration is set low ("reasonable to conclude", "one of the main purposes", "directly or indirectly").

Nearly all commentators consider the MPT as much too vague, wide scoped and subjective. Such a provision would create significant uncertainty for taxpayers (and their advisors) because of the extremely unpredictable outcomes. Many commentators emphasize that such clause would cause serious concerns for bona fide businesses. In particular, holding, financing, IP management and investment activities are all acceptable and genuine business activities that may fall within the scope of the MPT.

Should a MPT be inserted in the OECD-MC, it should be designed to tackle only wholly artificial arrangements that are set up solely for the purpose of obtaining treaty benefits. Accordingly, it should be established that "the main purpose" instead of "one of" the main purposes was to obtain the tax benefit. The provision should further only be applicable if it is established that granting the benefit would be contrary to the objective of the provisions of the Convention.

## 4. Title and Preamble

The Discussion Draft proposes that the title to the OECD-MC be replaced with the following wording: "Convention between ... and ... for the elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital and the prevention of tax evasion and tax avoidance" (emphasis added). Moreover, the proposed preamble states that the parties intend that the Convention eliminates double taxation "without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance". It is interesting to note that the proposed preamble devotes one line to referring to the prevention of double taxation (the main purpose of tax treaties) and three lines to the prevention of abuse of the Convention.

The proposed amendments may call into question unambiguous treaty terms and thereby add an unwarranted level of complexity to treaty analysis and contribute to uncertainty. Here, several commentators stress that a preamble should not be used for rule-making and that the proposed title could be interpreted to undermine the fundamental principle that a tax treaty should only relieve and not increase the taxation imposed under the domestic tax laws of the two Contracting States.

Many commentators reemphasize that the main purpose of a tax treaty is to facilitate cross-border trade and investment through the elimination of double taxation and that the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion (in general) or treaty abuse (in particular) is not the main objective for entering into a tax treaty. While it is necessary to prevent treaty abuse, it is not the purpose of a treaty to prevent its own abuse. It is only natural that countries should in their treaty negotiations aim at designing treaty provisions in a way that does not allow unintended non-taxation. Some commentators further suggest that it should be clarified that although tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation, double non-taxation is sometimes sought by the two Contracting States in order to make foreign investments more attractive.

## 5. Tie-breaker rule

In the current version of the OECD-MC, Article 4 (3) OECD-MC seeks to settle dual residence of companies. In many jurisdictions, companies are considered to be tax resident if either their seat or their place of effective management is located in that state. Thus, cases of dual residence may occur if only one of both criteria is fulfilled.

In these circumstances, the entity shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State in which its place of effective management is situated (the "corporate residence tie-breaker"). The main purpose of the tie-breaker rule is the determination of the state of residence of a company which is essential for the application of a tax treaty and the avoidance of a concurrent liability to tax the worldwide income in two contracting states.<sup>(15)</sup> It should be noted that instances of dual residency usually occur for non-tax reasons (for example, companies may want to change their place of effective management while keeping their corporate identity for commercial reasons, for employment reasons, etc.).

The Discussion Draft provides that the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavour to determine by mutual agreement the state of residence (without real guidelines or rules for them to apply). In the absence of such agreement, a dual resident company shall not be entitled to any relief or exemption from tax provided by the relevant tax treaty except to the extent as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the Contracting States.

